Tanya Conner v. Reginald Holley (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

On October 13, 2009, the defendant, Reginald Holley, filed a motion to open judgment of paternity which was based on an acknowledgment of paternity that he signed on September 28, 1988.   The Family Support Magistrate (Steele, Alan) heard testimony and arguments on December 3, 2009, January 15, 2010 and May 21, 2010.   The Connecticut department of social services (State) filed an objection to the motion to open judgment on August 6, 2010.   A decision was issued on November 9, 2010 in which Magistrate Steele opened the judgment on the grounds that the defendant was induced to sign the acknowledgment of paternity by fraud and that his claim was not barred by laches or equitable estoppel.   The State filed a timely appeal to the decision on November 23, 2010, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–231n.

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–231n(1), “[a] person who is aggrieved by a final decision of a family support magistrate is entitled to judicial review by way of appeal under this section.”  “The appeal shall be conducted by the Superior Court without a jury and shall be confined to the record and such additional evidence as the Superior Court has permitted to be introduced.”   General Statutes § 46b–231n(6).  “The Superior Court may affirm the decision of the family support magistrate or remand the case for further proceedings.   The Superior Court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the decision of the family support magistrate is:  (A) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;  (B) in excess of the statutory authority of the family support magistrate;  (C) made upon unlawful procedure;  (D) affected by other error of law;  (E) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record;  or (F) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.”  General Statutes § 46b–231n(7).

The State argues on appeal that “the magistrate's decision is clearly erroneous as it opened a valid paternity judgment that is res judicata on the issue of paternity, without adequate consideration of the doctrine of laches and estoppel.”   It maintains that the evidence shows that the defendant was not induced by fraud at the time that he executed the acknowledgment of paternity and that none of the defendant's reasons for his failure to diligently pursue his claim are a legitimate basis for an excusable delay.   Finally, the State argues that it is prejudiced by the inexcusable delay because it would have to refund payments made and it cannot re-establish paternity since the child has reached the age of majority.

It asserts that “[t]he defendant should now be equitabl[y] stopped from denying the contents or effect of the acknowledgment he knowingly signed in 1988.”   Finally, the State argues that the defendant had unclean hands as “[t]he record shows that the plaintiff moved out of the home she shared with the defendant and their minor children for fourteen months, because of his domestic violence and cheating.”

The court has reviewed the transcripts dated December 3, 2009, January 15, 2010 and May 21, 2010, the objection to the motion to open judgment as well as the memorandum in support of petition for appeal filed by the State and the magistrate's memorandum of decision dated November 9, 2010.   Based on the foregoing and applying the statutory criteria, the court finds no error on any issue.   The magistrate's decision is not clearly erroneous because there is evidence in the record to support the magistrate's decision that the defendant was the subject of fraud and that the doctrines of laches and estoppel do not apply.¹  Additionally, there is evidence to support the court's conclusion that the defendant was not estopped by having unclean hands.   Therefore, the decision of the magistrate is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed.

It is so ordered.

HARRY E. CALMAR, JUDGE

FOOTNOTES

FN1. General Statutes § 46b–172(a)(2) provides, in relevant part:  “The mother and acknowledged father shall have the right to rescind such affirmation or acknowledgment in writing within the earlier of (A) sixty days, or (B) the date of the agreement to support such child approved in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.   An acknowledgment executed in accordance with subdivision (1) of this subsection may be challenged in court or before a family support magistrate after the rescission period only on the basis of fraud, duress or material mistake of fact which may include evidence that he is not the father, with the burden of proof upon the challenger.”.  FN1. General Statutes § 46b–172(a)(2) provides, in relevant part:  “The mother and acknowledged father shall have the right to rescind such affirmation or acknowledgment in writing within the earlier of (A) sixty days, or (B) the date of the agreement to support such child approved in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.   An acknowledgment executed in accordance with subdivision (1) of this subsection may be challenged in court or before a family support magistrate after the rescission period only on the basis of fraud, duress or material mistake of fact which may include evidence that he is not the father, with the burden of proof upon the challenger.”

Calmar, Harry E., J.