Judith K. Fusari v. Middletown Area Transit (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

I

Judith K. Fusari (Fusari) seeks to institute this matter through an application for waiver of fees pursuant to General Statutes § 52–259b.¹  Fusari alleges that she is unable to pay the filing fees or marshal fees due to her financial condition.   Inasmuch as Fusari meets the financial requirements of subsection (b) of the statute, this court has no discretion and, therefore, waives the filing fee.

II

In Fusari's purported complaint, she alleges that Middletown Area Transit “is withholding a court settlement.” ²  “Practice Book § 10–1 requires each pleading to ‘contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts' and a signature on a pleading constitutes ‘a certificate ․ that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it.’  Practice Book § 4–2(b).  This court possesses inherent authority to limit the filing of frivolous or repetitive lawsuits that ultimately are destined for withdrawal or dismissal.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   In re 34 Fee Waiver Applications by Frank Perrelli, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven (October 27, 2008, Lager, J.).

“[I]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of pro se litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the pro se party ․ Although we allow pro se litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.”  (Intemal quotation marks omitted.)   Solomon v. Connecticut Medical Examining Board, 85 Conn.App. 854, 861, 859 A.2d 934 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 906, 868 A.2d 748 (2005).

Fusari's complaint does not comply with Practice Book §§ 4–2(b) and 10–1.   Without any facts, this court is unable to determine whether the matter is related to the previous matter this court dismissed;  see Fusari v. Middletown Area Transit, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 10 5035160 (November 3, 2010, Berger, J.);   or something else.   Before the taxpayers of this state are forced to spend money on a matter previously dismissed, Fusari must comply with the Practice Book. Therefore, the court dismisses this action sua sponte pursuant to its inherent authority.   A copy of this memorandum of decision shall be forward by the clerk to Fusari and Middletown Area Transit.

Berger, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Section 52–259b provides:  “(a) In any civil or criminal matter, if the court finds that a party is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees payable to the court or to pay the cost of service of process, the court shall waive such fee or fees and the cost of service of process shall be paid by the state.“(b) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that a person is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process if (1) such person receives public assistance or (2) such person's income after taxes, mandatory wage deductions and child care expenses is one hundred twenty-five per cent or less of the federal poverty level.   For purposes of this subsection, ‘public assistance’ includes, but is not limited to, state-administered general assistance, temporary family assistance, aid to the aged, blind and disabled, supplemental nutrition assistance and Supplemental Security Income.”“(c) Nothing in this section shall preclude the court from finding that a person whose income does not meet the criteria of subsection (b) of this section is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process.   If an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee or fees or the cost of service of process is denied, the court clerk shall, upon the request of the applicant, schedule a hearing on the application.”.  FN1. Section 52–259b provides:  “(a) In any civil or criminal matter, if the court finds that a party is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees payable to the court or to pay the cost of service of process, the court shall waive such fee or fees and the cost of service of process shall be paid by the state.“(b) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that a person is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process if (1) such person receives public assistance or (2) such person's income after taxes, mandatory wage deductions and child care expenses is one hundred twenty-five per cent or less of the federal poverty level.   For purposes of this subsection, ‘public assistance’ includes, but is not limited to, state-administered general assistance, temporary family assistance, aid to the aged, blind and disabled, supplemental nutrition assistance and Supplemental Security Income.”“(c) Nothing in this section shall preclude the court from finding that a person whose income does not meet the criteria of subsection (b) of this section is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process.   If an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee or fees or the cost of service of process is denied, the court clerk shall, upon the request of the applicant, schedule a hearing on the application.”

FN2. Fusari commonly makes similar allegations and several of her complaints so far this year have been dismissed sua sponte as being patently frivolous.   See, e.g., Fusari v. Berman, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 11 5015254 (February 28, 2011, Pittman, J.) (dismissing action, along with nine others, where it was false that Fusari had won previous lawsuit and defendant was withholding “court won” settlement).   In those cases, Fusari had previously sued all of the defendants at least once.   In the present case, Fusari is perhaps referring to Fusari v. Middletown Area Transit, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 10 5035160 (November 3, 2010, Berger, J.).   In that case, this court dismissed her action sua sponte, she appealed and her appeal was dismissed on February 9, 2011..  FN2. Fusari commonly makes similar allegations and several of her complaints so far this year have been dismissed sua sponte as being patently frivolous.   See, e.g., Fusari v. Berman, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 11 5015254 (February 28, 2011, Pittman, J.) (dismissing action, along with nine others, where it was false that Fusari had won previous lawsuit and defendant was withholding “court won” settlement).   In those cases, Fusari had previously sued all of the defendants at least once.   In the present case, Fusari is perhaps referring to Fusari v. Middletown Area Transit, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 10 5035160 (November 3, 2010, Berger, J.).   In that case, this court dismissed her action sua sponte, she appealed and her appeal was dismissed on February 9, 2011.

Berger, Marshall K., J.