Christine Szynkowicz v. Vincent P. Szynkowicz (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

In this dissolution action, the parties came before the court and were heard on March 29–30, 2011, April 6, 2011, and on April 14, 2011.   In addition to seeking a judgment of dissolution, the parties presented evidence relative to a series of pending motions.   The pending motions are:  Plaintiff's Motion for Contempt dated October 8, 2010 (# 115);  Plaintiff's Motion for Contempt dated October 21, 2010 (# 116);  Plaintiff's Motion for Contempt dated December 14, 2010 (# 119);  Defendant's Motion for Contempt dated June 7, 2010 (# 112);  Defendant's Motion for Permission to Remove Personal Property dated June 7, 2010 (# 114);  Defendant's Motion for Contempt dated December 7, 2010 (# 118);  Defendant's Motion for Contempt dated March 16, 2011 (# 127);  and Defendant's Motion for Contempt dated March 16, 2011 (# 127.50).

RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS

1. Plaintiff's Motion for Contempt (# 115);  Plaintiff's Motion for Contempt, (# 116);  Plaintiff's Motion for Contempt (# 119).   The plaintiff came before the court on April 14, 2011 and stated that she would not be pursuing any of the foregoing motions.   Therefore, no action is necessary with regard to the foregoing motions.

2. Defendant's Motion for Contempt (# 112).   The defendant asserts that the plaintiff took possession of joint funds in violation of the automatic standing orders and dissipated those funds.   However, all funds at issue, with a single exception, were joint funds taken by the plaintiff prior to the date the plaintiff signed the complaint.  Practice Book § 25–5 (“The automatic orders shall be effective with regard to the plaintiff ․ upon the signing of the complaint or the application ․”).  Of the various monies identified in the defendant's motion, the only amount taken after the date the complaint was signed was an income tax refund in the amount of $4,343.   The latter amount was taken from a joint savings account on February 19, 2010, approximately eleven days after the plaintiff signed the complaint.

The court finds that the plaintiff did not dissipate any of the funds that she took on the dates prior to the date the complaint was signed.   She used those funds to maintain herself in the face of the straitened circumstances in which the defendant left her.   The court does not find that the plaintiff's conduct warrants a finding of contempt.   Further, the tax refund money was needed to ensure that the plaintiff was able to meet her basic needs.  Practice Book Section 25–5(a)(1) allows a party to use such funds “for customary and usual household expenses or for reasonable attorneys fees in connection with this action.”   The plaintiff did spend a minimal amount of money on cosmetics;  the court does not find that any other expenditure by her was even arguably frivolous.   She did expend approximately $5,000 on clothing in the past year, but she testified that she lost approximately one hundred pounds in the last year, and so the clothing expenditures could not be avoided.

For the foregoing reasons,¹ the motion is denied.

3. Defendant's Motion for Permission to Remove Personal Property (# 114).   The defendant introduced a list of twenty-six items of property, all of which he wants conveyed to him.   The plaintiff testified that she does not possess all of the items on the list, some of the items having been previously conveyed to their children.   She does not object to making available all remaining items on the list, with the exception of a television and a step ladder.   Defendant's Exhibit T at 2, 5.

The motion for permission to remove personal property is granted, in part.   All items set forth on Defendant's Exhibit T, to the extent those items are within the possession and control of the plaintiff, with the exception of items 2 and 5, may be removed by the defendant.   Counsel for the plaintiff and the defendant will arrange for the removal of the items to be carried out on a single occasion.

3. Defendant's Motion for Contempt (# 118).   The defendant asserts, and the court finds, that the plaintiff took $5,000 from a home equity credit line on June 2, 2010.   The defendant alleges that this taking was in violation of Practice Book § 25–5.   The court finds that the plaintiff did not dissipate those funds but, rather, used them to maintain herself in the face of the straitened circumstances in which the defendant left her.   The plaintiff testified that she used those funds for household expenses, including food.   She testified, and the court finds, that she used the funds “to live.”

The taking of money from the home equity credit line was permissible because it did not constitute the creation of an “unreasonable” debt.  Practice Book § 25–5(a)(2).   The motion for contempt is denied.

4. Defendant's Motion for Contempt (# 127).   The defendant asserts, and the court finds, that the plaintiff took “more money” from a home equity credit line on February 17, 2011.   Defendant's Exhibit D indicates that the amount taken was $262.05.   The plaintiff testified that this amount, too, was used for household expenses, including the cable TV/internet/telephone bill.   The court finds that the plaintiff did not dissipate those funds but, rather, used them to maintain herself in the face of the straitened circumstances in which the defendant left her.   It was permissible for her to take the funds because the taking of those funds did not constitute the creation of an “unreasonable” debt.  Practice Book § 25–5(a)(2).   The motion for contempt is denied.

5. Defendant's Motion for Contempt (# 127.50).   On March 16, 2011, the defendant moved for contempt based on his view that the plaintiff failed to comply with her discovery obligations.   The defendant came before the court on April 14, 2011, and stated that he would not be pursuing this motion.   Therefore, no action is necessary with regard to the foregoing motion.

DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE

The plaintiff, Christine Szynkowicz, whose maiden name was Christine M. Gillotti, and the defendant, Vincent P. Szynkowicz, were married on January 29, 1983.   Both parties resided in Connecticut more than twelve months preceding the filing of the complaint initiating this action for dissolution of marriage.   The court has both personal and subject matter jurisdiction in this case.   Neither party has been the recipient of any state or municipal assistance.   The plaintiff receives Social Security disability payments totaling $764 per month.   The marriage has broken down irretrievably.   Based on the evidence presented, the court finds that the defendant was primarily at fault for the breakdown of the marriage.

There are two children, issue of the relationship between the parties:  their daughter was born in 1982 and their son was born in 1983.   Both children have reached the age of majority.   There is no request for post-majority educational support.

The plaintiff has a high school diploma and has serious health issues.   She suffers from multiple sclerosis, which is the basis for her social security disability payments.   She requires injections to try to slow the progress of the disease.   She also takes a variety of medications.   Currently, she must rely upon any available object to support her when she walks or else she faces a serious risk of falling.   She can traverse stairs but, due to the disease, can only go up or down stairs if she moves sideways.   She is fifty years of age.

The plaintiff was seriously injured in an automobile accident in June 1987.   She received a settlement payment of approximately $39,400.32, most of which was used to purchase the marital home in Torrington.   She still has neck pain from the accident.

The plaintiff has an additional, serious medical condition that will be addressed following the resolution of this proceeding.   She is a candidate for surgery at that time.

The plaintiff has lived in the marital home for more than twenty years.   She is fully familiar with the layout of the house, and despite her illness she is capable of maneuvering within the home.   She has friends and neighbors who assist her.   It would be a particular hardship for her to leave the marital home.

The plaintiff worked during the early years of the marriage, although her primary responsibility was raising the children.   She worked delivering newspapers, in the early morning hours before the children were awake, from 1985 to 1987.   Thereafter, she worked briefly as a waitress.   She worked a total of about five years of the twenty-eight-year marriage;  she has had multiple sclerosis for the past fourteen years.   The plaintiff's educational background and skills, her long hiatus from the workforce, and especially her medical condition, all combine to make it unlikely that the plaintiff will be able to obtain gainful employment in the future.

There were times during the marriage when the defendant would strike the plaintiff at night while he was sleeping.   Eventually, in 2004, the plaintiff suggested that they get twin beds.   The defendant refused, so the plaintiff began sleeping on a couch in 2004.   This arrangement continued for several years.   In 2008, the plaintiff believed that the defendant, who had become increasingly uncommunicative and distant over the years, was seeing another woman.   In 2009, the defendant told the plaintiff that he had met “Linda.”   In December 2009, the defendant began drinking more often and rarely engaged in conversation with the plaintiff.   In January 2010, the defendant told the plaintiff that he wanted a divorce, saying that “we have nothing in common, you don't like sports, and you're ill.”

The plaintiff testified that, as the defendant became more distant, he made fewer and fewer contributions to the marriage.   His relationship with their children deteriorated and he offered less assistance to his wife, including not helping her up when she fell due to her multiple sclerosis.   In early 2010, when the plaintiff became convinced that the defendant had entered into a relationship with another woman, the plaintiff moved back into the master bedroom and moved her husband's belongings out of that room.   The parties have been separated since March 2010.   The defendant now lives in an apartment with Linda Kleinschmidt.

The defendant pays Kleinschmidt's living expenses at the apartment, bearing responsibility for all household bills, including rent, utility expenses, and food supplies.   He has also paid some of her personal bills.   Kleinschmidt is employed, working as a “mystery shopper” and an auditor.   The defendant has given various sums of money to Kleinschmidt that total approximately $6,000.   The defendant testified that the amounts that were given to Kleinschmidt were loans, but he did not produce any documentation that would establish the payments to be loans, nor did he list any debts owed to him by Kleinschmidt when he completed his financial disclosure statement.   The defendant and Kleinschmidt have exchanged gifts, he has purchased gifts for her children from a prior relationship, and they have vacationed together.   The defendant paid for that vacation.

The defendant has an Associate's Degree in communication.   He worked for Otis Elevator for twenty-four years, he then worked for another company for four years, and he now works for Eagle (“Eagle”) Elevator Company, Inc. His current salary varies somewhat due to the availability of overtime pay, but his year-to-date earnings statement from Eagle shows $98,202.61 in gross pay as of December 30, 2010.   The defendant is fifty-four years of age and is in generally good health, suffering to some extent from high blood pressure.

Considering all of the monetary and non-monetary contributions of the parties during the marriage, the court finds that it was the plaintiff who contributed most substantially to the family unit;  the defendant contributed most substantially to the family finances, although it was the plaintiff's settlement from her personal injury claim that permitted the parties to purchase the marital home.   The plaintiff carried primary responsibility for the maintenance and preservation of the family finances.   The defendant has, for the past year, unnecessarily and inappropriately dissipated resources.

General Statutes § 46b–81 provides in relevant part:  “(a) [a]t the time of entering a decree annulling or dissolving a marriage or for legal separation pursuant to a complaint under section 46b–45, the Superior Court may assign to either the husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other.   The court may pass title to real property to either party ․ when in the judgment of the court it is the proper mode to carry the decree into effect ․ (c) In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court, after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party ․ shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the ․ dissolution of the marriage ․ the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income.   The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.”   The court has broad discretion, pursuant to § 46b–81, to assign the property and liabilities of the parties.  Schmidt v. Schmidt, 180 Conn. 184, 191–92, 429 A.2d 470 (1980).

General Statutes § 46b–82(a) permits the court, at the time of entering the decree of divorce, to “order either of the parties to pay alimony to the other, in addition to or in lieu of an award pursuant to section 46b–81.   The order may direct that security be given therefore on such terms as the court may deem desirable ․ The court may order that a party obtain life insurance as such security unless such party proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such insurance is not available to such party, such party is unable to pay the cost of such insurance or such party is uninsurable.   In determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the court shall hear the witnesses, if any, of each party ․ shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the ․ dissolution of the marriage ․ the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to section 46b–81 ․”

The court has considered all of the evidence presented with respect to the length of the parties' marriage, the causes for the dissolution, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunities of each for the future acquisition of capital assets and income.   The court has also considered the contributions of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation and appreciation in the value of their respective estates.   In summary, the court has carefully considered all of the factors set forth in General Statutes §§ 46b–81 and 46b–82.   Having done so, the court enters the following additional orders:

The marriage of the parties is hereby dissolved.

The husband, during his lifetime, shall pay to the wife during her lifetime, the sum of $36,000.00 per year as periodic alimony, in equal monthly installments of $2,800 per month, due and payable on the first day of each month, commencing May 1, 2011.   The defendant's obligation to pay alimony terminates upon the death of either party or the remarriage of the plaintiff.   The award of alimony is modifiable in accordance with the provisions of General Statutes §§ 46b–86(a) and 46b–86(b).  Each party shall pay one dollar per year to the other as alimony for debt indemnification purposes only.

Within thirty days of the date of this order the defendant shall, by quitclaim deed, transfer to the plaintiff all of his right, title and interest in the residence known as 227 Sherwood Drive, Torrington, Connecticut.   The plaintiff shall thereafter pay any mortgages on that residence and shall hold the defendant harmless with regard to such mortgage obligations.   At the time of the transfer of the residence to the plaintiff, the defendant shall ensure that all mortgages, utilities and taxes are fully paid up to that date.

With respect to federal and state taxes for 2011, each party shall be entitled to any deductions for any amounts he/she actually paid relative to the marital residence.   For example, the mortgage payments and taxes made by the defendant through and until the transfer of title to the plaintiff will be available to the defendant as tax deductions.

The defendant shall maintain life insurance in the amount of $200,000, naming the plaintiff as his irrevocable beneficiary thereof for as long as he is obliged to pay alimony to the plaintiff.

The defendant shall pay one-half of the plaintiff's COBRA core plus non-core coverage medical insurance premiums.   See Plaintiff's Exhibit 27.

The parties will divide evenly the defendant's pension, 401(k) accounts and any and all other deferred compensation to which the defendant is entitled through his employment or union membership.   Such accounts will be divided as of the date of this order.   The parties will arrange for the preparation of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order in order to effect the division of the accounts.   The expenses associated with the preparation of such an order will be divided evenly between the parties.

The defendant will pay the plaintiff's counsel fees up to and including the amount of $8,000.   Said payment will be effected no later than December 31, 2011.

The defendant is responsible for the balance due and owing on the parties' Capital One credit card account up to and including the amount of $6,471.63.

The plaintiff will take no action to harass or intimidate the defendant or any of his acquaintances.   The plaintiff will not conduct any investigations, absent permission of the court, regarding the defendant or any of his acquaintances.   The plaintiff will not initiate any contact with the defendant's landlord, the defendant's employer, or the employer of any of the defendant's acquaintances.

Judgment of dissolution shall enter.

BY THE COURT,

Danaher, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The findings that have been made provide a sufficient basis for the denial of the defendant's motion.   However, there is further factual support for the court's ruling on this motion as well as the remaining pending motions.   The findings relative to those matters appear in the discussion entitled “Dissolution of Marriage,” infra, and are incorporated by reference as further support for all of the rulings on the pending motions..  FN1. The findings that have been made provide a sufficient basis for the denial of the defendant's motion.   However, there is further factual support for the court's ruling on this motion as well as the remaining pending motions.   The findings relative to those matters appear in the discussion entitled “Dissolution of Marriage,” infra, and are incorporated by reference as further support for all of the rulings on the pending motions.

Danaher, John A., J.