IN RE: Alaysia R.1 (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This matter concerns the interests of Alaysia R., a minor child whose date of birth is March 20, 2009.   Angelica F. is the child's mother.   Miguel R. is Alaysia's father.   The parties were never married to each other.

The Department of Children and Families (DCF) filed petitions to terminate the respondent parents' parental rights to Alaysia on June 3, 2010.   Angelica F. filed a pleading entitled “Motion to Modify Disposition to Protective Supervision” on September 21, 2010.   Both matters were heard simultaneously by the undersigned at a consolidated trial/motion hearing that was conducted on December 2, 2010, February 10, 2011, and April 1, 2011.   The court finds that the TPR petition was properly served upon both parties and that it has jurisdiction over this matter.   The mother, father and child were represented throughout the proceeding by their court-appointed counsel.   DCF was represented by an assistant attorney general.

The petitioner alleged the following two statutory grounds for termination of parental rights against the respondent Angelica F.:  parental failure to rehabilitate (C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(I);  and parental failure to rehabilitate where the child has been in DCF custody for at least 15 months (C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(ii)).

In addition to the two foregoing statutory grounds, DCF also alleged grounds of abandonment (C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(A)) and lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship (C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(D)) in the TPR petition which it filed concerning the respondent Miguel R.

At the outset of the trial, both respondents were present and were contesting the petitions to terminate their parental rights.   However, on the second day of the proceeding, Miguel R. informed the court through counsel that he wished to consent to the termination of his parental rights.   Miguel R. submitted a sworn affidavit of consent, and DCF moved to orally amend the petition to substitute that adjudicatory ground.  (See:  C.G.S. § 17a–112(I)(2)).   After canvass of the respondent father by the court, and colloquy with his counsel, the court found that the respondent's affidavit of consent was knowingly and voluntarily executed.

DCF then withdrew the non-consensual adjudicatory grounds for termination that it had alleged against Miguel R. The court found that the father's consent to termination of his parental rights had been proven by clear and convincing evidence.   At their request, the court excused Miguel R., and his attorney, from further participation in the proceeding.   The contested trial/motion hearing continued thereafter in their absence.

DCF claimed at trial that Angelica F. has been very inconsistent in her visitation with the child and has been late for, or missed, many scheduled visits with Alaysia.   The petitioner also alleges that the respondent mother did not send cards or gifts to the child at Christmas or on her birthday, and has failed to satisfactorily complete court-ordered substance abuse and mental health counseling.   The petitioner requests the court to terminate Angelica F.'s parental rights.   Conversely, the respondent contends that she has secured and maintain adequate housing and income, and has undergone a substance abuse evaluation and screening that prove she does not need substance abuse treatment.   She also maintains that she has interacted positively with the child during visits.   Angelica F. urges the court to deny the TPR petition, modify the order committing Alaysia to DCF, and return the child to her custody.

The court finds that the facts set forth below were proven by clear and convincing evidence.

FACTUAL FINDINGS (ADJUDICATION)

Alaysia entered DCF care on June 5, 2009 pursuant to an order of temporary custody issued by the court on that date.   She was subsequently adjudicated as a neglected child and committed to the petitioner's custody by the court (Olear, J.) on September 3, 2009.   The reasons for the original neglect adjudication were detailed in a summary that was entered into evidence during this proceeding.  (Petitioner's Exhibit J, p. 1.) That summary noted in part:  “In 6/09, the Department of Children and Families completed an investigation that mother was homeless and transient with her minor child.   Mother would leave the child for lengthy periods of time without providing a means to contact her” (Petitioner's Exhibit J, p.1).   The DCF summary stated that Miguel R. was incarcerated at that time.   The summary also reported that at the time of the neglect commitment, the respondent mother had “․ unaddressed substance abuse issues” and that she was smoking “․ marijuana and taking ecstasy pills.”  (Petitioner's Exhibit J, p. 1–2.)

Alaysia, who is now slightly more than two years of age, has been in DCF custody continuously since she was three months old.   The court issued “specific steps” orders to both respondents on the date of commitment.   Angelica F. was ordered, inter alia, to participate in parenting, substance abuse and individual counseling/treatment;  refrain from substance abuse;  secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income;  keep her whereabouts known to DCF;  submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations regarding treatment;  consistently and timely meet and address the child's physical, educational, medical or emotional needs;  and visit the child as often as permitted by DCF. (Petitioner's Exhibit E.)

DCF Social Worker Brenda Colon testified credibly at trial that since the child entered DCF custody in June 2009, the petitioner has offered Angelica F. visits two times per week for two hours each visit.   A DCF social study dated July 6, 2010 was introduced into evidence, and alleged that the mother visited with Alaysia only 28 times out of a possible 300 scheduled visits between June 3, 2009 and the date of the report.  (Petitioner's Exhibit K., p. 12.)   The court does not find the claimed number of possible visits to be accurate.   Because DCF offered the respondent two, two-hour long visits per week during the 13–month period referenced in the study, only approximately 112 visits (for a total of 228 hours) would have been scheduled during that period.   Still, the evidence at trial proved that Angelica F. was very inconsistent in her visitation, missed many of her scheduled contacts with Alaysia during that period without valid excuse, and visited the child only on approximately 28 of approximately 112 scheduled visitation dates.   Ms. Colon testified credibly that the mother's missed visits, and lateness, were an ongoing cause for concern.   She recounted instances when the child was transported to the supervised visitation site and the respondent failed to appear without explanation, or arrived excessively late.   The social worker testified that she frequently counseled the mother about the inconsistency of her visits.   The court found all of the foregoing evidence to be credible, and accepts it as fact.   There was credible evidence at trial that the mother's attendance at visits improved and became more consistent between May 2010 and November 2010, when DCF hired an outside agency, Family Connections, to supervise Angelica F.'s contacts with Alaysia.   However, Angelica F.'s contacts with Alaysia were extensively interrupted when the mother made three trips to Florida in 2009, 2010, and 2011.

On November 12, 2009, Angelica F. called Ms. Colon and told the worker that she would be leaving for Florida on vacation, would possibly relocate permanently there, and might not return to Connecticut.   During that telephone call, the respondent requested reunification with Alaysia in Florida.   (Petitioner's Exhibit J, p. 2.) On December 8, 2009, the respondent contacted DCF again and advised that she had returned to Connecticut and was residing in an apartment in Hartford with a boyfriend, Jason M.

Ms. Colon testified credibly that the respondent had no visitation whatsoever with Alaysia between October 13, 2009 and December 8, 2009.   The worker also testified credibly that after mother left this state on November 12, 2009, DCF had no idea when or if the mother would be returning to Connecticut until Angelica F.'s second phone contact on December 8th.

Ms. Colon testified credibly that the respondent left Connecticut for Florida once again in December 2010 (after the commencement of this trial) and did not return to this state until January 31, 2011.   During this period, Angelica F. missed all of her scheduled, twice-weekly visits with Alaysia.   The mother did not send any gifts or cards to Alaysia at Christmas.   The social worker testified credibly that Angelica F. never expressed any concern that the many canceled visits might have a negative effect upon Alaysia.   The court accepts all of this evidence as fact.

There was credible evidence at trial that the respondent also traveled to Florida on February 26, 2011 and remained there until April 1, 2011.   Angelica F. once again missed all of her scheduled visits with Alaysia during this period.   Per the social worker, she did not send Alaysia any cards or gifts when the child turned two on March 20, 2011.   Ms. Colon testified credibly that during the mother's most recent month-long absence from Connecticut, the mother left a message on the worker's voice mail.   Angelica F. informed the worker that she was in Florida, stated that she was experiencing a health issue, and promised to send the worker documentation about her medical problem.   During the call, the respondent did not leave an address or phone number or indicate how the worker could contact her.   Ms. Colon testified credibly that she would have been unable to contact the mother if there had been an emergency involving Alaysia, and that the mother never provided documentation about the medical problem that purportedly extended her stay in Florida.

Angelica F. testified at trial on April 1, 2011.   She stated that she had traveled to Florida to visit her father, stepmother and siblings who reside there.   She claimed that her most recent stay in Florida became extended because she was diagnosed with a serious medical condition for which she sought medical consultation there with the assistance of her step-mother, who is a nurse.   The court found the respondent's explanation about her medical diagnosis to lack credibility.   Despite her promise to do so, Angelica F. never provided any documentation to DCF about the health condition that purportedly kept her in Florida.   Other than her testimony, she did not offer any proof concerning her diagnosis when she testified in court on April 1st.   The court believes that it would have been relatively simple for the respondent to have obtained a physician's note, or other proof about her claimed medical condition.   It would have been logical for her to provide such documentation to DCF and the court, particularly since the respondent's missed visits with Alaysia, and her extended visits to Florida, were the subject of considerable evidentiary focus during this trial.   Finally, the court questions the respondent's veracity based on the following credible evidence contained in a DCF case status report dated October 7, 2010.   That report notes in part:

On 7/26/10, mother filed a restraining order in Hartford Superior Court with fear of father and him threatening her.   The order was granted and court hearing was set for 8/10/10.   Mother reported that she did not attend the court hearing stating that she had a therapy appointment.   This worker confirmed that she did not have a therapy appointment that day, but then [sic] stated ‘I can't remember why I didn't go.’  (Petitioner's Exhibit M, p. 2–13.)

Furthermore, even if the respondent's medical condition and consultation caused her to remain in Florida as she claimed, that does not explain why Angelica F. failed to send a card or gift to Alaysia when the child celebrated her second birthday in March.

The respondent mother offered evidence at trial about the quality of her visits with the child.  (See Mother's Exhibit 1, p. 1–33.)   The visitation summaries authored by Family Connections contained numerous notations about “very good” and “pleasant” visits, and described positive interaction between the respondent and Alaysia.   One representative entry on August 27, 2010 noted in part:  “They laughed, hugged, and talked.   They sat and read books until the end of the visit.   This was a very good visit.”  (Mother's Exhibit 1, p. 8.) However, some of the visitation summaries also supported the petitioner's claims about the inconsistency of mother's visitation.   A summary dated November 24, 2010 about the November 4, 2010 visit reported:  “Mom has been arriving late for the past few visits without any calls/notice.   Today she was 45 minutes late and the transporter was on her way back to pick up Alaysia to return her to daycare when Mom arrived.   I advised her that if we do not receive a call, we are not obligated to hold baby at facility too long.” (Mother's Exhibit 1, p. 28.)   A visit scheduled for November 8, 2010 was “cancelled per Mom's request.”  (Mother's Exhibit 1, p. 29.)   The summary of the November 18, 2010 visit noted:  “Mom has been arriving late frequently.”   (Mother's Exhibit 1, p. 132.)   The November 22, 2010 visitation report, although indicating that the child was very happy to see the mother, indicated:  “Mom called at 9:40 to say she was just getting up.   I advised that we would have to return Alaysia to daycare if she did not arrive by 10:30.”   The summary recounted that Angelica F. arrived for the 10:00 a.m. visit at 10:15 a.m. on that date.  (Mother's Exhibit 1, p. 33.)

Viewed in totality, the foregoing evidence proved that the respondent was inconsistent in her visitation with Alaysia, missed or was late for a large number of scheduled visits, and did not visit the child as often as permitted by DCF. It also proved that mother failed to realize the potentially negative effect that inconsistent visitation might have on Alaysia, particularly as the child became older and was transported to anticipated visits that did not take place.   Although there was proof that the contacts were positive when they occurred, the respondent's missed visits, and particularly those that did not take place during the extended periods of time when the respondent voluntarily chose to be absent from Connecticut, are found by the court to be evidence of Angelica F.'s lack of commitment to parental reunification and rehabilitation.

There was credible evidence at trial that Angelica F. complied with the specific steps orders that she complete a parenting education course, and obtain adequate housing and legal income.   The respondent completed a 20–hour–long parenting training program in May 2010.  (Mother's Exhibit 2.) Angelica F. leased an apartment in Hartford with her boyfriend, Jason M., on February 5, 2010 (Mother's Exhibit 3.) Mother has been employed by a company in Manchester, first as a secretary, and more recently as an inside sales person working out of her home, since August 2009.

In June 2009, after Alaysia was removed from her custody, Angelica F. sought substance abuse treatment at Community Health Services.   At that time, the respondent informed a clinician there that she had used alcohol and marijuana on a daily basis since age 17, and had last taken those substances a week prior to her intake appointment.  (Petitioner's Exhibit A, p. 7.) She also reported then that she used ecstasy “every few days” since she was 18 years old, and that her last usage of that drug had occurred “one week earlier.”   (Petitioner's Exhibit A, p. 7.) During her intake interview the respondent indicated that she was “self-medicating due to depression.”  (Petitioner's Exhibit A, p. 1.)

The DCF social study dated July 6, 2010 contains the following information about the mother's substance abuse:  “Mother reported a history of substance abuse.   She denied using during her pregnancy.   She stated that she had been using ecstasy, marijuana and alcohol to pacify Alaysia's removal from her care.   She described that [sic] using a pill and 1/2 of ecstasy a day;  smoking eight blunts of marijuana a day and was drinking alcohol.   She reported that she stopped using on or about 6/15/09.   She stated that she stopped using because this is the only way of getting her baby back.   She stated that she was referred to a substance abuse group which she reports that she will attend weekly.”  (Petitioner's Exhibit K, p. 3.)

The court found all of the foregoing evidence to be credible and accepts it as fact.   The court finds that at the time Alaysia was removed from her care, Angelica F. had a significant history of poly-substance abuse of several year's duration, and required treatment for that problem.

Credible evidence at trial established that the respondent never satisfactorily completed the substance abuse treatment mandated in the specific steps orders.   A treatment summary from Community Health Services dated November 13, 2009 proved that the mother withdrew from treatment there “before adequate planning could be accomplished” and was “administratively discharged.”  (Petitioner's Exhibit A, p. 1.) Per the treatment summary, Angelica F. attended only seven of 13 scheduled treatment sessions and demonstrated “very poor compliance” with the therapy (Petitioner's Exhibit A, p. 1.) The report also indicated that the respondent made only “minimal progress in treatment as client was too inconsistent and lacked motivation.”   (Petitioner's Exhibit A, p. 1.)

Steven Zuckerman, a clinician at Community Health Services, testified credibly that during the time Angelica F. attended therapy, she was given two drug screens.   One was negative for all illegal drugs.   The other drug test revealed that the respondent tested positive for suboxone, a drug that is usually administered to persons with opiate dependencies to alleviate their cravings for heroin.   Mr. Zuckerman testified credibly that no one at Community Health Services had prescribed suboxone for Angelica F., and that she never informed his agency that she needed treatment for heroin abuse.   Mr. Zuckerman testified credibly that he gave the respondent an “addictive diagnosis.”

Angelica F. contended at trial that she did not need substance abuse treatment.   In support of that argument, she pointed to a substance abuse evaluation that she underwent in 2010 when she gave two negative substance abuse screens.  (Mother's Exhibit 4.) One of those screens was a negative hair test for drugs that was administered in January 2010.   The report of the substance abuse evaluation by Advanced Behavioral Health notes in pertinent part:  “[respondent's] test results were negative for all substances.”   (Mother's Exhibit 4, p. 2.) The respondent also pointed to the testimony at trial of Ms. Colon, the DCF social worker, and Sarah Batchelder, a mental health therapist who worked briefly with the mother.   Both witnesses testified that they had observed no evidence of, and had no concerns about, ongoing substance abuse by Angelica F. However, the court is unpersuaded by that evidence that Angelica F. has satisfactorily resolved her poly-substance abuse problem.   Steven Zuckerman testified credibly that it was difficult to make an accurate assessment about the respondent's substance abuse because she had missed seven scheduled appointments during the three months during 2009 that she was seen prior to being discharged, and was only given two urine tests during that period.   In June 2009, the respondent reported a history of alcohol, marijuana and ecstasy usage, and that she was self-medicating due to depression.   The substance abuse evaluation dated February 24, 2010 listed Axis 1 diagnoses of major depressive disorder, post traumatic stress disorder and “R/O” (rule out) alcohol abuse.  (Mother's Exhibit 1, p. 3.) During the February 2010 substance abuse evaluation, the respondent also reported that she had attended a 12–step program in Florida for two months during 2007 but did not complete it.  (Mother's Exhibit 4, p. 2.)

Given the significant nature of the drug and alcohol abuse that the respondent reported in June of 2009, her involvement with and failure to complete the 12–step program in Florida in 2007, the respondent's “addictive diagnosis,” her lack of compliance with the court-mandated substance abuse treatment at Community Health Services between June and November 2009, the number of substance abuse treatment sessions and visits with the child that the mother missed, the troubling and unexplained presence of suboxone in the respondent's system in 2009, the lack of ongoing substance abuse screening and treatment since her unsatisfactory discharge from the Community Health Services program, and the February 2010 “rule out alcohol abuse” diagnosis, the court finds that the substance abuse issues which contributed to the child's neglect adjudication in 2009 have not been satisfactorily addressed and resolved by the mother.   Based on all of the evidence recounted above, the court finds that Angelica F. has failed to comply with the specific steps order that she satisfactorily comply with recommended substance abuse treatment.

As noted above, Sarah Batchelder, the mother's mental health therapist at Hartford Behavioral Health, testified during this trial.   Ms Batchelder began treating Angelica F. on May 21, 2010.   Ms. Batchelder testified that she provided individual therapy for the respondent to treat her depression and deal with other problems that the respondent was experiencing.   A psychiatrist at her agency also prescribed medication for the mother.   Ms. Batchelder testified credibly that the respondent appeared to make some progress in therapy.   However, Ms. Batchelder also testified that she was scheduled to meet with the mother every two or three weeks.   Between May 21, 2010 and December 2, 2010, Angelica F. had 21 scheduled appointments at Hartford Behavioral Health to meet either with Ms. Batchelder, or the agency's psychiatrist.   Ms. Batchelder testified credibly that during that time, the respondent kept 14 appointments and missed seven.   The court finds from this evidence of Angelica F.'s sporadic attendance that she failed to sufficiently invest herself in this therapy and did not comply with the specific steps order that she successfully participate in individual counseling.

There was credible evidence at trial that during the period of time that Alaysia has been in state custody, the petitioner offered the following reunification services to Angelica F:  substance abuse treatment at Community Health Services;  individual mental health counseling with Hartford Behavioral Health;  parenting training at the New Life Family Center;  supervised visitation at Family Connections and DCF case management services.   DCF also provided a bus pass to Angelica F. to facilitate her transportation to visits and service appointments.

DISCUSSION (ADJUDICATION)

As a threshold matter, the court must determine whether or not the petitioner made reasonable efforts to reunify Alaysia with Angelica F. (See:  C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(1)).   The Connecticut Appellate Court has held that the term “reasonable efforts” means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.  In Re Jessica B., 50 Conn.App. 554, 566 (1998).

The credible evidence at trial proved that the petitioner offered the respondent mother substance abuse evaluation and treatment at Community Health Services, individual mental health counseling at Hartford Behavioral Health, parenting training at the New Life Family Center, supervised visitation at Family Connections, DCF case management services and a bus pass.   The court finds that the assistance offered to the respondent by the petitioner constituted reasonable and appropriate efforts to reunify the child with Angelica F.

The court also finds that the court issued final specific steps orders to Angelica F. on September 3, 2009 when Alaysia was committed as a neglected child to DCF. The court further finds that Alaysia first went into state custody on June 5, 2009, when the court issued the order of temporary custody.   The court finds that on June 3, 2010 when DCF filed its termination of parental rights petition in this case, Alaysia had been in the petitioner's custody for slightly less than 12 months.

DCF alleged two separate statutory adjudicatory grounds in its petition for the termination of Angelica F.'s parental rights.

Per C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(I), the petitioner claimed that Alaysia was found by the Superior Court in a prior proceeding to have been neglected, and that the respondent mother had failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief, that within a reasonable time, considering the ages and needs of the child, the respondent mother could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.

Pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(ii), DCF alleged that Alaysia was found to be neglected and had been in the custody of the commissioner for at least 15 months, and the respondent mother had. been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to her pursuant to C.G.S. § 46b–129 and had failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief, that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, the respondent mother could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.

As used in both of the foregoing statutes, “[p]ersonal rehabilitation refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent [and] requires the court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child.”   In Re Dylan C., 126 Conn.App. 71, 88 (2011), citing In Re Trevor G., 109 Conn.App. 782, 789 (2008).

In the adjudicatory phase of any termination of parental rights proceeding, the judicial authority is limited to events preceding the filing of the petition, or the latest amendment, except where the judicial authority must consider subsequent events as part of its determination as to the existence of a ground for termination of parental rights.   C.P.B. § 35a–7;  In Re Jennifer W., 75 Conn.App. 485, 494 (2003).  “In the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of the whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time.”  In Re Jennifer W., supra, 495, citing In Re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230 (2000) and In Re Amber B., 56 Conn.App. 776, 785 (2000).

Based on C.P.B. § 35a–7 and the case law cited above, this court will consider alleged acts and omissions of the respondent mother which allegedly occurred after June 3, 2010 when the TPR petition was filed,² with respect to the count of parental failure to rehabilitate that DCF has brought under C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(I).

However, based on that practice book section and the cases referred to above, the court finds the count of parental failure to rehabilitate under C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(ii) to be defective.   Alaysia had not been in DCF's custody for the statutorily required 15 months when the TPR petition was filed on June 3, 2010.   A fair reading of the statute, the practice book section, and the case law, suggests to this court that the child must have been in custody for at least 15 months on the date when the petition was filed, and that the court may not consider adjudicatory evidence about the length of time that the child has remained in state custody since June 3, 2010.   Given the absence of that statutory predicate, the court finds the count of parental failure to rehabilitate (B–2) which the petitioner filed against Angelica F. pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(ii) was not proven by clear and convincing evidence.   That count of the TPR petition is hereby DISMISSED.

With respect to the remaining adjudicatory count that was brought against Angelica F., the court has found that Alaysia was committed to DCF's custody as a neglected child on September 3, 2009.   The child, who was born on March 20, 2009, is now approximately 25 months old.   She has been in the same state-licensed foster home continuously since June 5, 2009, when she was less than three months old.

Around the time that Alaysia was removed from her custody in June 2009, Angelica F. was homeless, transient and would leave the child for lengthy periods of time without providing information where she could be contacted.   She had unaddressed mental health and substance abuse issues.   The respondent admitted to DCF and a treatment provider around that time that she was frequently abusing alcohol, marijuana and ecstasy, and was suffering with depression.   The court infers that those significant problems contributed to the circumstances that necessitated DCF involvement, removal of the child, and the neglect adjudication.

The clear and unambiguous specific steps orders that Judge Olear issued on September 3, 2009 were intended to guide Angelica F. in the direction toward reunification with Alaysia and to ensure that the mother would properly care for the child upon her return.   The court ordered DCF to provide the mother rehabilitative services that were specifically related to the problems that led to the child's removal.   The court ordered Angelica F. to take the requisite steps in order that she could resume her constructive and useful role as Alaysia's parent.   Specifically, it was necessary that the mother visit her daughter as often as permitted, and cooperate with and successfully complete the recommended mental health and substance abuse treatment.   Unfortunately, the evidence at trial proved that the respondent has not made sufficient progress toward parental rehabilitation since the court orders entered.

Clear and convincing evidence at trial proved that during the past 22 months, Angelica F. missed or was late for many visits with the child, and did not satisfactorily complete the substance abuse and mental health therapy that the court ordered as necessary prerequisites for reunification with Alaysia.   That evidence indicates an ongoing lack of recognition by the respondent about the needs of her child, and about the things that she must do in order to reclaim her daughter from foster care.   Furthermore, the court finds evidence about the mother's three voluntary trips to Florida while the child has been in state custody (including the two that occurred while this termination trial was ongoing) to be compelling proof of the respondent's lack of commitment to rehabilitation and reunification with the child.   It is certainly understandable that the respondent would want to visit with her other family members who reside out of state.   However, the length and frequency of those visits, the disruption to the parent-child visits that resulted, and the mother's failure to provide DCF with contact information during the last trip to Florida, all unfortunately reflect decisions by Angelica F. that placed her own needs above the best interests of this young child.

Based upon Alaysia's age, the considerable length of time that she has already spent in foster care, her obvious need for a permanent and stable home, and the mother's lack of compliance with the key specific steps orders referenced above, the court finds as proven by clear and convincing evidence that Angelica F. has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that she could assume a responsible position in Alaysia's life within a reasonable time.   The court finds that the petitioner has proven the count of parental failure to rehabilitate by the mother (B–1) by clear and convincing evidence.

FACTUAL FINDINGS (DISPOSITION)

Having found that the petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence an adjudicatory ground for the termination of each respondent's parental rights, the court is statutorily mandated to examine whether or not there is also clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests.  (See C.G.S. § 17a–112(I)(1)).   In making this determination with respect to the respondent mother, the court is required to make and consider seven written findings of fact pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a–112(K).³

During the trial, the court heard the testimony about the child's best interests from her foster father, and from Ms. Colon, the DCF social worker.

The foster parent testified credibly that Alaysia has lived with his wife and him since the child was approximately two months old.   The foster parents have a 22–year–old daughter.   The foster parents and their daughter have become very attached to Alaysia, and regard her as a member of their family.   The foster father testified that he and his wife would like to adopt the child.   Alaysia refers to her foster mother as “mommy” and her foster father as “poppy.”   The foster parents are bilingual and speak to the child in both English and Spanish.   Alaysia is starting to talk in both languages.   The foster father testified credibly that Alaysia looks to the foster parents for comfort.

The DCF social study in support of the petition for termination of parental rights notes in pertinent part:  “Alaysia has established a significant emotional tie with respect to her foster parents who have exercised physical care, custody or control of the child since 6/09.”  (Petitioner's Exhibit K, p. 12.)   Ms. Colon, who has observed the child's interaction with the foster parents, offered credible testimony that the foster home is meeting the child's needs, that the child is very happy there, and that she appears to regard the foster parents as parental figures.   The court finds from the foregoing evidence, as well as from the evidence about the respondent mother's inconsistent visitation, the child's age, and the amount of time she has been in foster care, that a strong parent-child bond exists between Alaysia and her foster parents.

In compliance with the provisions of C.G.S. § 17a–112(K), the court has made and considered the following findings:

1. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made to the parents and child to facilitate reunification.

DCF offered timely and appropriate reunification services to the respondent mother.   As noted previously herein, these included substance abuse evaluation and treatment, individual mental health counseling, parenting training, supervised visitation, DCF case management services, and assistance with transportation.

2. Whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Adoption and Child Welfare Law of 1980, as amended.

For the reasons cited above, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF did so.

3. The terms of any applicable court-order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order.

Clear and convincing evidence proved at trial that the court issued specific steps orders for both DCF and the respondent when Alaysia was committed to the petitioner's care and custody as a neglected child on September 3, 2009.   The court found by clear and convincing evidence that DCF complied with the orders and made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the respondent mother.   The court found that the respondent mother complied with the specific steps orders that she complete parenting training, and secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income.   However, the court has also found that Angelica F. failed to comply with the court's specific steps orders that she visit the child as often as permitted by DCF, and that she cooperate with the substance abuse and individual mental health counseling provided to her by the petitioner.

4. The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, and any person who has exercised physical care, custody and control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.

The evidence established that Angelica F. had been offered supervised visits with Alaysia during the past 22 months.   These visits were provided to the respondent mother on a twice-weekly basis.   The evidence established that when the visits occurred there were positive interactions between the respondent and the child.   However, the evidence also established that the respondent mother missed, or was late for, a considerable number of the visits.   During the past year, there were two extended periods of time (each of approximately one month's duration) when the respondent mother was in Florida and did not visit the child at all.   The court infers from that evidence that Angelica F.'s inconsistent visitation has impeded the establishment of a strong relationship and emotional bond between the child and her biological mother.   Clear and convincing evidence established that a strong parent-child bond exists between the child, who is 25 months old, and the foster parents with whom she has resided since she was less than three months old.   The court finds that the child, who calls her foster parents “mommy” and “poppy,” regards her caretakers as the primary parental figures in her life.

5. The age of the child.

Alaysia is 25 months old.   She was born on March 20, 2009.

6. The efforts each parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances or conduct or conditions to make it in the best interests of the child to return such child to the parental home in the foreseeable future, including but not limited to (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child.

Angelica F. completed parenting training and secured adequate housing and legal income.   She visited with Alaysia inconsistently, and did not comply with the court's specific steps order that she visit the child as often as permitted by DCF. During recent months, she voluntarily traveled twice to Florida for extended stays with relatives who live there.   During those periods, the respondent mother did not visit the child at all, and she did not send cards or gifts to the child at Christmas, and on her birthday.   The respondent did not comply with the court's specific steps that she cooperate with recommended substance abuse and mental health treatment, and the court finds that neither of those issues has been satisfactorily resolved.   The court finds based upon clear and convincing evidence that the respondent has not adjusted her circumstances, conduct and conditions to the extent that it would be in Alaysia's best interests to return the child to the respondent's home in the foreseeable future.

7. The extent to which the parent was prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable acts of any other person, or by the economic circumstances of the parent.

The evidence presented at trial did not establish the existence of any such unreasonable acts or conduct, or any adverse economic circumstances.

Having considered all of the evidence presented at trial, and having made and considered the seven statutory findings set forth above, the court finds that the petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence that termination of both parent's parental rights is in Alaysia's bests interests.   The child, who is now slightly more than two years old, has been in foster care for most of her young life.   She requires a stable, loving and consistent home which her biological parents unfortunately have not been able to provide for her.   The evidence established that Alaysia's current foster home would offer such an environment for the child.   The biological father has consented to the termination of his parental rights, and the court finds that it would be detrimental to Alaysia's best interests to delay permanency for the child by allowing the biological mother additional time to pursue reunification efforts.   The court finds that the petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is in Alaysia's best interests so that the child can be permanently placed in an adoptive home.

FINDINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS RE OTHER PENDING MOTIONS

The respondent mother's motion to modify disposition was also heard by the undersigned during this proceeding.   The court incorporates here by reference with respect to that motion all of the findings that it made above concerning the adjudicatory grounds for termination of parental rights, and the child's best interests.   As noted, the court found that DCF proved adjudicatory grounds for termination of both respondent's parental rights by clear and convincing evidence.   The court also found by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the child's best interests that each respondent's parental rights be terminated.

The respondent mother captioned her pleading as a “motion to modify disposition to protective supervision.”   She filed her motion pursuant to the provisions of C.P.B. § 35a–16.   That section of the practice book section reads as follows:  “Motions to modify dispositions are dispositional in nature based on the prior adjudication, and the judicial authority shall determine whether a modification is in the best interests of the child or youth based upon a fair preponderance of the evidence.   Unless filed by the commissioner of the department of children and families, any modification motion to return a child to the custody of the parent without protective supervision shall be treated as a motion for revocation of commitment.”

At the outset of the proceeding, the court stated that it was treating the respondent mother's motion to modify disposition as a motion to revoke commitment under C.P.B. § 35a–14A.   Under that practice book section, the respondent would be required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the cause for commitment no longer exists.   If she satisfied that burden of proof, the party opposing the motion (in this case, DCF) would then be required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that revocation would not be in the best interests of the child.

Upon further review and consideration, the court believes that it erroneously concluded that respondent's motion should be treated as a motion to revoke commitment.   Because the respondent sought a modification of disposition that would include protective supervision, it is permitted by C.P.B. § 35a–16.   Viewing the pleading as a motion to modify disposition, the court finds that Angelica F. did not prove by the requisite standard that such a disposition was in the child's best interests.   Because the court finds the respondent mother's inconsistent visitation and failure to satisfactorily complete necessary rehabilitative steps warrant the termination of her parental rights, the court certainly cannot find based upon a preponderance of the evidence that Alaysia should be presently returned to Angelica F.'s care under protective supervision.   The court also notes that if the respondent's motion was construed as a motion to revoke commitment under C.P.B. § 35a–14A, the evidence in this case would not support a judicial finding that the cause for commitment no longer exists.   The motion is hereby DENIED.

DCF previously filed a Motion for Review of Permanency Plan in this case.   The permanency proposed for Alaysia was termination of parental rights and adoption.   The respondent mother objected to this plan.   With respect to both the motion for review and the objection, the court also incorporates here by reference all of the evidentiary adjudicatory and dispositional findings that it entered above.   The court finds that DCF identified an appropriate permanency plan for Alaysia, and made reasonable efforts to achieve said plan.   The plan is APPROVED, and the respondent mother's objection is OVERRULED.

ORDERS

Having found that an adjudicatory ground for termination of parental rights has been proven by clear and convincing evidence with respect to both the respondent Angelica F. and the respondent Miguel R., and having found as proven by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the minor child Alaysia F., it is ORDERED that the parental rights of Angelica F. and Miguel R. with respect to Alaysia F. are hereby terminated.

The court further ORDERS that the Commissioner of Children and Families is appointed as the statutory parent of Alaysia F., and is ordered to pursue the adoption of said child as expeditiously as possible.   The Court ORDERS said Commissioner to file all Motions for Review of Permanency Plan, Permanency Plans, and Quarterly Status Reports pertaining to this child on a timely basis, as required by law, until the child is adopted.   The court also orders the Commissioner, and the Probate Court that processes the child's adoption, to notify the clerk of this court when Alaysia's adoption is finalized.

SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT,

Dyer, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN2. The TPR petition against the respondent mother was not amended after June 3, 2010..  FN2. The TPR petition against the respondent mother was not amended after June 3, 2010.

FN3. Because Miguel R. consented to the termination of parental rights, the court is not required to make such findings with respect to him..  FN3. Because Miguel R. consented to the termination of parental rights, the court is not required to make such findings with respect to him.

Dyer, Richard W., J.