IN RE: Joshua Z.1 (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The department of children and families (DCF) has brought this petition to terminate the parental rights (TPR) of Amanda Z. and two putative fathers, Martin S. and John Doe, to the minor child Joshua Z., born on April 8, 2006.   The department submitted affidavits of diligent search regarding DCF's unsuccessful efforts to locate the respondent putative fathers on November 19, 2010, after which the court, Wollenberg, J.T.R., granted the department's motion for notice by publication to both respondent putative fathers.   Thereafter notices were published in the Hartford Courant on December 3, 2010, that a proceeding to terminate their parental rights to Joshua was scheduled to be heard in this court on December 21, 2011, at which time neither respondent putative father appeared.   John Doe was defaulted that day, and after submission of a military affidavit Martin S. was defaulted on March 17, 2011.   On that same date, the respondent mother submitted a written consent to termination of her parental rights to Joshua on a form promulgated by the office of the chief court administrator.   Certain exhibits were also received into evidence and the matter was continued for decision on April 19, 2011.

The matter is now ready for decision, and the facts found herein were established by clear and convincing evidence.

I

THE MINOR CHILD

The minor child Joshua has been in DCF care and custody twice in his short life, both times because of his mother's substance abuse problems.   The first time was shortly after his birth, for he had been exposed to opiates during his mother's pregnancy because of her extensive drug use and the child spent 1 1/2 months in the hospital after his birth with withdrawal symptoms and needing to be weaned from morphine.   His mother was incarcerated on drug charges at the time of his birth but after her release from incarceration in June 2006 she made what appeared to be sincere efforts to confront her extensive history of substance abuse addiction and mental health problems, and in June 2007 Joshua was returned to her care.   In August of that year mother, child, and mother's boyfriend Michael B. moved into a two-bedroom home in Coventry and DCF closed its case with her in January 2008.   Shortly after that, unknown to DCF at the time, however, she relapsed, and in May 2008 she went for inpatient treatment, after which she was clean from heroin use until December 2008.

DCF reopened its case for her in January 2009 when Ms. Z. admitted to relapsing again and using cocaine with a new boyfriend.   She agreed with DCF that Joshua would stay with her former boyfriend Michael B. while she worked on her issues, and Joshua has remained with Mr. B. since then.   DCF filed a new neglect petition in May 2009, and at trial of that petition in October 2009 the court issued an order of temporary custody (OTC) to Mr. B. Thereafter, in November, after Mr. B. had been licensed by the department, the bench OTC was vacated, and Joshua was committed to DCF under an order from the court that he be placed with Mr. B. DCF has identified Mr. B. as an adoptive resource for the child.   Joshua looks to him for love, nurturance, and guidance, and he has provided a safe, stable and nurturing environment for Joshua.

II

ADJUDICATORY DECISIONAStatutory Grounds for Termination

As to the respondent mother, the TPR petition originally alleged failure to rehabilitate ² as a ground for terminating her parental rights, but on March 17, 2011, after she submitted her written consent, the court granted the department's oral motion to add a count of consent pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(i).³  The department is no longer pursuing the count that she failed to rehabilitate herself.   As to the respondent putative fathers, the grounds for termination pleaded by the petitioner are that both of them have abandoned Joshua, pursuant to General Statutes § 17–112(j)(3)(A),⁴ and that neither of them has an on-going parent-child relationship with Joshua, pursuant to General Statutes Section 17a–112(j)(3)(D).⁵

B

Effect of Default

The two respondent putative fathers have been defaulted.  Practice Book § 32a–2(a) establishes that child protection proceedings, including these petitions for termination of parental rights, are civil matters.⁶  See also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 634, 842 A.2d 1124 (2004);  In re Shonna K., 77 Conn.App. 246, 253, 822 A.2d 1009 (2003).   As in other civil matters, the entries of a default establish admission of the material facts constituting the petitioner's cause of action, and conclusively determine that the petitioner has prevailed on each of the elements at issue in the adjudicatory phase of this proceeding.  Commissioner of Social Services v. Smith, 265 Conn. 723, 732–33, 830 A.2d 228 (2003) (respondent in child support proceeding who fails to respond to pleadings “is deemed to have judicially admitted the underlying facts of the support petition”);  see also Bank of America, FSB v. Franco, 57 Conn.App. 688, 693, 751 A.2d 394 (2000).   In an abundance of caution, appropriate to the gravity of the TPR issues at hand, however, the court has further considered the petitioner's evidence that addresses the specific adjudicatory grounds alleged.

C

Reasonable Efforts

Terminations of parental rights under § 17a–112(j), as was pleaded here for the two respondent putative fathers, requires the court to find whether

There is clear and convincing evidence that DCF has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent;  and

There is clear and convincing evidence that DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.7

(There is no statutory requirement to find reasonable efforts when the ground for termination is consent, as with the respondent mother here.)   With respect to the statutory element of reasonable efforts to locate and reunify required for termination of the parental rights of the respondent putative fathers pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1), the court finds by clear and convincing evidence as follows:

1. Reasonable efforts to locate

DCF made reasonable efforts to locate both respondent putative fathers.   The mother gave DCF Mr. S's birth date and it located an address for him.   DCF then sent him several letters at that address, all of which were returned.   At the time of filing the neglect petition, DCF had checked the departments of corrections and motor vehicles and LOCATE PLUS for his location, all unsuccessfully.   When it filed the TPR petition, the department again conducted a diligent but search to locate him.   By publishing for John Doe in the Hartford Courant, DCF also made reasonable efforts to identify any unidentified possible father of Joshua and to notify him of these proceedings.

2. Reasonable efforts to reunify

Since DCF was unable to locate either of the putative respondent fathers after diligent searches to do so, the clear and convincing evidence establishes that they were unable to benefit from reunification efforts.

D

Adjudicatory Findings1. Mother's Consent

On March 17, 2011, while appearing before this judge at short calendar, the respondent mother submitted her written consent to termination of her parental rights to Joshua on a form promulgated by the office of the chief court administrator.   This court conducted a thorough canvas and found then, and finds here as well, that the respondent mother had knowingly and voluntarily consented to termination of her parental rights, with full awareness of the consequences of doing so and after having been adequately and effectively advised by her attorney, and that her attorney had reviewed the consent with her and had been present for the court's canvas of the respondent.   The court thus finds that the petitioner has sustained its burden of proof against the mother with regard to this adjudicatory ground by clear and convincing evidence.

2. Respondent putative fathers

The petitioner has asserted two statutory grounds under § 17a–112(j)(3) for terminating the parental rights of the respondent putative fathers.   Each statutory basis set forth in § 17a–112(j)(3) is an independent ground for termination.  In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 293, 618 A.2d 1 (1992).   To prevail in a non-consensual termination of parental rights case, DCF must prove at least one of these statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence.   See In re Michael B., 49 Conn.App. 510, 512, 714 A.2d 1279, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 919, 722 A.2d 807 (1998).   Only one ground need be established, however, for the granting of a TPR petition.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984).

In the present case, the petitioner filed the petition to terminate the respondents' parental rights on November 22, 2010.   The petition was amended on March 17, 2011, to add a count that the respondent mother had consented to the termination of her parental rights, but that amendment did not affect the substantive rights of either respondent putative father.   Under Practice Book § 35a–7(a), in the adjudicatory phase of the proceeding, “the judicial authority is limited to evidence of events preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment, except where the judicial authority must consider subsequent events as part of its determination as to the existence of a ground for termination of parental rights.”   See In re Anthony H., 104 Conn.App. 744, 757, 936 A.2d 638 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 920, 943 A.2d 1100 (2008).   In the adjudicatory phase of this proceeding, the court has considered the evidence related to circumstances and events prior to November 22, 2010, insofar as the allegations pertaining to abandonment and no ongoing parent-child relationship.   In view of the mandate of Practice Book § 35a–7(a), however, and despite the fact that the amendment did not affect the substantive rights of either respondent father, the court has also made a separate determination as to whether the adjudicatory grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence as of March 17, 2011.

3. Abandonment— § 17a–112(j)(3)(A)

The petitioner has asserted, as a statutory ground for termination of parental rights, that each respondent putative father had, as of the adjudicatory date, abandoned Joshua.  “In adjudicating a petition to terminate parental rights on the ground of abandonment, the court's focus is on the parent's conduct.”   In Re Jaime S., 120 Conn.App. 712, 994 A.2d 233 (2010).

A lack of interest in the child is not the sole criterion in determining abandonment ․ General Statutes [Rev. to 1995] § 17a–112(b)(1) [now § 17a–112(j)(3)(A) ] defines abandonment as the [failure] to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child ․ Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child ․ Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare ․

In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 17–18, 632 A.2d 1122, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993).   For the reasons stated below, the court finds this ground proven as to each respondent putative father by clear and convincing evidence.

The statute requires DCF to show by clear and convincing evidence that a parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child.  “Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern,” “not ․ a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child.”  Id., 18.  “The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes:  (1) express love and affection for the child;  (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child;  (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing, and medical care;  (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile;  and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance ․” (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that as of November 22, 2010, each respondent putative father had abandoned Joshua within the meaning of § 17a–112(j)(3)(A).   Although the March 17, 2011, amendment to the petition adding a count of consent against the respondent mother did not affect any substantive rights of the respondent putative fathers, in an abundance of caution the court has also separately considered the evidence through March 17, 2011;  and the clear and convincing evidence also establishes that as of March 17, 2011, each respondent putative father had abandoned Joshua within the meaning of § 17a–112(j)(3)(A).   As of both dates, neither of them had met the duty of supplying Joshua with financial support, an adequate domicile, necessary food, clothing, and medical care.   Neither of them had attempted to provide Joshua with social or religious guidance.   Neither of them provided DCF with cards, letters or gifts for Joshua.   Neither of them had ever shown any interest, concern or responsibility as regards Joshua.

4. No ongoing parent-child relationship— § 17a–112(j)(3)(D)

The second statutory basis alleged by the petitioner for terminating the parental rights of Mr. S. and John Doe to Joshua is that neither of them had an ongoing parent-child relationship with Joshua, within the meaning of General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(D).  For the reasons stated below, the court finds this ground proven as to each respondent putative father by clear and convincing evidence.

The statute defines an “ongoing parent-child relationship” as meaning “the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child.”

This part of the statute requires the trial court to undertake a two-pronged analysis.   First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop ․ In considering whether an ongoing parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of paramount importance.   The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent.   Feelings for the natural parent connotes feelings of a positive nature only.

(Citations omitted.)  In re Jonathan G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 525, 777 A.2d 795 (2001).   The term “ ‘no ongoing parent-child relationship’ ․ contemplate [s] a situation in which, regardless of fault, a child either has never known his or her parents, so that no relationship has ever developed between them, or has definitively lost that relationship, so that despite its former existence it has now been completely displaced.   In either case the ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 670, 420 A.2d 875 (1979);  In re Juvenile Appeal, (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 645–46, 436 A.2d 290 (1980);  In re John G., 56 Conn.App. 12, 23, 740 A.2d 496 (1999).   In the case of a very young child, whose feelings are not readily discernible, “the inquiry must focus, not on the feelings of the infant, but on the positive feelings of the natural parent.”  In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 532, 613 A.2d 748 (1991).   To satisfy the second prong of the statutory criteria, the court must determine

whether it would be in the child's best interest to allow additional time for the establishment of a parent-child relationship.   The “best interest” standard, therefore, does not become relevant until after it has been determined that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists.

The factors to be considered in deciding whether it would be in Kezia's best interest to permit further time for a relationship with her father to develop include (1) the length of stay with her foster parents, (2) the nature of her relationship to her foster parents, (3) the degree of contact maintained with the natural parent, and (4) the nature of her relationship to her natural parent.   In addition, the genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider.

(Citations omitted.)  In re Kezia M., supra, 33 Conn.App. 22.

Since Joshua has never seen either of these respondent putative fathers, there obviously was and is no ongoing parent-child relationship between Joshua and either of these putative respondent fathers, on November 22, 2010, or on March 17, 2011.   As of each of these dates, neither Joshua nor either of these putative fathers had positive feelings toward each other.   Moreover, under the circumstances of this case as recounted elsewhere, it would be detrimental to Joshua's best interest to wait while DCF continued to search for these individuals and then to allow time for such a relationship to develop.   Since this proceeding began, they have not sought any contact with Joshua.   The court thus finds that this ground for terminating the parental rights of Martin S. and John Doe has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.

III

DISPOSITION

“A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition ․ If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase.   In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interest of the child.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 52, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998).   Unlike the adjudicatory phase, on disposition the court may consider information through the close of the evidentiary hearing.   In the dispositional phase of this case the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events up to and including March 15, 2011, the date upon which the evidence in this matter was concluded.

A

Required Statutory Findings

In making the dispositional decision in a non-consensual case, “the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors” specified in General Statutes § 17a–112(k).⁸  See, e.g., In re Tabitha P., 39 Conn.App. 353, 664 A.2d 1168 (1995).  “[T]hose ‘seven factors serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered ․ There is no requirement that each factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence.’   “ In re Davonta V., 98 Conn.App. 46–47 (2009).   As required by the statute, the court has considered the statutory factors and makes the following written findings, which the court has considered in determining whether it is the best interest of each of these children to terminate the parental rights of the respondent putative fathers.  In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000).

(1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent— § 17a–112(k)(1)

Since DCF was unable to locate Martin S. and John Doe after diligent searches to do so, DCF was unable to provide either of them with services to facilitate reunion with their child.

(2) Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended— § 17a–112(k)(2).

DCF was unable to offer reunification services to the two respondent putative fathers, as neither of them could be located.

(3) The terms of any court orders entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which the parties have fulfilled their expectations— § 17a–112(k)(3).

As neither respondent putative father could be located, no orders were entered with regard to them.

(4) The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardian of his person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties— § 17a–112(k)(4).

Joshua does not know or have any feelings toward any of the men identified by the respondent mother as his possible father and named here as his putative fathers.   Instead, he has close emotional ties with the foster father who has cared for him for much of his life.

(5) The age of the child— § 17a–112(k)(5).

Joshua was born on April 18, 2006, and has just turned 5 years old.

(6) The efforts the parent has made to adjust his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return him to his home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child— § 17a–112(k)(6).

The respondent putative fathers Martin S. and John Doe never contacted DCF, sought contact with their possible child, or did anything to adjust their circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to be placed in his home, either now or in the foreseeable future.

(7) The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent— § 17a–112(k)(7).

Since Joshua's placement into DCF custody, none of the respondents has been prevented from having or maintaining a meaningful relationship with his or her child by virtue of any act of the child's other parent or by that person's financial circumstances.

B

Best Interest of the Child

The final element of the termination of the parental rights statutes, § 17a–112(i) and (j), requires that, before granting a petition for such termination, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the child.   In determining whether terminating the respondents' parental rights would be in Joshua's best interest, the court has considered various factors, including Joshua's interest “in sustained growth, development, well-being, and in the continuity and stability of his environment”;  Capetta v. Capetta, 196 Conn. 10, 16, 490 A.2d 996 (1985);  his age and needs;  the length and nature of his stay in foster care;  the nature of his relationship with his biological and foster parents;  the contact maintained with the biological parents and the potential benefit or detriment of their retaining a connection with their biological parents;  their genetic bond to each parent, In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999);  and, with regard to the respondent putative fathers, the seven statutory factors and the court's findings thereon.   The court has also balanced Joshua's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the potential benefit of maintaining a connection with his biological parents.   See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).   The best interest standard is inherently flexible and fact-specific to each child, giving the court broad discretion to consider all the different and individualized factors that might affect a specific child's welfare.

The credible and reliable evidence establishes by clear and convincing evidence that terminating the parental rights of each of the respondent putative fathers is in the best interest of each of this minor child.   None of the other respondent putative fathers has ever played an active role in the life of his child, or possible child, or shown any interest in Joshua.

The credible and reliable evidence also establishes by clear and convincing evidence that terminating the parental rights of the respondent mother Amanda Z. is in Joshua's best interest.   Although Ms. Z. had initial success in dealing with her substance abuse problem after Joshua's first removal in 2006, she relapsed again in May 2008, and was then drug free for several months before relapsing again in December 2008.   She then had numerous positive test results showing that she was using cocaine in 2009, although she repeatedly claimed to DCF that the test results were faulty.   She did complete a two-day drug treatment program at the Genesis Center that was recommended after a substance abuse assessment there in May 2009, but was then discharged from another drug treatment program at the Community Prevention and Addiction Services in January 2010 after attending only 3 or 12 sessions.   Throughout this period the respondent mother adamantly denied continuing to use illegal drugs, but DCF had various contacts with her that gave them legitimate reasons for concern.   In a June 2010 case review, for example, she appeared to be in a daze.   At a July 2010 home visit, she was disheveled, confused, and appeared to be under the influence.   That same month the foster father told DCF he had recently seen track marks on her arms.   In August the foster father told DCF that she had admitting relapsing the day before.

DCF has repeatedly encouraged the respondent mother to address her substance abuse, and the evidence does suggest that she has not used any illegal drugs in recent months.   After specific steps were issued in November 2010, all her urine screens and drug tests have been negative, and those results are consistent with her statement to a DCF social worker in January 2011 that she is now clean and in methadone treatment.   But her past history of substance abuse, recovery, and then relapse does not provide any reason for confidence that she will be able to maintain any current sobriety or offer any reasonable prospect that she could assume a responsible position in Joshua's life at any reasonable time in the future.   In view of Joshua's age and his need for permanence, allowing further time to ascertain whether and when Ms. Z. would be capable of caring responsibly for Joshua is not in his best interest.

Joshua has been living with his foster father, Michael B., since January 2009, when Ms. Z. placed him there voluntarily as part of her safety plan with the department after she acknowledged to DCF that she had relapsed.   The foster father had known and cared for Joshua even before that during the 18 months from 2006 through 2008 when he resided with the respondent mother as her boyfriend.   In the last two years Mr. B. has met Joshua's need for permanence and stability, and provided him with a loving, caring, and nurturing home.   The two have a strong bond with each other, Joshua referring to Mr. B. as his dad and Mr. B. calling Joshua his son.   At five years of age, Joshua needs stability and permanence, not more time waiting for either.   Those needs can only be met, on the facts of this case, by terminating the parental rights of these respondents.   The court thus finds by clear and convincing evidence that terminating the parental rights of each of these respondents is in Joshua's best interest.

C

Orders of Termination

The court having considered all the statutory criteria, having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for the termination of each respondent's parental rights and having further found by clear and convincing evidence, upon consideration of all of the facts and circumstances presented, that it is in each child's best interest to terminate the parental rights of the respondent parents, it is hereby ORDERED:

The department's petition for termination of parental rights is granted and judgment may enter terminating the parental rights of Amanda Z., Martin S., and John Doe to Joshua.

Pursuant to General Statutes Section 17a–112(m),⁹ it is ordered that the commissioner of children and families be appointed Joshua's statutory parent so that he may be placed for adoption.   In securing the adoption, the court urges the department to give first preference to the present foster parent.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(o) ¹⁰ and Practice Book Section 35a–14(g),¹¹ the statutory parent shall file a written report on the case plan for Joshua and the status of the child with the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford on or before May 19, 2011 at 9:00 a.m. A written status report on implementation of the plan will be due by August 19, 2011.   As a permanency plan was most recently approved by this court on September 23, 2010, a motion to review the permanency plan for Joshua, in accordance with General Statutes § 46b–129(k), shall be filed on or before July 14, 2011, and a hearing to review such plan shall be held on August 25, 2011, at noon.

Additional reports and/or motions to review of the plan for Joshua will be filed in accordance with state and federal law at least every three months until such time as the children's adoptions are finalized.

The department is also ordered to notify the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford in writing when the adoption is finalized.

Pursuant to an agreement between the Chief Court Administrator and the Chief Probate Court Administrator, the clerk of the Probate Court that has jurisdiction over any adoption of this child is ordered to notify in writing the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford of the date when said adoptions are finalized.

BY THE COURT

STEPHEN F. FRAZZINI

JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

FOOTNOTES

FN2. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j)(3)(B) provides thatThe Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence ․ that ․ (3) ․ (B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b–129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child;  ․.  FN2. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j)(3)(B) provides thatThe Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence ․ that ․ (3) ․ (B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b–129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child;  ․

FN3. General Statutes Section 17a–112(i) provides as follows:  “The Superior Court upon hearing and notice, as provided in sections 45a–716 and 45a–717, may grant a petition for termination of parental rights based on consent filed pursuant to this section if it finds that (1) upon clear and convincing evidence, the termination is in the best interest of the child, and (2) such parent has voluntarily and knowingly consented to termination of the parent's parental rights with respect to such child.”.  FN3. General Statutes Section 17a–112(i) provides as follows:  “The Superior Court upon hearing and notice, as provided in sections 45a–716 and 45a–717, may grant a petition for termination of parental rights based on consent filed pursuant to this section if it finds that (1) upon clear and convincing evidence, the termination is in the best interest of the child, and (2) such parent has voluntarily and knowingly consented to termination of the parent's parental rights with respect to such child.”

FN4. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j)(3)(A) provides as follows:(j) The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ (3)(A) the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child, ․.  FN4. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j)(3)(A) provides as follows:(j) The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ (3)(A) the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child, ․

FN5. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j)(3)(D) provides as follows:(j) The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ (3) ․ (D) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child;  ․.  FN5. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j)(3)(D) provides as follows:(j) The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ (3) ․ (D) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child;  ․

FN6. Practice Book Section Sec. 32a–2 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “All hearings are essentially civil proceedings except where otherwise provided by statute ․”.  FN6. Practice Book Section Sec. 32a–2 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “All hearings are essentially civil proceedings except where otherwise provided by statute ․”

FN7. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a–111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to section 17a–111b, or determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required, ․”.  FN7. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a–111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to section 17a–111b, or determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required, ․”

FN8. General Statutes Section 17a–112(k) provides as follows:  “Except in the case where termination is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding:  (1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent;  (2) whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended;  (3) the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order;  (4) the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties;  (5) the age of the child;  (6) the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child;  and (7) the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.”.  FN8. General Statutes Section 17a–112(k) provides as follows:  “Except in the case where termination is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding:  (1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent;  (2) whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended;  (3) the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order;  (4) the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties;  (5) the age of the child;  (6) the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child;  and (7) the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.”

FN9. General Statutes Section 17a–112(m) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “The Superior Court may appoint a statutory parent at any time after it has terminated parental rights if the petitioner so requests.”.  FN9. General Statutes Section 17a–112(m) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “The Superior Court may appoint a statutory parent at any time after it has terminated parental rights if the petitioner so requests.”

FN10. General Statutes Section 17a–112(o) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “In the case where termination of parental rights is granted, the guardian of the person or statutory parent shall report to the court not later than thirty days after the date judgment is entered on a case plan, as defined by the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, for the child which shall include measurable objectives and time schedules.   At least every three months thereafter, such guardian or statutory parent shall make a report to the court on the progress made on implementation of the plan.   The court may convene a hearing upon the filing of a report and shall convene and conduct a permanency hearing pursuant to subsection (k) of section 46b–129 for the purpose of reviewing the permanency plan for the child no more than twelve months from the date judgment is entered or from the date of the last permanency hearing held pursuant to subsection (k) of section 46b–129, whichever is earlier, and at least once a year thereafter while the child remains in the custody of the Commissioner of Children and Families.”.  FN10. General Statutes Section 17a–112(o) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “In the case where termination of parental rights is granted, the guardian of the person or statutory parent shall report to the court not later than thirty days after the date judgment is entered on a case plan, as defined by the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, for the child which shall include measurable objectives and time schedules.   At least every three months thereafter, such guardian or statutory parent shall make a report to the court on the progress made on implementation of the plan.   The court may convene a hearing upon the filing of a report and shall convene and conduct a permanency hearing pursuant to subsection (k) of section 46b–129 for the purpose of reviewing the permanency plan for the child no more than twelve months from the date judgment is entered or from the date of the last permanency hearing held pursuant to subsection (k) of section 46b–129, whichever is earlier, and at least once a year thereafter while the child remains in the custody of the Commissioner of Children and Families.”

FN11. Practice Book Section 35a–14(g) provides in pertinent part as follows:  “Where a petition for termination of parental rights is granted, the guardian or statutory parent of the child or youth shall report to the judicial authority not later than thirty days after the date the judgment is entered on a permanency plan and on the status of the child or youth.   At least every three months thereafter, such guardian or statutory parent shall make a report to the judicial authority on the implementation of the plan, or earlier if the plan changes before the elapse of three months.   The judicial authority may convene a hearing upon the filing of a report and shall convene and conduct a permanency hearing for the purpose of reviewing the permanency plan for the child no more than twelve months from the date judgment is entered or from the date of the last permanency hearing held in accordance with General Statutes § 46b–129(d), whichever is earlier, and at least once a year thereafter while the child or youth remains in the custody of the commissioner of the department of children and families.”.  FN11. Practice Book Section 35a–14(g) provides in pertinent part as follows:  “Where a petition for termination of parental rights is granted, the guardian or statutory parent of the child or youth shall report to the judicial authority not later than thirty days after the date the judgment is entered on a permanency plan and on the status of the child or youth.   At least every three months thereafter, such guardian or statutory parent shall make a report to the judicial authority on the implementation of the plan, or earlier if the plan changes before the elapse of three months.   The judicial authority may convene a hearing upon the filing of a report and shall convene and conduct a permanency hearing for the purpose of reviewing the permanency plan for the child no more than twelve months from the date judgment is entered or from the date of the last permanency hearing held in accordance with General Statutes § 46b–129(d), whichever is earlier, and at least once a year thereafter while the child or youth remains in the custody of the commissioner of the department of children and families.”

Frazzini, Stephen F., J.