Miguel Vega v. Warden, State Prison (2011)

HABEAS TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

THE COURT:  I have reviewed the file, considered the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits, and the arguments of counsel, and for the following reasons the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.

The petitioner's initial claim focuses on Section 53a–37 and particularly the end of the second sentence is that obligates the trial—sentencing court to state in conclusion the effective sentence imposed.   The petitioner appears to contend that the trial judge is obligated to calculate the current sentence and add it to any prior sentences imposed to determine the total net effective sentence.   The petitioner admits that there's no appellate authority requiring the trial judge to determine how DOC has calculated his previous—a prisoner's or petitioner's previous sentences.   This interpretation of the petitioner would impose an extremely difficult burden on trial judges who don't know how the Department of Correction has interpreted prior sentences or what prior sentences the offender is then serving.   Furthermore, such an interpretation would serve no purpose since the offender can get this information from DOC.

The purpose of the language, it seems to me, is to clarify what the trial judge is doing on that particular day because only the trial judge knows that.   Rather than clarify what has happened in the past, which is something the trial judge does not know and has no control over.   That's for DOC to determine.

So the trial judge's obligation is to determine what he or she has decided on that particular day and how any sentences that he or she has imposed on that particular day are to run with regard to each other.   Not to determine the offender's DOC record.   So I reject that interpretation.

The petitioner also appears to suggest that at the very least the '94 sentence should not be interpreted by DOC to run consecutive to his other sentences because the trial judge said that the sentence was—the sentencing judge, rather, stated that the sentence was to be consecutive to his current sentence.   The petitioner contends that that refers only to the thirty-year murderer's prison—murder sentence.   This argument, in my view, amounts to an extremely picky and hyper-technical interpretation of the statute which makes little to no sense.

Ms. Deveau, for the DOC, testified that DOC interprets consecutive to current sentence or present sentence as interchangeable with the language used in '93, which was consecutive to any sentence previously imposed.

Furthermore, the phrase “consecutive to any current sentence,” in fact, refers to what DOC had calculated his sentence to be, which was thirty years and eighteen months.   That was the current sentence that he was facing.

The transcript reveals—the transcript of the plea on that day reveals the petitioner misinformed the court that he was serving thirty-one years when, in fact, his current sentence was essentially thirty-one years and six months.   But it at least reflects his understanding that his current sentence was more than thirty years, which is how DOC calculated it.

The main point of this language is for the trial judge to clarify whether the sentence that he or she is imposing is consecutive to or concurrent with any previous sentences.   And the trial judge did that.   The use of the language “current sentence” versus “present sentence” or “sentence previously imposed” makes no difference whatsoever.   It is absolutely clear what the trial judge intended to do.   So the petitioner's claims in that regard are rejected.

Finally, the petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel.   I quite frankly do not understand the petitioner's claims.   Counsel—both of the petitioner's attorneys advised him that the sentence that he was going to receive on that particular day would run consecutively to his previous sentences.   So there can be no ineffective assistance of counsel in that regard.   The petitioner does not allege, nor did he present any evidence, that he would have achieved a better result at trial.   So there is no basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim at all.

For these reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.

The court reporter shall kindly produce a transcript of the decision that I have just announced, and that will serve as the memorandum of decision.

The petitioner shall produce a judgment file in thirty days if there is an appeal.   And the petitioner is entitled to notice of his right to petition for certification for permission to appeal.   I understand that you have received that, Mr. Rimmer?

ATTY. RIMMER:  Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT:  Is there anything further from any counsel?

ATTY. RIMMER:  No.

ATTY. MELCHIONNE:  No, Your Honor.

ATTY. GREENALCH:  No, Your Honor.

THE COURT:  All right.   I thank all counsel for their efficiency in presenting these claims.   We'll stand adjourned.

Schuman, J.

Schuman, Carl J., J.