Maria Grazia Cavallo–Snyder v. Wohl Associates, Inc. (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR COLLATERAL SOURCE REDUCTION

On August 9, 2005, the plaintiff, who was employed by R.C. Bigelow (intervening plaintiff in this action), lifted the cover of an industrial tea blender and inadvertently leaned against and activated the machine's limit switch, causing the motor to operate and to rotate the mixing blades.   Her left arm was entrapped between the blades and the inside wall of the blender's tank.   She sustained a significant injury to her arm, underwent five (5) surgeries, was assessed a 35% permanency to the arm, sustained significant scarring, and was out of work for approximately two (2) years.

Ms. Cavallo–Snyder proceeded to trial as against the seller of the blender, Wohl Associates, Inc., and asserted a violation of the Connecticut Products Liability Act, Connecticut General Statute § 52–572m et seq.   The jury found for the plaintiff in returning a verdict in the total amount of $905,241.00—$268,241.00 in economic damages and $637,000.00 in non-economic damages.   The verdict was reduced to $588,906.65, the jury having found the plaintiff 35% comparatively at fault in causing her own injuries.

As a result of the plaintiff's injuries, her medical care and treatment, and her lost wages, Bigelow paid out $113,579.41 for medical bills and $135,227.42 for indemnity benefits.   It intervened as a plaintiff in this action and has asserted a workers' compensation lien in the amount of $268,241.00.¹

Wohl Associates, Inc. has moved that the verdict be reduced “by the difference between the medical and lost wages awarded ․ ² The plaintiff has objected.

[T]he defendant, as the party seeking to reduce the amount of economic damages awarded by the fact finder, bears the burden of proving that the verdict includes items of damages for which the plaintiff has received a collateral source benefit.   Specifically, the defendant ․ must, at the conclusion of the evidence, submit interrogatories to the jury concerning the specific items of damages included within the verdict.  Jones v. Kramer, 267 Conn. 350, 349–50 (2004)

The defendant in the instant matter requested no interrogatories;  thus, the court cannot determine how much of the economic damages awarded were for medical bills, which medical bills were included in the $268,241 awarded for economic damages, or how much of that amount was for lost wages.  “[T]he defendant should bear the burden of proving the items of damages corresponding with the desired collateral source reduction.”  Id. Because no interrogatories were submitted to the jury, it is not possible to know specifically which of the medical bills or other benefits paid by the intervenor were paid by collateral sources as that term is defined in § 52–225b.³  See also Pikulski v. Waterbury Hospital Health Center, 269 Conn. 1 (2004)

Of interest is the plaintiff's assertion, at p.1 of her memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion, that she “in theory, will have to reimburse the intervening plaintiff $248,806.83 from the verdict” so as to preclude a “possible double recovery.”   The issue whether, under the circumstances of this case, Ms. Cavallo Snyder is in fact obligated to reimburse the intervenor in that—or any other—amount is not before the court and, thus, the court does not today decide that issue.   Should it arise, however, it may be helpful to the parties (plaintiff and intervenor) to note that Connecticut General Statute § 31–293, which is part of the Workers' Compensation Act, provides in part that, if the employer and the employee join as parties plaintiff in an action in which damages are recovered, “the damages shall be so apportioned that the claim of the employer ․ shall take precedence over that of the injured employee in the proceeds of the recovery, after the deduction of reasonable and necessary expenditures, including attorneys fees incurred by the employee in affecting the recovery.”   Yet, Connecticut General Statute § 52–225c provides, “Unless otherwise provided by law, no insurer or any other person providing collateral source benefits as defined in 52–225b shall be entitled to recover the amount of any such benefits from the defendant or any other person or entity as a result of any claim or action for damages for personal injury ․ regardless of whether such claim or action is resolved by settlement or judgment.”   In Pajor v. Wallingford, 47 Conn.App. 365 (1997),⁴ our Court of Appeals addressed the issue whether the plaintiff's insurer (the intervenor here) was entitled to reimbursement for the medical expenses it paid on the plaintiff's behalf because of the subrogation provision of the insurance policy.   Despite the insurance policy at issue in Pajor designating Rhode Island as the contract state, our Court, having determined there was no evidence to “provide a basis for determining in what state the contract was made” (id., at 383) and that the plaintiff had resided in this state and had received all of his medical treatment here and thus that Connecticut was the place of performance “or operative effect” of the policy (id.), concluded “the subrogation provision of the plaintiff's policy was ineffective because it conflicted with the prohibition against recovery of collateral source benefits in § 52–225c.”  Id. The issue with regard to whether, in the case before this court, the plaintiff is required to reimburse the compensation carrier (and in what amount) is neither raised by the parties here nor perhaps is it as easily resolved (as the plaintiff so suggests) in stating the plaintiff must reimburse the intervenor so as to preclude her from receiving a double recovery.

What is, however, clear is that this defendant cannot demonstrate its entitlement to a collateral source reduction.

The motion is denied.

SHEEDY

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Presumably, the difference lies in the payment for a permanency award..  FN1. Presumably, the difference lies in the payment for a permanency award.

FN2. The motion, dated Feb. 28, 2011, does not specify those amounts nor does it reference amounts paid out by the workers' compensation carrier (the intervenor) in medical or indemnity benefits..  FN2. The motion, dated Feb. 28, 2011, does not specify those amounts nor does it reference amounts paid out by the workers' compensation carrier (the intervenor) in medical or indemnity benefits.

FN3. In pertinent part, § 52–225b defines collateral sources “as any payments made to the claimant, or on his behalf, by or pursuant to:  (1) Any health or sickness insurance, automobile accident insurance that provides health benefits, and any other similar insurance benefits, except life insurance benefits available to the claimant, whether purchased by him or provided by others;  or (2) any contract or agreement of any group, organization, partnership or corporation to provide, pay for or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental or other health care services.   ‘Collateral sources' do not include amounts received by a claimant as a settlement.”.  FN3. In pertinent part, § 52–225b defines collateral sources “as any payments made to the claimant, or on his behalf, by or pursuant to:  (1) Any health or sickness insurance, automobile accident insurance that provides health benefits, and any other similar insurance benefits, except life insurance benefits available to the claimant, whether purchased by him or provided by others;  or (2) any contract or agreement of any group, organization, partnership or corporation to provide, pay for or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental or other health care services.   ‘Collateral sources' do not include amounts received by a claimant as a settlement.”

FN4. The insurer in Pajor was a health insurer—not a workers' compensation insurer—and thus the Court was not confronted with the interplay between 31–293 and 52–225c..  FN4. The insurer in Pajor was a health insurer—not a workers' compensation insurer—and thus the Court was not confronted with the interplay between 31–293 and 52–225c.

Sheedy, Barbara J., J.