Wilbert Lawrence v. State of Connecticut et al. (2011)

FACTS

In August 2010, the plaintiff, Wilbert Lawrence, commenced this action by service of process against the defendants, the Connecticut Board of Education, Department of Education, and Technical High School System, as well as Mark McQuillan, in his official capacities as commissioner of the Department of Education and commissioner of the Board of Education, and the State Vocational Federation of Teachers.

The plaintiff filed a five-count complaint alleging claims for rescission (count one);  intentional misrepresentation (count two);  a CUTPA violation (count three);  declaratory judgment (count four);  and breach of contract (count five).¹  In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following relevant facts.   He was employed as a teacher for the state vocational school system from 1997 through 2010 and was a union member of the State Vocational Federation of Teachers.   In 2010, the state accused the plaintiff of misconduct and the union, on his behalf, entered into negotiations with the state.   During these negotiations, the defendants represented to the plaintiff that if he entered into a stipulated agreement, any and all actions and/or charges pending against him would be terminated and that he would be able to pursue other employment with the state in the form of administrative positions.   The plaintiff alleges that the defendants knew or should have known that these representations were false and that they failed to tell him that other state agencies were investigating him or had pending charges against him.   Relying on these false representations, the plaintiff signed a stipulated agreement on April 9, 2010.   The agreement, attached as an exhibit to the complaint, provides that in lieu of termination for misconduct, the plaintiff would voluntarily resign from his position and not apply to or accept any teaching positions within the state.

On August 31, 2010, the defendants, with the exception of the State Vocational Federal of Teachers, filed a motion to dismiss counts one through four on the grounds that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, are not ripe for adjudication and the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.   The defendants also move to dismiss the CUTPA claim on the ground that the state is not a person engaged in trade or commerce.   On October 22, 2010, the plaintiffs filed an objection and a supporting memorandum of law.   The defendants submitted a reply memorandum on October 27, 2010.

DISCUSSION

“In general, a motion to dismiss is the proper procedural vehicle to raise a claim that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action.”   Bellman v. West Hartford, 96 Conn.App. 387, 392, 900 A.2d 82 (2006).  “[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Bacon Construction Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 294 Conn. 695, 706, 987 A.2d 348 (2010).   In addition, “ripeness is a sine qua non of justiciability ․ An issue regarding justiciability ․ must be resolved as a threshold matter because it implicates [the] court's subject matter jurisdiction ․ If it becomes apparent to the court that such jurisdiction is lacking, the [cause] must be dismissed.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Lone Star Industries, Inc., 290 Conn. 767, 812, 967 A.2d 1 (2009).   Finally, “Under [the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine], a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action that seeks a remedy that could be provided through an administrative proceeding, unless and until that remedy has been sought in the administrative forum ․ In the absence of exhaustion of that remedy, the action must be dismissed.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Garcia v. Hartford, 292 Conn. 334, 339, 972 A.2d 706 (2009).

“[I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ․ clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Wilcox v. Webster Ins. Co., 294 Conn. 206, 213–14, 982 A.2d 1053 (2009).  “In deciding a motion to dismiss that challenges the court's jurisdiction, the court must take the facts alleged in the complaint, including facts necessarily implied from the allegations, and construe them in the light most favorable to the pleader.”  Kelly v. Albertson, 114 Conn.App. 600, 605–06, 970 A.2d 787 (2009).   Moreover, “[i]t is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Wilcox v. Webster Ins. Co., supra, 294 Conn. 214.

Count One:  Rescission

The defendants argue that count one should be dismissed under the doctrine of sovereign immunity because the plaintiff has not received permission to sue from the claims commissioner.  “Our courts have long recognized the validity of the common-law principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent ․ A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends ․ The doctrine of sovereign immunity operates as a strong presumption in favor of the state's immunity from liability or suit ․ When the legislature intends to waive immunity from suit or liability, it expresses that intent by using explicit statutory language ․ Accordingly, to circumvent the strong presumption of sovereign immunity in an action for monetary damages, the burden is on the plaintiff to show that ․ the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waived the state's sovereign immunity ․ Exceptions to [the] doctrine [of sovereign immunity] are few and narrowly construed under our jurisprudence ․ which is consistent with what our Supreme Court has termed its longstanding adherence to the strict requirements for a waiver of such immunity ․ In the absence of a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, the plaintiff may not bring an action against the state for monetary damages without authorization from the claims commissioner to do so ․” (Citations omitted;  Internal quotation marks omitted.)   DePietro v. Department of Public Safety, 126 Conn.App. 414, 417–18, 11 A.3d 1149 (2011).

It is undisputed that the legislature has not statutorily waived the state's sovereign immunity and that plaintiff in the current case did not receive authorization from the claims commissioner.   See id.;  184 Windsor Avenue, LLC v. State, 274 Conn. 302, 313–14, 875 A.2d 498 (2005) (trial court properly granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's breach of contract claim because state did not waive sovereign immunity).

The plaintiff argues that he does not need permission from the claims commissioner because he seeks the equitable remedy of rescission, not money damages.   It is true that the “sovereign immunity enjoyed by the state is not absolute.   There are [three] exceptions:  (1) when the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waives the state's sovereign immunity ․ (2) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights ․ and (3) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer's statutory authority ․ For a claim made pursuant to the first exception, this court has recognized the well established principle that statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed ․ Where there is any doubt about their meaning or intent they are given the effect which makes the least rather than the most change in sovereign immunity ․ For a claim made pursuant to the second exception, complaining of unconstitutional acts, we require that [t]he allegations of such a complaint and the factual underpinnings if placed in issue, must clearly demonstrate an incursion upon constitutionally protected interests ․ For a claim under the third exception, the plaintiffs must do more than allege that the defendants' conduct was in excess of their statutory authority;  they also must allege or otherwise establish facts that reasonably support those allegations ․ In the absence of a proper factual basis in the complaint to support the applicability of these exceptions, the granting of a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds is proper ․” Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 293 Conn. 342, 349–50, 977 A.2d 636 (2009).

Even if this court were to assume that the plaintiff is seeking declaratory relief in the form of rescission of a contract,² the plaintiff has failed to meet his pleading requirements as to the second and third exceptions.   As to the second exception, the plaintiff has failed to clearly allege an incursion upon a constitutionally protected interest.   Simso v. State, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 02 0819172 (April 7, 2003, Sheldon, J.) (“Claims for declaratory relief based on non-constitutional claims are properly barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity if so challenged”).   Similarly, as to the third exception, the plaintiff has failed to substantially allege that McQuillan, in his official capacity, engaged in wrongful conduct to achieve an illegal purpose in excess of his statutory authority.   Because the state did not waive its sovereign immunity or consent to this suit through the claims commissioner and because this suit does not fall within one of the common-law exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the defendants' motion to dismiss count one is granted because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

Counts Two & Three:  Intentional Misrepresentation & CUTPA violation

The defendants argue that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the plaintiff's claims for intentional misrepresentation and a CUTPA violation because he has not received permission to sue from the claims commissioner.   “When a plaintiff brings an action for money damages against the state, he must proceed through the office of the claims commissioner pursuant to chapter 53 of the General Statutes, §§ 4–141 through 4–165.   Otherwise, the action must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.”  Prigge v. Ragaglia, 265 Conn. 338, 349, 828 A.2d 542 (2003).   The plaintiff in the present case concedes in his memorandum of law that he must first apply to the claims commissioner for a right to sue, which he did not originally do.   Although the plaintiff has represented that he has since filed a notice of claim with the claims commissioner, he has not yet received permission from the office of the claims commissioner to bring his claims for money damages against the state, pursuant to General Statutes § 4–160.³  Therefore, the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars these claims.   The motion to dismiss counts two and three is granted.

Count Four:  Declaratory Judgment

The defendants argue that, like count one, this claim is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.   The plaintiff, relying on Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 314, 828 A.2d 549 (2003), argues that a declaratory judgment action is not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.⁴  The plaintiff's argument, however, is based on a myopic reading of Miller.   As previously discussed, supra, sovereign immunity does not bar actions for declaratory relief as long as “the state officer or officers against whom such relief is sought acted in excess of statutory authority, or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute.”  (Citation omitted.)  Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 314.   See also Gold v. Rowland, 296 Conn. 186, 212, 994 A.2d 106 (2010).

The plaintiff has not alleged that a state official acted pursuant to an unconstitutional statute.   As to the “in excess of statutory authority” exception, “when a process of statutory interpretation establishes that the state officials acted beyond their authority, sovereign immunity does not bar an action seeking declaratory or injunctive relief.”  Miller v. Eagen, supra, 327.   For example, in Cox v. Aiken, 278 Conn. 204, 213–14 897 A.2d 71 (2006) the Supreme Court held that the trial court properly denied a defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity where the plaintiff alleged that he was laid off in violation of General Statutes § 5–241, which is sufficient to establish that the defendants acted in excess of the statutory authority vested in them by § 5–241.   Unlike the plaintiff in Cox, the plaintiff in the present case has failed to allege that McQuillan acted in excess of his statutory authority.   For those reasons, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the fourth.   The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the plaintiff's claim.

CONCLUSION

The court grants the defendants' motion as to counts one and four because the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the plaintiff's claims and deprives this court of subject matter jurisdiction.   The court grants the defendants' motion as to counts two and three because the plaintiff concedes that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars his claims until he obtains a release from the claims commissioner.

Robaina, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Attached to this complaint are three exhibits:  The first includes the plaintiff's annual work evaluations for the years 2007 through 2009;  letters from the school principal;  a Sixth Year Educational Diploma of Advanced Studies in Educational Leadership from Central Connecticut State University, dated May 17, 2008;  and an award from the mayor of Hartford, dated June 19, 2008.   Exhibit two is a stipulated agreement, signed April 9, 2010.   Exhibit three is a letter from the plaintiff's attorney asking that he be restored to his position and that the agreement be rescinded, dated June 23, 2010..  FN1. Attached to this complaint are three exhibits:  The first includes the plaintiff's annual work evaluations for the years 2007 through 2009;  letters from the school principal;  a Sixth Year Educational Diploma of Advanced Studies in Educational Leadership from Central Connecticut State University, dated May 17, 2008;  and an award from the mayor of Hartford, dated June 19, 2008.   Exhibit two is a stipulated agreement, signed April 9, 2010.   Exhibit three is a letter from the plaintiff's attorney asking that he be restored to his position and that the agreement be rescinded, dated June 23, 2010.

FN2. The second and third exceptions do not apply to actions seeking monetary damages against the state.  Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 321, 828 A.2d 549 (2003).   It is noted that, as to count one, the plaintiff seeks restitution, costs and interests..  FN2. The second and third exceptions do not apply to actions seeking monetary damages against the state.  Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 321, 828 A.2d 549 (2003).   It is noted that, as to count one, the plaintiff seeks restitution, costs and interests.

FN3. Section 4–160 provides in relevant part:  “(a) When the Claims Commissioner deems it just and equitable, the Claims Commissioner may authorize suit against the state on any claim which, in the opinion of the Claims Commissioner, presents an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a private person, could be liable ․ (c) In each action authorized by the Claims Commissioner pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of this section or by the General Assembly pursuant to section 4–159 or 4–159a, the claimant shall allege such authorization and the date on which it was granted, except that evidence of such authorization shall not be admissible in such action as evidence of the state's liability ․”.  FN3. Section 4–160 provides in relevant part:  “(a) When the Claims Commissioner deems it just and equitable, the Claims Commissioner may authorize suit against the state on any claim which, in the opinion of the Claims Commissioner, presents an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a private person, could be liable ․ (c) In each action authorized by the Claims Commissioner pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of this section or by the General Assembly pursuant to section 4–159 or 4–159a, the claimant shall allege such authorization and the date on which it was granted, except that evidence of such authorization shall not be admissible in such action as evidence of the state's liability ․”

FN4. General Statutes § 52–59, which provides that (a) The superior court in any action or proceeding may declare rights and other legal relations on request for such a declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.   The declaration shall have the force of a final judgment. (b) The judges of the superior court may make such orders and rules as they deem necessary or advisable to carry into effect the provisions of this section..  FN4. General Statutes § 52–59, which provides that (a) The superior court in any action or proceeding may declare rights and other legal relations on request for such a declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.   The declaration shall have the force of a final judgment. (b) The judges of the superior court may make such orders and rules as they deem necessary or advisable to carry into effect the provisions of this section.

Robaina, Antonio C., J.