Robert Thomas v. State of Connecticut, Department of Social Services (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The plaintiff, Robert Thomas, appeals pursuant to General Statutes §§ 4–176(h) and 4–183(a) from a declaratory ruling of the department of social services (DSS), upholding a prior decision of a DSS hearing officer.   The hearing officer concluded that the plaintiff's pending separate lawsuit was subject to a lien under §§ 17a–93, 17a–94 for state benefits paid to two children of which he was found to be a “parent.”

The record shows that on March 31, 2009, the plaintiff requested a DSS hearing to dispute the notice of the lien placed by the department of administrative services (DAS) on a pending lawsuit brought by the plaintiff.   The hearing was duly held and on August 24, 2009, a DSS hearing officer issued a decision.   The hearing officer made the following findings of fact:

1.  On February 28, 1986, M.G. signed a petition for a finding of paternity for her twin daughters.   The petition named Robert Thomas, Jr. [appellant before DSS, and now the plaintiff in this court] as the father of the ․ twin daughters.

2. On May 15, 1986, the appellant was adjudicated as the father of twin daughters born ․ on August 6, 1985.

3. On January 27, 1998, the Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, re-opened the above mentioned 1986 judgment based upon the lack of service and/or notice.

4. On January 27, 1998, the parties in M.G. v. Robert Thomas entered into an agreement whereby the parties agreed to the following:  (1) Robert Thomas shall execute an Acknowledgment of Paternity for the children;  (2) “The judgment entered on May 15, 1986 was without jurisdiction and shall be dismissed”;  (3) “All arrearages to the State of Connecticut are vacated”;  and (4) “The State of Connecticut shall pursue a Support Petition for support.”

5. On January 27, 1998, the Appellant signed form JD–FM–46 (Non–IVD) Information about the Acknowledgment of Paternity, which advised him of his right not to sign the acknowledgment if he denies that he is the father;  his right to request genetic testing;  and the rights and benefits accorded to the children for whom paternity was acknowledged.

6. On January 27, 1998, the Appellant acknowledged having read, or to have had read to him the statements contained on the JD–FM–46 form and the section titled Waiver of Rights.   With his signature, he waived his rights to a genetic (blood) test;  a trial by court or jury;  and an attorney.

7. On January 28, 1998, the Appellant signed an Acknowledgment of Paternity for the children born to M.G. on 8/6/85.

8. On January 27, 1998 and January 28, 1998, the Appellant was represented by counsel at the signing of the acknowledgment and the JD–FM–46.   The Appellant's counsel signed the acknowledgment and the JD–FM–46 form attesting to the Appellant's signatures.

9. By signing the Acknowledgment of Paternity and the JD–FM–46 form, the Appellant voluntarily and freely declared that he is the natural father (of the children.)

10. The Appellant presented no evidence to demonstrate that the copy of Acknowledgment of Paternity, presented by the Department, is altered or defective in its content.

11. Subsequent to the administrative hearing the Department provided a true copy of the court file in the matter of M.G. v. Robert Thomas certified by the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for the judicial district of New Haven, for the hearing record.   Included in the court file is a copy of the Acknowledgment of Paternity signed by the Appellant on January 28, 1998.

12. The certified copy of the Acknowledgment of Paternity and the copy of the Acknowledgment originally presented by the Department are one and the same document, executed by the Appellant on January 28, 1998.

13. The Appellant is the father and legally liable relative of twins.

14. The Appellant has a pending cause of action against Progressive Group of Insurance Companies.

15. M.G. and her children received AFDC and TFA (CLEM # 739771/EMS AU # 518447) for the period July 9, 1985 to August 1, 2003.

16. One of the Appellant's daughters received cash assistance.   The Appellant's [other] daughter also received cash assistance.

* * * *

19. The Department received total reimbursements through child support and/or payments for the period of November 1, 1986 to July 20, 2004 of $308.10.

20. The total cash assistance received by the Appellant's children for the period July 9, 1985 to August 1, 2003 was $108,987.19.

21. The total amount of assistance paid to or on behalf of the Appellant's children after reimbursements, is $108,679.09, ($108,987.19 cash assistance 7/9/85 to 8/1/03 minus $308.18, total reimbursements).

22. On February 6, 2009, the DAS notified the Progressive Group of Insurance Companies of the State's lien on the Appellant's cause of action pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 17b–93 and § 17b–94.

23. On March 23, 2009, the DAS notified the Appellant's attorney of the State's lien on his cause of action pursuant to § 17b–93 and § 17b–94.

24. On April 27, 2009, the DAS notified the Appellant's attorney of the final lien amount of $108,679.09 for cash assistance received from November 1, 1989 to August 1, 2003 by the Appellant's children.

25. The time period of the receipt of cash assistance was corrected to July 9, 1985 through August 1, 2003.

26. In accordance with UPM § 7505.05(A) the State's claim is for the entire amount of assistance provided or 50% of the net proceeds whichever is less.   (Return of Record, ROR, pp. 38–40.)

The hearing officer drew legal conclusions, based on these findings of fact.   The question to be resolved was whether the appellant was the “parent of a child who received cash assistance while under the age of 18.”  (ROR, p. 43.)   “The Appellant signed the acknowledgment on January 28, 1998, as part of an agreement whereby a previous judgment of paternity was dismissed and child support arrears were vacated.   As part of the accord, the appellant agreed to execute an Acknowledgment of Paternity for the children ․ In addition to the acknowledgment, the appellant also signed the JD–FM–46 Information about the Acknowledgment of Paternity, which contains information regarding his rights to request genetic testing to determine paternity, a court trial and an attorney.   The JD–FM–46 also contains language advising an individual not to sign the acknowledgment, if he believed he is not the father.   The appellant signed the JD–FM–45 and waived his rights to genetic testing and court trial.   By signing these two documents, the appellant voluntarily and freely declared that he is the natural father of the children in question.”  (Id.)

The hearing officer also examined the Acknowledgment of Paternity document as initially introduced at the hearing and found that it matched the document in the certified court record.   Finally the hearing officer reviewed the DSS print-outs to determine if these children were in fact the same children as on the acknowledgment.  (Id., pp. 43–44.)   The decision of the hearing officer upheld the lien on the Appellant's cause of action, as (1) the acknowledgment of paternity “was valid for the purposes of ․ §§ 17b–93, 17b–94,” (2) there was no evidence that the appellant rescinded the acknowledgment of paternity, (3) the appellant is the father of the twin daughters, and (4) the appellant is liable for the repayment of assistance received by or on behalf of his children while they were under the age of 18.  (ROR, p. 44.)

The plaintiff appealed this decision on September 30, 2009 as an administrative appeal, § 4–183, from a final decision of the DSS. On October 29, 2009, the DSS moved to dismiss.   The basis of this motion was that under Peters v. Dept. of Social Services, 273 Conn. 434, 870 A.2d 448 (2005), even though the plaintiff was granted a gratuitous hearing by the DSS regarding his §§ 17b–93, 17b–94 lien, this was not a statutorily mandated hearing.   Therefore this was not a final decision for purposes of § 4–183.  Id., 447.   The August 24 decision also indicated that “the appellant does not have the right to appeal the decision to the Connecticut Superior Court” citing Peters.  (ROR, p. 44.)   Subsequently the plaintiff withdrew his administrative appeal.¹

On March 15, 2010, the plaintiff requested a declaratory ruling from the DSS. The ruling was issued by the DSS commissioner on May 13, 2010.  (ROR, pp. 31–36.)   The ruling consisted of four questions posed by the plaintiff and a response to each question from the commissioner.   These questions and responses are summarized below as follows:

Question 1:  “Whether a lien pursuant to ․ §§ 17b–93 and 94 can be enforced against a parent without a legal determination of paternity?”

Response:  The liability for a “parent” under §§ 17b–93 and 17b–94 is not imposed with any specific type of proof, such as a legal determination of paternity, but “when there is substantial evidence indicating that an individual is the natural or adoptive parent.”  (ROR, p. 33.)

Question 2:  “Whether the [DSS] has the statutory authority to determine paternity in order to enforce the statutory lien pursuant to ․ §§ 17b–93 and 94?”

Response:  While the DSS does not actually place the lien of §§ 17b–93, 94, as the statutes delegate placement of the lien to the department of administrative services, a person who receives a lien notice may ask for a hearing from the DSS. The hearing is held under § 17b–60 allowing the party to contest the existence or amount of the lien.   This hearing is not statutorily required, but allowed pursuant to a consent decree in federal court.  (ROR, p. 34.)

Question 3:  “Whether paternity can be established by a document that is legally defective and insufficient to establish paternity and bind an accused in order to enforce the provisions of ․ §§ 17b–93 and 94?”

Response:  “As previously discussed, there are no statutory or regulatory requirements concerning how parenthood must be established prior to the imposition of a lien under sections 17b–93 and 17b–94 of the Connecticut General Statutes.   Accordingly, it is up to the Department of Administrative Services and the Department of Social Services Hearing Officer to rely on whatever documentation they believe is reasonable and reliable to determine whether the person whose cause of action proceeds are proposed to be liened is the parent of the beneficiary.   Notably, evidence or documentation of parentage that may not be legally sufficient for another purpose may still be utilized for the lien determinations raised in this ruling.   At the administrative hearing, the Petitioner had the right to present evidence that the documentation the Department of Administrative Service used to show that the Petitioner was a natural parent, and subject to sections 17b–93 and 17b–94 of the Connecticut General Statutes, was inadequate, which he attempted to do.”

“In the Petitioner's case, the Hearing Officer made the determination in her Notice of Decision, dated August 24, 2009, that the Petitioner was the parent of the children for whom state assistance was provided.   She concluded that the petitioner was the twins' father based on several factors.”

“First, the Hearing Officer found as a fact that, on February 28, 1986, MG signed a petition for a finding of paternity for her twin daughters born August 6, 1985, naming the Petitioner as the father of the twins.”

“In addition, on January 28, 1998, the Petitioner signed an Acknowledgment of Paternity form concerning the children at issue in this matter.”

“Moreover, the Hearing Officer found that the Petitioner signed the Acknowledgment of Paternity form after also signing the JD–FM–46 form, entitled “Information about the Acknowledgment of Paternity,” which advised him of his right not to sign the Acknowledgment of Paternity form if he denied that he was the father of the children.   The JD–FM–46 form also informed the Petitioner of his right to request genetic testing and the rights and benefits accorded to the children for whom paternity was acknowledged.   The Petitioner also acknowledged that he had read, or had read to him, the JD–FM–46 form and that he was waiving his rights to a genetic (blood) test.”

“The Petitioner was represented by counsel at the signing of the Acknowledgment of Paternity form and the JD–FM–46 form and the Petitioner's counsel signed these forms attesting to the Petitioner's signature.   There was no information or evidence presented that the documents had been altered or were in any way defective, which would possibly cast doubt on their validity ․ The Acknowledgment of Paternity form presented to the Hearing Officer was identical to the Acknowledgment of Paternity form in the true copy of the court file, which was certified by the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for the Judicial District of New Haven ․”

“The above-referenced information and evidence provide a sufficient legal basis for the determination of the propriety of the lien issued against the Petitioner as the parent of these children, regardless of whether it may be adequate for other legal determinations.”  (ROR, pp. 34–35.)

Question 4:  “Whether the [DSS] can determine the legal sufficiency of a document to establish paternity in order to enforce a lien pursuant to ․ § 17b–93 and 94?”

Response:  “The purpose of an administrative hearing by the [DSS] is to provide the individual against whom a lien has been placed with the opportunity to establish that the lien was incorrectly placed or that the amount of the lien is incorrect.   As part of that process, the Hearing Officer reviews all of the evidence presented.   Part of that process entails determining the legal sufficiency of documentary evidence supporting a finding that a person is a parent for purposes of enforcing the lien.   In this case ․ the Hearing Officer reviewed the documentation provided by the [DAS] concerning whether the Petitioner is the father of the children for whom assistance was provided by the [DSS].” The hearing officer found substantial evidence existed to conclude that the plaintiff was a parent and that the documents in evidence were genuine.  (ROR, pp. 35–36.)

This appeal was filed on issuance of the declaratory ruling.   The plaintiff makes the following claims:  (1) The record,² either in the declaratory ruling proceeding or at the administrative hearing, failed to establish that he was a “parent” for purposes of §§ 17b–93, 17b–94;  (2) The hearing officer in the August 24 decision and the commissioner in the declaratory ruling could not rely on the January 1998 documents to find the plaintiff was the parent;  (3) A finding that one is a parent should not be reviewed by the court under “the substantial evidence test”;  (4) The DSS had no jurisdiction to make a determination that the plaintiff was a parent for purposes of §§ 17b–93, 17b–94;  and (5) the plaintiff was denied constitutional due process in the finding that he was a parent.

The plaintiff's claims are reviewed under the following standard.   This is an appeal from a declaratory ruling.   The DSS commissioner, in issuing the ruling, relied upon factual findings and conclusions therefrom made by the DSS hearing officer.  “[A]n administrative agency's decision [is reviewed under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), §§ 4–166 through 4–189] for abuse of discretion to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the agency's findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Connecticut Motor Cars v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 300 Conn. 617, 621–22, 15 A.3d 1063 (2011).

“[J]udicial review of the [department's] action is governed by the ․ UAPA ․ and the scope of that review is very restricted ․ [R]eview of an administrative agency decision requires a court to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the agency's findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable ․ [T]he trial court may [not] retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the weight of the evidence or questions of fact ․ Our ultimate duty is to determine, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion ․ An administrative finding is supported by substantial evidence if the record affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred ․ The substantial evidence rule imposes an important limitation on the power of the courts to overturn a decision of an administrative agency ․ It is fundamental that a plaintiff has the burden of proving that the [department], on the facts before [it], acted contrary to law and in abuse of [its] discretion ․ The law is also well established that if the decision of the [department] is reasonably supported by the evidence it must be sustained.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Hogberg v. Dept. of Social Services, 123 Conn.App. 545, 552–53, 1 A.3d 1287 (2010).

To the extent that the declaratory ruling addressed issues of law, the following standard applies:  “Conclusions of law reached [in an agency's declaratory ruling] must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts.”  Wallingford v. Dept. of Public Health, 262 Conn. 758, 772, 817 A.2d 644 (2003);  “Ordinarily, [o]ur resolution of [administrative appeals] is guided by the limited scope of judicial review afforded by the ․ UAPA to determinations made by an administrative agency ․ A reviewing court, however, is not required to defer to an improper application of the law ․ It is the function of the courts to expound and apply governing principles of law ․ We have previously recognized that the construction and interpretation of a statute is a question of law for the courts, where the administrative decision is not entitled to special deference ․

“Because this case forces us to examine ․ [statutory] construction and interpretation ․ our review is de novo ․ The principles that govern statutory construction are well established.   When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature ․ In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply ․ In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1–2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.   If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered ․ When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Cashman, 283 Conn. 644, 649–51, 931 A.2d 142 (2007) (review of Superior Court's opinion sustaining declaratory ruling).

The first issue raised by the plaintiff starts with the agreement of the parties that the plaintiff must be a “parent” for the lien to apply to him.   The plaintiff then argues that under the circumstances of this case he became a parent, if at all, only by conception, or through a judicial determination thereof or his acknowledgment of paternity.   See Doe v. Doe, 244 Conn. 403, 435, 710 A.2d 1297;  Raftopol v. Ramey, 299 Conn. 681, 12 A.3d 783 (2011).³  The plaintiff concludes by arguing that there was no proof in the record that he conceived the children ⁴ or that there was a judicial determination under § 46b–160 or that he acknowledged paternity in strict compliance with § 46b–172.

As the commissioner of DSS and the DSS hearing officer pointed out, however, the determination that the plaintiff is a “parent” of the children for purposes of §§ 17b–93, 17b–94 and DAS regulation § 4a–12–1(f) (liability on “natural parent”) is not dependent on compliance with § 46b–172.  Sections 17b–93, 17b–94 are clear and there is no need for extratextual supplementation.  Section 17b–93(a) provides in part:  “If a beneficiary of aid [from the state] acquires ․ interest in any property ․ the state of Connecticut shall have a claim;  ․ the parents ․ shall be liable to repay.”  Section 17b–94 provides in part:  “In the case of causes of action of beneficiaries [of state aid] ․ the claim of the state shall be a lien against the proceeds thereof.”   These provisions, mandating a lien against parent-beneficiaries, do not depend on the definition of “paternity” in Doe v. Doe, supra, nor is the lien tied by statute to the acknowledgment of paternity of § 46b–172.⁵

Precedent from all court levels supports the DSS conclusion.   In State v. Wolfe, 156 Conn. 199, 205–06, 239 A.2d 509 (1968), our Supreme Court in similar circumstances found that an “unsworn but written acknowledgment of paternity” met the requirements of a legally-liable-relative statute.  “The language ․ is plain, and it cannot be construed to embrace a requirement which obviously it does not.”   The Appellate Court in Fischer v. Goldstein, 14 Conn.App. 487, 489–90, 542 A.2d 731 (1988) came to the same conclusion where the defendant had made repeated statements that he was in fact the father of the child.  “It would be unrealistic to expect the trial court to listen to the respondent's fervent declarations that he was the father and then to hold that he was not.   This court also refuses to participate in such judicial folly ․ No authority can be found to support the respondent's contention that paternity can only be established through proceedings pursuant to General Statutes §§ 46b–172, 46b–172a and 46b–173.”   Finally, Judge Alander in the Superior Court upheld a family support magistrate's finding of paternity based on the defendant's unsworn, written acknowledgment.   See Donoghue v. McCormick, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 410533, (December 15, 2000, Alander, J.).

The hearing officer made findings of fact that in this court under the substantial evidence test ⁶ establish that the plaintiff was the parent of the children.   By Finding 4, the state was to set aside the prior determination of 1986 that he was the father, but he was to execute a new acknowledgment of paternity.   By Finding 5, the plaintiff signed a form that he had been advised not to sign the acknowledgment of paternity if he denied that he was the father and that he had the right to genetic testing.   By Finding 6, the plaintiff acknowledged reading the form and that he waived his rights to a blood test, trial by court or jury, and an attorney.   By Findings 7 and 9, the plaintiff signed the Acknowledgment of Paternity and voluntarily and freely declared that he is the natural father of the children.   There was substantial evidence in the record ⁷ for the hearing officer to make the finding that the plaintiff was a liable parent, and for the commissioner of DSS to conclude that §§ 17b–93, 17b–94 may be enforced against the plaintiff.

After the oral argument, the court notified the parties that it was adding to the record a collection of documents introduced by the DSS before the hearing officer.  (See footnote 2 above.) ⁸  On May 2, 2011, the parties were notified by the court that they might also “submit further documents or transcripts” from the administrative hearing to supplement the record.

In response to this order, the plaintiff pointed to three documents already contained in Exhibit 5 that he contends are relevant in the court's review of the declaratory ruling.   Two are the certificates of live birth of the twins.   (Supplemental record, pp. 91, 93.)   The third document is the agreement entered into by the plaintiff and the state on January 27, 1998.  (Supplemental record, pp. 49.)

The certificates of live birth leave blank and cross out the section where the name of the father is to appear.   The January agreement is signed by the plaintiff, his attorney, and the assistant attorney general.   It bears the notation that no court order was entered on January 27 based on this agreement.

The court assumes that the plaintiff is arguing that these documents demonstrate that there is insufficient evidence that he is the father of the children.   On the other hand, the evaluation of evidence is “the exclusive province of the trier of fact” who may credit some, all or none of it.  “Nor is an agency required to use in any particular fashion any of the materials presented to it as long as the conduct of the hearing is fundamentally fair.”   (Citations omitted.)  Goldstar Medical Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Social Services, 288 Conn. 790, 830, 955 A.2d 15 (2008).   As indicated above, the record certainly supports the hearing officer and the DSS commissioner in finding that the plaintiff admitted to being the father of the children.

The plaintiff argues secondly that the DSS erred in relying on the 1986 documents in determining that the plaintiff was a parent.   He further argues that the 1998 documents initially relied upon by the hearing officer were defective.   The record before the court, as indicated above, includes the document setting aside the 1986 determination of paternity and the 1998 documents in which the plaintiff admitted to paternity.   There is nothing in the record indicating that the DSS relied on the determination of paternity made in 1986.⁹  Furthermore, the DSS hearing officer made three findings of fact that settle the validity of the plaintiff's 1998 admission.   Finding 10 states that there was no evidence to show the Acknowledgment of Paternity was defective;  Finding 11 recites that the DSS produced the court file with the admission by the plaintiff;  Finding 12 states that the hearing officer had compared the court documents with the documents initially submitted at the hearing and they were identical.  (ROR, p. 39.)

The plaintiff next contends that the substantial evidence test for judicial review is erroneous when the DSS determines that one is the parent-father, subjecting him to a lien on his pending litigation.   According to the plaintiff, in finding that one is a “parent” a stricter standard of review is required.   As the court has explained, however, proceedings under §§ 17b–93, 17b–94 are administrative in nature, and are not based on a definition of “paternity.”

The purpose of these sections is “the recoupment of public assistance funds from those now able to make repayment.   The legislature and the courts recognize that public assistance grants to those in need are a worthy necessity.   No less necessary is the availability of funds to these programs and it is for this purpose that the legislature has enacted such provisions as those under consideration ․ In view of the severe shortage of public assistance funds and the ever mounting demands on them, there is certainly a bona fide government interest in recouping such funds from persons who subsequently receive funds from other sources.”  (Citation omitted.)   Thibeault v. White, 168 Conn. 112, 118, 358 A.2d 358 (1975).   The DSS is following this legislative directive in placing the lien against the plaintiff's pending cause of action.   Under these circumstances, the court was required to evaluate the DSS determination under the substantial evidence test.

The plaintiff contends that the DSS had no jurisdiction to determine that the plaintiff was a parent.   On the contrary, the DSS had both the statutory duty and authority to institute recoupment proceedings against the plaintiff, as provided in §§ 17b–93, 17b–94.   In a similar circumstance, our Supreme Court stated that the DSS had jurisdiction to impose an administrative sanction, if allowed by the language of the statute.  “In construing a statute, common sense must be used and courts must assume that a reasonable and rational result was intended ․ We must avoid a construction that fails to attain a rational and sensible result that bears directly on the purpose the legislature sought to achieve ․ [T]he department did not lack jurisdiction to sanction the plaintiffs.”  (Citations omitted.)  Goldstar Medical Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Social Services, supra, 288 Conn. 803–07.   Here, as well, the DSS had jurisdiction to pursue a parent for recoupment, based on the clear statutory provisions.

Finally, the plaintiff challenges the taking of his property (the pending claim in litigation) as a denial of due process.   This argument has been rejected by the Connecticut Supreme Court.   See State v. Griffiths, 152 Conn. 48, 55, 203 A.2d 144 (1964);  see also State v. Strickland, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 00 080307 (November 18, 2002, Beach, J.) [33 Conn. L. Rptr. 638], agreeing with Griffiths, as a hearing was available to contest whether the property in question became subject to a state lien.   The cases from the U.S. Supreme Court agree.   See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (due process satisfied with hearing held after benefits revoked).   The liability of a parent for a repayment of benefits is one of those matters over which the DSS has considerable latitude without violating the Constitution.   See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970).

The court finds that the declaratory ruling of the DSS was not unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion.   The administrative appeal is therefore dismissed.

Henry S. Cohn, Judge

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The plaintiff was entitled on procedural due process grounds to a hearing under § 17b–60 after placement of the lien by DAS. See DelVecchio v. Freedman, United States District Court, District of Connecticut, Docket No. N–86–136 (March 23, 1982);  Tristani v. Richman, 609 F.Sup.2d 423 (W.D.Pa.2009)..  FN1. The plaintiff was entitled on procedural due process grounds to a hearing under § 17b–60 after placement of the lien by DAS. See DelVecchio v. Freedman, United States District Court, District of Connecticut, Docket No. N–86–136 (March 23, 1982);  Tristani v. Richman, 609 F.Sup.2d 423 (W.D.Pa.2009).

FN2. The record submitted to this court from the declaratory ruling was attested by the DSS on July 30, 2010.   It consists of the petition for declaratory ruling, the declaratory ruling itself with Exhibit A (the hearing officer's decision of August 24, 2009) and Exhibit B (Acknowledgment of Paternity), and a certificate of service of the declaratory ruling.   The court ordered that this record be supplemented with a collection of documents submitted by the DSS to the hearing officer in the administrative hearing.   The hearing officer refers to this collection as Exhibit 5, certified copy of New Haven Superior Court file # FA 96–0391813..  FN2. The record submitted to this court from the declaratory ruling was attested by the DSS on July 30, 2010.   It consists of the petition for declaratory ruling, the declaratory ruling itself with Exhibit A (the hearing officer's decision of August 24, 2009) and Exhibit B (Acknowledgment of Paternity), and a certificate of service of the declaratory ruling.   The court ordered that this record be supplemented with a collection of documents submitted by the DSS to the hearing officer in the administrative hearing.   The hearing officer refers to this collection as Exhibit 5, certified copy of New Haven Superior Court file # FA 96–0391813.

FN3. The parties agree that the record does not support that the plaintiff adopted the children, or that this is an artificial insemination situation..  FN3. The parties agree that the record does not support that the plaintiff adopted the children, or that this is an artificial insemination situation.

FN4. While offered to the plaintiff, he has not arranged for genetic testing..  FN4. While offered to the plaintiff, he has not arranged for genetic testing.

FN5. The DSS lists in its brief (pages 13–15) statutes involving paternity where a § 46b–172 acknowledgment of paternity is or is not required..  FN5. The DSS lists in its brief (pages 13–15) statutes involving paternity where a § 46b–172 acknowledgment of paternity is or is not required.

FN6. The third claim of the plaintiff is that the substantial evidence test does not apply to the determination of parentage.   This point is discussed below..  FN6. The third claim of the plaintiff is that the substantial evidence test does not apply to the determination of parentage.   This point is discussed below.

FN7. See Supplemental Record, pp. 48, 49, 71, 72..  FN7. See Supplemental Record, pp. 48, 49, 71, 72.

FN8. The court has the authority to require additions to the record. § 4–183(g).  The court concluded that it could not render a decision on the declaratory ruling without having documents contained in Exhibit 5 before the hearing officer..  FN8. The court has the authority to require additions to the record. § 4–183(g).  The court concluded that it could not render a decision on the declaratory ruling without having documents contained in Exhibit 5 before the hearing officer.

FN9. The plaintiff may be contending that the DAS placed its lien because the DAS or DSS thought that the plaintiff had admitted paternity in 1986 and since this determination was vacated, the lien is invalid.   But the plaintiff overlooks that he received a hearing that demonstrated that the lien was valid due to his 1998 admissions..  FN9. The plaintiff may be contending that the DAS placed its lien because the DAS or DSS thought that the plaintiff had admitted paternity in 1986 and since this determination was vacated, the lien is invalid.   But the plaintiff overlooks that he received a hearing that demonstrated that the lien was valid due to his 1998 admissions.

Cohn, Henry S., J.