IN RE: Alexia Emma Q.1 (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION Re Termination of Parental Rights

On October 13, 2009, the petitioner, the commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, (“DCF”), filed a petition pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a–112 et seq. to terminate the parental rights of Kelly S. and Daniel Q. to their minor child, Alexia Q. The mother and father have appeared and are represented by counsel.   Neither parent claims Indian Tribal affiliation.   The court is aware of no other proceedings pending in any other court regarding the custody of the child.   This court has jurisdiction.

The file reflects that the child was removed on December 31, 2008, three days after her birth.   The order of temporary custody in favor of DCF was granted by agreement on January 9, 2009.   Specific steps were prepared and distributed to the respondents and DCF on the same date.   The child was subsequently adjudicated neglected on April 7, 2009.   The prior specific steps were confirmed.

The petition alleges that as to both parents, the child was found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for on April 7, 2009, and the parents have failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and the needs of the child, they could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.  C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(I).

The court heard the testimony of nine witnesses including a DCF social worker, an evaluating psychologist, police officers, the visitation and parent education counselor, an undergraduate student intern who has been providing counseling to the respondent mother, and a methadone maintenance provider and the respondent, Kelly's, mother.   Documents were entered into evidence including social studies, social worker affidavits, psychologists reports, signed specific steps and criminal histories of both parents.   Both parents appeared through counsel.   The respondent mother was in attendance at the trial.   She elected not to testify.   Counsel for the respondent father announced that the father waived his right to be present.   Daniel is, as will be explained, presently incarcerated in a federal correctional facility.

The court relies heavily on the uncontroverted documentary evidence, as well as the oral testimony, in making its' findings.   With respect to all findings regarding the termination of parental rights, these findings are made by clear and convincing evidence.

LAW:

On October 13, 2009, DCF filed a petition to terminate the parental rights.   That is the adjudicatory date.   If grounds for termination of parental rights exist, they must have existed as of the adjudicatory date.   The other critical date for the court's attention is the permanency plan date for this child, December 31, 2009, one year from the date of removal of the child from the parent's care.  54 Code of Federal Regulations. § 1355.20(a).   In order to approve or disapprove of the child protection agency's recommendations, by the expiration of nine months from the date of removal, DCF must file with the court a permanency plan for the child.  [Motion for Review of Permanency Plan must be filed by DCF § 35a–14, § 46b–129(k)(1);  54 C.F.R. § 1355.20(a).]   This procedure is prescribed to begin the machinery for either reunification or for another plan of permanent, safe and nurturing placement for the child.

The time frame for deciding the issue of permanent placement of a child within one year is more than a mere declaration of state and federal law.   It represents the consensus thinking of child development and legal authorities.   “The best interests of children is guided by their need for permanency.”  In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208, 232, 764 A.2d 739 (2001).  “Time is of the essence in child custody cases ․ This furthers the express public policy of this state to provide all of its children a safe, stable nurturing environment.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Juvenile Appeal (Docket No. 10155), 187 Conn. 431, 439–40, 446 A.2d 808 (1982).  “We have consistently held that to allow a child to languish in foster care is not in the child's best interest.”  In re Christina V., 38 Conn.App. 214, 224, 660 A.2d 863 (1995).”Within twelve months of foster home placements, state courts must hold permanency hearings to consider the future status of each child.  42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2000 Ed.).”  In Re Darien S., 82 Conn.App. 169, 175–76 (2004).

This cardinal principal of prompt decision making was reenforced within child protection agencies by the passage of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), Pub.L. No 105–89, 111 Stat. 2115 and codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 620–79 (1998).   A major purpose of ASFA was to clarify issues of permanency planning not specifically addressed in earlier federal legislation.²  ASFA focused on two aspects relating to permanency;  1) reasonable efforts to achieve reunification and 2) permanency planning.   Both changes were directed at expeditious planning to either reunify the child with the family of origin or to adopt an alternative plan for permanent placement within one year.   Pursuant to earlier state and federal laws, children had been permitted to “drift” in foster care for long periods of time while waiting for the possible rehabilitation of their parents.   ASFA was enacted to prevent lengthy periods of impermanent conditions.

In the first instance, ASFA limited the circumstances under which the state must pursue reasonable efforts to reunify families.  42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15).   The regulations are designed to place burdens on the child protection agency and also upon the respondent parents themselves to act within the one-year construct.   The child protection agency must offer available, appropriate and accessible services in a timely manner to the respondents.   The respondents must engage and benefit by those services.   The agency must then decide within the one-year period whether to continue with rehabilitative efforts to return the child to the family of origin or made available for adoption.   Id., § 675(5).   These federal mandates have been adopted and codified in Connecticut statutes, notably in § 46b–129 wherein wholesale changes have been made to comply with the federal law.

Alexia, like others in her situation, deserves the benefit of a permanent home in a timely fashion.   This can only be accomplished by rigorous compliance with the law.   In most cases this means that parents must have corrected the problems that led to the removal completely, or at the very least, have demonstrated substantial progress toward rehabilitation ․ “as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and the needs of the child, they could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.”  C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i).

FACTS:

DCF became involved in this case upon a referral from the New London hospital where Alexia was born.   The child was born prematurely to a mother who tested positive for opiates and methadone.   The hospital reported that the mother had tested positive twice during the pregnancy for opiates.   The mother, Kelly, was unable to explain how that could have happened.

It is significant to note that Kelly is an unreliable reporter of her drug use.   In a Jan. 2010 interview with a substance abuse evaluator Kelly admitted she had used ecstacy “a couple of times” during her pregnancy with Alexia.   (Exhibit R.) Recall that she couldn't tell the hospital at the time of birth how she got the positive drug results.

Kelly admits to DCF a long-standing history of illegal drug use but said that her use of heroin and cocaine had ended three years earlier in 2005, when she began a methadone maintenance program.

The man named as the father of the child, Daniel Q., a convicted felon with a long record of weapons and illegal drug charges, did not immediately admit to paternity.   He was therefore, not immediately considered as a placement resource.   A subsequent paternity test confirmed his paternity.   The child protection agency immediately began to assess the maternal grandparents as a possible placement resource for the newborn child.   Ultimately, the paternal grandparents told DCF they were not in a position to care for the child.   The child was placed in a relative foster home.

The Respondent, Mother:

Kelly is presently twenty-nine years of age and unemployed.   She reports coming from a good household with no acknowledged problems as a youth.   She reports being a good student and a good high school athlete.   She admits to now being a “black sheep” in her family due to her extensive history of drug use.   Problems in her relationship with her mother are noted by a counselor and were observed by the court.

Kelly went to a college, Coastal Carolina, in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, where she partied aggressively.   She began a relationship with a man with whom she cohabited.   The relationship was based on partying according to Kelly.   She experimented with cocaine and ecstasy.   In an effort to make a “clean break,” she left college before graduating and returned to Connecticut.   Within a year, in 2003, she was involved with another man “who was already using pills.”   They were involved for two years.   He introduced her to heroin and she became “hooked” by her own account.   She used pills and heroin daily.   She ended the relationship with him in June 2005, when she entered a detoxification program on June 23, 2005, at South Central Rehabilitation Center in New Haven.   (Exhibit R.)

After her first five-day detoxification program she was still feeling sick from withdrawal and took up illegal drugs again.   She entered a second detoxification program and upon discharge began methadone maintenance at the Hartford Dispensary in New London.   She said that she was then receiving 145 milligrams of methadone daily.   She has remained on methadone for the past six years.

At around this time, it is unclear from her reports, she met Daniel Q. The two began dating.   Early on in their relationship “Danny” was picked up for his sixth arrest on March 14, 2005.   He was subsequently convicted of possession of narcotics, two counts, and on September 28, 2006, he was sentenced to four years in prison, suspended after two years with three years probation.   On another count he received another four-year sentence suspended after one year, and a one-year sentence for failure to appear.   His prior probations were terminated.   Danny went off to jail and Kelly, as would become a regular practice, awaited his release from jail.

Kelly rented an apartment in New London for Danny to be “released to.”   She maintains that she did not use drugs during his incarceration.   He was released in March 2007, and he continued to engage in criminal activity according to Kelly.   She reports that she was using drugs because of the ease of access to them.   Danny was returned to prison again on a probation violation.   He was released a second time in March of 2008.

Within a short time of his release, Kelly became pregnant.   Her pregnancy was confirmed in July 2008.   She admits to continuing the use of one bag of heroin a day during her pregnancy even with an increase in her methadone.   She said she was told that “as bad as I felt going through withdrawals, the baby feels worse.”   She says she stopped using illegal substances after August 2008, but according to the Hartford Dispensary she tested positive for opiates in October 2008.   Kelly also admits to taking Percocet, without a prescription, three days before Alexia's birth.

After the child was born, and removed from the parent's care, the parents signed Specific Steps with the court which among other things, required the parents to avoid criminal activity and not to use illegal drugs.  (Exhibits C and D.) Both Kelly and Danny very significantly violated these conditions almost immediately after leaving the courthouse.

Kelly had been referred by DCF to the Southeast Council on Alcohol and Drug Dependence (SCADD) program for evaluation, treatment and testing immediately after leaving court.   On January 21, 2009, twelve days after leaving court, Kelly tested positive for heroin and cocaine in all three segments of the hair test, meaning that she had been using those drugs during the preceding three months.   She denied using any of these substances and could not explain how the tests could produce such results.   Kelly was either simply in denial again or was just being deceitful.   Subsequent developments were helpful in explaining the test results that Kelly denied.

At the trial, a Connecticut State Police officer who was a member of the Statewide Narcotics Task Force testified.   In addition to his testimony, his report was placed into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit I. The following are excerpts from the document.

Uniform Arrest Report and Prosecutor's Report—March 13, 2009 (two months after Kelly's drug tests came back positive)

“․ a concerned citizen” possesses personal knowledge of Daniel Q. and that he/she knew Q. to be selling large quantities of heroin.   The source stated further that he/she knew Q. was selling heroin in New London, CT, but was currently residing in Ledyard, CT. The concerned citizen source stated further that he/she knew Q. to be utilizing several different vehicles to traffic the heroin, specifically a new model Lincoln Navigator that Q. had recently purchased.   The source stated further that Q. also had a black Infiniti, Model Q45, which Q.'s girlfriend “Kelly” drives and that Q. had just bought a 1996 green Acura sedan with a “stash box,” not currently drivable and being stored in Ledyard, CT. The source also stated that Q. also possessed an older model, dark blue, Jeep Grand Cherokee that he drove most frequently.   Q. had been recently carrying a handgun on his person.   The source stated further that he/she was aware that Q. had traveled to New York during the evening of March 11, 2009 to “get a shipment,” referring to Q. obtaining additional heroin ․

The source stated that he/she was also aware that Q. was in possession of three handguns.   An NCIC query for Q. determined that he is a convicted felon.   The query also revealed that Q. has multiple convictions for narcotics violations and firearms violations.   That on March 12, 2009, a State of Connecticut Department of Labor work history query for Daniel Q. and determined that he has last reported earning wages in the fourth quarter of 2004.

That a State of Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles query for the motor vehicle bearing CT registration * * * * * * determined that it belongs to a 1999 Pontiac Grand Am registered to Kelly S., the known girlfriend of Daniel Q. of Meadowlark Lane, Westbrook, CT.

The New London Police Detective L. and CSP Detective S. in the recent past have received information from multiple credible and reliable confidential informants ․ about Daniel Q., who is currently engaging in narcotics distribution from Mansfield Ave, New London, CT. The information received by Detective L. and S. indicates that Q. travels to his source in New York City and brings raw heroin to different “stash” houses or locations and then brings it to Mansfield Avenue for packaging for street sale and distribution ․

That upon the arrival of Ofc. L. and Ofc. S., they observed a male in the process of injecting himself with a full needle of heroin.   The male identified as James M. of Waterford, CT was also found to be in the possession of additional bag of heroin.   Subsequently, accused James M. was placed into custody and transported to the City of New London Police Headquarters.   That while speaking with the accused, he provided [police] with a sworn written statement that he had just purchased the heroin from a black male known to the accused as “Freak.”   The accused identified Freak in a photo line-up as the male who sold him the heroin.   The accused stated that he will commonly contact a Hispanic male known to the accused as “Dan.” The accused stated that he will speak with Dan on the phone and Dan will direct him to Freak.   The accused stated that he has purchased heroin from Dan in person in the past.   The accused was provided a photo array of eight similar looking Hispanic males and identified Daniel Q. as the male who he believed resemble the male he knows as Dan and who has sold him heroin in the past.   The accused stated that when he has purchased heroin from Dan in the past he has been accompanied by a heavy-set white female with blonde hair.   The heroin found in James M.'s possession was subjected to a field test with positive results for heroin.

“ ․ the Detectives then conducted a motor vehicle stop utilizing a uniformed Trooper to stop both vehicles.   It's known to all the Detectives involved that Q. is currently under suspension and that Kelly's vehicle was operating under a misuse of CT registration plates.   That Kelly immediately stopped when the Trooper activated his emergency lights.   Q. then pulled out and went around Kelly's vehicle and sped away at a high rate speed ․ That Q. was subsequently arrested for engaging in pursuit and operating under suspension and his vehicle was searched incident to the arrest ․ Q. was in possession of three thousand dollars in U.S. currency.   It is known to detectives that Q. has not reported any income since the year of 2004.

Kelly S. was arrested for operating a vehicle with misuse of license plates.   That Kelly S. gave Detective S. verbal consent to search her vehicle.   Kelly was found to be in possession of five thousand one hundred dollars in U.S. currency.   That it is known to detectives that Kelly has not reported any income since the 1st quarter of 2008.   The police obtained a search warrant for the houses of Danny and Kelly.   Their safety deposit box contained $30,000.

The police subsequently charged Danny with:

Possession of Heroin 21a–279(a)

Possession of Heroin WITS 21a–278(b)

Possession of Heroin WITS

w/i 1,500 ft of School 21a–278a(b)

Operating a Drug Factory 21a–277(c)

Operating Under Suspension 14–215

Engaging in Pursuit 53a–223 Destruction/Tampering with Evidence 53a–155

Kelly was charged with:

Possession of Heroin 21a–279(a)

Possession of Heroin WITS 21a–278(b)

Possession of Heroin WITS

w/i 1500 ft of School 21a–278a(b)

Operating a Drug Factory 21a–277(c)

The Respondent Daniel Q.

Daniel is twenty-nine years of age.   His social history is sparse.   DCF was involved with the family of origin for issues of substance abuse and physical abuse.   Daniel was a special education student who quit high school in the 11th grade.   He is not known to have had any lawful income in Connecticut in the past seven years.   He has an extensive criminal record.   His first adult arrest was at age eighteen.   His second arrest at age nineteen was on a weapons charge and a violation of his prior probation for which he received a 2–year sentence.  (Exhibit G.)

He was arrested three times in 2005, for various drug-related charges for which he received multiple sentences, the controlling sentence being four years in jail, suspended after two years to serve with four years probation.   The conviction occurred on September 28, 2006, at a time in which Danny and Kelly were involved in a relationship.   As noted earlier, Kelly waited out Danny's time in jail.   He was released in 2007, rearrested on a probation violation and released again in March 2008.

In 2009, Danny was arrested for selling drugs and possession of drugs on January 23, 2009.   Coincidentally, this date is 2 days after Kelly tested positive at SCADD for cocaine and heroin, and occurred exactly two weeks after he signed his Specific Steps agreeing not to be involved with the criminal justice system and not to use or possess any illegal drugs or substances.   He was selling drugs within thirty days of the birth of his first child, Alexia.

Also in 2009, within seventy-five days of Alexia's birth, on March 13, 2009, Danny and Kelly were arrested and charged with sale and distribution of drugs, selling drugs within 1500 feet of a nursery school, tampering with evidence, and operating a drug factory.

On May 21, 2010, Kelly pled guilty to possession of narcotics and was sentenced to five years in prison, execution suspended and placed on probation for three years.   Danny was convicted of federal weapons charges and was sentenced to serve five years in federal prison.   The terms of probation are not reported.   He is scheduled for release in March 2014.   Kelly has subsequently reported on March 18, 2011, that Danny has suffered a mental breakdown and was transferred to a federal medical facility in Minnesota where he remains in custody.

The child, Alexia:

Alexia was born four weeks prematurely.   She remained in the hospital from her birth on December 28, 2008, until her release to temporary foster care on January 21, 2009.   On February 6, 2009 she was placed with a relative.   She remained there until July 2009, when the relatives requested Alexia's removal for personal reasons.   No other relatives were available.   Thereafter, DCF placed Alexia in a legal risk foster home due to the felony drug charges then pending against both parents.

Alexia remains in the pre-adoptive foster home where she is fully bonded with the foster parents.   DCF reports that Alexia has flourished in their care.   She does not appear to have any lasting adverse consequences to her pre-natal drug exposure.   She is meeting all developmental milestones.

Grounds for termination of parental rights:

The ground alleged in the petition as to the respondent-parents, are that the child was found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and the parents have failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and the needs of the child, they could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.  C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i).

The factual determination for this court is whether the parents have achieved rehabilitation as contemplated under C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B), that is, rehabilitation sufficient to render them able to care for Alexia.

‘Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a–112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent ․ [The statute] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time ․ [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [the parents] have achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [they] can assume a responsible position in her child's life.’   In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706 (1999).

As to Daniel:

Under Connecticut law, incarceration alone is not sufficient to terminate a parent's rights.   The child protection cases in Connecticut tend to view the whole parent-child relationship;  pre- and post-incarceration.   Incarcerated parents have the ability to participate in the child protection proceedings.   Counsel are appointed for them;  usually visitation is available to the incarcerated parent in prison, and they are transported to the proceedings to fully participate.   That has not been true in this case since the respondent is in Minnesota and has elected not to participate, although he did through counsel.

This court considers the history of the parent including their criminal history, their propensity to criminal behavior, anything indicative of general parental fitness, the nature and quality of the relationship between parent and child pre-incarceration, the age and needs of the child or children, the effect of the incarceration on the children, the impact psychologically and emotionally of prison visitation on the children, the degree of rehabilitation while incarcerated, an estimate of how long it may be post-incarceration for the parent to verify the quality of their rehabilitative efforts, an assessment of the parenting ability of the person, the length of time the parent will be incarcerated as it effects meeting the child's everyday needs and the inability to meet parental responsibilities.   A paramount consideration, of course, is the issue of stability and permanence for the child as well as the child's sense of time.  (Language approved in In re Katia M., 124 Conn.App. 650, 666–67 (2010).)

Using these considerations as a guide to analyze Daniel's parenting quotient, he fails.   Neither his pre-incarceration performance nor his post-incarceration performance has been adequate.   The social studies reflect there is no indication from any source that he financially or emotionally supported his children.³

Here there is no substantial issue regarding the status of Daniel.   He has rendered himself non-available as a parent by his illegal conduct.   He was provided with a road map for reunification with his infant daughter.  (Exhibit D.) He catastrophically violated his obligations to the child and to the court.   He was arrested for selling drugs three weeks after Alexia's birth.   He was arrested for a multitude of criminal charges relating to possession and distribution of drugs within three months of Alexia's birth.⁴  Alexia is now two years old and he has no relationship with her and will be unavailable as even a possible parental resource until the child is at least five years old.

The court finds that the child was found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for on April 7, 2009, and that Daniel has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and the needs of the child, he could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.

As to Kelly:

The court must address the rehabilitative status of Kelly as of the date of the petition on October 5, 2009.   To assist the court in determining her rehabilitative status, the court ordered psychological testing of Kelly and Alexia.   The report was prepared by David Tobin, PhD. The report was submitted on July 28, 2010.  (Petitioner's Exhibit F.) Dr. Tobin testified during these proceedings.   The salient issues in his report and testimony are noted as follows:

Given her need for attention and affection, and her lack of personal identity, and her willingness to subserve her needs to those of others, she is at continued risk for engaging in self-destructive relationships, as she has in the past ․ Diagnostic considerations for the MCMI include a substance abuse disorder, which she has by history, and a personality disorder with self-defeating and antisocial features.

She shows a marked tendency to deal with challenging situations in an escapist manner in which she substitutes fantasy for reality.   She tends to rely on wishful thinking about how she wants things to be, rather than to address problems directly.   Her resulting sense of impotence and feelings of helplessness and dependency leave her vulnerable to being exploited and manipulated.

Both tests suggest Kelly's strong preference for wishful thinking as her primary coping strategy, which often leaves her unprepared and unaware of what she needs to do to solve problems.   Kelly remains fearful of examining herself, and has limited motivation for change other than what other people are asking her to do.

Foremost, Kelly requires treatment for her dependency issues, both in terms of substances and in terms of her interpersonal relationships and lack of personal autonomy.   Kelly remains on methadone and is at continued risk for relapsing on opiates.   She needs to settle into a long term, weekly counseling relationship where she can sort out her identity, interpersonal, and occupational challenges which have thus far, gone unresolved.   This treatment should be every week and last several years.

1) As noted in previous questions, Kelly needs to establish a long term, weekly therapy relationship in which she can establish a more autonomous sense of her identity as well as to explore a less dependent way of relating to other people.   This treatment should be weekly and last several years.

2) Kelly needs ongoing drug treatment and a more stable period of abstinence from opiates.   Though she has been abstinent from illegal drugs for one year (according to her self-report), she remains dependent on methadone and does not feel she is stable enough to come off of it.

3) Kelly needs to establish a stable residence.

4) Kelly needs to establish a stable income, and could benefit from occupational counseling.

5) Kelly needs ongoing, hands on, parent training.

In addition to the concerns of Dr. Tobin, the court is troubled by Kelly's consistent failure to honestly acknowledge the extent of her drug use and recognize the impact that drugs have had on her life in the past and the likelihood of future damage.

As indicated earlier, Kelly denied knowing how she could have had positive drug test results during her pregnancy and on January 21, 2009, at SCADD.   She refused to acknowledge active use of drugs even when confronted by a positive hair test for cocaine and heroin.   Kelly told the examiners that she did not need drug treatment.  (Petitioner's Exhibit N.) She said she had tested positive at the Hartford Dispensary (the methadone maintenance clinic) on two occasions but they were not due to her use.   She said her boyfriend was “cooking cocaine in the house and another time she tested positive for helping him bag cocaine for sale.   Client appears to have minimal insight to actions and behaviors related to her drug use, drug selling exposure or the harmful effects to use when pregnant.”

DCF referred Kelly for inpatient treatment at Connecticut Valley Hospital and the Stonington Institute.   At pre-admission interviews, Kelly refused to acknowledge active drug use and therefore she was deemed ineligible for comprehensive, in-patient care.

On August 28, 2009, while she was awaiting resolution of her criminal charges, Kelly tested positive for marijuana, amphetamines and opiates.   This was nearly nine months after the child had been removed from her care.   This clearly demonstrated that Kelly had not made progress in her rehabilitation.   Again Kelly minimized and denied active drug use.   She reported that she was in a room where marijuana was being smoked and possibly being in a room where it was being packaged.   Neither event would have produced the positive test results in three segments.   Even the events she reported were under illegal circumstances, i.e. criminal activity.

Three months after the termination of parental rights petition was filed, Kelly tested positive for PCP ⁵ (phencyclidine).   She has tested positive during these proceedings to marijuana, ecstacy, cocaine, heroin, amphetamines and phencyclidine.   She remains on methadone.   But Kelly insists she does not have a drug problem and does not need treatment.

DCF concluded from Kelly's conduct that Kelly was not receptive to comprehensive treatment and even if she went it would likely be ineffective if she remained in denial.

Neither does Kelly deal with the objective reality that her relationship with Danny is dangerous and destructive.   Kelly maintains that she was using drugs only when she was in relationships with men.   As a consequence of her drug use, she has a felony criminal record which will likely impact her for life.   She has even been physically assaulted due to her relationship with Danny and drugs.

On the evening of August 5, 2009, she was with Danny.   The police received a 911 telephone call, later determined to have been from Danny.   The report was of a home invasion and assault in progress.   The police responded.   A New London police detective testified that Kelly had been tied at the wrists and pistol whipped outside her apartment, dragged from the first floor to her third floor landing and forced into her apartment by three men.   They ransacked her apartment.   The police found it to be in disarray, “as if it had been searched.”   Kelly was taken to the emergency room of the hospital where she was treated and interviewed.   Although the men were masked, Kelly recognized one of the men as an associate of Danny, whom Danny owed money.   The man identified by Kelly was known by the New London police to be affiliated with narcotic sales and weapons.   The police considered him to be dangerous.

Kelly told the hospital authorities that “she had been drinking earlier in the evening.”  (Exhibit Q.) Later in the hospital report under social history, Kelly told the examiner that she smokes “and denies alcohol or illicit drug use.”   Three weeks later a hair test showed that Kelly tested positive for marijuana, amphetamines and opiates during the preceding three months.   The court finds that Kelly is blatantly dishonest about her drug use.

Another concern is her claim that she has been sober for an extended period of time.   Even if the court could overcome her history of denial and dishonesty, her sobriety would only relate to illegal substances.   She remains very addicted to methadone.

Methadone, according to Kelly's counselor, is a synthetic opiate.   Kelly may have traded her illegal drug use for a legal controlled substance.   It is clear from the documents and testimony that Kelly has no interest in weaning herself from methadone.   The evidence shows that she was receiving 145 milligrams of methadone daily five years ago.   She is presently receiving 155 milligrams of methadone.   Even Dr. Tobin noted “Kelly remains on methadone and is at continued risk for relapsing on opiates.”

Summary:

1. According to Dr. Tobin:  “Foremost, Kelly requires treatment for her dependency issues, both in terms of substances and in terms of her interpersonal relationships and lack of personal autonomy ․ Kelly needs to establish a long term, weekly therapy relationship in which she can establish a more autonomous sense of her identity as well as to explore a less dependent way of relating to other people.   This treatment should be weekly and last several years.”   These are major issues that relate to her substance use and her relationship with a person who has been unable to live a productive life on his own and is presently confined and suffering mental health issues.   Kelly remains hopeful of establishing a fruitful and productive life with this man.   This optimism is completely inconsistent with historic reality.   She desperately needs therapy to deal with this fantasy.   Danny is dangerous and poorly prepared for supporting himself in a legal and productive way.

What has Kelly done with Dr. Tobin's recommendation for weekly therapy to deal with these issues?   She has been engaged in semi-monthly therapy with a student intern who has not addressed any of Kelly's most significant problems.   The therapy, such as it was, addressed Kelly's stress at dealing with DCF. It never addressed, Kelly's self-defeating behavior, her fanciful thinking, her co-dependency on substances and an antisocial, dangerous man.

Kelly doesn't seem to recognize that if she can't get a job with three years of college and a felony record, the likelihood of Danny coming out of his third prison term with multiple felony convictions for weapons and drugs and no high school degree is not a good bet for her future or for her children's future.   This supports Dr. Tobin's analysis of Kelly's wishful thinking.

She shows a marked tendency to deal with challenging situations in an escapist manner in which she substitutes fantasy for reality.   She tends to rely on wishful thinking about how she wants things to be, rather than to address problems directly.   Her resulting sense of impotence and feelings of helplessness and dependency leave her vulnerable to being exploited and manipulated.

Kelly remains “in love” with Danny.   She recently had plans to visit him in prison in Minnesota.   It was only his objection to her seeing him there that prevented her trip.   Her mother's testimony confirmed her relationship, her affection, his monthly phone calls and her plans for the Minnesota trip.   While this may be a man with whom she wishes to associate, he is not a man that is likely to safely father her children.

The court finds that the child was found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for on April 7, 2009, and that Kelly has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and the needs of Alexia, that she could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.

Statutory Findings:

“During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child.”  In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 103 (2000).  “In arriving at that decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in General Statutes [17a–112(k) ].”  In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 528 (2001) (quoting In re Denzel A., 53 Conn.App. 827, 833 (1999)).   The seven factors “serve simply as guidelines to the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered.”  In re Quanitra M., supra, at 104.  “There is no requirement that each factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”  In re Janazia S., 112 Conn.App. 69, 98, 961 A.2d 1036 (2009).   The court considers each of them in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section

1. TIMELINESS, NATURE AND EXTENT OF SERVICES— § 17a–112(k)(1)

Multiple timely and appropriate services were offered to Kelly.   Those services included, but are not limited to:  treatment and permanency plans;  case management services;  and administrative case reviews;  transportation services for visitation supervised by DCF personnel, and by Nutmeg Services;  and most urgently, repeated referrals so that Kelly could participate in community-based substance abuse counseling and/or evaluations over the past two years.

Services including visitation and drug evaluations were offered to Daniel, but his continued illegal and antisocial conduct rendered him unavailable for most services.   It would be without benefit to address each of the required findings as they relate to the absent Daniel.

2. REUNIFICATION EFFORTS PURSUANT TO FEDERAL LAW— § 17a–112(k)(2)

DCF made reasonable efforts to reunite Kelly pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, through the provision of timely reunification services.   Notably extensive visitation was provided to Kelly amounting to four hours of visitation twice a week.

3. COMPLIANCE WITH COURT ORDERS— § 17a–112(k)(3)

Previously discussed.   Both Kelly and Daniel flagrantly violated the court orders as to use and possession of illegal drugs and avoiding further involvement with the criminal justice system.   They both have felony convictions for conduct occurring after they signed their Specific Steps for reunification.

4. THE CHILD'S FEELINGS AND EMOTIONAL TIES— § 17a–112(k)(4)

The documents and testimony reflect that Alexia is closely bonded to her foster family.   Notwithstanding eight hours of visitation per week, there was no testimony that Kelly has a parent child relationship with Alexia.   In the parent child interactions observed by Dr. Tobin, Kelly was passive when she was brought to the room with Alexia.  “Mom was attentive but seemed at a loss about how to engage Alexia and keep her focused on any activity.”   There was no testimony of expressive affectionate behavior between Kelly and the child.

5. AGE OF THE CHILD— § 17a–112(k)(5)

Alexia was born on December 28, 2008.

6. PARENT'S EFFORT TO ADJUST CIRCUMSTANCES— § 17a–112(k)(6)

Kelly has not robustly engaged and participated in the therapies and treatments which could bring about rehabilitation.   She has had Dr. Tobin's report.   It is clear from a reading the areas she needs to address, but instead of vigorous participation in therapy, she tepidly self-referred herself to a student intern to help her deal with stress.   Instead of obtaining in-patient drug treatment when she was pregnant with Jayden, she denied substance abuse use and decried a need for treatment at all.   Hardly the appropriate reaction of a woman whose boyfriend is in a federal penitentiary, whose child has been removed and who has been maintained on methadone and various illegal drugs for her entire adult life.   Kelly is no closer to self-sufficiency than she was when Alexia was removed, let alone to sole parenting outside the parameters of her parent's shelter, protection and support.

7. EXTENT TO WHICH RESPONDENT WAS PREVENTED FROM MAINTAINING A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CHILDREN— § 17a–112(k)(7)

No unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parents or third parties prevented Kelly from maintaining, a relationship with Alexia, nor did the economic circumstances of the parent interfere with such relationship.

IV. Orders

“The public policy of this state is:  To protect children whose health and welfare may be adversely affected through injury and neglect;  to strengthen the family and to make the home safe for children by enhancing the parental capacity for good child care ․” General Statutes § 17a–101(a).  “Time is of the essence in child custody cases ․ This furthers the express public policy of this state to provide all of its children a safe, stable nurturing environment.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Juvenile Appeal (Docket No. 10155), 187 Conn. 431, 439–40, 446 A.2d 808 (1982).

After due consideration of the child's sense of time, her need for a secure and permanent environment and the totality of circumstances;  and having considered all the statutory criteria and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for termination of parental rights;  and having concluded that the termination of the parental rights at issue will be in the child's best interests, the court issues the following.

ORDERS:

That the parental rights of Kelly S. and Daniel Q. are hereby terminated as to the child Alexia Emma Q. The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for the child for the purpose of securing an adoptive family for her.

With regard to the outstanding permanency plan for Alexia, the court hereby approves the plan of termination of parental rights and adoption as being in the best interest of the child.   To the extent not previously found, the court also finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to effectuate the permanency plan.

A case plan shall be submitted within 30 days of this judgment, and that such further reports shall be timely presented to the court, as required by law.   The motion to revoke commitment filed by the respondent mother is denied.

The Clerk of the Probate Court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of this child shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, 978 Hartford Turnpike, Waterford CT 06385 of the date when said adoption is finalized.

Judgment may enter accordingly.

It is so ordered this 12th day of May 2011

Foley, Sr. J. # 374

FOOTNOTES

FN2. Notably the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 Pub.L. No 96–272, 94 Stat. 500, also codified in various sections of 42 U.S.Code (1998)..  FN2. Notably the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 Pub.L. No 96–272, 94 Stat. 500, also codified in various sections of 42 U.S.Code (1998).

FN3. Even while serious criminal charges were pending against both respondents, Kelly became pregnant again by Daniel and delivered another child Jayden on June 9, 2010..  FN3. Even while serious criminal charges were pending against both respondents, Kelly became pregnant again by Daniel and delivered another child Jayden on June 9, 2010.

FN4. All ten criminal charges outstanding in the Connecticut court were not prosecuted after Daniel was convicted and sentenced on federal charges..  FN4. All ten criminal charges outstanding in the Connecticut court were not prosecuted after Daniel was convicted and sentenced on federal charges.

FN5. National Institute of Drug Abuse, NIH.GovPCP is a synthetic drug sold as tablets, capsules, or white or colored powder.   It can be snorted, smoked, or eaten.   Developed in the 1950s as an IV anesthetic, PCP was never approved for human use because of problems during clinical studies, including intensely negative psychological effects..  FN5. National Institute of Drug Abuse, NIH.GovPCP is a synthetic drug sold as tablets, capsules, or white or colored powder.   It can be snorted, smoked, or eaten.   Developed in the 1950s as an IV anesthetic, PCP was never approved for human use because of problems during clinical studies, including intensely negative psychological effects.

Foley, Francis J., S.J.