Timothy Lester v. Shannon Patinkin et al. (2011)

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Arnold, Richard E., J. Opinion TitleMEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT The plaintiff has commenced a personal injury action against the defendants Shannon Patinkin and the PV Holding Corporation alleging he sustained serious personal injuries in a motor vehicle accident which occurred on or about March 5, 2008 on Route 8 in Derby, Connecticut.   The plaintiff alleges his vehicle was struck in the rear by a vehicle operated by defendant Patinkin and owned by the defendant PV Holding Corporation.   At the time of the incident, the plaintiff was operating a 1998 Freightliner dump truck during the performance of his duties as an employee of the State of Connecticut Department of Transportation (“Conn DOT”).   At the time of the vehicle collision, the automobile operated by Patinkin was owned by the defendant PV Holding Corporation (“PV Corp.”) and was registered in the State of New York. PV Holding Corporation is a member of the group of affiliated companies that comprise the “Avis” and “Budget” car rental business enterprises.   Prior to the collision, Patinkin had rented the vehicle she was operating from the Avis Rent a Car System, LLC, an affiliate of PV Corp. The plaintiff's complaint dated February 25, 2010, contains three counts, each of which is directed at both defendants, the operator and owner of the subject vehicle.   The First Count asserts direct claims against both defendants based on negligent acts or omissions alleged to have been committed by each defendant, individually.   The Second Count alleges causes of action against each defendant for double or treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14–295.1  In the Third Count, the plaintiff asserts claims against each defendant based on allegations of reckless, willful and wanton misconduct by the defendant operator.   The complaint does not allege that the defendant Patinkin was an agent, servant and/or an employee of the defendant PV Corporation.   The State of Connecticut, the plaintiff's employer at the time of the incident, filed an intervening complaint dated May 18, 2010 seeking to be reimbursed for any amounts paid by the state or amounts the state may be obligated to pay in the future under the Workers' Compensation Act. The State of Connecticut's Intervening Complaint also consists of three counts and incorporates the allegations and claims of the plaintiff's complaint as they pertain to each defendant.   The defendant PV Corp. has filed a motion for summary judgment as to all three counts of the plaintiff's Complaint and to the intervening complaint of the State of Connecticut arguing that it is entitled to summary judgment because the Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 30106 bars vicarious liability claims arising from a vehicle rental relationship.2  Additionally, PV Corp. argues that the second counts of the Complaint and Intervening Complaint sounding in statutory recklessness are prohibited by the express language of General Statute § 14–295, and the third counts of both complaints, sounding in common-law recklessness, are prohibited by the decision in Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 837, 836 A.2d 394 (2003).3  The plaintiff has objected to the motion for summary judgment filed by PV Corporation arguing that this defendant's arguments all rest on the assumption that the plaintiff is pursuing claims against PV Corp. solely based on a theory of vicarious liability, when, in fact, the plaintiff has alleged direct claims against PV Corp. for its own “negligent, reckless, willful or wanton acts and omissions.”   Accordingly, the plaintiff argues the Graves Amendment does not shield an owner/lessor of a motor vehicle from claims based on the negligent acts or omissions of the owner/lessor itself, as opposed to the acts or omissions of the lessee.   The plaintiff also states that this same reasoning defeats the defendant's argument that General Statutes § 14–295, which provides for double or treble damages, is not applicable to the defendant, and defendant cannot be liable for punitive damages pursuant to Connecticut common law.   The intervening plaintiff State of Connecticut, joins the plaintiff Lester in objecting to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and has adopted the plaintiff Lester's legal arguments and memorandum of law.   I Standard of Law:  Summary Judgment “A Motion for Summary Judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue where there is no real issue to be tried.”   Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989).  “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”   Hertz Corp. v. Federal Ins., Co., 245 Conn. 374, 381, 713 A.2d 820 (1998).   In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any issues exist.   Nolan v. Borkowski, 206 Conn. 495, 500, 538 A.2d 1031 (1988).   The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.   Hertz Corp. v. Federal Ins. Corp., supra, 245 Conn. 381.  “The opposing party must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.”   Id. “A material fact is a fact which will make a difference in the result of a case.”   Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99, 639 A.2d 507 (1994).   The test used by the court is to determine if the moving party would be entitled to a directed verdict if the same set of facts were presented at trial.   Connell v. Colwell, 214 Conn. 242, 246–47, 571 A.2d 116 (1990).   A directed verdict is properly rendered if a trier of fact cannot reasonably and legally find in any fashion other than that directed.   Santopietro v. New Haven, 239 Conn. 207, 225, 682 A.2d 106 (1996).   II Count One Negligence and Graves Amendment The defendant argues that the plaintiff is alleging vicarious liability against the defendant and that the plaintiff's complaint is devoid of any allegations of independent negligence or criminal wrongdoing by PV Corporation.4  Therefore, the vicarious liability claims are barred as a matter of law by operation of the Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 30106, which abrogated vicarious liability claims against rental car companies, absent allegations of such a company's negligence or criminal wrongdoing.   See 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1)(2);  see also 49 U.S.C. § 30106(c).  The court notes that the defendant has not filed a request to revise or a motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint.   The plaintiff has not objected to the use of the procedural pleading of a motion for summary judgment to determine the issues at hand.   Thus the court is left to decide the merits of the defendant's legal argument by way of the defendant's motion for summary judgment.   It is well-settled that “in deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”   Hertz Corp. v. Federal Ins., Co., supra, 245 Conn. 381.   The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.   Id. In support of the motion for summary judgment the defendant has filed a memorandum of law, a reply memorandum of law.   In support of its burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the defendant has submitted documentary evidence consisting only of the affidavit of Vince Moffa.   See n.3. The plaintiff has submitted a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion, but has not submitted any documentary evidence in support of his opposition.   A review of the First Count of the complaint and the intervening complaint reveals that the plaintiff Lester alleges that the defendant Patinkin and the defendant PV Corporation were both negligent in various ways.   All but one allegation can be construed to apply solely to the defendant operator Patinkin.   However, the complaint contains an allegation of negligence which can be construed to apply independently to the defendant PV Corporation, as well.   Specifically, the complaint alleges that Patinkin, the defendant-operator, “was operating said motor vehicle when it was not equipped with brakes adequate to bring it to a controlled stop ․ and when the brakes were not in good working order, all in violation of Section 14–80 of the Connecticut General Statutes.” 5  The affidavit from Moffa submitted by the defendant PV Corporation does not address the issue as to whether there is an absence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding inadequate brakes or whether the brakes were in good working order.   Therefore the court must construe the matter in a light more favorable to the plaintiff when addressing the issue of summary judgment.  “The Graves Amendment was enacted by Congress on August 10, 2005, as part of a comprehensive transportation bill entitled the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act:  A Legacy for Users (act), Pub.L. No. 109–59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005).   The [a]ct deals generally with motor vehicle safety, primarily providing billions of dollars in funding allocations for transportation projects.”  “The Amendment was included in the act as a tort reform measure intended to bar recovery against car rental and leasing companies on the basis of vicarious liability.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted, internal citations omitted.)   Rodriguez v. Testa, 296 Conn. 1, 9, 933 A.2d 955 (2010).   There are three requirements that trigger the applicability of the Graves Amendment (§ 30106), namely;  (1) the action must have commenced on or after August 10, 2005;  (2) the owner of the vehicle must be engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles;  and (3) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the vehicle owner.   Rodriguez v. Testa, supra, 296 Conn. 9–10;  Rodriguez v. Testa, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 065002252 (December 11, 2008, Brunetti, J.);   Steinfeld v. Lipman, Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven, No. CV07–5009730S (Jul. 30, 2008, Bellis, J.).   The first prong, requiring that the action must have commenced on or after the statute's effective date of August 10, 2005, has been met.   Here, the action was commenced in March 2010, when service was made on P.V. Holding Corporation.   The second requirement of § 30106 is that the vehicle owner must be engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles.   Here, the affidavit of Moffa sufficiently establishes that the defendant was in the business of renting or leasing motor vehicles for the purposes of summary judgment.   The third and final requirement is that there can be no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the vehicle owner.   Here, there is a claim of negligence or wrongdoing, against PV Corporation by the plaintiff regarding the condition of the brakes of the vehicle owned by PV Corporation and leased to the defendant Patinkin.   The defendant P.V. Holdings Corporation has not satisfied its evidentiary burden that there is an absence of genuine issues of material facts regarding the plaintiffs' claims that the brakes on the leased vehicle were inadequate or not in good working order.   The defendant has not submitted documentation that the brakes were adequate or were in good working order.   Unless the plaintiff satisfies its initial evidentiary burden it cannot for the purposes of summary judgment shift the burden to the plaintiff to show that the brakes were, in fact, inadequate or not in good working order, although this will, in fact, be the plaintiffs' evidentiary burden at trial.   Thus, the third condition is not met.   While Connecticut can no longer impose vicarious liability on the owner of a rented or leased vehicle, § 30106 (Graves Amendment) does not prevent an owner of a rented or leased vehicle from being liable for its own negligent conduct.   Peterson v. Swain, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, No. CV 05–5001192 S (Apr. 6, 2010, Wilson, J.) “[T]he plain language of the statute states that its protection is unavailable where the rental car company commits independent acts of negligence that lead to the eventual injury at the heart of the litigation.”   Ellis v. Jamin, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 09 5010839 (December 17, 2009, Cosgrove, J.) (49 Conn. L. Rptr. 1).   Because the plaintiffs have demonstrated that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether this defendant engaged in independent negligent conduct regarding the brakes on the subject vehicle, the plaintiffs' negligence claims are not preempted by the Graves Amendment.   The defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied as to the First Count of both the plaintiff's complaint and the intervening plaintiff's complaint.   III Counts Two and Three Statutory and Common–Law Recklessness The Second Counts of the plaintiff's complaint and the intervening complaint allege claims for double/treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14–295.   The Second Counts, unlike the First Counts, are devoid of independent allegations of negligence or criminal wrongdoing by the defendant PV Holding.6  General Statutes § 14–295 expressly prohibits claims against a car rental company.   “The owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle shall not be responsible for such damages unless the damages arose from such owner's operation of the motor vehicle.”   General Statutes § 14–295.   Additionally, the plaintiff's and the intervening plaintiff's claims of common-law recklessness, contained in the Third Counts, are barred by the holding in Matthiessen v. Vanech, supra, 266 Conn. 837.  “[A]t common law, there is no vicarious liability for punitive damages.”  (Citations omitted.)   Id. “[U]nder common-law doctrine, the owner of a motor vehicle is not vicariously liable for punitive damages resulting from the driver's reckless operation of the vehicle.”   Id. The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to Counts Two and Three of the plaintiffs' complaint and intervening plaintiff's complaint.   IV Summary The defendant PV Corporation's motion for summary judgment is denied as to the First Counts of the complaint and intervening complaint and is granted as to Second and Third Counts of the complaint and intervening complaint.   Judge Richard E. Arnold FN1. Sec. 14–295.   Double or treble damages for personal injury or property damage resulting from certain traffic violations. In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14–218a, 14–219, 14–222, 14–227a, 14–230, 14–234, 14–237, 14–239 or 14–240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property.   The owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle shall not be responsible for such damages unless the damages arose from such owner's operation of the motor vehicle. FN2. The Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 30106 regarding “Rented or leased motor vehicle safety and responsibility” reads as follows: (a) In General—An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if— (1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles;  and (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner). (b) Financial Responsibility Laws—Nothing in this section supersedes the law of any State or political subdivision thereof— (1) imposing financial responsibility or insurance standards on the owner of a motor vehicle for the privilege of registering and operating a motor vehicle;  or (2) imposing liability on business entities engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles for failure to meet the financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements under State law. (c) Applicability and Effective Date—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this section shall apply with respect to any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of this section without regard to whether the harm that is the subject of the action, or the conduct that caused the harm, occurred before such date of enactment. (d) Definitions—In this section, the following definitions apply: (1) Affiliate—The term “affiliate” means a person other than the owner that directly or indirectly controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the owner.   In the preceding sentence, the term “control” means the power to direct the management and policies of a person whether through ownership of voting securities or otherwise. (2) Owner—The term “owner” means a person who is— (A) a record or beneficial owner, holder of title, lessor, or lessee of a motor vehicle; (B) entitled to the use and possession of a motor vehicle subject to a security interest in another person;  or (C) a lessor, lessee, or a bailee of a motor vehicle, in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles, having the use or possession thereof, under a lease, bailment, or otherwise. (3) Person—The term “person” means any individual, corporation, company, limited liability company, trust, association, firm, partnership, society, joint stock company, or any other entity. FN3. In support of the Motion for Summary Judgment the defendant has filed an affidavit of Vince Moffa, Assistant Secretary of P.V. Holding Corporation stating in summary: 1.  P.V. Holding is a Delaware corporation and is the nominal titleholder for vehicles used in the rental operations of Avis Rent A Car Systems, LLC; 2. “Avis” is in the business of renting passenger vehicles to the public; 3.  Avis Budget Car Rental, LLC is a Delaware Company that subleases vehicles to Avis Rent A Car Systems, LLC for use in the vehicle rental business; 4.  Avis Budget Car Rental, LLC is a direct parent company to P.V. Holdings Corporation and Avis Rent A Car System, LLC, and directs the management policies of both; 5.  The subject vehicle was rented to the plaintiff Patinkin by Avis Rent A Car System, LLC, on March 5, 2008 6.  The plaintiff Patinkin was not an employee of P.V. Holding Corporation, Avis Rent A Car System, LLC or Avis Budget Car Rental, LLC, and was not an agent of those entities on the date of the subject accident. FN4. The defendant's arguments apply, as well, to the State of Connecticut's Intervening Complaint which is identical in substance to the plaintiff Patinkin's Complaint. FN5. These allegations are contained in paragraph 7(i) of the First Count alleging negligence and paragraph 7(k) of the Third Count alleging reckless, willful and wanton misconduct.   The Second Count alleging a violation of General Statutes § 14–295 does not allege a violation of General Statutes § 14–80 or other acts of negligence against P.V. Holdings Corporation.   The Second Count alleges that the defendant Patinkin violated General Statutes § 14–219 (excessive speed), General Statutes § 14–218a (unreasonable speed) and General Statutes § 14–222 (reckless operation). FN6. Neither the Second Count nor the Third Count allege the defendant Patinkin was operating the subject motor vehicle when it was not equipped with brakes adequate to bring it to a controlled stop or that the brakes were not in good working order in violation of Section 14–80 of the Connecticut General Statutes.