163867 v. Warden, State Prison (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

On February 1, 2006, the petitioner, Michael Edwards, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was amended on May 18, 2009.   On May 28, 2009, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss.   After a hearing on the motion to dismiss, this Court dismissed counts four and seven of the amended petition in their entirety and allowed the petitioner to proceed against prior habeas counsel only in counts one, two, three, five and six.   In those counts, the petitioner claims that he was denied the effective assistance of habeas counsel in violation of the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and article first, § 8, of the Constitution of Connecticut in a number of ways, including, but not limited to, the following:  habeas counsel failed to raise the claim that trial counsel failed to object to the state's cross-examination of the petitioner and make a record that it amounted to prosecutorial misconduct;  habeas counsel failed to raise the claim that the state's cross-examination of the petitioner violated his constitutional rights under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and article first, § 8, of the Constitution of Connecticut to confront witnesses against him;  habeas counsel failed to raise the claim that trial counsel failed to make a record of all the facts regarding the Isaiah C. Manuel statement in order to preserve future claims;  habeas counsel ineffectively raised the claim that trial counsel had failed to request a jury instruction on self-defense;  habeas counsel ineffectively raised the claim that trial counsel failed to challenge the state's failure to preserve the clothing worn by the victim at the time of the shooting.   For reasons stated more fully below, the petition is denied.

The matter came to trial on April 12, 2010.   The court heard testimony from Ernest James, the owner of the Main and Tower Cafe, Detective Nicholas Russo, one of the investigators in the petitioner's case, Scott Courtney Davis, the person who signed a statement about the petitioner with the name Isaiah C. Manuel, Attorney Rosita Creamer, a state's attorney involved at the pre-trial stage of the petitioner's case, and Attorney Kevin Murphy, the state's attorney who tried the petitioner's case.   The petitioner entered into evidence the statement of Isaiah C. Manuel, a police report in this matter and the trial transcripts.   The respondent proffered the Appellate Court decision in the petitioner's direct appeal, the transcript of the petitioner's first habeas matter, the memorandum of decision in the petitioner's first habeas matter, the Appellate Court decision in the petitioner's appeal of the judgment denying his first habeas petition, a transcript of the hearing on the motion to dismiss in the instant matter and a transcript of a hearing on the petitioner's motion for new trial.   The petitioner and the respondent filed post-trial briefs on April 7, 2011 and May 12, 2011, respectively.

The Court has reviewed all of the testimony and evidence and makes the following findings of fact.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The petitioner was the defendant in a criminal case in the judicial district of Hartford, bearing docket number CR95–469192, in which he was charged with murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a–54a, criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a–217 and criminal possession of a pistol in violation of General Statutes § 53a–217c.

2. The petitioner was tried by a jury.   On May 15, 1996, the jury convicted the petitioner of murder and acquitted him of criminal possession of a firearm and criminal possession of a pistol.

3. On September 27, 1996, the trial court, Schimelman, J., sentenced the petitioner to prison for a term of fifty years.

4. The Supreme Court affirmed the petitioner's conviction.   See State v. Edwards, 247 Conn. 318, 721 A.2d 519 (1998).

5. As articulated by the Supreme Court, the jury reasonably could have found the following facts regarding the underlying offenses:  “During the evening of February 18, 1995, the [petitioner], after closing the family grocery store in which he had been working, approached the victim on Albany Avenue in Hartford.   The two men, who were not friendly, exchanged angry words, and the [petitioner] grabbed the victim's clothing and held a gun to his head.   The [petitioner] then shoved the victim backwards along the sidewalk in front of the store.   The victim did not resist, but said ‘no, no, no.’   The [petitioner] then pushed the victim's head down and shot him in the head.   The victim fell to the sidewalk.   The bullet entered the left side of the back of the victim's head, behind the left ear, traveled through the base and right side of the brain and lodged near his right eye.   The victim died the following day of injuries sustained as a result of the gunshot wound.”  State v. Edwards, supra, 247 Conn. 320–21.

6. The petitioner has filed at least one other petition for a writ of habeas corpus.   See Edwards v. Warden, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 99 0423254.

7. On December 29, 2003, the habeas court, Skolnick, J., denied the petitioner's earlier habeas petition.   See Edwards v. Warden, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 99 0423254 (December 29, 2003, Skolnick, J.).

8. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the habeas court.   See Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction, 87 Conn.App. 517, 865 A.2d 1231 (2005).

9. Attorney Donald Cardwell, who is now deceased, represented the petitioner at his criminal trial.

10. The state was represented at trial by Assistant State's Attorney Kevin Murphy and at certain pre-trial proceedings by Assistant State's Attorney Rosita Creamer.

11. Attorney Elizabeth Brooks represented the petitioner in his earlier habeas matter.

12. Additional facts will be discussed as needed.

DISCUSSION

The only claims properly before this Court are the petitioner's claims that his prior habeas counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise in the petitioner's earlier habeas petition that the petitioner's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in that he failed to object to the state's cross-examination of the petitioner on the grounds that it constituted prosecutorial impropriety and that it violated the petitioner's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him.   The petitioner did not address the other claims raised in his amended petition in his post-trial brief.   Accordingly, this Court deems those claims abandoned and declines to address them.   See Raynor v. Commissioner of Correction, 177 Conn.App. 788, 796–97, 981 A.2d 517 (2009), cert. denied, 294 Conn. 926, 986 A.2d 1053 (2010) ( “[r]eviewing courts are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to th[e] court through an inadequate brief ․ Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly”).

“In Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ], the United States Supreme Court established that for a petitioner to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of [the] conviction ․ That requires the petitioner to show (1) that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Kearney v. Commissioner of Correction, 113 Conn.App. 223, 228–29, 965 A.2d 608 (2009).  “[When] applied to a claim of ineffective assistance of prior habeas counsel, the Strickland standard requires the petitioner to demonstrate that his prior habeas counsel's performance was ineffective and that this ineffectiveness prejudiced the petitioner's prior habeas proceeding ․ [T]he petitioner will have to prove that ․ the prior habeas counsel, in presenting his claims, was ineffective and that effective representation by habeas counsel establishes a reasonable probability that the habeas court would have found that he was entitled to reversal of the conviction and a new trial ․ Therefore, as explained by our Supreme Court in Lozada v. Warden, 223 Conn. 834, [842] 613 A.2d 818 (1992), a petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of habeas counsel on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must essentially satisfy Strickland twice:  he must prove both (1) that his appointed habeas counsel was ineffective, and (2) that his trial counsel was ineffective.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Lapointe v. Commissioner of Correction, 113 Conn.App. 378, 394, 966 A.2d 780 (2009).

The petitioner first alleges that his prior habeas counsel should have raised the claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the state's cross-examination of the petitioner on the ground that it constituted prosecutorial impropriety.   Specifically, the petitioner contends that Assistant State's Attorney Murphy did not have a good faith basis for asking him on cross-examination about statements that he allegedly made to one Isaiah C. Manuel shortly after the shooting.

“In analyzing claims of prosecutorial impropriety, [the court engages] in a two step analytical process ․ The two steps are separate and distinct ․ We first examine whether prosecutorial impropriety occurred ․ Second, if an impropriety exists, we then examine whether it deprived the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial ․ [T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged[ly] [harmful] prosecutorial [impropriety] is the fairness of the trial, and not the culpability of the prosecutor ․ The issue is whether the prosecutor's [actions at trial] so infected [it] with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process ․ In determining whether the defendant was denied a fair trial ․ we must view the prosecutor's [actions] in the context of the entire trial.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. LaFountain, 127 Conn.App. 819, 835 (2011).  “Prosecutorial impropriety may occur in the course of cross-examination of witnesses ․” (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Singh, 259 Conn. 693, 700, 793 A.2d 226 (2002).

“It is fundamental that for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of his testimony, a witness may be cross-examined as to statements made out of court or in other proceedings which contradict those made upon direct examination ․ This is based on the notion that talking one way on the stand, and another way previously, raises a doubt as to the truthfulness of both statements.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Schiavo, 93 Conn.App. 290, 306–07, 888 A.2d 1115, cert. denied, 277 Conn. 923, 895 A.2d 797 (2006);  see also Conn.Code Evid. § 6–10(a) (“[t]he credibility of a witness may be impeached by evidence of a prior inconsistent statement made by the witness”).  “A good faith basis on the part of examining counsel as to the truth of the matter contained in questions propounded to a witness on cross-examination is required.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Grant, 89 Conn.App. 635, 640, 874 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 903, 882 A.2d 678 (2005).

“[B]y exercising his fifth amendment right to testify on his own behalf, it is axiomatic that a defendant opens the door to comment on his veracity.   It is well established that once an accused takes the stand and testifies his credibility is subject to scrutiny and close examination ․ A defendant cannot both take the stand and be immune from impeachment ․ An accused who testifies subjects himself to the same rules and tests which could by law be applied to other witnesses.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Dudley, 68 Conn.App. 405, 413, 791 A.2d 661 (2002).

The petitioner alleges that the following questioning during the state's cross-examination of him at his criminal trial constituted prosecutorial impropriety:

“Q. And do you recall when you were at the Main and Tower Cafe, running into a guy named Isiah [sic] Manuel, or Manual?

“A. I don't know an Isiah [sic] Manual.

“Q. Do you remember running into the bouncer in the bathroom, while you were washing your hands and your coat?

“A. Yes.

“Q. All right.   And while you were there, do you remember trying to sell one of these guns to Mr. Manual, or to the bouncer?

“A. No. That never happened

* * *

“Q. Now, do you remember at the Main and Tower, when you went into the bathroom, and you bumped into the bouncer in the bathroom?   Do you remember that?

“A. No. I didn't bump into him in the bathroom.   I went to the bathroom, and I was trying to get—I was looking in the mirror, trying to get—clean my face off, and he came into—I guess they wanted the money, because I didn't pay to get in.   I just walked in, and went straight to the bathroom.

“Q. So, you bumped into him while you were washing your face and washing your hands?

“A. He came in—he came in when I was in the bathroom.

“Q. And you were washing your jacket, too, weren't you?

“A. No, I didn't wash my jacket.   If I washed my jacket, there wouldn't be no bloodstains on it, or any stains on it.

“Q. Well, were there stains on it?

“A. Yeah, there were stains on it.

“Q. So, you admit, though, that at some point, you're in the bathroom and so was the bouncer?   Is that right?

“A. Yes, he came into the bathroom, yes.

“Q. And you told him that you needed to speak to him?

“A. No, I never said—no.   Me and Courtney—Courtney's real name is Courtney Davis, and Courtney Davis, me and him don't get along.   We don't really talk.

“Q. You're saying that the bouncer's name is Courtney Davis?

“A. Yes. He's using a false name, ‘cause he's wanted.   And he's walking around the police department, wanted.

“Q. Do you remember the bouncer helping you clean yourself, and got you a towel?

“A. No. That never happened.   I was in Main and Tower for less than two minutes.   And most of that, I was drinking.

* * *

“Q. Do you remember indicating to the bouncer that you'd just popped a dude, and asked him if he wanted to buy a gun?

“A. No;  that never happened.

“Q. Do you remember telling him that one of the guns had a body on it?

“A. No;  that never happened.

“Q. Do you remember telling him that the gun was at Angela's at that time?

“A. No. I never told him that.” ¹

The petitioner contends that Assistant State's Attorney Murphy did not have a good faith basis to ask him about statements that he allegedly made to the bouncer at the Main and Tower Cafe because he knew or should have known that the written statement of Isaiah C. Manuel, on which these questions were based, was false.   Specifically, he argues that the state was put on notice that the statement was false on January 3, 1996 when Attorney Cardwell stated the following while arguing for a bond reduction:  “I do anticipate that you may hear from the state by way of a counter argument that after this occurred [the petitioner] made a statement and I want to give some background with respect to that.   The person who makes that remark that [the petitioner] made a statement is somebody who may be known to the state as Manuel Sabon.   In fact we represent—his real name is Courtney Davis.   And Mr. Davis was dating a former girlfriend of the [petitioner] with whom the [petitioner] has a child and there had been some ill will between the [petitioner] and Mr. Davis because of their common relationship with a female ․ Now I don't know if the state is aware of the A.K.A. or not but we do make those representations because [the petitioner] has known Mr. Davis for many years ․” ²

In a written statement given to the police on February 24, 1995, approximately one week after the shooting, the bouncer who was working at the Main and Tower Cafe on the night of the shooting, stated in relevant part:  “I followed ‘Mike’ [the petitioner] into the men's room ․ ‘Mike’ went to the sink grabbed a towel and began wetting the towel and wiping down the front of his jacket as he said that he had blood on him because he had just ‘popped’ (shot) a dude ․ ‘Mike’ looking strange stated that he had popped this dude and wanted to know if I wanted to buy some guns but that one of the guns had a body on it ․ ‘Mike’ then stated that if I needed a gun the guns was at Angie's house right now ․” ³

At the habeas trial, Ernest James, the owner of the Main and Tower Cafe identified Scott Courtney Davis as someone he had employed in February 1995.   He also testified that he did not recollect having an employee named Isaiah Manuel.   Scott Courtney Davis testified that he went to the police station on February 24, 1995 and signed a written statement as Isaiah Manuel.   He explained that he used the name Isaiah Manuel because there was an arrest warrant out on him at the time.   He further testified that he knew the petitioner and that he saw him the night of the shooting but he denied that the petitioner ever told him that he had “popped a dude” or that he had told the police that the petitioner had said that.   Assistant State's Attorneys Creamer and Murphy testified that they did not recall whether they interviewed Isaiah Manuel.   Assistant State's Attorney Murphy also testified that although he does not remember cross-examining the petitioner and what his good faith basis was for asking the particular questions that he asked the petitioner during his cross-examination of him, he would have had a good faith basis for asking them.

Despite the petitioner's argument to the contrary, this Court finds that Assistant State's Attorney Murphy did have a good faith basis for questioning the petitioner about the statements that he allegedly made to the bouncer at the Main and Tower Cafe. Although it is clear that the bouncer used a false name in providing his statement to the police, which does cast some doubt on the veracity of his statement, this Court does not find it credible that Davis never told the police that the petitioner had told him that he “popped a dude” and that he had tried to sell him a gun.   Moreover, there was evidence that tended to corroborate the statement given by Isaiah Manuel a.k.a. Scott Courtney Davis.   Davis was a bouncer at the Main and Tower Cafe at the time.   Moreover, the petitioner admitted that he went to the Main and Tower Cafe following the shooting and that he saw the bouncer, Davis, at that time.   He also admitted that he gave the gun to Angela Ford. Accordingly, even if the state investigated Isaiah Manuel and his statement, such an investigation would not have necessarily led to the conclusion that his statement was completely false.   Even the petitioner's contention that Davis had a motive to lie does not completely undermine the reliability of his statement to the police.   Notably, Davis did not testify to any ill will between him and the petitioner.   To the contrary, he stated that he dated the same girl that the petitioner did after the petitioner broke up with her and that they were all friends.⁴

On direct examination, the petitioner testified at his criminal trial that he only had his hand on the barrel of the gun not on the trigger and that the gun went off accidentally, as he attempted to disarm the victim, George Wright, by pulling Wright's right hand, which contained the gun, toward the left side of his head and pulling the gun down.⁵  This testimony is substantially inconsistent with the petitioner's alleged statement to the bouncer at the Main and Tower Café following the shooting that he had just “popped a dude.”   Consequently, Assistant State's Attorney Murphy appropriately sought to impeach the petitioner with the prior inconsistent statement during his cross-examination of the petitioner.   See Conn.Code Evid. § 6–10;  see also Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225–26, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (“[h]ad inconsistent statements been made by the accused to some third person, it could hardly be contended that the conflict could not be laid before the jury by way of cross-examination and impeachment”).   As explained supra, he had a good faith basis for doing so.   Accordingly, no prosecutorial impropriety occurred, and the petitioner's prior habeas counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to raise this claim, as it would not have been successful.

Even if this Court were to conclude that Assistant State's Attorney Murphy did not have a good faith basis for questioning the petitioner as he did during his cross-examination of him and that his questioning constituted prosecutorial impropriety, the petitioner's claim would nevertheless fail for lack of a showing of prejudice.   That is, even if Attorney Cardwell objected to the questions on the grounds of prosecutorial impropriety and the trial court struck the line of questioning or prohibited it, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the petitioner's trial would have been different.   Thus, this claim would likewise not have succeeded in the prior habeas matter.

The state's case against the petitioner was strong.   Several eyewitnesses testified that they saw the petitioner shoot Wright in the back of his head.⁶  Although most of the witnesses were either related to Wright or friends of Wright, even the petitioner admitted, during his testimony at the criminal trial, that Wright's friends and family were in the area when the shooting occurred.⁷  Several witnesses also testified that Wright would not go into the store where the petitioner worked because he had a “beef” with the petitioner, which the petitioner also corroborated during his testimony.   The petitioner testified that he told the petitioner not to come into the store anymore.⁸  Furthermore, there was little to no evidence to substantiate the petitioner's testimony regarding how the shooting occurred.   The petitioner and Wright were comparable in size.   While some of the eyewitnesses saw the petitioner and Wright struggle a bit, no one saw the petitioner hook Wright's right arm towards his left side and pull the gun down, as the petitioner testified.   Moreover, the medical examiner testified that Wright did not have any abrasions or bruises on his body apart from a small scrape on his forehead, which tends to belie the petitioner's testimony that he struggled with Wright, hitting him and pushing him up against the wall before attempting to disarm him.⁹  Additionally, and more importantly, the medical examiner opined, during the state's rebuttal, that the gunshot wound that he observed in Wright's head could not have been caused by the victim having the gun in his right hand and pointing it to the left side of his head.¹⁰

Moreover, the statements that the petitioner allegedly made to Isaiah Manuel a.k.a Scott Courtney Davis only came up during the state's cross-examination of the petitioner.   Notably, neither the state nor the defense mentioned them during closing arguments.¹¹  Additionally, Assistant State's Attorney Murphy did not engage in a repetitive line of questioning regarding the statements that the petitioner allegedly made to the bouncer;  once he established that the petitioner did see the bouncer on the night of the shooting, he asked him once if he said certain things to him.¹²  The jury was, thus, only exposed to the statements once, during the presentation of the evidence.   It is also worth noting that the trial court advised the jury during its charge that “[q]uestions posed by counsel do not constitute evidence nor do counsel's comments.” ¹³  Although not directed specifically at the prior inconsistent statements allegedly made by the petitioner to the bouncer, the trial court also gave a general instruction on prior inconsistent statements, stating:  “Evidence of statements made out of court whether written or oral inconsistent with a witness's testimony on the stand is admitted here not to prove the truth of the facts contained in the statement, but as evidence of conduct inconsistent with testimony given at trial.   You should consider such evidence, if you find any, as you would any other evidence of inconsistent conduct in determining the weight to be given to that witness's testimony.   That is the believability or lack thereof of the particular witness whose testimony you are considering.” ¹⁴  In light of the above, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the state's cross-examination of him regarding statements he allegedly made to the bouncer at the Main and Tower Cafe, the outcome of his criminal trial would have been different.   Accordingly, this claim fails.

Similarly, the petitioner's claim that his prior habeas counsel should have raised the claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the state's line of questioning during its cross-examination of him on the ground that it violated his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him fails.

“The sixth amendment to the constitution of the United States guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution to be confronted with the witnesses against him.   This right is secured for defendants in state criminal proceedings ․ [T]he primary interest secured by confrontation is the right of cross-examination.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Jennings, 125 Conn.App. 801, 813, 9 A.3d 446 (2011).  “Where testimonial evidence is at issue ․ the [s]ixth [a]mendment demands what the common law required:  unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004).  “Hearsay statements that, are nontestimonial in nature are not governed by the confrontation clause ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Madigosky, 291 Conn. 28, 44, 966 A.2d 730 (2009).  “The [confrontation] [c]lause also does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.”  Crawford v. Washington, supra, 59 n.9, citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414, 105 S.Ct. 2078, 85 L.Ed.2d 425 (1985).   The right to confrontation within article first, § 8, of our state constitution does not provide any greater protections than its federal counterpart;  “the principles of interpretation for applying these clauses are identical.”  State v. Lockhart, 298 Conn. 537, 555, 4 A.3d 1176 (2010).

In the present case, it is clear that the Isaiah Manuel statement could not have been admitted during the petitioner's criminal trial to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein without violating the confrontation clause, as the petitioner did not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine Manuel (Courtney) and his statement to the police clearly constitutes a testimonial statement.   See Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. 51 (“[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not”).   The statement was not directly introduced into evidence at the petitioner's criminal trial.   Instead, Assistant State's Attorney Murphy used the content of the statement, the petitioner's alleged statements to Manuel, during his cross-examination of the petitioner.   That is, the content of the statement came into evidence for a nonhearsay purpose, i.e., to impeach the direct testimony of the petitioner by confronting him with a prior inconsistent statement that he allegedly made to the bouncer at the Main and Tower Cafe on the night of the shooting.¹⁵  As noted supra, the confrontation clause does not bar the use of testimonial statements for nonhearsay purposes.

Nonetheless, even if the state's use of the content of the Isaiah Manuel statement ran afoul of the confrontation clause, “[i]t is well established that a violation of the defendant's right to confront witnesses is subject to harmless error analysis ․” (Citation omitted.)  State v. Smith, 289 Conn. 598, 628, 960 A.2d 993 (2008).  “In order to assess the harmfulness of the impropriety, we review the record to determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence ․ complained of might have contributed to the conviction.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Madigosky, supra, 291 Conn. 46.   The petitioner argues in his post-trial brief that the use of the Isaiah Manuel statement “was the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back in relation to [his] defense that the shooting was an accident during a struggle.”   This Court does not agree.   As mentioned supra, there was little to no evidence presented to substantiate the petitioner's account of the shooting, and there were several eyewitnesses who testified that the petitioner held a gun to Wright's head and shot him.   Additionally, the medical examiner opined, based upon the angle of the gunshot wound to Wright's head, that the shooting could not have occurred as described by the petitioner.   Furthermore, the petitioner's alleged statements to the bouncer were confined to his cross-examination;  neither the state nor the defense mentioned them again during the petitioner's trial.   Consequently, not only was any violation of the petitioner's right to confront the witnesses against him harmless but any deficient performance by either trial or habeas counsel related to this issue did not result in any prejudice.   This claim likewise fails.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.   Judgment may enter in favor of the respondent.   Should the petitioner wish to appeal, counsel shall submit a judgment file to the clerk within thirty days.

BY THE COURT,

T. Santos, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Petitioner's Exhibit [Exh.] 10, pp. 121–28..  FN1. Petitioner's Exhibit [Exh.] 10, pp. 121–28.

FN2. Petitioner's Exh. 5, p. 4..  FN2. Petitioner's Exh. 5, p. 4.

FN3. Petitioner's Exh. 1..  FN3. Petitioner's Exh. 1.

FN4. April 12, 2010 Habeas Trial Transcript, p. 32..  FN4. April 12, 2010 Habeas Trial Transcript, p. 32.

FN5. Petitioner'sExh. 10, pp. 109–12..  FN5. Petitioner'sExh. 10, pp. 109–12.

FN6. Petitioner's Exh. 7, pp. 95–100;  Petitioner's Exh. 8, pp. 6–8, pp. 43–47;  Petitioner's Exh. 9, p. 24 (Petitioner's Exh. 4, pp. 26–29)..  FN6. Petitioner's Exh. 7, pp. 95–100;  Petitioner's Exh. 8, pp. 6–8, pp. 43–47;  Petitioner's Exh. 9, p. 24 (Petitioner's Exh. 4, pp. 26–29).

FN7. Petitioner'sExh. 10, pp. 120–21..  FN7. Petitioner'sExh. 10, pp. 120–21.

FN8. Petitioner's Exh. 6, pp. 16–17, pp. 83–84;  Petitioner's Exh. 10, pp. 95–97..  FN8. Petitioner's Exh. 6, pp. 16–17, pp. 83–84;  Petitioner's Exh. 10, pp. 95–97.

FN9. Exh. 6, p. 129;  Petitioner's Exh. 10, pp. 160–61..  FN9. Exh. 6, p. 129;  Petitioner's Exh. 10, pp. 160–61.

FN10. Exh. 10, pp. 162–64..  FN10. Exh. 10, pp. 162–64.

FN11. Petitioner's Exh. 10, pp. 175–236..  FN11. Petitioner's Exh. 10, pp. 175–236.

FN12. Exh. 10, pp. 109–12..  FN12. Exh. 10, pp. 109–12.

FN13. Petitioner's Exh. 11, p. 3..  FN13. Petitioner's Exh. 11, p. 3.

FN14. Petitioner's Exh. 11, p. 7..  FN14. Petitioner's Exh. 11, p. 7.

FN15. Although the trial court did not give a limiting instruction immediately following the introduction of this evidence, the context in which it was admitted demonstrates that it was admitted for the purpose of impeaching the petitioner's direct testimony..  FN15. Although the trial court did not give a limiting instruction immediately following the introduction of this evidence, the context in which it was admitted demonstrates that it was admitted for the purpose of impeaching the petitioner's direct testimony.

Santos, Thelma A., J.