State of Connecticut v. Nathan Johnson (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO SUPPRESS

On March 7, 2011, the defendant, Nathan Johnson, filed a Motion to Suppress evidence seized from his person on April 12, 2010 without a warrant by the police.   The defendant claims that the actions of the police were not only in violation of his federal and State constitutional rights, but also constituted police misconduct in that the gun seized was “planted” on his person by the police.   On March 23, 2011, the Court conducted a hearing in the above-referenced matter.   The Court heard testimony from the following State's witnesses:  New Haven Police officers David Stratton, Ryan Przybylski, and Joshua Smereczynsky.   The defendant offered the testimony of his girlfriend, Keosha Elbert.   After a thorough review of the claims made by the parties in the instant matter, this Court finds that the State has met its burden in establishing proof of specific and articulable facts that reasonably warranted the stop of the defendant on April 12, 2010.   The court also finds that the defendant's claim that the gun was “planted” on him by the police is wholly without merit and not credible.   On March 24, 2011, the court denied the Motion to Suppress on the record.   This written decision is an articulation of the court's findings.

FACTS

The Court finds the following facts to be relevant and credible:  On April 12, 2010 at approximately 1:30 a.m., New Haven police were dispatched to a threatening-breach of peace complaint in the Newhallville section of the city.   This section of the city is an extremely high crime area where multiple shootings have occurred.   According to the police dispatch tape, the complainant was locked inside her car and described her assailants as two black females and one black male.   She also provided a description of the clothing worn by two of the suspects:  one of the females had on an orange top and the male was wearing a black hooded sweatshirt.   Police responded in under two minutes to the area of the complaint and spotted three individuals matching the complainant's description a short distance from where the incident had occurred.   The police saw no other persons in the area.   The first two officers on the scene stopped the group and began to speak to the females.   Less than a minute later, Officer Stratton arrived in his patrol car.   Officer Stratton approached the black male who was standing near the others.   Officer Stratton indicated that the defendant looked “startled” and turned “really quick” (Transcript at page 8) and started to walk away from him.   The defendant ignored the officer's command to stop and instead started to run away from the officer.   Officer Stratton was able to tackle the defendant.   The defendant was “not compliant at all” and “had his hands tucked underneath him.”   (Transcript at page 25.)   Once the defendant was on the ground, Officer Stratton as well as Officer Przybylski began a patdown of the defendant.   The officers explained that they did this because (1) the investigation into the threatening complaint was in progress and they did not know the role the defendant had in the original incident;  (2) the defendant took evasive actions by refusing to obey commands, by running from them, and by refusing to show his hands;  and, (3) the location of the stop was in a dangerous area with “fairly dim” lighting.  (Transcript at page 42.)

The officers testified that the defendant was wearing dark windbreaker pants over a pair of jeans.   Inside the front pants pocket of his jeans and concealed from view, Officer Przybylski recovered a fully loaded Smith and Wesson .357 revolver which was introduced as evidence.  (State's Exhibit Two.) The court credits these facts presented by the police officers in testimony as the basis for the patdown search of the defendant as well as the subsequent seizure of the firearm.   Their testimony is also consistent with the dispatch transmissions that were reviewed by the court in Defendant's Exhibit “A.”

The defendant's girlfriend, who was pregnant with their child at the time, testified that she was with the defendant that evening and did not see or feel a gun on his person.   She also testified that the police stopped them for no reason with their guns drawn.   Ms. Elbert also indicated that the only items the police recovered from the defendant were his keys, wallet, and asthma pump and that the police “actually searched him twice.”  (Transcript at page 54.)   The court finds her testimony to be unpersuasive and not consistent with the credible evidence and dispatch tapes.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

The State has the burden of persuasion to show justification on the basis of one or more of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.   Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971);  State v. Eady, 249 Conn. 431, 436, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1030 (1999);  State v. Copeland, 205 Conn. 201, 210 (1987).

“When a reasonable and articulable suspicion exists, the detaining officer may conduct an investigative stop of the suspect in order to confirm or dispel his suspicions.  Terry v. Ohio, [392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968] ․ During the course of a lawful investigatory detention, if the officer reasonably believes that the detained individual might be armed and dangerous, he or she may undertake a patdown search of the individual to discover weapons ․ Additionally, under the federal constitution, an officer conducting a Terry stop of an automobile may search the passenger compartment of the automobile for weapons, limited to areas where the weapon might be hidden, if he or she reasonably believes the suspect is potentially dangerous.  Michigan v. Long, [463 U.S. 1032 (1983) ]” (Citations omitted.)  State v. Wilkins, 240 Conn. 489, 495–96 (1997).  “Reasonable and articulable suspicion is an objective standard that focuses not on the actual state of mind of the police officer, but on whether a reasonable person, having the information available to and known by the police, would have had that level of suspicion.”  State v. Torres, 230 Conn. 372, 379 (1994).   The police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.  State v. Donahue, 251 Conn. 636, 645 (1999).

In this case, the officer was given information via a police broadcast of a group of three individuals who were involved in a threatening complaint.   The credible testimony is that the officers stopped the individuals who appeared to have been involved in this complaint given that they matched the size of the group, the clothing descriptions, and were also in close proximity to the original incident location.

When the police have received information from a third party, they must make some effort to corroborate the allegation of criminal activity.  State v. Hammond, 257 Conn. 610, 623–34 (2001);  State v. Clark, 297 Conn. 1, 11 (2010);  State v. Torelli, 103 Conn.App. 646, 656 (2007).   However, “citizen informers are presumptively reliable if they are identifiable.”  State v. Bolanos, 58 Conn.App. 365, 369 (2000).   In this case, the complainant identified herself and was, in fact, locked in her car because of threatening activity being directed at her.   The court finds that based upon all of the circumstances, including objective observations made by the detaining officers, information from police dispatch, and consideration of the modes of operation of certain kinds of law-breakers, from which a trained law enforcement officer draws inferences and makes deductions based upon professional experience and expertise, that the officers in this case had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to detain and patdown the defendant.   The court credits their assessment which raised a suspicion that the particular individual or individuals being stopped were engaged in wrongdoing.  State v. Scully, 195 Conn. 668, 674–75 (1985);  State v. Cyrus, 297 Conn. 829, 839 (2010).   Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that police knowledge of an area as a high crime area and flight by a suspect are enough to raise a reasonable and articulable suspicion.  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673, 676, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000);  State v. Lipscomb, 258 Conn. 68, 77–78 (2001).  “During the course of a lawful investigatory detention, if the officer reasonably believes that the detained individual might be armed and dangerous, he or she may undertake a patdown search of the individual to discover weapons.”  State v. Wilkins, 240 Conn. 489, 495–96 (1997).

“A court reviewing the legality of a stop must therefore examine the specific information available to the police officer at the time of the initial intrusion and any rational inferences to be derived therefrom.”  State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 654 (1992).   The determination is a question of fact.   State v. Anderson, 24 Conn.App. 438, 441, cert. denied, 219 Conn. 903 (1991).   Based on the facts and circumstances, the court finds that the stop of the defendant and subsequent patdown was reasonable.

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby denies the Defendant's Motion to Suppress.

Ordered this 12th day of May 2011:

BY THE COURT

JOAN K. ALEXANDER, JUDGE

Alexander, Joan K., J.