Michael Rogers v. LLC (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The defendants, Seventeen Pillsbury, LLC, Lawrence Brennan, and Christine Brennan, move for summary judgment in this negligence case as to the counts of the complaint of the plaintiff, Michael Rogers, which pertain to them.

Summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings and documentary proof submitted demonstrate that no genuine dispute as to material facts exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Practice Book § 17–49.

For purposes of this motion, the court assumes as true that Christopher Brennan, the son of Lawrence and Christine Brennan, invited Jeffrey McEwen, Jr. to their son's residence which he shared with the plaintiffs;  that McEwen harbored hostility toward the plaintiff;  that Christopher shared liquor or other intoxicating substances with McEwen;  that Christopher gave a gun to McEwen;  and that McEwen took the gun and shot Rogers in the chest.   The court also assumes, arguendo, that Christopher Brennan acted as a property manager for his parents and the LLC which owned the property.   Despite these assumptions, the court holds, as a matter of law, that there exists no genuine factual controversy which could impose liability for the plaintiff's injuries on the movants.

The only two legal theories which would render the movants liable are that they have imputed liability for the acts or omissions of Christopher Brennan or that the parents have liability for their own acts or omissions regarding allowing their son to reside at and manage the residence.

A principal may be vicariously liable for the acts of his or her agent if those acts are performed with authority from the principal and within the scope of the agency relationship.  Gordon v. Tobias, 262 Conn. 844, 849 (2003).   “The underlying rationale ․ of respondeat superior ․ is that every man who prefers to manage his affairs through others, remains bound to so manage them that third persons are not injured by any breach of legal duty on the part of such others.”  Mitchell v. Resto, 157 Conn. 258, 262 (1968).   But this doctrine only applies where the business of the principal is being furthered and not where the agent is engaged in his or her own affairs, Id. “Unless [the agent is] actuated at least in part by a purpose to serve a principal, the principal is not liable.”  A–G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 216 Conn. 208, 210 (1990).

The movants submitted affidavits from Lawrence and Christine Brennan attesting to their lack of any knowledge of their son's possession of a gun, much less his predilection to share that weapon with an intoxicated guest.   The plaintiff proffered no documentary evidence contradicting this lack of knowledge.   The plaintiff also offered no evidence logically supporting an inference that giving intoxicating liquor and a gun to a social guest who bore animosity toward another resident was within the scope of any duties of a property manager.   These actions in no way served to benefit the property owners nor furthered the purposes for which the premises were owned by the movants.   Accordingly, the movants, as a matter of law, cannot be vicariously liable for the alleged actions of their son which contributed to the shooting of the plaintiff by a third-party, social guest of their son.

Also, the Brennan's affidavits refute the plaintiff's claims that they were responsible for the plaintiff's shooting by virtue of their own alleged negligence in allowing their son to reside at the property.   The plaintiff's allegations are that the Brennans knew or should have known that their son would permit his social guest, who wished ill of the plaintiff, to visit the residence, that their son would share intoxicating substances with this guest, and that their son would keep a gun which he was willing to give to his discontented guest while at the residence.

Again, the Brennans denied awareness of any circumstances from which one might reasonably and logically infer actual or constructive knowledge of these alleged facts.   The plaintiff submitted no documentary evidence to controvert the Brennan's sworn statements in this regard.

“[A] defendant [is] not required to take precautions against hazards [that are] too remote to be reasonably foreseeable.”  Lodge v. Arett Sales Corp., 246 Conn. 563, 575 (1998).   Our Supreme Court has stated, “Existing Connecticut precedents impose only a limited duty to take action to prevent injury to a third person ․ Absent a special relationship of custody or control, there is no duty, to protect a third person from the conduct of another.”  Fraser v. United States, 236 Conn. 625, 632 (1996), affirmed, 83 F.3d 591 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 872 (1996).

In particular, trial court decisions have held that this principle of nonliability applies in the context of a landlord's failure to warn or protect others from the potential untoward acts by their tenants, see Murphy v. Eddinger, Superior Court, Middlesex Judicial District, d.n. CV98–86973 (November 30, 1999), Robaina, J. [26 Conn. L. Rptr. 8].

For these reasons, the motion for summary judgment as to the second and third counts of the complaint is granted in favor of the movants.

Sferrazza, J.

Sferrazza, Samuel J., J.