IN RE: Charlotte H.1 (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

These actions are brought by The Department of Children and Families (“DCF” or “Petitioner”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of the biological mother and the biological father of Charlotte H. (hereinafter referred to as “Charlotte H.” or “child”).   The biological mother of this child is Michelle M. (hereinafter referred to as “Michelle M.” or “Mother”), passed away on January 17, 2010.   The biological father is Joshua H., (hereinafter referred to a “Joshua H.” or “Father”).

On 1/27/2010, a 96–Hour Hold was issued on behalf of Charlotte H. On 1/29/2010, DCF filed a motion for Order of Temporary Custody and a Petitioner of Neglect on behalf of the above-named child.   The Order of Temporary Custody and Neglect Petition were granted on 1/29/2010 and subsequently sustained on 2/5/2010.   On 6/9/2010, Charlotte H. was adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and custody of the Department of Children and Families.

On 10/21/2010, DCF filed a permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption which was pending at the time of trial.

On 8/24/2010, Petitions to Terminate the Parental Right of Father, Joshua Haynes, were filed as to Charlotte H.

On 9/23/2010, the Court confirmed service on Father, who was present and advised him of his right, and a denial was entered.   A CMC was set for 11/22/2010 at 11:00 a.m., and thereafter on 12/7/2010 a trial was set for 2/3/2011.

On 2/3/2011 the court commenced trial and Father was present.   At the completion of evidence the trial was continued to 2/15/2011.   On 2/15/2011 the court opened, Father was not present inasmuch as a Habeas Corpus had not issued and the matter was continued to 2/16/2011 from 2–5 p.m. On 2/16/2011 court was reconvened and at the closing was continued to 3/8/2011 at 9 a.m. for summation.   On 3/8/2011 court commenced and upon summation by all parties, was adjourned.

On 12/7/2010 Dyer, J., had recused himself upon request of Respondent Father and on 1/16/2011 Attorney Dayner, counsel for the Respondent Father was allowed to withdraw upon Father's request and Attorney Perez was named counsel.

At the time of the trial counsel for DCF submitted fourteen exhibits (A–N) and Respondent Father submitted ten exhibits (1–10).   On 2/3/2011 five witnesses testified for DCF and two witnesses testified for Father.   On 2/16/2011 four witnesses testified for Father, including Respondent Father himself.

The court finds that there is no action pending in any other court affecting custody of this child and that this court has jurisdiction in this matter.

The grounds for the Petition for TPR as to the biological Father, Joshua H., are Failure to Rehabilitate.

The court has applied the burden of proof applicable to the Termination of Parental Rights, has reviewed the Neglect Petition and the social studies and exhibits that were submitted in evidence.   The court has utilized the applicable legal standards in considering the evidence and the testimony of any witnesses.

I.

FACTUAL FINDINGSA. Background, Facts Substantiating Allegations of Neglect and Termination, Present Situation, Reasons for Petition

DCF has been involved with this family since 2009.   The presenting problems were identified as Father, Joshua H.'s, unresolved substance abuse, domestic violence, criminal activity, anger management, and mental health issues.   Father has been arrested in Connecticut, Rhode Island and New Hampshire for drug and domestic violence charges.   The parties were also involved with family court and came to an agreement on January 12, 2010 (Exhibit C).  Shortly after this agreement was reached, Mother committed suicide.

At the time of Mother's suicide on 1/16/2010, Charlotte was visiting with Father at Paternal Grandmother's home with Paternal Grandmother and Father's girlfriend.   On 1/16/2011 Father was arrested, having several warrants outstanding, and the child was to be left overnight in their care.   On 1/17/2011 Charlotte was turned over to the Maternal Grandmother as her caretaker.   Father was arraigned in Superior Court in Manchester and in Superior Court in Enfield on 1/19/2010 and 1/20/2010 respectively, bail was set and paid by relatives to allow for release on 1/20/2010.   On 1/22/2010 Father requested visitation with Charlotte and discovered the Maternal Grandmother had returned to Arizona with her.   On 1/24/2010 the Windsor Locks Police Department called DCF regarding concerns for the child being with her father.   After 1/25/2010, Maternal Grandmother returned to Connecticut with the child and refused to allow father to take custody.   After discussions with the local police department and DCF, Charlotte was placed with Father who was sole custodian of her at the time.   On 1/26/2010 DCF commenced an investigation concerning Father and available resources.   On the same date, Father was rearrested.   On 1/27/2010 a 96–hour hold was taken on Charlotte and she was placed with MGM. On 1/28/2010 in a telephone call to DCF, father advised that he had been released from jail on bond on 1/27/2010.   On 1/29/2010 an order of Temporary Custody and Neglect Petition was ordered by the court and on 2/5/2010 was sustained with Father in agreement (See Exhibit A).

Mother previously resided with Maternal Grandparents.   Said child had resided with Maternal Grandparents and Mother since her birth and Maternal grandparents have assisted greatly in said child's care since her birth.   Father has a history of violence against Mother, a history of untreated substance abuse and numerous pending criminal charges.   On 1/26/2010, Father was arrested for one hundred and fifty counts of Violation of a Protective Order for calls and text messages to Mother between the dates of January 6 and January 16, 2010.   Said child was present during the arrest, becoming very upset.

Family History

B. Mother:  Michelle M.

Michelle M. was born 9/16/1987 to Bethany and Stephen M. in Hartford, CT, and is a U.S. citizen.   Mother was the youngest of three girls.   Maternal Grandmother stated Mother had good relationships with everyone in her family.

Mother graduated Windsor Locks High School in 2005.   Following high school, she went to cosmetology school and then Porter and Chester for Electrical Apprenticeship.

During high school Mother worked part time for the family business.   Mother worked for Maternal Grandfather's business as an electrical apprentice for the last one and a half years, before the business was dissolved, due to the family moving to Arizona.

In 10/2008, Mother was diagnosed with leukemia, and had been on a pill form of chemotherapy from that time on.   Mother went to the hospital every four to six weeks for blood work.   This diagnosis affected Mother's day-to-day living, as she dealt with symptoms including pain, tiredness, nausea and vomiting.   More recently, Mother's doctors were discussing the possibility of a stem cell transplant for Mother, and Maternal Aunt Erica had been identified as a match.

After Mother was diagnosed with Leukemia, she began to see a therapist and was on Wellbutrin and Zoloft due to depression.

Mother and Father met when Mother was eighteen years old.   Two years into their relationship, Mother gave birth to Charlotte.   Maternal Grandmother described Mother as a dedicated mother, who took excellent care of Charlotte.   Mother and Charlotte resided with Maternal Grandparents until the time of her death.   Maternal Grandparents have assisted in Charlotte's care since the time of her birth.

Maternal Grandmother stated Father verbally and physically abused Mother for the duration of their relationship.   Mother had protective orders against Father on at least two separate occasions.   Father served one year on probation in Rhode Island after being convicted of Domestic Battery on Mother.   There was a full no contact order in place at the time of Mother's death.

In August 2009, Mother disclosed concerns she had with Father to her therapist.   This disclosure led to a referral to the Department.   During the course of the investigation, Mother disclosed Father hit her while she was holding Charlotte when she was two weeks old.   Mother stated that there was no police involvement, as she was afraid of Father's reaction if she were to contact police.   Mother further stated she had heard through friends Father was drinking and using cocaine during times he was caring for Charlotte.   Mother informed the Social Worker she no longer went to Father's home herself, as six months prior, Father attempted to have sex with her in the same room Charlotte was playing.

In 8/09, Mother disclosed use of marijuana to the Department.   Mother had disclosed abuse of pain killers to her Oncologist.

On 5/22/09, Mother filed an application for custody of Charlotte at the Superior Court in Hartford.   On 1/12/2010, an agreement had been reached between Mother and Father.   Mother was granted permission to relocate with Charlotte to Arizona with Maternal Grandparents, and Father was granted three weeks of visitation with Charlotte per year.   This agreement was to go into effect on 1/31/2010, and Mother planned to move to Arizona at that time.

On 1/16/2010, Mother committed suicide in Manchester, CT. There were a total of fifty-eight phone calls between Mother and Father on 1/16/2010, as well as what the Manchester Police Department described as a “heated exchange of text messages” regarding Charlotte's visit with Father.   Father was the last person Mother spoke with prior to her suicide;  she called twelve minutes prior to purchasing the rope she hanged herself with.   Father reported to the Manchester Police Mother asked if he was taking Charlotte for the night and did not indicate she was upset or about to hurt herself.

Maternal Grandmother also reported Mother was having a lot of anxiety about moving to Arizona and leaving Father and her friends.   She acknowledged although Mother and Father has a volatile relationship, Mother was in love with Father, and was very upset he was dating someone else.

During an investigation into Mother's suicide, Manchester Police interviewed Mother's friend Shannon.   Shannon reported Mother was depressed and repeatedly told her Charlotte would be better off with Maternal Grandmother than with herself.   Shannon reported Mother's relationship with Father as “pretty awful” and stated Mother had spent the night before her death complaining about Father.

C. Father:  Joshua H.

Father was born to Jeffrey and Pilar C. at St. Francis Hospital in Hartford.   Paternal Grandparents were married from 1985–1994.   Father has one older maternal half-brother, Brandon.   He lived in Somers until the age of three or four and then grew up in Windsor Locks.   He lived with Paternal Grandmother following the divorce until approximately the age of thirteen, when he went to live with Paternal Grandfather.

Father claims that he graduated in 2004 from Enrico Fermi High School in Enfield, CT. Later he attended high school in Windsor Locks, but left during his senior year and participated in adult education for six months at Enrico Fermi.   The Department's records show Father had academic and behavioral issues dating back to 1997.

Father has stated that he had a good childhood and there were “no problems.”   Although Father has claimed to have had a good childhood it has been noted there were frequent police intervention due to violence and dysfunction.   There were physical altercations with all members of the family, he was involved with the Juvenile Justice system and generally a very unstable situation during his early years.

Father stated that he and Mother lived together off and on during their relationship but “officially Mother and Charlotte resided with Maternal Grandparents.”   Their relationship ended sometime in the fall of 2010 according to Father.   It is abundantly clear that the collegiality between Father and Mother's family members has never been acceptable and continues to be a source of animosity between them.   It is doubtful that a meaningful, resourceful family relationship can ever be developed especially since Father blames Mother's parents for her death.  (See Exhibit D.)

Father initially claimed to have no mental health issues but records indicate that from at least 2002 there have been a number of evaluations and commitments with regard to erratic actions on occasion.   Also, Father denied substance abuse of any kind initially but later admitted the use of drugs including cocaine.   On 2/16/10 he submitted to a hair test which resulted in a positive reading for cocaine.  (See Exhibit D.)

Father has an extensive history of erratic, threatening behavior.   Several specific instances are noted (Exhibit D) between 10/3/02 and 12/19/05.   Also, Father has a history of violence against Mother which has resulted in the police being contacted, culminating in a full no contact protective order being issued to Father on 9/21/09.

Father has the following convictions:  10/31/02, Violation of a protective order;  5/22/03, Violation of a protective order;  9/24/05, Criminal Mischief 3rd degree, Interfering with officer/resisting arrest;  11/13/05, Interfering with an officer/resisting arrest;  7/24/06, Failure to appear 2nd;  12/6/05, Interfering with Officer/resisting;  12/17/05, Breach of Peace 2nd, Interfering with Officer/resisting;  12/29/07, Illegal operation of a motor vehicle under suspension;  9/25/02, Criminal Mischief 2nd;  3/10/07, Illegal operation of a motor vehicle under suspension;  2/11/08, Improper use of marker/license/registration;  7/23/08, Operating under suspension;  8/18/09, Larceny 4th.

Father also has a criminal record as a juvenile, including assault and Possession of a Stolen Vehicle in Vermont.

On 8/18/09, Father was placed on probation.   Conditions of probation included participation in anger management.   Father failed to complete the anger management classes at Wheeler Clinic.   Father reported he is not currently reporting to a probation officer due to his probation being violated.

The Department also ran a NCIC criminal check and determined that on 7/1/07, Father was arrested in Rhode Island for Domestic Assault and Battery due to punching Mother multiple times in the face and spitting on her on the side of the road.   Father was convicted and served one year of Probation.

The NCIC criminal check further showed that on 6/10/2005, Father was arrested in New Hampshire for Transportation and Possession of Drugs.   The Department had requested this police report but did not receive it.

Father was arrested on 1/26/10 for one hundred and fifty counts of Violation of a Protective Order, on 1/16/10 for Violation of Probation and Larceny 4th Degree, on 8/22/09 for eight charges of Harassment 2nd Degree and Failure to Appear on 1/7,10, on 10/10/09, for Threatening 2nd Degree and Failure to Appear on 1/7/10, on 7/23/08 for Operation Under Suspension and Violation of Probation, on 10/10/09, for Illegal Operation of a Motor Vehicle Under Suspension and Failure to Appear on 1/17/10, on 10/6/09, for Illegal Operation of a Motor Vehicle Under Suspension, Illegal Operation of a Motor Vehicle Without Minimum Insurance, Failure to Use a Seat Belt in the Front Seat, and Failure to Appear on 1/11/10.

Father has been arrested more recently on 8/18/09 for Larceny 4th and Violation of Probation;  5/4/10, Violation of Protective Order;  6/1/10 four counts of Harassment, Violation of Probation, Interfering with an Officer and Resisting Arrests.   Father was sentenced to one year of jail on 6/1/10.   He is currently incarcerated at Osborn Correctional for a period of one year.   His maximum release date is 5/31/11.

D. Child:  Charlotte H.

Charlotte H., DOB 9/11/07, was born to Michelle M. and Joshua H., in Manchester, Connecticut.   She is an only child, in good health, has no major illnesses or operations, is medically up to date and developmentally on target.   Prior to her Mother's death she lived with Mother and Maternal Grandparents from the time of her birth.

Prior to entering into care, Charlotte visited with her Father on a weekly basis.   There are conflicting reports from Father and Maternal Grandmother about how often visits were attended, cancelled or properly maintained.   At one time, Father was ordered to pay $121.00 per week in child support.   Again, there are conflicting reports as to whether Father assisted in financing Charlotte, with Father maintaining “hundred of thousands” of dollars although he had no financial records of child support or otherwise.

Since entering care Maternal Grandmother has transported Charlotte from Arizona on a regular basis, at her expense, in order to afford Father visitation with the child.   Testimony indicates that the visits were normally appropriate, excepting on one occasion when Charlotte became uncontrollable and the visit was not commenced.   At times it was noted that Father did not always conduct himself within the boundaries set by the social worker aide.   On one occasion removing the child from the presence of the visiting aide into a room alone with Charlotte.   Some of the conversation of Father to the child was also claimed to be inappropriate.

E. Relative Resources:

Charlotte H. resides with her maternal grandparents, who are willing to adopt her if she becomes legally free for adoption.   DCF is supportive of the child's maternal grandparents as her adoptive resource.

F. Present Situation:

Charlotte continues to be placed in the care of Maternal Grandmother;  Bethany M. She has ensured Charlotte has been maintained medically and dentally up to date, and has no outstanding medical needs at this time.

On 6/15/10 an ex-parte motion was granted in which the order prohibiting the child to be removed from the State of Connecticut was vacated.   Since that date, the child has been visiting Arizona with Maternal Grandmother on a monthly basis and returning to the State of Connecticut to ensure monthly visits with both Father and Paternal Grandmother.   Maternal Grandmother and Charlotte reside at the home of Maternal Grandfather when in Arizona.   On 8/2/10, an interstate compact was completed and approved the home of Maternal Grandfather in Arizona.   Under the Interstate Compact Regulation 1, upon approval for placement of child out of state, a foster parent can relocate to another state with the child, while the receiving state completes the licensing process of the foster parent.   During that time the Department requested that Arizona supervise the case pending license approval.

Father remains incarcerated at this time with a maximum release date of 5/31/11.   The Department has been providing Father with monthly supervised visits with the child at the correctional facility.   Although there have been some concerns with the visits, Father has been appropriate with said child.

The Department recommends out of state placement of Charlotte in the license home of Maternal Grandmother to ensure stability to said child.   Maternal Grandmother is willing to continue to provide monthly visits to Father as court ordered, and is willing to cover the cost of travel to and from the State of Connecticut to ensure these visits occur.   By placing said child in Arizona, she will be able to engage in necessary services and treatment to address her needs and will be provided with a stable home environment in which she can flourish.

II

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS/ADJUDICATION

The court must determine whether the proof provides clear and convincing evidence that a pleaded ground exists to terminate Father, Joshua H.'s rights as of the date of the filing of this petition.

A. Reasonable Efforts Finding

Unless a court has found in an earlier proceeding that efforts to reunify are no longer appropriate, DCF, in order to terminate parental rights, initially must show by clear and convincing evidence that it “has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify Charlotte H., with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.”  C.G.S. Sec. 17a–112(j)(1).   “Reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.”  In re Jessica B., 50 Conn.App. 554, 566, 718 A.2d 997 (1998).

DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with Father.

DCF has been involved with this family since 2009.

The presenting problems with this family were identified as Father's unresolved substance abuse, domestic violence, criminal activity, anger management, and mental health issues.

The following reasonable and active efforts were made to prevent removal of the above named child and/or to reunify the above named child with Father:

Substance Abuse Assessment Services at Community Prevention and Addiction Services (CPAS), Manchester, CT;

Domestic violence counseling at the Non Violence Alliance (NOVA), East Hartford, CT;

Parenting Education at Restoring the Family, East Hartford, CT;

Supervised visitation by DCF, Manchester, CT;

Court ordered psychological evaluation by Dr. Franklin, Hartford, CT.

Father was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification services, in that he failed to demonstrate progress and insight with regard to the issues that led to the neglect and removal of the above named child, such that the above named child could be safely reunified with him in a timely manner.   Father continued to minimize the seriousness of the violence perpetrated by him on Mother, and has failed to demonstrate that he could adequately protect the child from future incidents of violence.   He is also unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification services, in that, despite the numerous services offered to him, he had failed to appropriately and adequately address his mental health, substance abuse, and domestic violence issues;  he has failed to maintain sobriety;  and he had failed to refrain from criminal activity.   In addition, Father is currently incarcerated until 5/31/2011 and has been so for most of the time that the child has been in DCF custody.

From the time of incarceration, 6/1/10, Father was on a waiting list for services at the correctional facility.   Once he was moved to Cybulski Correctional he was involved in Domestic Violence classes with Buddy Andrews and Parenting classes with Ms. Lisa Rakestran, both having testified at the time of trial.   Counselors Andrews and Rakestran testified that Father participated and engaged in the programs and completed them in good order.   Mr. Andrews, when questioned as to whether he thought that Father had gained an insight as to how to effectively impose the instructions he had been given in a stressful situation, he quickly replied that it was his job to instruct the individual, how it was put into practice depended entirely on the individual and how he wished to proceed.   This is, of course, the case in all services, it is up to the individual to implement what one has been taught or presented.

In addition, DCF has made reasonable efforts to achieve the Permanency Plan. All court findings were made by clear and convincing evidence.

B. Grounds for Termination:  Failure to Rehabilitate—General Statutes 17a–112(j)(3)(B1)—as to Biological Father, Joshua H.

The Commissioner has alleged as a ground for termination that the father has failed to rehabilitate himself after his child was adjudicated as neglected in a prior proceeding.   This ground for termination, based upon a prior adjudication of neglect and a failure of personal rehabilitation, is clearly articulated in our statutes.  Conn. Gen.Stat. Sec. 17a–112(j)(3)(B1) states in part that:

“[t]he Superior Court ․ may grant a petition [to terminate parental rights] if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ the child ․ has been found by the Superior Court ․ to have been neglected ․ in a prior proceeding ․ and the parent of such child has been provided with specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent ․ and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.”

Personal rehabilitation, as used in the statute, refers to the restoration of a respondent to a constructive and useful role as a parent, In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn.App. 194, 203, 504 A.2d 532 (1986).   The parent's compliance with expectations or steps set after the adjudication of the neglect or uncared for case or the parent's success in fulfilling service agreements entered into with DCF are relevant, but not dispositive, to the rehabilitation finding.  In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 167–68, 5545 A.2d 722 (1989).   The ultimate question is whether the parent at the time of the filing of the termination petition is more able to resume the responsibilities of parents than he or she was at the time of the commitment.  In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 112, 126, 614 A.2d 832 (1992).

“․ [The statute] requires the trial court ․ to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [they] have achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [they] can assume a responsible position in [their] child's life.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted).  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873 (1999).  “ ․ [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the [parents have] improved [their] ability to manage [their] own life, but rather whether [they] have gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000).   See also In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, 718, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 769 A.2d 61 (2001);  In re Alejandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 259, 881 A.2d 450 (2005).

Whether the age and needs of the child would support allowance of further time for the parent to rehabilitate must also be considered.  In re Luis C., supra, 210 Conn. 167.   The reasonableness of the time period within which rehabilitation is sought to be accomplished is a question of fact for the court.  In re Davon M., 16 Conn.App. 693, 696, 548 A.2d 1350 (1988).   Also, in determining whether further allowance of a reasonable period of time would promote rehabilitation, a court can consider efforts made since the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights.  In re Sarah M., 19 Conn.App. 371, 377, 562 A.2d 566 (1989).

Several aspects of the clear and convincing evidence in this case compel the conclusion that Joshua H. has yet to achieve a sufficient “level of rehabilitation ․ which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [he] can assume a responsible position in his child's life.”  In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. 441, 448, 749 A.3d 77 (2000).   See In re Alajandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 259, 881 A.3d 450 (2005);  In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, cert.   Denied, 255 Conn. 950, 769 A.2d 61 (2001).   The credible evidence in this case, presented through the TPR social study and exhibits, and testimony, clearly and convincing establishes that Joshua H., has not achieved CGS Sec. 17a–112(j)(3)(B1) rehabilitation.   The court credits the DCF reports which show that Joshua H. has been unable to achieve his rehabilitation.

Ground B1—Failure to Rehabilitate with Charlotte H., as to Biological Father, Joshua H.

See Section I, Factual Findings, Paragraphs A, B, C, D and F above.   Charlotte H. has been in the continuous care of the Department since 1/27/10.

Father has been informed by the Court and by the Department that in order to be successfully reunified with the above named child, he needed to consistently engage in services and demonstrate adequate progress and insight with regard to his ongoing issues of domestic violence, substance abuse, anger management, criminal activity, and mental health issues through appropriate and consistent treatment, maintain appropriate housing, secure and maintain legal income, and to enhance his parenting skills for the purpose of developing an appropriate understanding of the impact of domestic violence and substance abuse on children and how to appropriately protect them from exposure to such issues.

On 3/2/10, Father was referred to domestic violence services with Scott Vinci of Non Violence Alliance (NOVA) in East Hartford, CT. On 3/3/10, the Department sent Father a letter explaining he must make the intake appointment himself.   Father subsequently attended seven out of eleven sessions.   Father's goals were 1. Increase participation and 2. Increase sense of ownership of how his actions contribute to his behavior.

Despite his participation in domestic violence services with the NOVA program, Father has failed to demonstrate progress regarding insight into his behaviors.   Initially, Father denied any domestic violence in his life and was not honest with providers regarding his criminal charges, status of his relationship with Mother prior to her suicide, or his history of ongoing violence.   Mr. Vinci described Father as a pure narcissist, blinded by arrogance, and unable to see past his own needs.   Father continuously refused to acknowledge how his actions precipitated negative events in his life.   Following 5/4/10, when it was determined Father would be sentenced to one year jail beginning on 6/1/10, Father missed three out of four sessions for the month of May 2010.

On 6/1/10, Father was incarcerated.   Father was unsuccessfully discharged from NOVA on 6/1/10.

Prior to Father's ongoing domestic violence with Mother, Father has a long history of violence against peers, family members, and other girlfriends.   Father has been on Adult Probation and has been issued Protective Orders multiple times as a result of his violence towards others.   Father is not currently in any programs to address his anger management issues or violence against women with the exception of the corrections course.   Based on his pattern of behavior, and lack of participation in services to facilitate an understanding of the impact of his violence on himself and others, he continues to be at risk to perpetrate further acts of violence upon his release.

On 3/4/10, Father was referred to parenting education at Restoring the Family in East Hartford, CT with Pam Sailor.   Mrs. Sailor stated during sessions based on Father's presentation during class, Father's anger was “barely contained below the surface.”   Father completed parenting education on 3/3/10.   On 3/3/10, Ms. Sailor recommended that if reunification should occur, Father be offered further parenting classes, additional early childhood development/school readiness services, and fatherhood programs along with parent and child community group activities.   Father recently completed another parenting program in corrections.

The Department became involved with this family on 8/7/09, due to Mother reporting concerns to her therapist regarding Father's substance abuse while visiting with the child, Father leaving the child with inappropriate caretakers, Father hitting Mother while Mother was holding her child, and Father's mental health.   Father did not fully cooperate with the Department during the investigation and presented as hostile and volatile.

On 8/27/09, Father participated in a hair test at CPAS, which was positive for cocaine.   This test was segmented and all three segments were positive for cocaine.   As a result, at the suggestion of the Department, Mother informed Father he would no longer be allowed to visit with said child overnight.   At that time, Father did not follow through with treatment recommendation for outpatient services at CPAS.

The Department referred Father for a substance abuse evaluation and hair test on 1/25/10 at CPAS. Father was subsequently scheduled for an appointment on 2/4/10.   Father refused to submit to a hair test as scheduled on that date.   Father later submitted to a body hair test on 2/6/10, as Father continued to refuse allowing his head hair tested.   The results of this test were positive for cocaine.   Results obtained through body hair testing extend back six months and cannot be segmented.   Father denied current use and, as a result, was recommended to participate in outpatient services and relapse prevention group once a week.

Upon beginning substance abuse treatment with CPAS on 2/16/10, Father denied any substance abuse issues, mental health issues, aside from the recent death of his “fiancé.”   Father did not disclose any history of substance abuse aside from “recreational use.”   Father continuously refused to acknowledge substance use had a negative impact on his life, however, his assigned therapist, Dustin Yager, reported he did begin to participate in group discussions.   Following 5/4/10, when it was determined Father would be sentenced to one year jail beginning on 6/1/10, Father missed three out of four sessions for the month of May 2010.

Father submitted to a hair test on 5/26/10, and the results were positive for cocaine.   Despite being instructed not to cut his hair, Father's hair sample was too short to be segmented or to test for the presence of THC.

On 2/25/10, Father refused to sign Releases of Information for UCONN Health Center and Hartford Hospital, for the Department to obtain records detailing Father's history of mental health issues.   Father refuses to acknowledge his history of mental health issues or the impact it could have on the child.

Prior to incarceration on 6/1/10, Father resided with David M., DOB 2/19/80, who had pending criminal charges of Operating Under the Influence, Possession of Narcotics, and Possession of drugs/Marijuana, Drug Paraphernalia.   He was arrested in Enfield on 10/1/08.   Father has expressed his intent to return to this residence upon his release from incarceration.

On 5/4/10, Father learned he would be sentenced on 6/1/10 to one year in prison.   On 5/4/10, Father stopped attending services on a regular basis.   Between 5/4/10 and 6/1/10, Father missed one visitation with said child, two substance abuse sessions with CPAS, and three domestic violence group sessions with NOVA.

As an adult, Father has been issued Protective Orders at least three times in the State of Connecticut.   Father has been convicted of Violation of Protective Orders on two separate occasions.

On 4/8/10, Father participated in a psychological evaluation with Dr. Franklin.   Father was diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder, unspecified;  Depressive Disorder NOS, Cannabis abuse, Alcohol abuse, cocaine abuse, Hallucinogenic abuse, and Antisocial Personality traits.

In his report, dated 4/8/10, Dr. Franklin suggested Father be “regarded as emotionally fragile and psychologically unstable.”

Dr. Franklin recommended if Father is to serve as a placement option for said child, Father should attend inpatient substance abuse, anger management, domestic violence services, and mental health treatment, preferably with a male clinician experienced in working with adults with histories of domestic violence, early childhood trauma, and concerns specific to personality traits.

Dr. Franklin notes Father exhibits, “a continued pattern of aggressive and assaultive behaviors” which extends to Father's history of violence toward Michelle M. He also noted, “he clearly has difficulties in modulating his anger to perceived offenses, real or imagined, and will require fairly intensive corrective intervention if he is to be deemed an appropriate provider of care to young children.”

In his report Dr. Franklin further states, “It is the opinion of the examiner that Father has little to no real insight into the effects that his behavior have had upon others, more specifically with the child's mother and Charlotte in particular.”   Based on this lack of insight, combined with Father's history of violence and present psychological state, Dr. Franklin concluded “the potential for unintended harm to the child cannot be ruled out.”   He recommended all contact between Father and said child be supervised.

Dr. Franklin recommended Charlotte remain in her current placement, with Maternal Grandmother and recommended “a period of no less than six months from the time of his participating in services which have been identified ․ should elapse prior to revisiting the question of transfer of care.”

On 6/15/10, the Department sent Father a letter with a list of services available to him at Osborn CI. The letter explained Dr. Franklin's recommendation and stated the Department recommends Father attend mental health treatment, parenting education, domestic violence education, anger management, and substance abuse treatment while incarcerated.

Father was not involved in any programs through the Department of Corrections until he was transferred to Cybulski.

Specific steps ordered by the court on 1/29/10 and amended on 6/9/10, to facilitate the return of Charlotte H. to Joshua H.'s care have not been complied with.

Joshua H. Will not be able to assume a responsible position in the life of this child within a reasonable time period.   He has had minimal involvement in the life of his daughter and he has been recently incarcerated.

Summary of Adjudicatory Findings

This court has found that the Commissioner has proved the following adjudicatory grounds by clear and convincing evidence:  Joshua H. has failed to rehabilitate after a prior court finding of his having neglected Charlotte H.

III

DISPOSITION

Except in the case where termination is based on consent, if grounds have been found to terminate parental rights, applying the appropriate standard of proof the court must then consider whether the facts as of the last day of trial, establish, by clear and convincing evidence, after consideration of the factors enumerated in C.G.S. Sec. 17a–112(k), that termination is in the child's best interest.   If the court does find that termination is in the child's best interest, an order will enter terminating parental rights.

A. C.G.S. Sec. 17a–112(k) Criteria

The court has found by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory grounds alleged by DCF for the termination of parental rights have been proven.

Before making a decision of whether or not to terminate Joshua H.'s parental rights as he did not consent, the court will consider and make findings on each of the seven criterias set forth in C.G.S. Sec. 17a–112(k).  In re Romance M., 229 Conn. 345, 355, 641 A.2d 378 (1994).

These criteria and this court's findings, which have been established beyond a reasonable doubt, are as follows:

1. “The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered or provided to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.”

This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify Charlotte H. with her parent.   Services were ordered in a timely manner and were appropriate for the circumstances at hand.

Considered carefully, the clear and convincing evidence shows that DCF offered timely, appropriate and comprehensive services to the respondent parent to facilitate his reunification with his child and made reasonable efforts to reunite him with his child.  In re Victoria B., 79 Conn.App. 245, 258–60, 829 A.2d 855 (2003).

Based on this clear and convincing evidence of the circumstances now present in this case, the court finds that Joshua H. is unable to and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts.  CGS Sec. 17a–112(j)(1).   His serious issues clearly and convincingly make him unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts.  In re Tyqwane V., 85 Conn. App 528, 535–36, 857 A.2d 963 (2004).

Joshua H. has been provided with many services to rehabilitate and return Charlotte H. to his care and the referrals were made in a timely manner to facilitate a successful reunification.   He was referred to services multiple times to encourage cooperation.   Joshua H., has not been able to take full advantage of services recently as he has been incarcerated since 6/1/10 and is scheduled to be released on 5/31/11.

2. “Whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.”

This court finds that the clear and convincing evidence in this matter proves that the child's parent is presently unable and/or unwilling to benefit from such reunification services as was contemplated by the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

DCF has previously offered multiple services to Father.   DCF has made reasonable efforts to maintain contact with Father.

3. “The terms of any court ordered entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all the parties have fulfilled their obligations of such order.”

The clear and convincing evidence indicates that Father has failed to fully comply with most of the steps ordered by the court and Father has been incarcerated for much of the time.

4. “The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, his guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.”

The child has been able to exhibit only limited bonding with her parent, due to her parent's substance abuse, reluctance to accept his role as a parent and the unavailability of Father.   She has developed a strong bond with her foster parents with whom she has lived since her removal by DCF on 1/27/10.   The foster parents have expressed a desire to adopt her.

5. “The age of the child.”

Charlotte and is now 3 years 5 months old.

6. “The efforts the parents have made to adjust parents circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return to such child's home for the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent provided that the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child.”

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Father has not made realistic and sustained efforts to conform his conduct to minimally acceptable parental standards.

The court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father has not made the changes necessary in his lifestyle that would indicate that he would be a safe, responsible and nurturing parent for his child.   To permit the child to return to her parent's care would compromise the safety of the child.

7. “The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.”

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that no unreasonable conduct by DCF, foster parents, Department of Correction or third parties prevented Joshua H., from maintaining a relationship with his child, nor did his economic circumstances prevent such relationship, although the limitations and restrictions inherent in the foster care system remained in effect.

Father has maintained minimal contact with the child and the petitioner.   In order to improve his parenting bond with his child, he is in need of adequate parenting classes, and significant visitation with his child.   However, since he has been incarcerated for much of the time, time will not permit the necessary compliance.

B. Best Interest of the Child—CGS Sec. 17a–112(j)(2)

The court is next called upon to determine whether termination of Joshua H.'s parental rights to Charlotte H. would be in her best interest.²

Applying the appropriate legal standards ³ to the clear and convincing facts of this case, the court finds this issue in favor of the State of Connecticut and DCF.

In determining whether termination of Joshua H.'s parental rights would be in the child's best interests, the court has examined multiple relevant factors, including the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of her environment;  her length of stay in foster care;  the nature of her relationship with her biological parent;  and the degree of contact maintained with her biological parent.⁴  In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000);  In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000);  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999).   In a matter such as this, the court is further called upon to balance the child's intrinsic needs for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with her parents.   See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (the child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).

Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter establishes that it is not in the child's best interest to continue to maintain any legal relationship with her parent.

The clear and convincing evidence also shows that the child's parent has failed to gain insight into becoming a safe, nurturing and responsible parent for the child.   The clear and convincing evidence shows that his judgment and conduct remains questionable, and has not improved since the child was taken into DCF care.

The parent's performance clearly and convincingly shows that he lacks the attributes and characteristics necessary to fulfill valid parental roles.   His recalcitrance concerning referrals clearly and convincingly shows that, without commitment to consistent substance abuse treatment, as well as individual and parenting counseling, it is likely that he has extinguished what little chance he ever had to be able to serve as a safe, nurturing and responsible parent for any child.

An additional factor to consider in this case is time.   The clear and convincing evidence demonstrates the child's pressing need for permanence and stability.   Unfortunately, much time would be required for Father to show that he has forsaken substance abuse, addressed his issues, undertaken the necessary counseling and succeeded in it, established himself in the community and shown that he was capable of being a safe, nurturing and responsible parent to his child.

Charlotte H. cannot delay her need for permanence and stability in exchange for her parent's uncertain future.

Based upon the parent's behavior and performance so far, this court cannot foresee him ever having the ability or the opportunity to be able to follow the regimen necessary for this child to maximize her abilities and achievements.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that the time needed for the parent to attempt to rehabilitate and establish himself in the community as a safe, nurturing and responsible parent, if that were possible, is time that his child cannot afford.

The parent's performance clearly and convincingly shows that he lacks the attributes and characteristics necessary to fulfill a valid parental role.   His conduct clearly and convincingly shows that it is unlikely that he will ever be able to conform his behavior to appropriate norms or be able to serve as safe, nurturing and responsible parent for this child.

Our courts have recognized that “long-term stability is critical to a child's future health and development ․” In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 709, 741 A.2d 873 (1999).   Furthermore, “[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence” when resolving issues related to the permanent or temporary care of neglected children.  In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 934 (1991), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1992);  see also In re Juvenile Appeal (84–CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).   The court is obliged to agree with DCF and concludes that the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that the child is entitled to the benefit of ending, without further delay, the period of uncertainty as to the availability of her biological parent as a caretaker.

Having balanced the child's individual and intrinsic needs for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with her parent, the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that the child's best interests cannot be served by continuing to maintain any legal relationship to her parent.  Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. 313–14.

Accordingly, with respect to the best interests of the child as contemplated by CGS § 17a–112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, including the testimony and evidence presented, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Joshua H. as to Charlotte H., is in the best interest of the child in question.

The linchpin to a determination of rehabilitation necessarily includes a finding that the parent can begin parenting within a reasonable period of time.   Father is to be released from prison on 5/31/11, and so any reunification that might be further explored would have to wait for however long thereafter it may take him to rehabilitate himself so as to be able to provide safe and nurturing parenting to this child and to attend to her developmental needs and provide her with an appropriate home.   This would include a substantial period of sobriety, adequate housing, gainful employment, no further involvement with the criminal justice system and an unknown amount of therapeutic services to facilitate a relationship with this child who may well be 1–2 years older before all of these events could conceivably unfold.   To allow for such a further additional and significant period of time, easily more than one year for Father to achieve a degree of reasonable rehabilitation, runs counter to our court's long recognized preference for permanency.   Indeed, it would result in this young child being raised with not only the specter of upheaval but the goal of such.   This, the court cannot allow.   The question is not simply one of rehabilitation;  it is whether the particular needs of the child can be met within a reasonable timeframe.   See In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App., 384–85.

IV

CONCLUSION

The court having considered all statutory considerations and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for termination of parental rights, further finds upon all the facts and circumstances presented, that it is in Charlotte H.'s best interest to terminate the parental rights of Joshua H., the biological Father of the child.   Accordingly, it is ordered that his parental rights to Charlotte H. are hereby terminated.

It is further ordered that the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families be appointed the statutory parent for this child for the purpose of securing an adoptive family and a permanent placement for this child.

The statutory parent is ordered to file the appropriate written reports with the court, as are required by state and federal law and which show the efforts to effect the permanent placement of this child.

BY THE COURT,

WOLLENBERG, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN2. The final element of the termination of parental rights statute, CGS Sec. 17a–112(j), requires that before granting a duly noticed petition for such termination, the court must find, “by clear and convincing evidence ․ (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child ․”.  FN2. The final element of the termination of parental rights statute, CGS Sec. 17a–112(j), requires that before granting a duly noticed petition for such termination, the court must find, “by clear and convincing evidence ․ (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child ․”

FN3. Termination of parental rights means the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child's parent or parents ․ Termination of parental rights is a most serious and sensitive judicial action.  In re Barbara J., 215 Conn. 31, 44, 574 A.2d 203 (1990).”  (Citation omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Steven N., 57 Conn.App. 629, 632, 749 A.3d 678 (2000).  “[T]he question ․ to be decided in a dispositional phase is whether it is in the best interests of the child to sever the parent-child relationship.   That is different from the question of who should have custody of the child if termination of parental rights is determined to be in the best interests of the child.   See Practice Book Sec. 33–5.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 776, 740 A.3d 896 (1999).  “In making this determination, the trial court can consider all events occurring prior to the date of the dispositional hearing, including those occurring after the filing of the termination petition.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Kasheema L., 56 Conn.App. 484, 488, 744 A.2d 441, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 945, 747 A.2d 522 (2000)..  FN3. Termination of parental rights means the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child's parent or parents ․ Termination of parental rights is a most serious and sensitive judicial action.  In re Barbara J., 215 Conn. 31, 44, 574 A.2d 203 (1990).”  (Citation omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Steven N., 57 Conn.App. 629, 632, 749 A.3d 678 (2000).  “[T]he question ․ to be decided in a dispositional phase is whether it is in the best interests of the child to sever the parent-child relationship.   That is different from the question of who should have custody of the child if termination of parental rights is determined to be in the best interests of the child.   See Practice Book Sec. 33–5.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 776, 740 A.3d 896 (1999).  “In making this determination, the trial court can consider all events occurring prior to the date of the dispositional hearing, including those occurring after the filing of the termination petition.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Kasheema L., 56 Conn.App. 484, 488, 744 A.2d 441, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 945, 747 A.2d 522 (2000).

FN4. “[T]he genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999)..  FN4. “[T]he genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999).

Wollenberg, William L., J.T.R.