Maria D. Pilar Fernandez v. Gonzalo Fernandez (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

I

BACKGROUND AND FACTS

This dissolution action was filed by the plaintiff, Maria D. Pilar Fernandez, on May 10, 2011, alleging an irreconcilable breakdown of her marriage to the defendant, Gonzalo Fernandez.   The parties were married in Columbia, South America on August 7, 1982.   Two children were born issue of the marriage, with only one now under the age of 23, Andre Fernandez, who was born on May 20, 1989.   Both parties were represented by counsel at the trial, which occurred over the course of three days on June 7, 9 and 10, 2011.

Although the parties generally agreed upon the documentary evidence presented, there were two significant factual disputes between the parties.   The first involved the amount of the defendant's personal income derived from his small business, Kathy's Grocery Store in Hartford.   The second involved the causes of the breakdown of the marriage.

A. Physical and Economic Abuse

The plaintiff asserts that she was physically and economically abused during the marriage.   The defendant's family had resided in the Hartford area before the parties immigrated to the United States.   After the defendant moved here with the parties' first child in December 1985, the plaintiff was later admitted into the United States in January/1986, pursuant to a tourist visa.   Soon thereafter, she decided to stay in the Hartford area with her husband and daughter as an undocumented alien.   She found employment through her sister-in-law, who provided her with the social security number, inappropriately obtained from another individual.

After this employment opportunity ended in the late 1980s, the plaintiff began to work on a daily basis at her husband's grocery business in Hartford, and did so for over twenty years until this action was filed in May 2010.   For over fifteen years, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant would not pay her or allow her to obtain a social security card.   The defendant counters that he did not interfere with her obtaining a social security card and that she failed to follow through with an application she made but which was denied in 1986.

The plaintiff ultimately received her social security card in 2005 and got her, so-called, “green card” in 2008.   Her first recorded social security income occurred in 2009 for work she did for another, part-time employer.   Most recently, she has worked for the City of Hartford as a temporary employee in the Tax Collector's Office for $9.50 an hour.   Immediately prior to this employment opportunity, she worked at Sam's Club on a part-time basis for $12.00 per hour.   She voluntarily left this higher paying hourly, but part-time, position with the hope of obtaining permanent, full-time work and benefits with the City of Hartford.   The court finds this to be a logical, voluntary employment decision, and because the plaintiff never worked full-time at $12.00 per hour, the court will further find that her current income of $380 per week is appropriate and accurate.

The plaintiff additionally asserts that the defendant has physically and verbally abused her during the marriage.   She testified that the first incident of physical abuse was over twenty years ago in 1989, when he struck her while pregnant with their son, Andre.   Although she called the police after the incident, she decided not to pursue the matter because the defendant promised he would behave in a more civil manner toward her in the future.   Despite this promise, she claims that after a year had passed, his physical and verbal abuse continued.   Until the time she became a legal resident of the United States, however, the plaintiff did not report any of her husband's alleged abuse for fear that she would be discovered and deported without her American born son, Andre.   She asserts that after a humiliating arrest of her husband for solicitation of a prostitute in 2002, she implemented a plan to legitimize her residency and obtain an education to achieve personal independence from her husband.

Ultimately, the defendant was removed from the home pursuant to an ex parte order of protection after what has been described as a “pushing and shoving” incident at Kathy's Grocery Store.   This ex parte order was issued by the court, Prestley, J. on September 23, 2010, several months after the action for dissolution was filed by the plaintiff.   By agreement of the parties on October 5, 2010, an order of protection was issued by the court, Adelman, J., for a period of six months, whereupon the defendant's cross-application for an order of protection was withdrawn.   Although only the plaintiff's application against the defendant was granted, the language of the agreement interestingly restrains both parties, which is consistent with the defendant's cross-allegations of abusive language and behavior by the plaintiff.   On March 29, 2011, this agreed-upon order of protection was extended for six months by the court, Olear, J., and remains in effect.

Based upon the evidence presented, the court finds that whatever ongoing, limited physical abuse occurred between the parties, the cause of the breakdown was precipitated by the defendant's arrest for solicitation and that, ultimately, there was an irreconcilable division between them, exacerbated by the plaintiff's long delay in documenting her life in the United States, thereby making herself a social and economic prisoner for many years by her own inaction.   The defendant, however, is also complicit in her failure to resolve her immigration status until 2008, as he arrived first in the United States and paved the way for their new lives in Hartford.   To the degree that this circumstance socially crippled and economically disadvantaged the defendant, he should be equally responsible for the plaintiff's inability to document her work status with the Social Security Administration.

B. The Defendant's Income

The defendant is the sole owner of Kathy's Grocery Store at 423 Main Street in Hartford.   Although it is now located across from the Federal Building, it was moved several blocks north from 250 Main Street late in 2009.   Since the move, the gross receipts of the business have fallen by approximately 25%, from $204,936 in 2009 to $154,308 in 2010.   Although the defendant attributes this entirely to a general decline in the economy, the plaintiff cynically characterizes it as a “divorce related deficiency.”   The court finds that all of the factors above have contributed to the decline in receipts, except that the “divorce related deficiency” is more likely caused by the plaintiff's absence from the business than by any intentional undermining of gross receipts by the defendant.   Until May 2010, the plaintiff assisted in operating the store while the defendant attended to purchasing goods for sale, banking and other administrative duties associated with maintaining the business.   The plaintiff has a pleasant personality and, without her full-time assistance in sales, the daily operation of the store has suffered, especially at its new location.

The more complicated factual question to resolve in this case is the amount of net profits the defendant receives from the business.   Generally, the parties have lived beyond their apparent means for several years.   Within the last several years, and until the dissolution was filed in May 2010, the parties have vacationed with other members of their family in the Caribbean by going to the Bahamas and to the Cayman Islands, and again together in Columbia.   Furthermore, since the filing of this action, the defendant has traveled internationally to Russia.   In addition to these expenses, the parties' children have attended college.   Their daughter has successfully graduated from Central Connecticut State University and their son currently attends the University of Hartford.   During this time, however, the defendant claims to have generated net income from the business of only $26,328 in 2007, $21,713 in 2008, $25,653 in 2009 and $31,955 in 2010.   Although the defendant claims to have extracted $30,000 from the equity in the family home in 2009 to pay for these expenses, he has been unable to give a specific accounting of this money.

On his financial affidavits filed in September 2010 and June 2011, the defendant has consistently claimed gross weekly income of $520, netting him $400 per week.   He calculates his gross income figure by dividing his annualized net profits from Kathy's Grocery Store, as reflected on his 2009 income tax return, into the weekly amount of $520.   However, with only $400 in net weekly income, he has consistently run a deficit, compared with his expenses.   In September, for example, he claimed weekly expenses totaling $977, including payments on liabilities, and he was therefore running a weekly deficit of $577.   More recently in June, he claimed the same net weekly income of $400 to partially pay $1,151 in weekly expenses, including payments on liabilities, resulting in an even higher weekly deficit of $751.   These higher expenses in June appear primarily to result from an increase in housing expenses, a new automobile payment and higher payments on his Capitol One credit card.

To pay for his deficit spending, the defendant claims to be using his Capitol One credit card.   His debt to Capitol One has increased since September by approximately $12,300, from $1,127 to $13,415.¹  In addition to accruing this debt, he also claims to have spent a one-time payment of $4,500 he received in a settlement for a car accident.   However, the defendant testified that he used $4,100 of this settlement to pay his attorney, leaving only $400 attributable to the payment of weekly expenses.   This additional debt on the Capitol One card, together with the net settlement income, amount to $12,700 in expenses paid from these two sources.²

According to the defendant's financial affidavits, his total debts have increased by approximately $15,000 in the nine months since September 2010.   This is higher than the $12,700 calculated above because $4,000 of this debt of $15,000 is owed to his attorney.³  However, not all of the remaining $11,000 increase in debt is attributable to the defendant's ordinary living expenses.   For example, the defendant testified that he spent approximately $1,600 on a trip to Russia this past fall, all of which was charged to this credit card.   He also testified that he charged $1,000 to this credit card for a down payment on his new automobile.   After these deductions, there is only $8,400 of this debt attributable to his ordinary living expenses.   This increase in debt, however, does not balance with his rate of deficit spending.

By any measure, this approximate number of $8,400 is far less than the debts that the defendant should have accumulated in the 38 weeks that have passed between the filing of his two financial affidavits.   For example, based upon his $577 weekly deficit spending in September, his accumulated debt should be approximately $22,000 or about $13,600 more than this $8,400 debt accumulated on his credit card.   Moreover, based upon his $751 weekly deficit spending in June, his accumulated debt should be approximately $28,500 or about $20,000 more than is attributable to debts accumulated on his credit card.   Therefore, the court finds that the defendant has more income to pay his personal expenses than is reflected on his financial affidavits.   Based upon the above analysis, his weekly spending appears to be between $358 and $526 more than the $400 in net income he claims on his financial affidavit.⁴  Adding these figures to his net weekly income of $400, the court finds the defendant has between $758 and $926 of income available to him per week.   The average of these numbers is $842, which the court finds to be his net weekly income.

C. Kathy's Grocery Store

The defendant solely owns Kathy's Grocery Store.   He claims it should be valued at $25,000 in light of his diminished gross sales.   Although the replacement cost of the store's equipment is listed as $50,000, Exhibit 13, it is old and in disrepair and therefore worth only $4,000.   The plaintiff counters that Kathy's was contracted to be sold for $100,000 no more than four years ago.   Exhibit 1. Based upon this contract for sale, she asserts that the business should be valued at $100,000.   The court agrees with the analysis of both parties.   Since the store was moved to 423 Main Street a year and a half ago, the gross receipts have diminished by 25%.   The causes for this may be complex, but on paper the income generating capacity of the business has been reduced by 25% and so the court will reduce its value by the same measure to $75,000.⁵

D. Real Property

The defendant also owns two homes;  one in Columbia and the other here in Hartford.   The property in Columbia was purchased by using down payment funds earned by the plaintiff while the defendant was an engineering student.   The plaintiff credibly identified the source of the funds from her savings, although the defendant claims that his father assisted with the down payment.   The court finds that this property is worth $26,725, as valued by the defendant.   Although it is currently unrented and generating no income, it has been used as an income producing property in the past and is managed by the defendant's family in Columbia.

The defendant also owns the marital home at 172 Hubbard Road in Hartford.   Both parties have exclusively used internet appraisals for the values they list on their financial affidavits.   To the degree these are hearsay and not offered by experts or challengeable through cross examination, the court will simply choose the median amount of $170,000.   This property is subject to two mortgages.   Both the first and second mortgages are for approximately $53,000;  the first to Chase Bank and the second to Franklin Trust.   Based upon the court's value of the property, the equity in the home is $64,000.

II

FINDINGS

After reviewing the evidence and evaluating the testimony of the parties, the court makes the following findings, in addition to the findings of fact made by the court, infra.   The court has jurisdiction in this case and the marriage has broken down irretrievably with no reasonable expectation of reconciliation.   Neither the parties nor their children have received state or municipal assistance during the course of the marriage.   Based upon these findings, the marriage of the parties is ordered dissolved, effective this date of judgment, and the court issues the following orders concerning property and support:

III

DISCUSSION AND ORDERSA. Alimony

The statutory authorization for the award of alimony in dissolution cases is provided in General Statutes § 46b–82,⁶ and “the purpose of both periodic and lump sum alimony is to provide continuing support.”  Dombrowski v. Noyes–Dombrowski, 273 Conn. 127, 132, 869 A.2d 164 (2005).   Based upon the facts of this case, and having considered all the statutory factors pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–82, the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff alimony in the amount of $150 per week for a period of ten (10) years from the date of the dissolution.   Based upon the income of the parties, as determined by the court, this leaves the plaintiff with forty (40) percent of the family income, absent payment of the second mortgage by the defendant, ordered infra.

The alimony award is non-modifiable as to duration, but shall terminate upon the death of either party or upon the remarriage of the plaintiff.   The award is modifiable in the event of a substantial change in circumstances by either party and in the event of the plaintiff's cohabitation as defined by statute.

Defendant shall maintain life insurance, in a declining balance, on his life to secure said alimony obligation and shall name the plaintiff as irrevocable beneficiary for the term of the alimony.

B. Property

“The trial court is empowered to deal broadly with the equitable division of property incident to a dissolution proceeding, and, consistent with the purpose of equitable distribution statutes generally, the term property should be interpreted broadly as well ․ General Statutes § 46b–81 confers broad powers upon the court in the assignment of property, and the allocation of liabilities and debts is a part of the court's broad authority in the assignment of property.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Roos v. Roos, 84 Conn.App. 415, 420, 853 A.2d 642, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 936, 861 A.2d 510 (2004);  see Clark v. Clark, 115 Conn.App. 500, 505, 974 A.2d 33 (2009);  also see General Statutes § 46b–81.⁷

In considering the statutory criteria delineated in General Statutes § 46b–81 for the disposition of property, “no single criterion is preferred over the others, and the court is accorded wide latitude in varying the weight placed upon each item under the peculiar circumstances of each case.”  Sunbuy v. Sunbury, 210 Conn. 170, 174, 553 A.2d 612 (1989), (quoting Valante v. Valante, 180 Conn. 528, 531, 429 A.2d 964 (1980)).   In addition, “[t]here are three stages of analysis regarding the equitable distribution of each resource:  first, whether the resource is property within § 46b–81 to be equitably distributed (classification);  second, what is the appropriate method for determining the value of the property (valuation);  and third, what is the most equitable distribution of the property between the parties (distribution).”  Czarzasty v. Czarzasty, 101 Conn.App. 583, 588–89, 922 A.2d 272, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 902, 931 A.2d 262 (2007).

The court retains jurisdiction of the real estate and other property transactions, as set forth below

1. The Family Home and Related Mortgage Debts.   The defendant shall immediately transfer to the plaintiff, by quit-claim deed, all of his right, title and interest to 172 Hubbard Road, Hartford, CT. The plaintiff shall assume and pay the existing first mortgage to Chase Bank (originally Fleet Mortgage) in the approximate principal balance of $53,000.   She shall indemnify and hold the defendant harmless on this first mortgage.   She shall refinance the home to release the defendant from his obligation on the first mortgage within two years from this date of judgment.   Currently, the monthly mortgage payment includes approximately $37.00 toward life insurance.   The defendant shall fully cooperate to maintain this life insurance policy with the plaintiff paying said premium so that in the event of the defendant's death prior to the mortgage being paid, the insurance will pay the balance.

The defendant shall continue to pay the second mortgage/equity line of approximately $53,000 with Franklin Trust F.C.U. The second mortgage payment is approximately $150 per week.   With the plaintiff receiving the benefit of this mortgage payment along with alimony, her share of family income increases from forty (40) percent to over fifty three (53) percent.   The defendant shall fully pay and have this mortgage/equity line released within five (5) years of this date of judgment.   He shall not further encumber the family home either by the exercise of any rights he may have under the existing mortgages or by making any additional loans secured by the home.

The defendant shall pay the plaintiff $1.00 per year as periodic alimony for so long as the plaintiff remains obligated on the Franklin Trust F.C.U. note secured by the mortgage deed.   Said periodic alimony shall only be modifiable in the event the defendant defaults on said mortgage and the mortgagee brings a foreclosure action.   In addition, said periodic alimony shall also be modifiable in the event the defendant attempts to discharge said mortgage in bankruptcy, and only to the extent that the plaintiff becomes liable for said deficiency.   Further, the defendant shall assume, defend, indemnify and hold the plaintiff harmless from any claims, actions and lawsuits relating to said Franklin Trust F.C.U. note and the lien of said mortgage.   In addition, the defendant shall assume said mortgage debt, including any said deficiency or deficiency judgment as a part of a divorce maintenance and property order and said mortgage debt shall not be dischargeable by defendant in the event defendant files for bankruptcy protection.

To the extent it may be permitted under federal law, the party who pays mortgage interest shall be entitled to deduct the mortgage interest paid pursuant to these orders.   The parties shall cooperate with each other to effectuate this order.

If the home is sold prior to the full payment of the second mortgage to Franklin Trust F.C.U., the second mortgage shall be paid from the proceeds of the sale.   The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff any principal balance due as of the date of sale, within the five-year period required by these orders and with three (3) percent interest.   In the event that the plaintiff is in default of his payments for a period greater than ninety (90) days, the remaining arrearage shall be accelerated and become due and payable immediately.   Simple interest of ten (10) percent on the remaining arrearage shall commence immediately upon such default pursuant to General Statutes § 37–3a.

In order to secure the payment of the second mortgage to Franklin Trust F.C.U., as well as alimony, the defendant shall convey a non-controlling, non-voting 50% interest in Kathy's Grocery Store, LLC to the plaintiff.   This interest may be secured way of a UCC–1 filing or any other method authorized by law to perfect an interest in Kathy's Grocery Stores, LLC. The defendant shall cooperate in the transfer of this interest in Kathy's.

2. Colombia Residence.   The plaintiff shall transfer to the defendant, by quit-claim deed, all of her right, title and interest to the jointly-owned residential property in Pereira, Colombia.   This deed shall be held in escrow as additional security pursuant to paragraph 1, above.   The plaintiff shall relinquish her interest in rents received in connection with this property.   The defendant shall hold the plaintiff harmless from any and all costs associated the Columbia property.   The quit-claim deed from the plaintiff to the defendant, transferring her interest in the property in Pereira, Colombia (see paragraph 4 below) shall be released from escrow upon the defendant's payment and satisfaction of the second mortgage to Franklin Trust F.C.U.

3. Personal Property.   The parties shall retain the personal property in their possession, including their respective motor vehicles.   The plaintiff shall have all right, title and interest to the 2009 Nissan Rogue and shall be responsible for the payments on the loan.   The defendant shall have all right, title and interest in the 2011 Jeep Patriot and shall similarly be responsible for the payments on the loan.   The parties shall indemnify and hold each other harmless on any liability associated with the vehicles.   Each party shall pay to the other $1.00 per year as periodic alimony for so long as the other party remains obligated on the note for their automobile.   Said periodic alimony shall only be modifiable in the event of and to the extent of a default.   If a transfer of title is required, the parties shall execute the necessary documents as soon as practicable and maintain insurance thereon.

B. Family Business

Except as provided in subsection A.1., above, the defendant shall retain Kathy's Grocery Store, LLC and shall indemnify and hold the plaintiff harmless from any and all costs and liabilities associated with this business.   The defendant shall insure the business against losses of at least $75,000.

C. Other Debts

Each party shall be responsible for their respective debts including credit card liabilities, taxes and the like, and shall hold the other party harmless and indemnified therefrom.

D. Counsel Fees

The defendant shall pay $4,000 toward the plaintiff's counsel fees.   Said payment shall be made within 120 days from the date of dissolution.   If not paid in that time, simple interest of 10% on the remaining arrearage shall commence immediately upon such default pursuant to General Statutes § 37–3a.

E. Restoration of Birth Name

The plaintiff shall have her birth name, Maria del Pilar Botero, restored to her.

SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT,

Mark H. Taylor, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. At the time of trial, the defendant claimed that his Capitol One credit card balance had increased by over $1,570, from $13,415 to $14,987, Exhibit A..  FN1. At the time of trial, the defendant claimed that his Capitol One credit card balance had increased by over $1,570, from $13,415 to $14,987, Exhibit A.

FN2. The defendant claims to have received two other settlements for car accidents.   One was for his son's Jetta, for which he received $6,800, which was used to purchase a new car.   The second was $7,400 for another accident involving the defendant's truck.   This accident, however, occurred in 2009 and appears to have no bearing on the income of the defendant within the last nine months..  FN2. The defendant claims to have received two other settlements for car accidents.   One was for his son's Jetta, for which he received $6,800, which was used to purchase a new car.   The second was $7,400 for another accident involving the defendant's truck.   This accident, however, occurred in 2009 and appears to have no bearing on the income of the defendant within the last nine months.

FN3. He also appears to have paid his $1,630 debt to Citibank..  FN3. He also appears to have paid his $1,630 debt to Citibank.

FN4. These numbers are calculated by dividing unaccounted for deficits of $13,600 and $20,000 by thirty-eight weeks.   Although the court cannot determine whether this additional spending is done with before- or after-tax dollars, it will be used as a net number, based upon the fact that it is being spent by the defendant..  FN4. These numbers are calculated by dividing unaccounted for deficits of $13,600 and $20,000 by thirty-eight weeks.   Although the court cannot determine whether this additional spending is done with before- or after-tax dollars, it will be used as a net number, based upon the fact that it is being spent by the defendant.

FN5. The court's analysis was not informed by expert testimony, as none was offered into evidence..  FN5. The court's analysis was not informed by expert testimony, as none was offered into evidence.

FN6. General Statutes § 46b–82 provides:  “(a) At the time of entering the decree, the Superior Court may order either of the parties to pay alimony to the other, in addition to or in lieu of an award pursuant to section 46b–81.   The order may direct that security be given therefor on such terms as the court may deem desirable, including an order pursuant to subsection (b) of this section or an order to either party to contract with a third party for periodic payments or payments contingent on a life to the other party.   The court may order that a party obtain life insurance as such security unless such party proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such insurance is not available to such party, such party is unable to pay the cost of such insurance or such party is uninsurable.   In determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the court shall hear the witnesses, if any, of each party, except as provided in subsection (a) of section 46b–51, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to section 46b–81, and, in the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor children has been awarded, the desirability of such parent's securing employment.”.  FN6. General Statutes § 46b–82 provides:  “(a) At the time of entering the decree, the Superior Court may order either of the parties to pay alimony to the other, in addition to or in lieu of an award pursuant to section 46b–81.   The order may direct that security be given therefor on such terms as the court may deem desirable, including an order pursuant to subsection (b) of this section or an order to either party to contract with a third party for periodic payments or payments contingent on a life to the other party.   The court may order that a party obtain life insurance as such security unless such party proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such insurance is not available to such party, such party is unable to pay the cost of such insurance or such party is uninsurable.   In determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the court shall hear the witnesses, if any, of each party, except as provided in subsection (a) of section 46b–51, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to section 46b–81, and, in the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor children has been awarded, the desirability of such parent's securing employment.”

FN7. The provisions of General Statutes section 46b–81 are as follows:  “(a) At the time of entering a decree annulling or dissolving a marriage or for legal separation pursuant to a complaint under section 46b–45, the Superior Court may assign to either the husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other.   The court may pass title to real property to either party or to a third person or may order the sale of such real property, without any act by either the husband or the wife, when in the judgment of the court it is the proper mode to carry the decree into effect. (b) A conveyance made pursuant to the decree shall vest title in the purchaser, and shall bind all persons entitled to life estates and remainder interests in the same manner as a sale ordered by the court pursuant to the provisions of section 52–500.   When the decree is recorded on the land records in the town where the real property is situated, it shall effect the transfer of the title of such real property as if it were a deed of the party or parties. (c) In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court, after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party, except as provided in subsection (a) of section 46b–51, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income.   The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.”.  FN7. The provisions of General Statutes section 46b–81 are as follows:  “(a) At the time of entering a decree annulling or dissolving a marriage or for legal separation pursuant to a complaint under section 46b–45, the Superior Court may assign to either the husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other.   The court may pass title to real property to either party or to a third person or may order the sale of such real property, without any act by either the husband or the wife, when in the judgment of the court it is the proper mode to carry the decree into effect. (b) A conveyance made pursuant to the decree shall vest title in the purchaser, and shall bind all persons entitled to life estates and remainder interests in the same manner as a sale ordered by the court pursuant to the provisions of section 52–500.   When the decree is recorded on the land records in the town where the real property is situated, it shall effect the transfer of the title of such real property as if it were a deed of the party or parties. (c) In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court, after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party, except as provided in subsection (a) of section 46b–51, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income.   The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.”

Taylor, Mark H., J.