Connie Chen et al. v. Hopkins School, Inc. et al. (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

FACTS

This action arises out of injuries alleged to have occurred due to a single-car crash in Orange, Connecticut on or about November 6, 2008.   The plaintiffs, Connie Chen, a minor at the time of injury, and her father Ping Chen, served a complaint against the defendants, Hopkins School, Inc., and Hopkins Committee of Trustees, Inc., on November 9, 2010.   The two-count complaint contains the following factual allegations.   Connie Chen was a student at the Hopkins School and had parked her car in the school parking lot.   Shortly upon leaving the parking lot after school, she lost control of her car due to a failure of a front tire, causing her vehicle to strike a utility pole and rollover.   The failure of the tire was due to it having been lacerated while the car was parked in the school lot.   In count one, it is alleged that due to the negligence of the defendants in failing to prevent the tire laceration, Connie Chen suffered personal injuries and harm including, inter alia, that she “has and may in the future incur expenses for medical care and attention, medicines, x-rays ․ and other medical services, supplies, and necessities, etc., ․” In count two, it is further alleged that due to the defendants' negligence, her father Ping Chen, “has and may in the future incur expenses for the plaintiff Connie Chen's medical care and attention, medicines, x-rays ․ and other medical services, supplies, and necessities, etc., ․” While Connie Chen's alleged injuries were suffered as a minor child, she has subsequently reached the age of majority and now brings this suit in her own individual capacity, and with her father Ping Chen as an additional plaintiff.

On January 4, 2011, the defendants filed a motion to strike and memorandum of law in support.   The defendants specifically move to strike count two of the plaintiffs' complaint on the ground that it is legally insufficient in failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the father's claim is barred by General Statues § 52–204.¹  The plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law in objection to the motion to strike.²  The motion was heard by the court on February 22, 2011.

DISCUSSION

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).  “We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint ․ and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency ․ [I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.”  (Internal quotations marks omitted.)  American Progressive Life & Health Ins. Co. of New York v. Better Benefits, LLC, 292 Conn. 111, 120, 971 A.2d 17 (2009).

The defendants here argue that the assertion of claims by the plaintiffs for medical expenditures incurred by the father in count two is barred by § 52–204 because it seeks recovery for duplicate expenses also claimed by the daughter.   In particular, the defendants argue that the second count should be stricken because “Connie Chen brings suit on her own behalf as an adult, and explicitly seeks recompense for past and future medical expenses, thus barring recovery by her father, Ping Chen, for the same damages.”   The plaintiffs counter in their objection to the motion to strike that count two is legally sufficient because each of the “plaintiffs' claims address different points in time, both before and after plaintiff, Connie Chen, reached the age of majority.”

“When a minor child is injured by the negligent act of a third party, two causes of action immediately spring into existence;  first, the right of action by the child itself for the personal injuries inflicted upon it;  and second, a right of action to the parent for consequential damages, such as loss of services and expenses, caused by the injury to the child.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, 200 Conn. 290, 308, 512 A.2d 130 (1986).  Section 52–204 provides, in relevant part:  “In any civil action arising out of personal injury ․ as a result of which personal injury ․ [the] parent of the plaintiff has made or will be compelled to make expenditures or has contracted indebtedness, the amount of such expenditures or indebtedness may be recovered by the plaintiff, provided a recovery by the plaintiff shall be a bar to any claim by such ․ parent ․” “Although [§ ] 52–204 authorizes the recovery of medical expenses in an action solely in behalf of the injured child and makes the recovery in such action a bar to any claim by the parent for in such expenses, the statute does not mandate that procedure.”  (Emphasis added.)  Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, supra, 200 Conn. 308.

“The parents of an injured child, therefore, may bring a claim for expenses incurred as a result of their child's injury in a separate count, even though the child also brings a claim for injuries in the same action ․ [Section] 52–204 bars double recovery;  it does not limit the plaintiff's ability to plead her case.   If, subsequent to the trial, the fact finder ultimately deems that damages are appropriately due, only then will § 52–204 limit the manner in which the damages can be awarded.   If the damages are due, they can be awarded directly to the injured plaintiff ․ or they can be awarded directly to [the parent], they will not be awarded to both.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Mercede v. Kessler, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford–Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 99 0172682 (February 13, 2001, Karazin, J.) (29 Conn. L. Rptr. 246, 247).

In the present case, the plaintiff daughter, in the first count, claims expenses that she “has and may in the future incur” for her own medical care as a result of the alleged negligence of the defendants.   The plaintiff father, in the second count, claims expenses he “has and may in the future incur” for the medical care of his daughter.   When construed in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency, the plaintiffs' complaint sets forth legally sufficient claims for the daughter's expenses that she has, or will in the future, incur as an adult;  and the expenses the father has, or may incur, for the medical expenses incurred for his minor daughter.   While it is not implausible to read the second count of the complaint as impermissibly setting forth claims by the father for future expenses of his now adult daughter, the court does not read it in such way as “pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 318, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006).

Contrary to the defendants' argument, § 52–204 does not preclude the father from claiming comparable expenses in a separate count in the same action as his adult daughter;  it merely bars recovery of any duplicate damages to the father already awarded to the daughter.   As pled, there is nothing to indicate that the expenses sought by the plaintiffs are inherently duplicative, other than the mere allegation they arise from the same incident.   The plaintiffs are not required to provide itemized receipts for medical expenses in order to sufficiently plead at this stage that they have incurred such expenses due to the alleged negligence of the defendants.   Furthermore, to the extent any monetary damages are ultimately awarded to the plaintiffs at trial, § 52–204 can be applied at that time, as appropriate, in order to bar any possible double recovery.

Accordingly, count two of the complaint is legally sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the parent of an alleged negligently injured child may set forth a separate claim for expenses incurred when the child has not yet recovered for those same expenses.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to strike count two of the plaintiffs' complaint is denied.

Woods, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. General Statutes § 52–204 provides:  “Recovery of expenditures by husband or parent.   In any civil action arising out of personal injury or property damage, as a result of which personal injury or property damage the husband or parent of the plaintiff has made or will be compelled to make expenditures or has contracted indebtedness, the amount of such expenditures or indebtedness may be recovered by the plaintiff, provided a recovery by the plaintiff shall be a bar to any claim by such husband or parent, except in an action in which the husband or parent is a defendant.”.  FN1. General Statutes § 52–204 provides:  “Recovery of expenditures by husband or parent.   In any civil action arising out of personal injury or property damage, as a result of which personal injury or property damage the husband or parent of the plaintiff has made or will be compelled to make expenditures or has contracted indebtedness, the amount of such expenditures or indebtedness may be recovered by the plaintiff, provided a recovery by the plaintiff shall be a bar to any claim by such husband or parent, except in an action in which the husband or parent is a defendant.”

FN2. The plaintiffs failed to comply with Practice Book § 10–42(b) as they did not file their memorandum in objection to the motion to strike at least five days prior to the hearing.   However, there was no objection to the plaintiffs providing a copy of its memorandum in opposition to the defendants at the short calendar hearing, along with a copy to the court.   Thereafter, the memorandum was filed with the clerk on February 24, 2011.   Thus, the court will address the merits of the arguments in the memoranda in support and opposition..  FN2. The plaintiffs failed to comply with Practice Book § 10–42(b) as they did not file their memorandum in objection to the motion to strike at least five days prior to the hearing.   However, there was no objection to the plaintiffs providing a copy of its memorandum in opposition to the defendants at the short calendar hearing, along with a copy to the court.   Thereafter, the memorandum was filed with the clerk on February 24, 2011.   Thus, the court will address the merits of the arguments in the memoranda in support and opposition.

Woods, Glenn A., J.