Bruno Suraci et al. v. City of New Haven (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 4104

The plaintiffs, Bruno Suraci and Marc Suraci, filed the present appeal from the actions of the defendants, the city of New Haven and its board of assessment appeals, on April 30, 2009.¹  The following facts have been alleged.   The plaintiff's are the owners of a parcel of real property located at 1455 State Street in New Haven, Connecticut.   On October 1, 2006, the date of the last town wide revaluation, the property was valued by the city's assessors at $536,700.   This valuation was carried forward to subsequent years.   The plaintiff claims that this valuation did not represent the property's “true and actual value on the revaluation date of October 1, 2006, and each grand list thereafter, but was grossly excessive, disproportionate and unlawful.” ²

On September 7, 2010, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.   On October 4, 2010, the plaintiffs filed an objection.   Oral argument on the motion was heard during short calendar on November 15, 2010.³

DISCUSSION

“Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ․ The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried.”  (Citations omitted.)  Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989).  “However, since litigants ordinarily have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by a jury ․ the moving party for summary judgment is held to a strict standard ․ of demonstrating his entitlement to summary judgment.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Kakadelis v. DeFabritis, 191 Conn. 276, 282, 464 A.2d 57 (1983).  “As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent ․ When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).

The defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because there is no genuine issue of material fact relating to the plaintiffs' entitlement to an interim evaluation under General Statutes § 12–64a.⁴  The plaintiffs assert that this statute is irrelevant to whether the October 1, 2006, revaluation was grossly excessive, disproportionate and unlawful.

Section 12–64a “compels an interim revaluation under the limited circumstances of damage to the property requiring either complete demolition or total reconstruction.”   Lucifora v. Bridgeport, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 00 0375486 (May 8, 2003, Aronson, J.T.R.).   The defendants have submitted evidence, in the form of an incident report from the city fire department, that a “minor” fire occurred in “small” room located in the basement of 1455 State Street on December 14, 2007.   The defendants have also submitted evidence that this structure remains standing and is currently being used for storage.   These facts are uncontested by the plaintiffs.⁵

The allegations made by the plaintiffs in the present case, however, do not include such a claim.   The plaintiffs' sole contention is that the valuation of the property reached in 2006, and therefore every grand list year thereafter, was grossly excessive, disproportionate and unlawful.   Such allegations, if proven at trial, would entitle the plaintiffs to relief without reliance upon § 12–64a.   See Konover v. West Hartford, 242 Conn. 727, 734, 699 A.2d 158 (1997) (“Section 12–117a, which allows taxpayers to appeal the decisions of municipal boards of tax review to the Superior Court, provide[s] a method by which an owner of property may directly call in question the valuation placed by assessors upon his property ․ [M]ere overvaluation is sufficient to justify redress under [§ 12–117a] ․” [Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.] ).   The defendants have submitted no evidence indicating that the plaintiff's property was properly valued on October 1, 2006.   Consequently, the defendants have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.   Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is denied.

BY THE COURT

Richard E. Burke, Judge

FOOTNOTES

FN1. This appeal was taken pursuant to General Statutes § 12–117a.   This statute provides, in relevant part:  “Any person ․ claiming to be aggrieved by the action of the board of tax review or the board of assessment appeals, as the case may be, in any town or city may, within two months from the date of the mailing of notice of such action, make application, in the nature of an appeal therefrom, with respect to the assessment list for the assessment year commencing October 1, 1989 ․ and with respect to the assessment list for assessment years thereafter, to the superior court for the judicial district in which such town or city is situated ․.  FN1. This appeal was taken pursuant to General Statutes § 12–117a.   This statute provides, in relevant part:  “Any person ․ claiming to be aggrieved by the action of the board of tax review or the board of assessment appeals, as the case may be, in any town or city may, within two months from the date of the mailing of notice of such action, make application, in the nature of an appeal therefrom, with respect to the assessment list for the assessment year commencing October 1, 1989 ․ and with respect to the assessment list for assessment years thereafter, to the superior court for the judicial district in which such town or city is situated ․

FN2. It should be noted that this court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over the present appeal despite the plaintiff's failure to allege some of these facts at the administrative level.  Konover v. West Hartford, 242 Conn. 727, 741, 699 A.2d 158 (1997) (“[T]he scope of a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction [in an appeal] must encompass the power to consider any facts that are relevant to determining whether a taxpayer actually has been overassessed.”);  Union Carbide Corp. v. Danbury, 257 Conn. 865, 870, 778 A.2d 204 (2001) (“[T]he trial court tries the matter de novo and the ultimate question is the ascertainment of the true and actual value of the [taxpayer's] property.”)..  FN2. It should be noted that this court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over the present appeal despite the plaintiff's failure to allege some of these facts at the administrative level.  Konover v. West Hartford, 242 Conn. 727, 741, 699 A.2d 158 (1997) (“[T]he scope of a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction [in an appeal] must encompass the power to consider any facts that are relevant to determining whether a taxpayer actually has been overassessed.”);  Union Carbide Corp. v. Danbury, 257 Conn. 865, 870, 778 A.2d 204 (2001) (“[T]he trial court tries the matter de novo and the ultimate question is the ascertainment of the true and actual value of the [taxpayer's] property.”).

FN3. Subsequent to oral argument supplemental briefs were filed by both parties pursuant to a request of this court..  FN3. Subsequent to oral argument supplemental briefs were filed by both parties pursuant to a request of this court.

FN4. Section 12–64a (a) provides:  “Whenever a building is so damaged as to require total reconstruction before it may be used for any purpose related to its use prior to such damage and following which, the owner provides for complete demolition of such building with the material from demolition being removed from the parcel of real property on which the building was situated or used as fill on such parcel for purposes of grading, such parcel shall be assessed for purposes of property tax as of the date such demolition, removal and grading are completed, to the satisfaction of the building inspector in the municipality, and such assessment shall reflect a determination of the assessed value of such parcel, exclusive of the value of the building so damaged, demolished and removed.”.  FN4. Section 12–64a (a) provides:  “Whenever a building is so damaged as to require total reconstruction before it may be used for any purpose related to its use prior to such damage and following which, the owner provides for complete demolition of such building with the material from demolition being removed from the parcel of real property on which the building was situated or used as fill on such parcel for purposes of grading, such parcel shall be assessed for purposes of property tax as of the date such demolition, removal and grading are completed, to the satisfaction of the building inspector in the municipality, and such assessment shall reflect a determination of the assessed value of such parcel, exclusive of the value of the building so damaged, demolished and removed.”

FN5. Had the present case sought an interim evaluation in order to account for the damage done to the property by the fire, the defendants might well have been entitled to summary judgment..  FN5. Had the present case sought an interim evaluation in order to account for the damage done to the property by the fire, the defendants might well have been entitled to summary judgment.

Burke, Richard E., J.