IN RE: E'Laysia O. (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

I

STATEMENT OF CASE

This matter is before the court for hearing on a petition for termination of parental rights and a motion to revoke commitment and transfer guardianship.

The parties are as follows:  petitioner, Commissioner of Children and Families (DCF or department);  respondent mother, Bianca G.;   respondent father, Eric O.;   and the child, E'Laysia O.

The matter was tried on February 14 and 18, March 14, 2011, and April 11, 2011.   The following witnesses testified at trial:  Anthony Rucker (program manager for Fatherhood Initiative Program, New Opportunities, Inc.);   Joseph Futschik (president, Family Intervention Center);  Jamie Boulanger (therapeutic foster care manager, Boys & Girls Village);  Flannigan Smith (probation officer);  Leticia A. (foster mother);  Mark Williams (DCF social worker);  Bianca G. (mother);  Eric O. (father);  Rosalind C. (proposed guardian), and Jessica S. (proposed guardian's house mate).   On February 14, 2011, the court granted the petitioner's motion for judicial notice, filed February 10, 2011.

The court finds that it has proper jurisdiction of the matter, notice of the proceeding was provided, and no action is pending in any other court affecting the custody of the child.

The court has fully considered the criteria set forth in the relevant Connecticut General Statutes, as well as the evidence, applicable case law, demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and arguments of the parties in reaching the decisions reflected in the orders that issue in this memorandum.

After due consideration, the court grants the petition for termination of parental rights and denies the motion to revoke commitment and transfer guardianship.

II

FINDINGS OF FACT

Having weighed all the evidence and assessed the credibility of the witnesses, the court finds the following relevant facts.

A

Procedural History

E'Laysia was born on August 1, 2009.   On August 5, 2009, E'Laysia was placed in the care and custody of the department on a ninety-six hour hold.

On August 6, 2009, the department filed an ex-parte motion/order of temporary custody (OTC), which was granted by the court (Upson, J.) that day.   Specific steps were ordered for the respondents.   The department also filed a neglect petition alleging that the child was denied proper care and attention and permitted to live under conditions injurious.   The addendum to the petition for neglect alleged the following jurisdictional facts:  “1. This family has been known to the Department of Children & Families since December of 2005.   Since January 2006, there have been four counts of physical neglect and one count of medical neglect that have been substantiated against Ms. G. regarding three children. 2. Ms. G.'s DCF history is significant in that she has one prior termination of her parental rights.   Ms. G. also has two more termination of parental rights petitions pending in the Middletown Superior Court. 3. Ms. G. has been working with the Department for the past two and a half years and has made minimal to no progress in specific steps. 4. Ms. G. is currently in jeopardy of losing her section 8 housing ․ 5. Ms. G. is currently under two years probation and was recently arrested on July 3, 2009 for Breach of Peace. 6. Ms. G. continues to make poor judgments, as she was involved in an altercation with father of her three older children in July 2009, when she was 8 months pregnant. 7. Eric O., putative father of E'Laysia is a convicted felon who is currently on five years probation.”

On August 14, 2009, the court (Upson, J.) sustained the OTC by agreement.   Specific steps were ordered for the respondent mother.   A paternity test for father was also ordered.

On October 14, 2009, the department filed a motion for finding that the putative father, Eric O., is the father of the child based on paternity testing.   The court (Epstein, J.) granted the motion on October 28, 2009, and adjudicated Eric O. as the biological father of E'Laysia.

On November 5, 2009, the court (Epstein, J.) adjudicated the child neglected based on conditions injurious after mother entered a plea of nolo contendere and father stood silent.   The child was committed to the custody of the department.   The court ordered specific steps for father and reaffirmed mother's steps.

On November 6, 2009, father filed a motion to revoke commitment.   The department filed an objection to the motion to revoke commitment on November 20, 2009.   The father's motion to revoke commitment was withdrawn on March 5, 2010.

On April 6, 2010, the department filed a motion to review permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption.   Mother filed an objection on April 12, 2010.   On June 29, 2010, the court (Upson, J.) approved the requested permanency plan.

On June 11, 2010, the department filed a petition for termination of parental rights (TPR).  The TPR grounds for mother are failure to rehabilitate (Ground B1) and failure to rehabilitate, prior termination (Ground E).   The TPR ground for father is failure to rehabilitate (Ground B1).

On December 1, 2010, father filed a motion to revoke commitment and transfer guardianship to Rosalind C. On December 8, 2010, the department filed an objection to the father's motion.

On December 13, 2010, the court (Bentivegna, J.) granted father's motion to require the department to conduct an investigation of Rosalind C. as a potential placement resource.

On January 18, 2011, the foster parents, Jose A. and Leticia A., filed a motion to intervene and memorandum of law.   After a hearing on February 14, 2011, the court denied the motion and entered orders regarding the foster parents' right to be heard and comment pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–129(o).   See In re Nicholas B., Superior Court, Child Protection Session at Middletown, Docket Nos. N05–CP08–017705–A & 06–A (April 27, 2010, Bentivegna, J.).

B

Historical Facts(1)Department's Involvement

The department has been involved with mother since 2005.   The child protection concerns for mother have included physical and medical neglect, domestic violence, substance abuse, lack of employment, inadequate housing and continued involvement with the criminal justice system.   After E'Laysia was born, the department assessed the situation and determined that the child was at risk, given the mother's child protection history and the child's needs.

The department became involved with father for the first time after E'Laysia was born.   The child protection concerns for father have included substance abuse, failure to secure and/or maintain adequate housing and legal income and continued involvement with the criminal justice system.

(2)

Mother

The mother, Bianca G., was born in Waterbury, Connecticut on November 26, 1988.   Her mother is N'Tarsha S. (maternal grandmother).   Mother attended school in Waterbury and completed the tenth grade.

Her employment history includes working at a temporary staffing agency, Burger King and Baker's Choice.   Mother is currently unemployed but reportedly receives some money for babysitting her younger siblings.

Mother has never been married.   She has given birth to five children.   Her first child passed away shortly after birth.   Mother had three children with Andre W., with whom she had a history of domestic violence.   Na'Zaria W. was born on August 21, 2005.   Briana W. was born on April 20, 2006.   Andre W. was born on January 15, 2008.   On October 2, 2008, mother consented to the termination of her parental rights to Briana.   On September 29, 2009, mother consented to the termination of her parental rights to Andre and Na'Zaria.   After a hearing, the court (Esposito, J.) granted the termination of parental rights petitions for Andre and Na'Zaria.   These older children have all been adopted.   Mother reports that she had a less than two month relationship with Eric O., during which she became pregnant with E'Laysia.

Bianca has a lengthy criminal record that includes seven arrests between July 2008 and January 2011.   She was arrested while pregnant with E'Laysia as well as after the child's removal.   On July 4, 2008, mother was arrested for larceny in the fifth degree.   On February 23, 2009, she was convicted of failure to appear in the second degree and sentenced to one year in jail, execution suspended, two years probation, concurrent.   On January 9, 2009, mother was arrested for larceny in the sixth degree, for which she was sentenced to ninety days in jail, execution suspended, one year probation, concurrent on February 23, 2009.   On July 3, 2009, mother was arrested for breach of peace in the second degree and criminal mischief in the third degree, for which she was sentenced to six months in jail, execution suspended, one year probation, concurrent on May 7, 2010.   After E'Laysia was born, mother was arrested on September 11, 2009, for breach of peace in the second degree and assault in the third degree, which charges were nolled on May 7, 2010.   On October 1, 2009, mother was arrested for breach of peace in the second degree, which was nolled on May 7, 2010.   Mother has two pending criminal cases.   On December 11, 2010, mother was arrested for disorderly conduct.   Mother was arrested for breach of peace in the second degree on January 25, 2011.

Mother is currently on probation.   She was initially placed on one year probation on February 23, 2009.   She first met with her probation officer, Flannigan Smith, on March 31, 2009.   Smith testified as follows regarding mother's compliance with probation.   As conditions of probation, she was required to meet with Smith twice per month and ordered to cooperate with DCF and substance abuse evaluation/treatment.   Smith spoke with mother's DCF social worker to determine whether she was complying with DCF. In the beginning, mother was somewhat compliant with probation.   In June 2009, mother was referred to Catholic Charities for a substance abuse evaluation.   She completed the evaluation and tested negative for illegal substances.   At that time, she was considered in compliance with the substance abuse probation requirements.   Mother was referred to the Morris Foundation for anger management and mental health treatment and was compliant.   She completed the program in November 2009.   She had a negative hair test in March 2010.   Smith testified that mother has become less and less compliant with her probation.   She has not complied with the reporting requirements.   From February 2009 to February 2011, she failed to report for fifteen appointments five times in 2009, and ten times in 2010.   While on probation, mother has been arrested several times.   On May 7, 2010, her probation was extended when she was sentenced to another one year term of probation.   She has two pending criminal cases.   Mother has also engaged in substance abuse.   In November 2010, and January 2011, she tested positive for marijuana.

Since May 2006, DCF social worker Mark Williams has been assigned to mother's case, and he testified as follows.   Mother's child protection concerns include substance abuse, inadequate supervision, ongoing anger management, mental health, lack of adequate housing, loss of section 8 housing and continued involvement with the criminal justice system.   Mother's parental rights to her three older children have previously been terminated.

After E'Laysia was born, the department assessed the situation and decided to invoke a ninety-six hour hold.   Mother had two pending TPR actions concerning her older children.   Her section 8 housing status was in jeopardy due to noncompliance.   She was having continued involvement with the criminal justice system and had been arrested approximately one month before E'Laysia was born.

On August 14, 2009, after E'Laysia was removed, mother was ordered to comply with specific steps.   The department worked with mother to get her in a position to be reunified with E'Laysia.   The original plan was reunification with mother.   The department made the following services available to mother to assist her in reunifying with E'Laysia:  individual therapy at Family Intervention Center;  supportive housing assistance including locating rental properties, rental assistance, financial planning, furniture assistance, and section 8 voucher;  and in-home family reunification services through the Permanency Placement Services (PPS) program at the Boys & Girls Village, parenting education classes, substance abuse assessment/treatment, anger management counseling, transportation assistance, supervised visitation and supportive housing/section 8 referral.   The visitation was initially increased from two to four hours per week.

Mother has made some positive efforts toward reunification.   Williams testified that mother has visited with E'Laysia as often as DCF allows.   Generally, the visits have gone well.   On occasion, mother has displayed her temper but is usually able to pull it together.

Mother testified as follows regarding her visits with E'Laysia.   She has consistently attended the visits.   The visits are currently once per week for two hours.   The visits were taking place at the Waterbury Mall but are now being held at the Waterbury DCF office.   Visits have also taken place at a park.   Mother brings toys, clothes and shoes to the visits.   She does not bring food because of the child's food allergies.   She brings gifts for holidays.   During the visits, they talk and play together.   E'Laysia comes to mother for love and attention.   Mother comforts E'Laysia when necessary.   E'Laysia does not want to leave when the visit ends.   Mother has requested longer and more frequents visits with E'Laysia, but DCF has not provided additional visitation.   She thinks her bond with E'Laysia would be stronger if the visits were more frequent.

Williams testified that visits were moved from the mall to the DCF office after an incident between mother and the DCF case aide in November 2010.   Mother became very angry with the case aide during the visit and started swearing and yelling at the aide in front of E'Laysia.   As a result, visits were moved from the community to the department's office.   Mother testified that she got into an argument with the case aide over the way the aide was treating her and handling E'Laysia.   Mother became upset when the aide pulled strongly on the child's arm.   E'Laysia started screaming and crying.   Mother was unable to say goodbye to E'Laysia.

In November 2009, mother completed anger management counseling through the Morris Foundation.   On July 9, 2009, and September 16, 2009, mother tested negative for illegal substances.   Mother is currently receiving some services at the Morris Foundation including individual counseling and medication management.   According to reports from the Morris Foundation, mother attends sporadically but has not been discharged from the program.

Despite some positive efforts, mother has been unable to make sustained progress in addressing her child protection concerns.   Overall, her level of cooperation has not been sufficient, and she has failed to fully comply with the specific steps.

Mother has not secured and/or maintained adequate housing and legal income.   In September 2009, mother lost her section 8 housing services due to noncompliance.   Mother was able to stay in the apartment but was obligated to pay rent.   In October 2009, mother was no longer able to pay rent.   She tried to move in with her maternal grandfather, but it did not work out.   In November 2009, mother returned to the maternal grandmother's (MGM) home, where she continues to reside.   The department has determined that MGM's home is not appropriate for E'Laysia.   In November 2009, mother reported that she was moving into a condominium owned by her uncle.   Mother was not able to provide the department with any documentation of this move.   In February 2010, mother confirmed that she was not living at her uncle's but rather was living with maternal grandmother.   Mother has talked about getting her own apartment, but it has not happened.

Mother has not fully cooperated with recommended service providers.   In September 2009, mother was referred by the department to in-home reunification program through the Boys & Girls Village, Inc. program in Waterbury.   Jamie Boulanger is a therapeutic foster care manager, and she testified as follows.   From September 2009 to January 2010, Boulanger worked with mother on the goals of gaining stable employment and housing.   The program was to meet with mother on a weekly basis.   Appointments were scheduled at mother's residence.   Mother started out being compliant but became less so over time.   While the reunification program was in place, mother made little, if any, progress toward meeting the goals of stable employment and housing.   She was often late for appointments and missed several appointments altogether.   She failed to return phone calls.   She did not provide requested documentation regarding employment and housing.   Boulanger recommended individual therapy, but mother refused.   She claimed to have a job but refused to provide any proof.   Mother was living with maternal grandmother and did not find housing suitable for reunification.   Mother became easily frustrated when she was questioned or asked for documents.   During this period, mother was inconsistent regarding appointments.   She was arrested for fighting and anger management issues.   She did not comply with a recommendation that she attend individual counseling.   In December 2009, mother became angry and verbally aggressive toward Boulanger regarding re-scheduling an appointment.   On January 22, 2010, mother was discharged from the program due to noncompliance.   At discharge, Boulanger recommended that mother receive individual therapy on a weekly basis to address her verbal aggression and improve her coping skills.

Mother has not fully participated in individual counseling and made sufficient progress towards the identified treatment goals.   In August 2009, the department had concerns regarding mother's ability to deal with anger issues.   Mother was referred to anger management program at Morris Foundation, which she completed on November 19, 2009.   Although mother completed anger management counseling, she has continued to struggle with anger issues.   In December 2009, mother became verbally aggressive toward Boulanger regarding re-scheduling an appointment.   The department became so concerned with mother's ability to manage her behavior after the November 2010 visitation incident that visits were moved from the community to the department's office.

On or about February 3, 2010, mother was referred by DCF for individual counseling at the Family Intervention Center in Waterbury.   Joseph Futschik, a licensed clinical social worker and substance abuse counselor, testified as follows.   Mother participated in the evaluation.   On March 10, 2010, she attended an individual therapy session.   On April 8, 2010, she was discharged from the program for failure to engage in services after she missed or rescheduled four appointments.   She made no further efforts to contact the program.

The department referred mother to the Morris Foundation for individual counseling and medication management.   Mother was supposed to attend individual sessions every other week.   From April 2010 to December 2010, she attended only ten sessions, which is approximately half of the required sessions.   She failed to attend any sessions in May, June, September and November 2010.   She also missed all of the appointments for January 2011.

Mother has continued to have further involvement with the criminal justice system and has not fully complied with conditions of probation.   From 2009 to 2011, mother was arrested six times.   Mother's completion of anger management counseling has not prevented her from later being arrested several times for breach of peace and disorderly conduct.   The department has ongoing concerns regarding mother's continued involvement with the criminal justice system.   The number of arrests is of concern.   E'Laysia needs a caretaker who is stable and consistent and available to care for her on a daily basis.

Despite some apparent periods of abstinence, mother has continued to engage in substance abuse.   Early in the case, mother was referred for substance abuse evaluation/treatment and tested negative.   However, in November 2010, mother submitted to a urine screen at probation's request and tested positive.   The department referred mother for a hair test at the Morris Foundation, but she failed to comply.   In January 2011, mother submitted to a urine screen at probation's request and again tested positive for marijuana.

In April 2010, based on the respondents' level of cooperation with referrals and the child's need for permanency, the department recommended a change in the permanency plan to termination of parental rights and adoption.   Mother has come forward with relative placement resources for the child, but none of them have been appropriate.

(3)

Father

The father, Eric O., was born in Waterbury on October 12, 1984.   He attended school in Waterbury and completed the 11th grade.   Father was involved with DCF when he was a child.   From 1993 to 2001, he and his siblings were placed in foster care, and father was placed in six different foster homes.

Father has never been married.   His relationship with Bianca G. lasted approximately two months.   Besides E'Laysia, he has one other child, Symphanie O., who was born on August 21, 2009.

Father is a convicted felon and has a lengthy criminal record which includes six arrests between April 2002 and April 2010.   On April 3, 2002, father was arrested for sale of illegal drugs, sale of hallucinogens/narcotics, possession within 1500 feet of a school, failure to appear in the first degree, and probation violation, for which he was sentenced to ten years in jail, six years to serve, five years probation on February 3, 2003.   On September 18, 2002, father was arrested for assault in the first degree, for which he was sentenced to three years in jail, concurrent on February 3, 2003.   Father was incarcerated from approximately 2003 to 2008.   On June 5, 2008, father was arrested for possession of drugs/marijuana, for which he was sentenced to sixty days in jail, concurrent on June 24, 2008.   Father was arrested three times after E'Laysia was born.   On November 13, 2009, he was arrested for possession of drugs/marijuana, interfering/resisting and risk of injury.   The charges were nolled pursuant to a plea agreement on April 13, 2010.   On February 4, 2010, father was arrested interfering/resisting, possession of drug paraphernalia, possession with intent and possession within 1500 feet of a school.   The charges were nolled pursuant to a plea agreement on April 13, 2010.   On April 1, 2010, father was arrested for possession with intent to sell and was sentenced to two years in jail on April 13, 2010.   He also admitted to a violation of probation, which was terminated.   He is currently incarcerated.

DCF social worker Mark Williams started working with father after E'Laysia was born, and he testified as follows.   Initially, there was a question of paternity.   In October 2009, paternity was established through genetic testing.   On November 5, 2009, father was ordered to comply with specific steps after the child was adjudicated and committed to the department.   The child protection concerns with father include continued involvement with the criminal justice system, need for parenting education, possible substance abuse and ability to secure and/or maintain adequate housing and legal income.   The department offered the following services to father to assist him in reunifying with E'Laysia:  parenting education and Fatherhood Initiative Program, substance abuse evaluation and treatment at the Morris Foundation, and supervised visitation.

Father has made some positive efforts toward reunification.   He has visited with E'Laysia as often as DCF allows.   Father behaves appropriately during visits and interacts well with E'Laysia.

Father testified regarding visitation with E'Laysia.   While incarcerated, he was supposed to receive monthly visits with E'Laysia.   The visits have been less frequent, and he has not had a visit since the end of January 2011.   Father believes that he has a great relationship with E'Laysia given the circumstances.   During visits, they talk and play together.

Despite some positive efforts, father has not been able to make sustained progress in addressing his child protection concerns.   Father has not secured and/or maintained adequate housing and legal income.   Although father had adequate housing and legal employment in the fall of 2009, he was subsequently arrested for charges related to selling drugs and is currently incarcerated.

Father has not fully cooperated with recommended service providers.   On or about November 3, 2009, father was referred by DCF to the Fatherhood Initiative Program at New Opportunities, Inc. in Waterbury, Connecticut.   Anthony Rucker, the program manager, testified as follows.   Father was required to participate in the program and receive parenting education services, but he failed to do so.

Father has not fully participated in counseling and made sufficient progress toward the identified treatment goals.   Father was referred to the Fatherhood Initiative and the Morris Foundation but failed to comply.

Father has continued to have further involvement with the criminal justice system and has not fully complied with his conditions of probation.   From 2009 to 2010, father was arrested three times.   He is currently serving a two-year sentence.   The department has ongoing concerns regarding father's continued involvement with the criminal justice system.   The number of arrests is of concern as well as father's involvement with selling drugs.   E'Laysia needs a caretaker who is stable and consistent and available to care for her on a daily basis.   Due to his continued criminal involvement, father is not presently available to care for the child.   Although father may be eligible for transitional supervision in April 2011, he has not demonstrated the ability to secure adequate housing and legal income to provide for E'Laysia upon his release.

There are concerns regarding whether father has continued to engage in substance abuse.   On October 7, 2009, father submitted to a drug tests at Catholic Charities, which was negative.   While this case has been pending, he has been arrested several times for drug offenses.   Based on father's criminal history, he was referred several times to the Morris Foundation for a substance abuse evaluation.   Father did not attend the evaluation.   He failed to present himself at the Morris Foundation for urine screens.

Williams testified that the department recommended a change in the permanency plan to termination of parental rights and adoption in April 2010, based on the respondents' level of cooperation with referrals and the child's need for permanency.   Given father's continued criminal involvement, reunification was not a viable option.   Although father has come forward with potential placement resources besides Rosalind, none of them have been appropriate.

Father testified regarding the case.   He has been incarcerated since April 2010, for possession with intent to sell.   His maximum release date is April 2012.   He expects to be released on transitional supervision on or about April 4, 2011.   Williams testified that father did not previously inform him of this release date.   Upon release, father plans to reside with his girlfriend and their child.   He plans to obtain a job or go to vocational school for heating and cooling.   He has already obtained his GED. He has worked in a food store in the past.   Father testified that he would comply with any conditions of release including substance abuse treatment while on transitional supervision.   He admits that he does not have a job lined up or a source of legal income upon his release.

Father has participated in a number of programs since he was incarcerated in April 2010, including a parenting program, substance abuse treatment, and a re-entry program.   He has completed several programs or is in the process of doing so.   He believes that he has learned how to be a better parent.

Father wants to remain part of E'Laysia's life.   He is willing to cooperate with DCF. He realizes now that he may never be able to see E'Laysia again and has re-dedicated himself.   He believes that he has a strong bond with E'Laysia.   He made mistakes in his past due to drug involvement.   He realizes that negative impact his past behavior has had on his relationship with E'Laysia.

Father is seeking to have guardianship of the child transferred to Rosalind C. For several months, he has asked DCF to consider Rosalind as a resource.   Previously, he had asked DCF to consider as a resource other persons, including his former foster mother.   None of the other placement resources worked out.   Father has known Rosalind as a friend for approximately eleven years.   Rosalind is not related to E'Laysia by blood or marriage.   He believes that Rosalind is a responsible person who would be able to properly care for E'Laysia.   Father and mother would be able to visit E'Laysia if the transfer of guardianship is granted.   He understands that the guardian would be responsible for making decisions regarding E'Laysia.   Visitation would be up to Rosalind.

(4)

Child

E'Laysia was born on August 1, 2009.   She was removed from her mother on August 5, 2009, and placed in foster care.   She has resided with the current foster family since she was five days old.

E'Laysia has special needs.   She is considered medically complex and is diagnosed with asthma, eczema, food allergies and acid reflux.   She must attend frequent medical appointments, take prescribed medications and use a nebulizer on a regular basis.   Her skin condition requires constant attention.   She has frequent outbreaks of eczema.   She is allergic to several kinds of food, including milk products.   E'Laysia is developmentally on target.

The respondents have consistently visited with E'Laysia.   The visits go well.   E'Laysia has demonstrated that she is bonded to her biological parents.   She has exhibited some separation anxiety both before and after visits.

The foster family is composed of the foster parents and their three adopted children.   The foster siblings are 9, 5 and 4 years old.   Since August 2009, Williams has visited the foster home and observed the interaction between E'Laysia and the foster family.   ELaysia is very comfortable in the home.   E'Laysia is very bonded to her foster parents and foster siblings.   She calls her foster parents “mommy” and “daddy.”   She seeks them out for love, comfort and support.   The children interact like siblings.   She receives a lot of attention from her foster parents and siblings.   E'Laysia is also bonded with the foster family's extended family, including the foster grandparent who provides childcare.   The foster home is able to provide for E'Laysia's special needs.   There are no safety concerns regarding the foster home.   The department believes that the foster home is a very appropriate placement for the child.   The foster parents have expressed a desire to adopt E'Laysia if she is freed for adoption.

(5)

Rosalind C.

The proposed guardian, Rosalind C., is fifty-four years old.   She receives social security benefits due to an accident and health reasons and does not work.   She is on permanent disability.   She also receives food stamps.   She resides in a three bedroom co-op in Waterbury with a friend, Jessica S., and Marlysa H. (b.7/2/93).   Marlysa is the daughter of Rosalind C.'s niece, who passed away in July 2010.

Father and Rosalind have known each other for about ten years.   She describes their relationship as almost like family.   For the last several years, she has been living between Brooklyn, New York and Connecticut and taking care of her terminally ill niece.   She obtained permanent guardianship of her niece's daughter from the Waterbury Probate Court on or about February 13, 2011.

Rosalind testified regarding her interest in being E'Laysia's guardian.   She is not related to E'Laysia by blood or marriage.   Rosalind was aware of E'Laysia's birth and subsequent removal.   She was not able to come forward earlier as a resource because she was caring for her niece and seeking guardianship of her niece's daughter.   In addition, before July 2010, she did not have her own apartment in Connecticut and was staying with different relatives/friends.

In October 2010, Rosalind tried to contact DCF regarding being E'Laysia's guardian.   Rosalind testified that after several attempts, she spoke to Mark Williams about being E'Laysia's guardian.   Williams testified that he did not hear from Rosalind until October 29, 2010.   DCF was focused on the child being adopted by the current foster parents if the termination was granted.   After discussion, the department decided not to consider Rosalind as a placement resource because E'Laysia had lived with the foster family for well over a year and was strongly bonded to them.   The department conducted an investigation of Rosalind and determined that she is eligible.

Rosalind understands that E'Laysia has special medical needs.   She has experience taking care of someone with asthma and eczema.   She is willing and able to take E'Laysia to all her medical appointments.   If Rosalind needs help caring for E'Laysia, Jessica would be available.   She is willing to care for E'Laysia for the foreseeable future.   Rosalind would allow the parents to have contact with E'Laysia as long as they were not under the influence.   She is willing to comply with any services ordered or recommended.   If Rosalind becomes guardian, E'Laysia would have one of the bedrooms or sleep in Rosalind's bedroom which is a large room.   Jessica would move into the basement if necessary.   The department has no concerns regarding Rosalind's home.

Rosalind has only met E'Laysia on one occasion.   DCF scheduled a visit at a McDonalds in Waterbury in February 2011.   No other visits were scheduled by DCF as it is awaiting the resolution of the pending case.

Jessica S. testified regarding the proposed transfer of guardianship.   She is thirty years old and has known Rosalind since she was fifteen.   Jessica is not related to E'Laysia by blood or marriage.   She is single and does not have any children.   She is currently receiving unemployment.   In October 2009, she became aware of E'Laysia from father while he was undergoing paternity testing.   She claims that she contacted DCF in the fall of 2009 to express interest in being a resource for E'Laysia, and continued to try to contact DCF through the spring of 2010.   Later, she tried to contact DCF regarding Rosalind becoming E'Laysia's guardian.   Jessica claims that she did not hear from DCF. She is willing to give up her bedroom and move into the basement if E'Laysia comes to live with them and is willing to help out with E'Laysia.   She also attended the visit at McDonalds in February 2011, which was her first contact with E'Laysia.

Mark Williams testified that the department is not in support of transferring guardianship of E'Laysia to Rosalind because the child has been with the current foster parents since August 2009.   The child is closely bonded with the foster family.   The child's first contact with Rosalind was not until February 2011.   The department still believes termination of parental rights and adoption is the best interest of E'Laysia.   The court will provide additional facts as needed.

III

DISCUSSION

The court must determine whether the petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the parental rights of the respondent parents should be terminated.  “In order to terminate a parent's parental rights under [General Statutes] § 17a–112, the petitioner is required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that:  (1) the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify the family;  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1);  (2) termination is in the best interest of the child;  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(2);  and (3) there exists any one of the seven grounds for termination delineated in § 17a–112(j)(3).”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 148–49, 962 A.2d 81 (2009).  “The legal framework for deciding termination petitions is well established.  [A] hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases:  the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase.   During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine whether one or more of the ․ grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in § 17a–112[ (j)(3) ] exists by clear and convincing evidence ․ If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, then it proceeds to the dispositional phase.   During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child ․ The best interest determination also must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Melody L., supra, 231 Conn. 163.  “Except in the case where termination is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding” the seven statutorily-enumerated criteria.  General Statutes § 17a–112(k).  “Although expert testimony may be accorded great weight when it is offered, there is no requirement for expert testimony in termination of parental rights cases.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Jeisean M., 270 Conn. 382, 400 (2004).

A

Reasonable Efforts

In the adjudicatory phase, the first issue to be addressed is whether DCF met its burden regarding reasonable efforts.   See In re Melody L., supra, 290 Conn. 148–49.   The court must determine if “the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent ․ unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to section 17a–111b, or determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1).   In accordance with § 17a–112(j)(1), “the department may meet its burden concerning reunification in one of three ways:  (1) by showing that it made such efforts, (2) by showing that the parent was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts or (3) by a previous judicial determination that such efforts were not appropriate.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Jonathan C., 86 Conn.App. 169, 173, 860 A.2d 305 (2004).

“The standard for reviewing reasonable efforts has been well established by the Appellate Court.  ‘Turning to the statutory scheme encompassing the termination of the parental rights of a child committed to the department, [§ 17a–112] imposes on the department the duty, inter alia, to make reasonable efforts to reunite the child or children with the parents.   The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof.   Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn ․ [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.’  ․ In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 361, 776 A.2d 487 (2001).”  In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 632, 847 A.2d 883 (2004).  “[R]easonableness is an objective standard ․ and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   In re Vincent B., 73 Conn.App. 637, 641, 809 A.2d 1119 (2002), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 934, 815 A.2d 136 (2003).   The department has “a continuing duty to make reasonable efforts.”  Id., 644.   But “[t]he department is required only to make ‘reasonable efforts.’   It is axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act.”  In re Antony B., 54 Conn.App. 463, 476, 735 A.2d 893 (1999).   In addition, “making no efforts to reunify a parent and his or her child may be reasonable in certain circumstances ․” In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn.App. 645.

The court may also determine that the respondent was either unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.   As previously noted, “[t]he department is required only to make ‘reasonable efforts' ․ [as][i]t is axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act.”  In re Antony B., supra, 54 Conn.App. 476.   Accordingly, the court may find by clear and convincing evidence that “the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with the children, [and][t]he respondent's subsequent failure to take advantage of those efforts establish her [or his] inability or unwillingness to benefit from those reasonable efforts ․” In re Alexander T., 81 Conn.App. 668, 676, 841 A.2d 274, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 924, 848 A.2d 472 (2004).

(1)

Mother

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the department has met its burden concerning reunification by showing that it made reasonable efforts and by showing that the mother was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.

From the beginning of the case, the department made efforts to reach out to mother and engage her in reunification efforts.   The department offered mother numerous services including parenting education classes, substance abuse assessment, individual and anger management counseling, reunification services, transportation assistance, supervised visitation, and assistance with supportive housing and section 8 referrals.   The services were appropriate to address the child protection concerns and were made available to the mother on a consistent, timely and sufficient basis.

Despite the numerous services offered by the department, mother has been unable or unwilling to fully cooperate with the services and has not adequately addressed her child protection concerns.   There are numerous examples of mother's inability and/or unwillingness to benefit from reunification efforts.   In September 2009, mother lost her section 8 housing services due to noncompliance.   In September 2009, mother was referred to an in-home reunification program through the Boys & Girls Village.   On January 22, 2010, mother was discharged from the program due to noncompliance.   On or about February 3, 2010, mother was referred by DCF for individual counseling at the Family Intervention Center in Waterbury.   On April 8, 2010, she was discharged from the program for failure to engage in services after she missed or rescheduled four appointments.   The department referred mother to the Morris Foundation for individual counseling and medication management.   Mother has attended approximately half of the required sessions.   In November 2010, the department referred mother for a hair test at the Morris Foundation, but she failed to comply.

Mother has failed to make herself available to actively participate in services.   She has demonstrated a lack of interest, cooperation and progress with efforts toward reunification.   She has not taken the steps necessary to present the department with a window of opportunity during which reasonable efforts at reunification could have been made.   The department's efforts were thwarted by mother's inability or unwillingness to benefit from the services.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify mother with the child and that mother was unable or unwilling to benefit from the reunification efforts.   Therefore, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the department has met its burden of proving reasonable efforts as to mother.

(2)

Father

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the department has met its burden concerning reunification by showing that it made reasonable efforts and by showing that the father was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.

From the beginning of the case, the department made efforts to reach out to father and engage him in reunification efforts.   The department offered the following services to father to assist him in reunifying with E'Laysia:  parenting education and Fatherhood Initiative Program, substance abuse evaluation and treatment at the Morris Foundation, and supervised visitation.   The services were appropriate to address the child protection concerns and were made available to the father on a consistent, timely and sufficient basis.

Despite the numerous services offered by the department, father has failed to fully cooperate with the services and has not adequately addressed his child protection concerns.   There are several examples of father's inability and/or unwillingness to benefit from the reunification efforts.   On or about November 3, 2009, father was referred by DCF to the Fatherhood Initiative Program, but he failed to participate in the program.   He did not participate in parenting classes.   Father was referred several times to the Morris Foundation for a substance abuse evaluation and treatment.   Father did not cooperate.   Father has continued to be involved in criminal activity.   Since E'Laysia was born, he was arrested several times and has been in prison since April 2010.   Due to his incarceration, he has been unable to visit with the child more often and has not been available to participate in reunification services in the community.

Father failed to make himself available to actively participate in services.   He has demonstrated a lack of interest, cooperation and progress with efforts toward reunification.   He has not taken the steps necessary to present the department with a window of opportunity during which reasonable efforts at reunification could have been made.   The department's efforts were thwarted by father's inability or unwillingness to benefit from the services.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify the father with the child and that father was unable or unwilling to benefit from the reunification efforts.   Therefore, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the department has met its burden of proving reasonable efforts as to father.

B

Statutory Grounds for Termination of Parental Rights

Having found that the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondents with the child, the court must next determine whether the department has proved one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights.   The TPR grounds for mother are failure to rehabilitate (Ground B1) and failure to rehabilitate, prior termination (Ground E).   The TPR ground for father is failure to rehabilitate (Ground B1).  Each statutory basis set out in General Statutes § 17a–112(j) is “an independent ground for termination.”  In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 293, 618 A.2d 1 (1992).   The petitioner is required “to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that one of the specific statutory bases for termination has been established.”   Id.

(1)

Failure to Rehabilitate

The petitioner alleges that the respondent parents have failed to rehabilitate.  Section 17a–112 (j)(3)(B)(i) provides in relevant part:  “The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ (B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding ․ and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b–129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child ․” The first element is satisfied in that the child was adjudicated neglected on November 5, 2009.

Personal rehabilitation, as used in the statute, refers to the restoration of a respondent to a constructive and useful role as a parent.  In re Melody L., supra, 290 Conn. 149.   The parent's compliance with the court ordered expectations entered at the time of the neglect adjudication is relevant but not dispositive to the rehabilitation finding.  Id., 151.  “The court, in proceedings to terminate parental rights ․ considers the specific steps issued in the order as a measure of the degree of ‘personal rehabilitation.’  ․ The specific steps are also considered ‘fair warning’ of the potential termination of parental rights in subsequent proceedings pursuant to § 17a–112.”  (Citation omitted.)  In re Jeffrey C., 64 Conn.App. 55, 61–62, 779 A.2d 765 (2001), rev'd on other grounds, 261 Conn. 189, 802 A.2d 772 (2002).  “Indeed, the failure to comply with specific steps ordered by the court typically weighs heavily in a termination proceeding.”  In re Devon B., 264 Conn. 572, 584, 825 A.2d 127 (2003).  “The failure to articulate expectations or to convey them to the respondent, however, does not in and of itself preclude a finding of failure to rehabilitate ․ [The statute] does not provide that in order to achieve personal rehabilitation a parent must meet the expectations of a court as ordered pursuant to a commitment hearing ․ Nor have our courts required an articulation of expectations or strict compliance thereto as a condition precedent to a finding of failure to rehabilitate.”   (Citation omitted.)  In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 112, 125, 614 A.2d 832 (1992).

The statute “requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Melody L., supra, 290 Conn. 149.  “There may be instances in which the evidence does not establish that parental rights should be terminated under this section, despite the fact that continuing support programs for the parent may be suitable or even necessary.”  In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 167, 554 A.2d 722 (1989).   The statute “requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [the parent] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date she can assume a responsible position in her child's life.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Melody L., supra, 290 Conn. 149.  “Although the standard is not full rehabilitation, the parent must show more than ‘any’ rehabilitation ․ Successful completion of the petitioner's expressly articulated expectations is not sufficient to defeat the petitioner's claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation ․ [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue ․ Thus, even if a parent has made successful strides in her ability to manage her life and may have achieved a level of stability within her limitations, such improvements, although commendable, are not dispositive on the issue of whether, within a reasonable period of time, she could assume a responsible position in the life of her child.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted).  In re Victoria B., 79 Conn.App. 245, 254–55, 829 A.2d 855 (2003).  “Thus, the trial court's inquiry requires the determination of both the present and past status of the child, and obtaining a historical perspective of the respondent's child caring and parenting.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Galen F., 54 Conn.App. 590, 594, 737 A.2d 499 (1999).   See In re Halle T., 96 Conn.App. 815, 836–38, 902 A.2d 670 (2006), cert. denied, 280 Conn. 924, 908 A.2d 1087 (2006);  In re Daniel C., supra, 63 Conn.App. 354.

(a)

Mother

Throughout the department's involvement, mother was given fair warning as to what conduct was required, or must be avoided, in order to prevent the termination of her parental rights.   See In re Samantha C., supra, 268 Conn. 631.   Mother was advised by the court and the department as to what she needed to do in order to be reunified with the child, including being ordered to comply with specific steps.   On August 6, 2009, specific steps were ordered for the respondent mother.   On August 14, 2009, the court signed specific steps.   On November 5, 2009, the court reaffirmed mother's steps.

Mother made some positive efforts toward reunification.   She remained in contact with the department.   She visited with E'Laysia as often as DCF permits.   She cooperated with some services to a limited degree.   In November 2009, she completed anger management counseling through the Morris Foundation.   On July 9, 2009, and September 16, 2009, she tested negative for illegal substances.   She attended some individual counseling at the Morris Foundation.

Despite some positive efforts, mother failed to achieve sufficient rehabilitation.   She failed to secure and/or maintain adequate housing and legal income.   During this period, mother lost her section 8 housing services due to noncompliance.   She was unable to obtain suitable housing.   She continued to live with maternal grandmother.   Mother talked about getting her own apartment but failed to do so.

Mother failed to fully cooperate with recommended service providers.   In September 2009, mother was referred by the department to in-home reunification program through the Boys & Girls Village.   Mother started out being compliant but became less so over time.   She was often late for appointments and missed several appointments altogether.   She failed to return phone calls.   She did not provide requested documentation regarding employment and housing.   Boulanger recommended individual therapy, but mother refused.   On January 22, 2010, mother was discharged from the program due to noncompliance.

Mother did not fully participate in individual counseling and make sufficient progress toward the identified treatment goals.   In February 2010, mother was referred for individual counseling at the Family Intervention Center in Waterbury.   On April 8, 2010, she was discharged from the program for failure to engage in services after she missed or rescheduled four appointments.   The department referred mother to the Morris Foundation for individual counseling and medication management.   From April 2010 to December 2010, mother attended approximately half of the required sessions.

Mother continued to have further involvement with the criminal justice system and did not fully comply with conditions of probation.   From 2009 to 2011, mother was arrested several times and charged with disorderly conduct and breach of peace.   Anger management issues remained a concern.   Mother's continued involvement with the criminal justice system was an ongoing concern.   E'Laysia needs a caretaker who is stable and consistent and available to care for her on a daily basis.

Mother continued to engage in substance abuse.   In November 2010, mother submitted to a urine screen at probation's request and tested positive.   The department referred mother for a hair test at the Morris Foundation, but she failed to comply.   In January 2011, mother submitted to a urine screen at probation's request and again tested positive for marijuana.

Mother failed to make sufficient progress in addressing the child protection concerns.   She was unable or unwilling to cooperate with services offered by the department to assist her in reunifying with E'Laysia.   She did not keep all her appointments set by or with DCF. She failed to participate in individual counseling on a regular basis.   She did not cooperate with recommended services.   She was unable to provide a suitable home environment for the child.   She lost her section 8 services due to noncompliance.   She remained unemployed.   She continued to make poor life decisions that jeopardize her ability to reunify with E'Laysia.   She continued her involvement with the criminal justice system.   She was arrested several times since E'Laysia was born.   She did not comply with the terms of her probation.

E'Laysia was born on August 1, 2009.   She has been in foster care since she was five days old.   She has specialized medical needs that require a competent caretaker who is available on a consistent basis.   E'Laysia is closely bonded with the foster family.   The child's emotional stability and well-being would be adversely affected by allowing mother additional time to rehabilitate.

When the TPR petition was filed, mother was not in a position to care for E'Laysia and tend to her special needs.   Mother failed to achieve sufficient rehabilitation.   She did not improve her ability to manage her own life.   She failed to show any real and sustained growth in terms of her parenting skills that would indicate she could effectively handle her child's physical, emotional, behavioral and medical needs.   Mother was unable to assume a responsible position in the life of the child within a reasonable time.   She failed to sufficiently address the issues that led to the removal of the child and the neglect adjudication.

There is clear and convincing evidence that when the TPR petition was filed on June 11, 2010, mother had failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, she could assume a responsible position in the child's life.   The level of rehabilitation she achieved, if any, fell short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date she could assume a responsible position in the child's life.

The court may also consider a parent's rehabilitative efforts subsequent to the filing of the TPR petition, in determining whether the parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child within a foreseeable period of time.   Practice Book § 35a–7;  In re Amber B., 56 Conn.App. 776, 785, 746 A.2d 222 (2000).

Since the TPR petition was filed, mother has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation.   She has failed to fully comply with the specific steps.   She has not attended individual counseling on a consistent basis.   She has continued to have further involvement with the criminal justice system.   She has engaged in substance abuse.   She has not secured and/or maintained adequate housing and legal income.   Even though mother has expressed a desire to have the child returned to her and has made some efforts toward reunification, mother is not equipped to raise the child in a safe and nurturing environment where the child would thrive.

Since June 11, 2010, mother has failed to achieve the necessary degree of rehabilitation.   Mother has failed to “assume a responsible position in the life of the child[ren].”  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i).   Mother has not made a real, sustained effort to improve her parenting skills.   She has not gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child, and she is no closer to being ready to assume full parenting responsibilities.   Even if it could be argued that mother made some progress toward rehabilitation, it is not of such a degree that would allow this court to find that she could be a responsible parent within a reasonably foreseeable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child.   She would need a substantial period of time to address her needs before she could assume the role of a responsible parent.   See In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 481, 771 A.2d 244 (2001).

For the above-stated reasons, the court finds that the department has proved the ground of failure to rehabilitate as to mother by clear and convincing evidence.

(b)

Father

Throughout the department's involvement, father was given fair warning as to what conduct was required, or must be avoided, in order to prevent the termination of his parental rights.   See In re Samantha C., supra, 268 Conn. 631.   Father was advised by the court and the department as to what he needed to do in order to be reunified with the child, including being ordered to comply with specific steps.   On August 6, 2009, specific steps were ordered for the respondent father.   On November 5, 2009, the court ordered that father comply with specific steps.

Father made some positive efforts toward reunification.   He visited with E'Laysia as often as DCF allows.   He interacted well with E'Laysia.   In October 2009, father had adequate housing and legal income.

Despite some positive efforts, father failed to achieve sufficient rehabilitation.   Although father had adequate housing and legal employment in the fall of 2009, he was subsequently arrested several times for charges related to selling drugs and is currently incarcerated.   When the TPR petition was filed he was incarcerated and did not have adequate housing and legal income.

Father failed to fully cooperate with recommended service providers.   On or about November 3, 2009, father was referred to the Fatherhood Initiative Program but failed to comply.   He did not participate in the program and obtain parenting education.

Father continued to have further involvement with the criminal justice system and did not fully comply with conditions of probation.   Since E'Laysia was born, father was arrested several times, mainly for charges related to selling drugs.   Based on father's criminal history, he was referred several times to the Morris Foundation for a substance abuse evaluation but failed to comply.   He is currently serving a two-year sentence.   The department has ongoing concerns regarding father's continued involvement with the criminal justice system.   The number of arrests is of concern.   E'Laysia needs a caretaker who is stable and consistent and available to care for her on a daily basis.   Due to his continued criminal involvement and incarceration, father was not available to care for the child.

Father failed to make sufficient progress in addressing the child protection concerns.   He was unwilling or unable to cooperate with services recommended by the department to assist him in reunifying with E'Laysia.   He did not keep all his appointments set by or with DCF. He failed to participate in the Fatherhood Initiative and parenting education.   He continued to make poor life decisions that jeopardized his ability to reunify with E'Laysia.   Since E'Laysia was born, father was arrested several times.   Most of his arrests are for drug offenses.   His criminal conduct raised serious concerns regarding substance abuse.   He failed to comply with referrals for substance abuse evaluation.   He was incarcerated and unable to provide a suitable home for E'Laysia.

E'Laysia was born on August 1, 2009.   She has been in foster care since she was five days old.   She has specialized medical needs that require a competent caretaker who is available on a consistent basis.   E'Laysia is closely bonded with the foster family.   The child's emotional stability and well-being would be adversely affected by allowing father additional time to rehabilitate.

When the TPR petition was filed, father was not in a position to care for E'Laysia and tend to her special needs.   Father failed to achieve sufficient rehabilitation.   He did not improve his ability to manage his own life.   He failed to show any real and sustained growth in terms of his parenting skills that would indicate he could effectively handle his child's physical, emotional, behavioral and medical needs.   Father was unable to assume a responsible position in the life of the child within a reasonable time.   He failed to sufficiently address the issues that led to the removal of the child and the neglect adjudication.

There is clear and convincing evidence that when the TPR petition was filed on June 11, 2010, father had failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, he could assume a responsible position in the child's life.   The level of rehabilitation he achieved, if any, fell short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date he could assume a responsible position in the child's life.

The court can also consider a parent's rehabilitative efforts subsequent to the filing of the TPR petition, in determining whether the parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child within a foreseeable period of time.   Practice Book § 35a–7;  In re Amber B., supra, 56 Conn.App. 785.

Since the TPR petition was filed, father has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation.   He has not fully complied with the specific steps.   Due to his incarceration, he has been unable to engage in services in the community to facilitate reunification with E'Laysia.   To his credit, he has engaged in some programs while incarcerated.   Although father expects to be released on transitional supervision in April 2011, he does not have the ability to care for the particular needs of the child.   He has not secured and/or maintained adequate housing and legal income.   Even though father has expressed a desire to have the child returned to him and has made some efforts toward reunification, father is not equipped to raise the child in a safe and nurturing environment where the child would thrive.

Since June 11, 2010, father has failed to achieve the necessary degree of rehabilitation.   Father has failed to “assume a responsible position in the life of the child[ren].”  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i).   He has not made a real, sustained effort to improve her parenting skills.   He has not gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child, and he is no closer to being ready to assume full parenting responsibilities.   Even if it could be argued that father made some progress toward rehabilitation, it is not of such a degree that would allow this court to find that he could be a responsible parent within a reasonably foreseeable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child.   Father would need a substantial period of time to address his needs before he could assume the role of a responsible parent.   See In re Sheila J., supra, 62 Conn.App. 481.

For the above-stated reasons, the court finds that the department has proved the ground of failure to rehabilitate as to father by clear and convincing evidence.

(2)

Failure to Rehabilitate Prior Termination

The petitioner also alleges that the respondent mother has failed to rehabilitate, prior termination, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(E).   Under this statute, the court may grant the TPR petition if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that “the parent of a child under the age of seven years who is neglected or uncared for, has failed, is unable or is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and such parent's parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children and Families ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(E).

The department has proved this ground by clear and convincing evidence.   First, E'Laysia was born on August 1, 2009, and is under the age of seven years.   Second, the child was adjudicated neglected and committed to the custody of the department on November 5, 2009.   Mother was ordered to comply with specific steps by the court.   Third, mother's parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the department.   On October 2, 2008, mother's parental rights of another child, Briana W., were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the department by the court.   On September 29, 2009, her parental rights of another child, Na'Zaria W., were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the department by the court.   On September 29, 2009, her parental rights of another child, Andre W., were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the department by the court.   Finally, as stated-above, the evidence demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that mother has failed, is unable or is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, the parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.

For the above-stated reasons, the court finds that the department has proved by clear and convincing evidence the ground of failure to rehabilitate, prior termination, as to mother pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(E).

C

Best Interest of the Child

Having determined that the department has proved the adjudicatory grounds with respect to the respondent parents, the court must determine whether the department has met its burden of proof as to disposition.

“In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of the child ․ [T]he trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent's parental rights is not in the best interest of the child.”   (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Janazia S., 112 Conn.App. 69, 97–98, 961 A.2d 1036 (2009).

“The best interests of the child include the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being and continuity and stability of its environment ․ In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings delineated in [§ 17a–112(k) ].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Trevon G., 109 Conn.App. 782, 794–95, 952 A.2d 1280 (2008);  see also In re Tremaine C., 117 Conn.App. 590, 600, 980 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 920, 984 A.2d 69 (2009).   The court makes the following findings regarding the statutory factors.

(1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.

The department has offered numerous services to the respondents to facilitate reunification with the child.   The services were made available to the respondents and were offered on a consistent, timely and sufficient basis.

(2) Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

The department has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family.   The department offered appropriate services to the respondents to address the issues that led to the removal of the child.   The respondents were unable or unwilling to benefit from the services offered.   The respondents have failed to adjust their circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return the child to the care of the respondents.

(3) The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order.

The respondents were ordered by the court to cooperate and comply with specific steps.   During this period, the department offered services to the respondents.   The services were appropriate in that they were designed to address the problems that led to the department's involvement and ultimately the removal of the child.   The respondents have not fulfilled their obligations under the orders and have been unable or unwilling to benefit from the services offered.

(4) The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.

E'Laysia has regular visitation with the respondents.   She visits with mother on a weekly basis.   Her visits with father were weekly when he was in the community and monthly while he was incarcerated.   The evidence demonstrates that E'Laysia clearly has feelings and emotional ties to her parents.

E'Laysia has developed a significant bond with her current foster parents, who she has lived with since she was five days old.   The foster home is the only home she has ever known.   She is totally dependent on her foster parents for her care.   She has specialized medical needs that require constant attention.   She is a happy child.   She seeks out the foster parents for comfort.   ELaysia is very bonded to her foster siblings.

5) The age of the child.

E'Laysia was born on August 1, 2009, and is twenty-one months old.

(6) The efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child.

The respondents have failed to sufficiently adjust their circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to be reunified with the respondents in the foreseeable future.   Although the respondents have consistently visited with the child, they have been unable or unwilling to sufficiently address their child protection concerns and are not in a position to provide E'Laysia with a safe, permanent and stable home environment where she would be able to thrive.

(7) The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.

The department attempted to encourage and assist the respondents in reunifying with the child.   The respondents were offered appropriate services.   The department acted reasonably under the circumstances.   The respondents have been unable or unwilling to benefit from the services necessary to ensure reunification with the child.   The respondents have not been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by an unreasonable act or conduct by anyone, or by their economic circumstances.

Having made the written findings regarding the seven factors delineated in § 17a–112(k), the court must now determine whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child.   This is part of the dispositional phase of a termination proceeding.  In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 511, 613 A.2d 748 (1992) (“the determination of the child's best interests comes into play only after statutory grounds for termination of parental rights have been established by clear and convincing evidence”).   In making this determination, the court can consider all events occurring through the close of the dispositional hearing.   Practice Book § 35a–9.

“[T]he determination of a child's best interest is generally a fact intensive inquiry ․ [T]he best interest standard ․ is inherently flexible and fact specific and gives the court discretion to consider all of the different and individualized factors that might affect a specific child's best interest.”   (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Shanaira C., 297 Conn. 737, 759–60, 1 A.3d 5 (2010).

In addition to the statutory factors, the court has identified a number of other factors that are relevant to the determination of the best interest of the child.   These factors include the following:  child's age;  child's bond to biological parent;  child's bond to foster parents;  child's emotional well-being;  child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being and continuity and stability of her environment;  child's lack of visibility in the community;  child's length of stay in foster care;  child's need for supportive, safe, structured, stable, and nurturing caretakers;  child's relationship with foster siblings;  child's safety;  child's specialized medical needs;  family integrity;  foster parent's willingness to provide long-term care and/or adopt the child;  genetic bond to the parent;  historical perspective of parent's child caring and parenting;  home environment (biological, foster);  parent's ability to be a full-time, unsupervised caretaker;  parent's ability to benefit from services provided;  parent's ability to meet child's basic needs;  parent's ability to make sufficient efforts to reunify;  parent's ability to provide long-term care;  parent's ability to resume a position as a responsible and stable parent in order for reunification to occur;  parent's ability with respect to anger management;  parent's choice to pursue a life not consistent with parenting the child;  parent's compliance with the court orders (specific steps);  parent's constitutional right to raise child;  parent's contact with child—quantity and quality;  parent's cooperation with service providers;  parent's criminal involvement and continuing to make decisions lead to arrests/incarceration;  parent's demonstrated ability to raise other children;  parent's efforts toward reunification;  parent's employment history;  parent's financial condition;  parent's history of having other child(ren) removed;  parent's history of substance abuse;  parent's housing situation;  parent's incarceration and unavailability to be caretaker;  parent's income;  parent's love and attention toward child;  parent's level of participation in services;  parent's prior termination of parental rights;  parent's progress in counseling, treatment, etc.;   parent's wishes and desires;  parent's visitation history;  parent's concern with meeting own needs rather than child's needs;  parental rights and responsibilities;  permanency, need for;  and reasonable efforts made by the department to reunite the family.

E'Laysia is twenty-one months old.   She has been in the same foster home since she was five days old.   E'Laysia is bonded to the foster parents and siblings.   The foster parents are willing to adopt E'Laysia if she is freed for adoption.   In order for E'Laysia to grow and develop in a healthy manner, she needs competent and loving caretakers who are able to provide a stable and healthy home environment free from child protection issues.   She needs caretakers who are available and are able to care for her special medical needs.   She has been in foster care for basically all of her life.   E'Laysia needs permanency now.

The respondents have failed to achieve sufficient rehabilitation.   They have been unable or unwilling to take advantage of services offered by the department to address the child protection concerns and improve their circumstances so that they could play a responsible role in the child's life.   The respondents continue to have involvement with the criminal justice system.   The respondents have been unable or unwilling to put E'Laysia's interests ahead of their own.   The respondents are unable or unwilling to appropriately care for the child and provide a safe and nurturing home environment.

For the above-stated reasons, the court finds that the department has established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the parental rights of the respondents is not in the best interest of the child.

In regards to the TPR petition, the department has established by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts to reunify the family have been made, at least one of the seven grounds for termination exists, and termination of the respondents' parental rights is in the best interest of the child.

D

Transfer of Guardianship

The court must next consider the father's motion to revoke commitment and transfer guardianship to Rosalind C. The father argues that Rosalind C. is ready, willing and able to take care of E'Laysia and that transfer of guardianship is in the best interest of the child.   The department contends that the child has been in the pre-adoptive home for over a year, the father did not offer this placement resource until the eve of trial, and transfer of guardianship is not in the best interest of the child.

General Statutes § 46b–129(m) provides that “[t]he commissioner, a parent or the child's attorney may file a motion to revoke a commitment, and, upon finding that cause for commitment no longer exists, and that such revocation is in the best interests of such child or youth, the court may revoke the commitment of such child or youth.   No such motion shall be filed more often than once every six months.”

Practice Book § 35a–20(b) provides:  “A parent, legal guardian or other interested party seeking guardianship of the child or youth after guardianship rights to that child or youth were transferred to another person by the superior court for juvenile matters may file a motion with the court that ordered the transfer of guardianship.”

The legal standard for determining whether to transfer guardianship is, in effect, a two-prong test.   First, the court must determine whether the proposed guardian is a suitable and worthy person.  General Statutes § 46b–129(j) provides in relevant part:  “Upon finding and adjudging that any child ․ is uncared-for, neglected or dependent, the court may commit such child ․ to the Commissioner of Children and Families.   Such commitment shall remain in effect until further order of the court, except that such commitment may be revoked ․ at any time by the court, or the court may vest such child's ․ legal guardianship ․ with any other person or persons found to be suitable and worthy of such responsibility by the court, including, but not limited to, any relative of such child ․ by blood or marriage.”

Second, the court must determine whether transfer of guardianship is in the best interest of the child.   See In re Marcus S., 120 Conn.App. 745, 994 A.2d 253, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 914, 995 A.2d 955 (2010);  In re Haley B., 81 Conn.App. 62, 64, 838 A.2d 1006 (2004);  In re Anthony A., 112 Conn.App. 643, 647, 963 A.2d 1057 (2009);  and In re Karl J., 110 Conn.App. 22, 29, 954 A.2d 231, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 954, 961 A.2d 420 (2008).   Citing Practice Book § 35a–16, the Appellate Court found that ‘[t]he standard for determining ․ whether the court should transfer guardianship is the best interest of the child.”  In re Marcus S., supra, 120 Conn.App. 753–54.  Practice Book § 35a–16 provides in relevant part:  “Motions to modify dispositions are dispositional in nature based on the prior adjudication and the judicial authority shall determine whether a modification is in the best interests of the child or youth upon a fair preponderance of the evidence.

The trial court approved a plan of transfer of guardianship in In re Marcus S., supra, 120 Conn.App. 747.   There, the child had been removed from the home based on domestic violence and inadequate supervision.  Id., 747–48.   After trial, the child was adjudicated neglected and mother's parental rights were terminated.  Id., 748.   The child was committed to the department and remained in the care of the paternal grandparents.  Id.

In transferring guardianship to the paternal grandparents, the trial court found the following facts.   The child had been in the custody of the paternal grandparents for well over one year.  Id., 754.   During this period, the grandparents had provided for the child's needs, including his educational and medical needs.  Id. They were “ready, willing and able to continue to do so in the future.”  Id. The child was bonded with his grandparents and happy to live with them and referred to their home as his home.  Id. The trial court noted that the father also had a positive relationship with his son and the grandparents.  Id. Father visited the child as his schedule permitted, which was limited based on the fact that “[h]e worked two jobs, attended evening classes and was on call at times for one of his jobs.”  Id. At trial, the father did not articulate any plans for taking care of the child if the child were returned to his care.  Id. The father failed to offer any evidence that it would be in the child's best interest to be in his care.  Id.

The Appellate Court found that:  “there were ample facts on which the court reasonably could conclude that it would be in the best interest of Marcus to remain in the care and custody of his paternal grandparents and to have guardianship transferred to his grandparents.

“Although our Supreme Court has recognized that the best interests of the child are usually served by keeping the child in the home with his ․ parents ․ the court also has noted consistently the importance of permanency in children's lives ․ The trial court's findings reflected these considerations in relation to Marcus' best interest.   Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not improperly determine that it was in Marcus' best interest to transfer guardianship to his paternal grandparents.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 754–55.

The trial court did not grant a motion for transfer of guardianship in In re Haley B., supra, 81 Conn.App. 64.   There, the respondent grandmother (MGM) appealed the trial court's denial of her motion to transfer guardianship.   The trial court found that the grandmother had “failed to meet her burden [of showing] that Haley's best interests require the physical return of the child.”  Id., 64–65.   The grandmother “did not satisfy the court that her long pattern of substituting her own judgment against an expressed agreement will change.”  Id., 64.   On several occasions, MGM had not complied with guidelines issued by the department limiting visitation between the child and her parents.  Id., 65–66.   She allowed the mother to have unauthorized visits or contact with the child, and “then failed to disclose or misrepresented these facts to [the department].”  Id., 66.  “[MGM] also failed to seek prior approval for any of these acts and, in some cases, took them despite [the department's] direct prohibition.”  Id. The court also raised concerns regarding the MGM's credibility, including as to whether the child had been exposed to a convicted sex offender.  Id. MGM demonstrated a lack of credibility and made misrepresentations regarding the child and her parents.  Id. The Appellate Court found that the best interest of the child standard was correctly applied by the trial court in determining whether to transfer guardianship.  Id., 66–67.  “To determine whether a custodial placement is in the best interest of the child, the court uses its broad discretion to choose a place that will foster the child's interest in sustained growth, development, well being, and in the continuity and stability of its environment.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 67.

The trial court denied a motion for transfer of guardianship in In re Anthony A., supra, 112 Conn.App. 647.   There, the trial court terminated the parental rights of the parents and denied the mother's motion to transfer guardianship of the child to the intervening maternal grandmother.  Id., 643.   The child had been in the care of his foster parents for over a year, and from the time he was nine months old.  Id. The trial court concluded that the transfer of guardianship was not in the child's best interest.  Id., 654.   In affirming the denial of the motion to transfer guardianship, the Appellate Court noted the following:  “The court reasoned that no evidence was presented that would warrant the disruption of Anthony's life from his current placement to a new placement.   The court found that Anthony's [paternal great-aunt and uncle] foster parents were his psychological parents, with whom he had bonded and referred to as ‘Mommy’ and ‘Daddy.’   The court apparently credited the testimony of Regina Wilson, a clinical psychologist, who testified that it would not be in Anthony's best interest for him to move out of his current foster home to the home of another relative.”  Id., 654–55.   The Appellate Court found that “the court reasonably concluded that it was in the best interest of Anthony to remain with his foster family and not to have guardianship transferred to the intervenor.”  Id., 655.

The trial court denied a motion for reinstatement of guardianship in In re Karl J., supra, 110 Conn.App. 22.   There, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the mother's motion for reinstatement of guardianship.  “Although the trial court ․ found that the reasons for the commitment no longer existed, the court concluded that it was in the best interest of the child to remain with his aunt and uncle.”  Id., 27.   The evidence as to best interest included the following:  “the child had made significant improvements in his mental, physical and emotional health while in the care of his aunt and uncle.   Additionally, the court noted that the child referred to his aunt and uncle as ‘mom and dad’ and adamantly expressed a desire to remain in Florida with them.”  Id., 28–29.   The Appellate Court also noted that:  “Although our Supreme Court has recognized that ‘the best interests of the child are usually served by keeping the child in the home with his ․ parents' ․ the court also has noted consistently the importance of permanency in children's lives.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 29.

When there is a dispositional question, the court “may admit into evidence any testimony relevant and material to the issue of the disposition, including events occurring through the close of the evidentiary hearing ․” Practice Book § 35a–9.

(1)

Suitable and Worthy Guardian

The first issue the court must address is whether Rosalind C. is a suitable and worthy guardian for the child.   The court must consider what it means to be a “suitable and worthy guardian.”   A guardian stands in the place of a biological parent and assumes the parental role.   Just like a parent, the guardian must have the ability to care for the child.   Guardianship is synonymous with parenthood.  “The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes:  (1) express love and affection for the child;  (2) express personal concern for child's health, education, and general well being of the child;  (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing, and medical care;  (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile;  and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Angelica W., 49 Conn.App. 541, 551, 714 A.2d 1265 (1998).   In regards to whether a person is appropriate for a certain role, the court also notes that the term “suitable” is ordinarily defined as “able, qualified.”   Merriam–Webster Online Dictionary, 2010. http:// www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/suitable (last visited July 2010).   While “worthy” is commonly understood to mean “honorable, meritorious.”  Id., http://www. merriam-webster.com/dictionary/worthy (last visited July 2010).

The evidence as to whether Rosalind would be a suitable and worthy guardian for E'Laysia is inconclusive.   Her only contact with E'Laysia was a one-hour visit at a McDonalds in February 2011.   She has no relationship or bond with the child.   They are not related by blood or marriage.   Rosalind did not come forward as a resource for the child until October 2010, over one year after the child was removed.   There is no evidence that Rosalind ever attempted to develop a relationship with E'Laysia through sending her letters, cards or gifts.   In the last several months, Rosalind has assumed responsibility for her niece's daughter.   She is on a fixed income, and it is unclear whether she is able to financially provide for E'Laysia.   Although Rosalind appears to be a good and well-intentioned person, it is uncertain whether she would be a suitable and worthy caretaker for E'Laysia.   Based on the evidence presented, the court is unable to find by a preponderance of the evidence that father has satisfied the first prong of the transfer of guardianship test.

(2)

Best Interest of the Child

The court must next determine whether transfer of guardianship is in the best interest of the child.   As previously noted, “the determination of a child's best interest is generally a fact intensive inquiry ․ [T]he best interest standard ․ is inherently flexible and fact specific and gives the court discretion to consider all of the different and individualized factors that might affect a specific child's best interest.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Shanaira C., supra, 297 Conn. 759–60.

The Appellate Court in In re Haley B. found that in order to determine “whether a custodial placement is in the best interest of the child, the court uses its broad discretion to choose a place that will foster the child's interest in sustained growth, development, well-being, and in the continuity and stability of its environment.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Haley B., supra, 81 Conn.App. 67.

In addition to these considerations, the court has identified a number of other factors that are relevant to the determination of the best interest of the child with respect to transfer of guardianship.   These factors include the following:  child's age;  child's bond to foster parents;  child's bond to proposed guardian;  child's emotional well-being;  child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being and continuity and stability of her environment;  child's lack of visibility in the community;  child's length of stay in foster care;  child's need for supportive, safe, structured, stable, and nurturing caretakers;  child's relationship with foster siblings;  child's special needs;  family integrity;  financial condition of potential caretaker;  foster parent's willingness to provide long-term care and/or adopt the child;  home environment (proposed guardian, foster);  length of time the child has been in the custody of the caretaker;  length of time that the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity in such environment;  parent's ability to be actively involved in child's life;  nature of the relationship of the child with the caretaker of the child;  permanency;  proposed guardian's ability to meet child's needs;  proposed guardian's ability to provide long-term care;  proposed guardian's ability to provide suitable housing;  and proposed guardian's prior involvement in child's life.

After due consideration, the court concludes by a preponderance of the evidence that transfer of guardianship to Rosalind C. is not in the best interest of the child.   E'Laysia is twenty-one months old.   She has been in the same foster home since she was five days old.   E'Laysia is bonded with the foster parents and is happy to live with them.   She calls her foster parents “mommy” and “daddy.”   She is also very bonded with her foster siblings.   The foster home is the only home she has ever known.   The foster parents had provided for the child's special needs and are ready, willing and able to continue to do so in the future.   All of E'Laysia's needs are being addressed.   She has made significant improvements in her health while in the care of the foster parents.   The foster parents are willing to adopt E'Laysia if she is freed for adoption.   E'Laysia only contact with Rosalind was a one-hour visit at a McDonalds in February 2011.   They are not related by blood or marriage.   E'Laysia has no demonstrated feelings or emotional ties to Rosalind.

It is not in E'Laysia's best interest to remove her from the only home she has ever known, where she is having all of her needs met and is thriving, to live with a person who would basically be a stranger to her.   The respondents' ability to remain active in E'Laysia's life does not make transfer of guardianship in the child's best interest.   E'Laysia is in need of permanency.   She is not able to wait to develop a relationship with Rosalind.   It would take months, if not years, for E'Laysia to develop the type of relationship she already enjoys with the foster parents.

As in In re Anthony P., the evidence does not support the disruption of the child's life from her current placement, which is the only home she has any recollection of.   The child has a very close and nurturing bond with the foster parents.   She calls them mommy and daddy and seeks them out for love and support.   She is also strongly bonded to the foster siblings.   Like the respondent in In re Haley B., father has failed to meet his burden of proving that the child's best interest requires transfer of guardianship to Rosalind.   The foster home is the place that will best foster the child's interest in sustained growth, development, well-being, and in the continuity and stability of her environment.   As was true of the child in In re Karl J., E'Laysia has thrived in her current home environment.

For the above-stated reasons, the court finds that the father has not proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that transfer of guardianship to Rosalind C. is in the best interest of the child.   Therefore, father's motion to revoke commitment and transfer of guardianship is denied.

IV

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the above stated reasons, the court renders judgment and enters the following orders:

(1) Petitioner's termination of parental rights (TPR) petition, filed June 11, 2010, is GRANTED.

The TPR petition is hereby granted and judgment may enter terminating the parental rights of the respondent parents.   It is further ordered that the Commissioner of Children and Families is appointed the statutory parent for the child.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(o), the department shall report to the court, not later than thirty days after the date judgment is entered, on case plans, as defined by the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, for the child, which shall include measurable objectives and time schedules.   At least every three months thereafter, the department shall report to the court on the progress that has been made on the implementation of the plans.

(2) Respondent father's motion to revoke commitment and transfer of guardianship, filed December 1, 2010, is DENIED.

BY THE COURT:

Bentivegna, J.

Bentivegna, James M., J.