Maurice Langlois v. Warden (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

THE COURT:  I have had time to review the transcripts and the file, and so I am prepared to render a decision at this time.

Just one moment.   Thank you counsel.

For the following reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.   I have reviewed the testimony, the exhibits, the pleadings, and considered the arguments of counsel.

First, as to the claim that a three-and-a-half-year offer was not conveyed or explained to the petitioner, I find no evidence that the state made a three-and-a-half-year—or the Court made a three-and-a-half-year offer, and so therefore, there was nothing to convey or explain in that regard.

The main claim is that trial counsel,Mr.   Spears, was ineffective with regard to a global four-year offer made by the state.

The transcript of the December 18th proceedings reveals that Mr. Spears did convey the essentials of that offer.   As the transcript states, Mr. Spears relayed that offer to Mr. Langlois.   He mentions it was a four-year offer.

Mr. Spears states that he indicated to him that it was a one-day offer.   Further, he indicated to him that he thought it was an appropriate offer and that he should accept.   Petitioner indicated to Mr. Spears that he wishes to reject the offer.   So Mr. Spears did convey the most important facts concerning that offer.

And this was—so this was not a case like Ebron or Sanders, in which trial counsel gave bad or erroneous advice to the petitioner.

The facts that trial counsel relayed to the petitioner were correct, and furthermore and most importantly, the recommendation of trial counsel was a good one.   Trial counsel told the petitioner it was an appropriate offer and that he should accept it.

So on the most important aspects of this, communication between trial counsel and the petitioner, trial counsel said the right things.   This is simply a case in which trial counsel rendered good advice, and the petitioner chose not to follow it.

Now, as to some of the subsidiary claims as concerning what Mr. Spears said or didn't say;  first, with regard to parole, I find no ineffective assistance of counsel to the extent that Mr. Spears said you should talk to your counselor in prison because parole is complicated.

There was no right to parole at fifty percent of your time.   There's not even a right under the current statute to a hearing at fifty percent of your time.   And essentially, there can be no guarantee that counsel, the Court, or the state can make with regard to parole.   And so essentially, leaving that out of the decision, which Mr. Spears did, was the proper advice.

Had he guaranteed Mr. Langlois that he'd be eligible for parole after fifty percent of the sentence, that would have been erroneous advice.   Here, counsel properly told the petitioner to talk to a Department of Correction representative.

As to the fact elicited today that Mr. Spears perhaps did not explain that the four-year offer effectively may have meant less than that to serve because the petitioner would be getting jail credit for the drug offense and would only be sentenced to three and a half years on the violation of probation, it seems to me that, first, we lack some information because we don't know exactly how much jail credit the petitioner would have received for the drug offense and exactly what the difference between a four-year sentence on a drug offense is and a three-and-a-half-year sentence on the violation of probation would amount to.

But furthermore, it's hard to believe that the petitioner, who rejected a four-year offer, would have accepted the offer if he had been told that he would receive some jail credit on the drug offense;  that might have reduced his time to something closer to three and a half years.

It seems to me that the petitioner just was not interested in an offer in that ballpark, and the difference between four years and four years minus jail credit was not critical to his decision as to whether to accept or reject the offer.

There's an additional claim that counsel did not explain the merits of the case and what the petitioner was facing, but as to that, it seems to me important to note that the petitioner was no stranger to the criminal justice system.

As the sentencing transcript reveals, the petitioner had a record for—I'm looking at Page 9 of the sentencing transcript—prior sale of narcotics, a number of violent convictions, including assaults, robberies, possession of a dangerous weapon, sexual assault in the first degree, and had a 1988 conviction for a violation of probation.

So the petitioner can be presumed to know generally how the system works, generally what a strong case is and what a weak case is.

These drug offenses—as the transcripts reveal—were based on search warrants of his premises, which generally reveals it's a strong case and that the person is in possession of items within his own premises.

Furthermore, the petitioner clearly was present in court for the underlying offenses for which he received probation and would have been told how much time was hanging over his head and essentially how much time he owed on these violations of probation.

And so the petitioner surely knew that he was facing a much more severe sentence had he gone to trial, lost, and received the maximum sentence on all of these consecutively, and that four years essentially—despite what may typically go on in the GA—was essentially a very lenient offer;  and apparently, that's why Mr. Spears recommended it.   The petitioner just chose not to accept it.

So I think the fact that the petitioner was familiar with the process has to be weighed in the balance here.

Finally, I'll note—although this is of lesser import.   But on Page 31 of the sentencing transcript, the trial judge, Judge Rubinow, in the violation of probation hearing complimented Mr. Spears on his representation of Mr. Langlois and said that he gave Mr. Langlois the best defense there could be.

I realize that was in the trial context and was not directly a remark concerning his representation of petitioner in the plea negotiation stage, but it certainly weighs in favor of the conclusion that Mr. Spears rendered effective assistance of counsel.

The petitioner bears the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel, and there is, in fact, a presumption that counsel was effective.   I find that the petitioner has not overcome the presumption of effective assistance of counsel in this case;  therefore, the petition is denied.

The Court monitor will kindly produce a transcript of my decision in this case which will serve as the memorandum of decision.

Petitioner is entitled to be advised of his right to appeal the decision, and the Marshal has just handed him notice of his rights in that regard.

And petitioner's counsel will produce a judgment file within thirty days.

Carl J. Schuman, Superior Court Judge

Schuman, Carl J., J.