IN RE: Jasmin L.1 (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

On February 9, 2010, the petitioner, the commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, (“DCF”), filed a petition pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a–112, et seq. to terminate the parental rights of Sandra L., and an unknown father, as to the minor child Jasmin L. d.o.b. 11/5/03.   The mother has appeared and is represented by counsel.   The father, of the child is unknown since Sandra was prostituting herself at the time of conception.   She named possible candidates.   The one who was able to be found was genetically excluded from paternity.   A publication “To the father of the female child born to Sandra L. on 11/5/03 in New London Ct. of parts unknown” was confirmed by the court on March 18, 2010.   The mother of the child does not claim Indian Tribal affiliation.   The court is aware of no other proceedings pending in any other court regarding the custody of this child.   This court has jurisdiction.

DCF has notified possible parental claimants of the pendency of these proceedings.   No one claiming paternity has ever appeared.   The court views this as an indication of the level of concern they have for this child.   The foster parents were in court to express their level of interest in Jasmin's welfare.   The foster mother testified regarding the joy that she and her husband have experienced in parenting Jasmin.   They are committed to adoption of the child if that becomes possible.

The court received Exhibits A–O as full exhibits of the petitioner and Exhibits 1–17 from the respondent.   The court heard from ten witnesses including two psychologists, two social workers, service providers, the mother's individual therapist and the respondent Sandra L. After considering the testimony and examining the documents in evidence, the court makes the following findings by clear and convincing evidence.

1. The Unknown Father of Jasmin

The evidence from all testimony and documents indicates that the male biological parent has never developed a relationship with the child.

In the case of Michael H. v. Mark K., 898 P.2d 891, 896 (Cal.1995), the California Supreme Court held that unless the natural father can prove “that he has promptly come forward and demonstrated his full commitment to his parental responsibilities ․ the federal Constitution protects only the parental relationship that the unwed father has actively developed,” citing Lehr v. Robertson 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983).   The respondent in the present case did not robustly assert his rights to a paternal relationship.   It is likely that the male biological parent does not know of his paternity.

In Lehr the court succinctly stated;

․ the existence or nonexistence of a substantial relationship between (the unmarried) parent and child is a relevant criterion in evaluating both the rights of the parent and the best interests of the child.

Id., at 266–67.

The unknown father has not provided food and shelter for the child, he has not provided the daily emotional support and guidance the child needs, nor has he provided the child with the interest, concern or responsibility necessary for the child's welfare.   The court finds that the unknown father has abandoned his child in the sense that the father failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of the child.

Since the respondent father has never been involved with his daughter, never participated in these proceedings, and has never been located, it would serve no useful purpose to address DCF efforts to reunify the child and the father as that was not possible.   Neither would it serve any purpose to itemize the statutory considerations normally required by Section 17a–112(k).  There was no way services could have been offered, provided or measured.   There was no relationship to assess, improve or repair.   His parental role ended at conception.

2. The Respondent mother, Sandra L.

The court had the opportunity to see Sandra during her two days in court and to hear her testimony.   She is a self-described “American woman of European descent.”   Her arms revealed multiple forms of body art.   During her testimony she appeared confident and firm in her belief that she has done everything that DCF has requested and while she professes to accept responsibility for the loss of her children, she frequently blamed others.   Dr. Tobin in his psychological evaluation of February 10, 2010, confirmed this.

Sandra was very externalizing about her situation, blaming “society, DCF” and various people in her life for not giving her a chance.   There were no signs of hallucinations or delusions, though she takes so little responsibility for her actions that it verges on being delusional.

(Exhibit H)

On May 30, 2004, six years earlier, another psychologist observed about Sandra:

She demonstrated a very strong tendency to put the best possible gloss on all social situations.   It is very characteristic of her personal style that she exudes optimism.   This appears to be in very large part a way of distracting people from criticizing her or holding her accountable for her own behavior.   She is very skilled at reading people for their preferred responses and then reflecting these responses back to them.   She is quite willing to change her tune according to her audience.

(Psychological of Dr. Connolly, Exhibit N.)

The findings of these psychologists are consistent with the court's observations.   Additionally, the court finds that Sandra is deceitful and dishonest, as will be seen in reference to her conduct and exhibits to the court, and continues to deflect blame for her circumstances.

A. Her history:

Sandra is currently forty-three years of age.   She has had two children Kristal, born in 1990 and Jasmin born 13 years later in 2003.   Sandra has never been married.   She dropped out of formal education in the ninth grade.   Her parents divorced when she was aged eleven.   She reports she had a “great childhood.”

It is difficult to construct the history of Sandra from the social studies.   Kristal, the older child, was born to Sandra when Sandra was 23 years old.   The father of Kristal is known.   Within five years, DCF was involved with Sandra for substance abuse and criminal history.   Kristal was removed from Sandra's care and the child's father took her.   In 1996, Sandra was arrested for sale of controlled substances.   She was convicted of possession of narcotics and given a three-year suspended sentence.   She violated probation and was sent to jail for a year on July 30, 1998.²  She reported to a rehab facility that she has had five periods of incarceration.  (Respondent's Exhibit 14.)

At some point of time, Kristal returned to live with Sandra.   In 2002, when Kristal was 12, Sandra lost custody again.   She had left Kristal alone for several days and a fire broke out in the trailer where Kristal was living alone.   The presenting issues at the time were heroin and cocaine use by Sandra, inadequate supervision and truancy since Kristal was not going to school.   The reports of Dr. Connolly indicate greater issues of sexual abuse of Kristal, chronic absenteeism from school and other serious issues of neglect, infra.

On July 30, 2003, Sandra was convicted of Risk of Injury to a minor child and sentenced to four years execution suspended with three years of probation.   She was also convicted of Failure to Appear in the first degree to which she received an identical four-year suspended sentence.

Jasmin was born on November 5, 2003.   Since Sandra had been actively engaged in drugs and prostitution when Jasmin was conceived, Jasmin's father is unknown.   The social study is unclear on this, but it appears that Jasmin was cared for by her mother under orders of protective supervision until June 2005.   Kristal was not living at home as she was still committed to DCF.

On December 30, 2005, Jasmin was removed from Sandra's care upon her incarceration.   Jasmin was in foster care for nearly a year.   She was returned to Sandra in November 2006.   Sandra and the child remained under protective supervision until March 2007.

In November 2008, DCF again became involved with Sandra for issues of homelessness, domestic violence and inadequate supervision.   While DCF had an open case, Sandra got involved in a domestic violence episode with her daughter Kristal.

On December 29, 2008, Jasmin was removed from Sandra's care upon Sandra's newest incarceration.   Jasmin had just turned four.   The circumstances of removal are these:  Sandra states she was living with her boyfriend (or a male friend), who was then older than 40 years old, when Sandra caught her daughter Kristal, who was then 19, embracing and kissing this man.   Sandra told the psychologist they were making out.   Sandra admits she became quite upset to the point that the man told Sandra to leave his house.   Sandra had assumed that she would begin to have a relationship with this man.   Sandra told a drug rehab program that she relapsed after she “caught her daughter w/boyfriend.”   (Respondent's Exhibit 14.)   The police were summoned and asked Sandra to leave as well.   She collected her personal things together with Jasmin, and her Great Dane dog and left her boyfriend's residence at 11:00 PM. Her daughter Kristal agreed to drive them all to a hotel.

On the way to the hotel, Sandra's boyfriend called Kristal on the cell phone and told her that she could now move in with him.   Sandra told a psychologist that she became outraged, whatever else she was saying or doing, she grabbed Kristal's hair.   Kristal somehow called the police.   Sandra got out of the car, took Jasmin and ran into the woods to avoid capture.   The police found them, arrested Sandra, took her into custody.   DCF sought and obtained an order of temporary custody.   Even in court during her recent testimony, Sandra insists it was all a misunderstanding, again deflecting responsibility.   Notwithstanding any misunderstandings, Sandra was subsequently convicted upon her own plea of guilty to assault in the 3rd degree and received a one-year suspended sentence.

Jasmin was placed at the Waterford Country School Safe home from December 29, 2008, until February 27, 2009.   Jasmin was then moved to a foster home and remained there until November 24, 2009 when she was placed in her present legal risk foster home.

Following Sandra's arrest on December 29, 2008, Sandra admits to returning to drugs and prostitution in early 2009, even after signing the Specific Steps for reunification at court.   She testified “I was re-establishing my life, no family, no friends, alone, no car, no place to stay, no clothes.”   She was forty years old and had lost custody of her children four times, twice with Kristal and twice with Jasmin.   She was vocationally and educationally handicapped with a multiple history of felony convictions.   On April 9, 2009, she again pled guilty to prostitution and received a one-year suspended sentence with probation for two years.   Her probation will end in a few weeks.

B. Her Psychological Evaluations

Sandra has had two comprehensive psychological evaluations.   The first was conducted in April and May 2004.   Kristal had just turned fourteen.  (Exhibit N.) The evaluation was conducted by Waterford psychologist James Connolly.   Excerpts from his ten-page report provide interesting history and insight into Sandra and her parenting.

Sandra L. is a 36–year–old American woman of European descent.   During my interview with her, Kristal (sic) spoke in a rapid and animated fashion, and a great deal of her discourse was a clear effort to justify her deviant past behavior.   She had blond hair and was a somewhat heavy woman who wore a very prominent cross on a chain around her neck.   Sandra gave the initial impression of being a forthright individual, because she volunteered large amounts of information about herself, some of which was of a rather embarrassing nature.   Upon reflection, however, it became somewhat questionable whether Sandra was indeed a forthcoming individual, because much information she conveyed appeared to be an effort to minimize her involvement in deviant behavior.   There is some reason to question many of the time frames that she has supplied for her drug involvement and other illegal activities.   In several instances, Sandra appeared to be attempting to set up time limits on her deviant behaviors in order to impress the observer with the fact that it had only been a temporary part of her life and was most definitely terminated as of the time of the interview.   Sandra's principal aim in undergoing the psychological evaluation was clearly to demonstrate that her recent conversion to Christian religious beliefs has brought about a complete transformation of her existence and provided a permanent solution to her problems with drug dependence, prostitution, and child neglect.   There appears little question that Sandra believes that she has undergone a complete transformation, but the question for the other person involved in this child protection case is whether Sandra's belief in her complete personal transformation is a well-founded on which should permit the reunification of her severely neglected 14–year–old daughter with her and her infant in living conditions which are much less than stable ․

Her score on histrionic personality pattern was two standard deviations above any of her other scales scores.   It is quite unusual to find such a strong “spike” configuration on this instrument.   These psychometric results are in accord with my clinical impressions.   Sandra L. may be considered to suffer from an almost prototypical histrionic personality disorder.   She exhibits all of the diagnostic criteria for this condition.   DSM–IV defines histrionic personality disorder as “a pervasive pattern of excessive emotionality and attention-seeking beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts.”   The diagnostic criteria for this condition are the following:  being uncomfortable in situations in which she is not the center of attention, interaction with others is often characterized by inappropriate sexually seductive or provocative behavior, displaying rapidly shifting and shallow expression of emotions, using physical appearance to draw attention to herself, a style of speech that is excessively impressionistic and lacking in detail, shows self dramatization, theatricality, and exaggerated expression of emotion, is highly suggestible, that is easily influenced by others or by circumstances, and considers relationships to be more intimate than they actually are.   Sandra's fulfillment of these criteria is quite obvious in the extent to which Sandra manifests a generally shallow set of emotions which are, however, presented in a highly dramatic fashion.   Her tendency to sexualize situation is obvious from both her history of prostitution and her current arrangement with her landlord.   As I noted above, both Sandra's speech and thinking tend to substitute vague ideas and impressions for details and planning.   Her suggestibility is clear from her belief that she has in the last year totally changed her entire life simply on the basis of her adoption of new religious beliefs.   Her tendency to consider relationships to be more intimate than they are in actuality is obvious from the fact that she proposes to bring her adolescent daughter Kristal in the highly unusual situation that she has with her current landlord ․

Kristal has been severely neglected by her drug dependent mother.   Kristal said that when she was 11 years of age, she was raped by a 21–year–old man who was an associate of someone in whose care her mother had left her.   She acknowledged that she got involved with drinking and cannabis at the age of 12 or 13, and that, once again, it was associates of her mother who got her involved in these practices.   Kristal acknowledged that she missed more than half of her sixth-grade year in school, because her mother's absences from home meant that it was not necessary for her to get up and go to school.   Kristal's sexual attitudes are noteworthy, because despite her history of having been the victim of older males, she currently has an active sexual interest in both males and females of roughly her own age.   She has a very definite sense that she should be allowed to conduct sexual relationship on her own terms.   Her attitudes are sufficiently negative toward social authority in general and toward schooling in particular that it can be safely predicted that school attendance will be an ongoing issue of great significance for the next couple of years in Kristal's life ․

First, Sandra L suffers from a chronic substance dependence to heroin and cocaine and a severe histrionic personality disorder.   She is a warm and demonstrative person, but her planning is extremely ambitious and stretches her limited resource base to the uttermost.   She appears to be a very optimistic person, but many of her relationships and sentiments are shallow and poorly considered.   She has a history of selling narcotics and of prostitution.   She is impulsive in her actions and excessively dramatic in her interpersonal conduct.   Although her heroin and cocaine addiction have been in remission for one year, she has a history of substance dependence of at least ten years, and by any reasonable and objective standards, her relapse potential must be considered to be high.   Her reliance on her religious beliefs and her involvement with her children as the only components of her “recovery program” makes her rehabilitation from active substance dependence yet more problematic, because she does not avail herself of regular counseling or the assistance of groups of recovering substance abusers.   She is involved in a frankly peculiar relationship with a retired Navy commander.   She lives in his house, cleans the house, and has a sexual relationship with him.   Sandra and her six-month-old infant daughter, Jasmine, live in this obviously unstable residential arrangement, and Sandra is now proposing to bring her 14–year–old daughter Kristal into it as well.   For Sandra, wishful thinking and ad hoc arrangements take the place of reasoned judgment and serious planning.   Her recovery efforts should be encouraged, but the child protection authorities and other persons with responsibility for supervising this severely disordered person need to understand that Sandra's fantasies and vague ambitions are not substitutes for therapy, rehabilitation, and sound planning.

As indicated earlier, five years after this report was written, Sandra's life was even worse than it was when Dr. Connolly had made his analysis and recommendations.   Sandra was again abusing heroin and engaging in prostitution.   She had no transportation, no employment, no residence, and had lost custody of her younger daughter.   Some reports indicate that, not surprisingly, Kristal has also engaged in prostitution.   Sandra is upset with DCF that she could not take custody of Kristal's two children that have been removed from her.   Kristal is now twenty years of age, soon to be twenty-one.   Her conduct seems to be mirroring her mother.   Interestingly, Sandra has reported to Dr. Tobin that she has “lost her faith in God.”

Dr. David Tobin of East Lyme conducted a psychological evaluation of Sandra and Jasmin on January 27, 2010.   Dr. Tobin and Dr. Connolly both testified in court on this case.   Dr. Tobin does not vary greatly in his analysis and his conclusions regarding Sandra and her prospects of rehabilitation.

Exhibit H–Referral questions

The validity scales suggest that Sandra may have minimized some of her problems and concerns, and probably has little insight into herself.   The following comments were guided by the PAR MMPI–2 Adult Interpretive System.   Sandra can be characterized as angry, belligerent, rebellious, resentful of rules and regulations, and hostile towards authority figures.   She is likely to be impulsive, unreliable, egocentric, and irresponsible.   She has little regard for social standards.   She often shows poor judgment and has difficulty planning ahead or benefitting from previous experiences.   She can make a good first impression, but her long-term relationships tend to be superficial and unsatisfying.

She is prone to seeking attention and acting in a seductive and self-dramatizing way.   She is inclined to act impetuously with insufficient deliberation and poor judgment.   She tends to exhibit short lived enthusiasm for new ventures and relationships, which is typically followed by disillusionment and resentment.

The MCMI suggests that Sandra is unlikely to take responsibility for her personal and family difficulties.   For example, one of the last things I said to Sandra was that it seemed like she tended to blame others for her problems, and that she would benefit from taking more responsibility for herself.   However, she was unable to hear this in a productive way and responded with more externalizing accusations about being misunderstood.   Therapists who confront this defensive pattern are likely to be jettisoned in favor of a counselor who is less confrontive.   Sandra is impetuous and imprudent, driven by a need for excitement and the inability to delay gratification;  such character sets the stage for Sandra's periodic sojourn into drug use.   The MCMI suggests that Sandra has a poor prognosis for staying out of trouble.   Like Dr. Connolly's report, the test identifies the likelihood of current or historical drug use and a histrionic personality disorder, this time with antisocial and narcissistic features.

Sandra shows marked tendencies to overvalue her personal worth and to be preoccupied with her own needs at the expense of concern about the needs of others.   Other narcissistic characteristics are likely to be present, such as a sense of entitlement and a tendency to externalize blame and responsibility.   These features are clearly conveyed in Sandra's attitude towards the difficulties in her life.

She also gives evidence of mild to moderate impairment in her ability to think logically and coherently, and is less capable than most people of coming to reasonable conclusions about relationships between events.

The findings from the MMPI, the MCMI, and the Rorschach, consistently portray Sandra as impulsive, unreliable, emotionally labile, uninsightful, contemptive of social standards, and unable to learn from past mistakes.   Her relationships are shallow and fleeting, and she is prone to blame others for her difficulties.

C. Her Individual Counseling:

Another matter which belies Sandra's honesty and progress toward rehabilitation relates to her individual counseling.   Both psychologists identify her need for a strong therapist, willing to confront Sandra, willing to make her accept personal responsibility for her conduct and willing to provide weekly sessions for more than a year.   Sandra has managed to obtain a therapist who meets none of those challenges.

Sandra has been seeing a counselor since November 24, 2009.   The therapist, Mr. S., testified.   He has a bachelors degree in “English Lit” and a masters degree in social work.   He appeared thoroughly satisfied with his client and with her progress in his counseling.   He thought that by August 11, 2010, she had made so much progress that her treatment could be reduced to visits on an as needed basis.

Mr. S. said Sandra's main presenting problem was not having her daughter with her.   She was, according to Mr. S., doing everything that DCF asked of her and more.   His diagnosis of Sandra was opioid ³ dependence in sustained, full remission and dysthymia, which he described as a mild to moderate depression from environmental causes.   He was quick to point out, when asked by the court if he meant cocaine and heroin dependance, he said “no that opioids are pain relievers like darvon, and codeine.”   That was only one example of his lack of knowledge about Sandra and Sandra's likely misrepresentation to her therapist.   She had told the SCADD people she used heroin at the rate of five bags per day and the last use was February 2009.  (Respondent's Exhibit 14.)

He was unable to recall why her children had been removed from her care.   He thought a positive feature of Sandra's past was her ability to raise another daughter, i.e. Kristal.   He obviously had no knowledge of Sandra's horrific parental history with Kristal.

He concluded that a source of Sandra's dysthymic disorder was the stress she got from a particular DCF worker.   So when Sandra and her attorney successfully had the DCF worker removed from the case, according to Mr. S., Sandra's dysthymia was improved.

He was of the opinion that Sandra had not been mandated by DCF to have intensive individual therapy and that she was doing more than she was asked.   Although he conceded that he was neither a psychiatrist nor a psychologist, and that he had read Dr. Tobin's report, he strongly disagreed with the diagnosis of histrionic personality disorder with narcissistic and antisocial features.   He was of the opinion she was mildly depressed.

The court concludes that Mr. S. is exactly the type of therapist that Dr. Tobin did not want for Sandra.   In his recommendations following the full psychological evaluations Dr. Tobin recommended “1) Sandra needs to increase her therapy visits to every week, for at least one year.   The therapist needs to be prepared to confront Sandra on her dependency on others and her externalizing attitude towards her problems, ․” The therapist she consulted, Mr. S., did not confront her, he accepted her claims at face value, he accepted the notion that her problems were externally caused by the DCF worker (externalizing blame), and he felt her psychological problems were only mild to moderate depression and a history of misuse of pain medication.   His understanding of Sandra's sociopsychological history was shallow and likely induced by Sandra's dishonesty.   His conclusions were not helpful to resolving Sandra's pervasive psychological needs.   Sandra did not significantly benefit from this counseling.

It is significant to note that mere compliance with the Specific Steps set forth by the court is not the test for successful rehabilitation.   The whole notion of referral to services is predicated upon the aspiration that the client will benefit from the services and thus be in a better position to parent.   Here that did not occur.

D. Her Tax Return:

A matter of significant concern to DCF and the office of Adult Probation for much of the past two years has been the issue of Sandra's sources of income, given her acknowledged history of using prostitution as a form of financial reward.   Sandra has at all times been very much less than forthcoming about her present source of income except to say that she is a house cleaner and works part-time for her landlord cleaning his apartments.   As Dr. Connolly noted that Sandra has a history of house cleaning and sexual favor in exchange for lodging.

She has never provided any documentation whatsoever to support these claims nor has she disclosed any names of persons for whom she works.   Until this past month.   In January or February, 2011, she produced her “tax return” as evidence of her claims.  (Respondent's Exhibit 16.)   The return is dated January 14, 2011.   She subsequently showed it to DCF as proof of income.

The exhibit, which purports to be Sandra's tax return for 2010, is indeed a curious document.   It cannot be expected that a DCF social worker would have sufficient knowledge of tax returns to challenge the document.   But there are a number of reasons to do so.

1) The exhibit consists of three pages, the last page an apparent authorization to the tax preparation service to use the IRS e-file electronic signature, has no real significance to DCF. Essentially the return consists of two pages, both are stamped five times across each page with the words “REFERENCE COPY—DO NOT FILE.” So, while this may be a copy of her actual return, it does not purport to be an actual copy of the document submitted to the Internal Revenue Service, if indeed any return was submitted.

2) Page one appears to be carefully photo copied to eliminate the column on the right side of the page where all dollar amounts of gross earnings, adjustments to gross earnings and sources of income are claimed.   This page reveals nothing regarding income.   It has been carefully copied to avoid displaying critical information.

3) Page one of the return also appears to be altered by redacting the name of the person that Sandra has claimed as a dependant.   The court notes that Jasmin has not been in her custody for the preceding two years.   It is clear from the second page of her return that she did in fact claim a child as a dependent.

4) The tax return is incomplete.   The form as submitted requires a form SE to be attached for self-employed persons, which would reveal gross income and all adjustments to the gross.   To claim the Child Tax Credit, a form 8812 is to be attached.   Both forms, if submitted, would assist in establishing the validity of the return.   Neither form was attached.

5) The return was prepared for Sandra by a New London tax preparation service.   There is nothing to support the claim of $10,083 as adjusted gross income.   What is further of concern is the possibility of fraud upon the IRS as well as the court.   Sandra claims no amount withheld from her earnings nor are there any schedules attached showing that she made any quarterly payments to the IRS. The return shows no payments made by Sandra to the IRS but nonetheless, based upon an Earned Income Credit and an additional credit of $1,000 for the unidentified dependant, Sandra, according to the tax return was entitled to a refund of $2,917.

The court concludes that the document is not a valid copy of her return, if indeed she filed a tax return at all.   Neither is it proof of her earnings or her source of earnings.   Thus in the two years that both DCF and her adult probation officer have sought a verification of her income, she has failed to provide any credible documentation.   This is especially unsettling in light of her secrecy surrounding the men whom she professes to work for and given her history of sexual exchanges for value.

E. Possible Sexual Abuse of the Child

While in foster care, Jasmin began to demonstrate sexualized behaviors.   Jasmin was reported to have poor boundaries around sexual issues.   She was reported to cling to other people's body and asking to see them naked.   She was seen “humping” her stuffed animals and was often seen with her hands inside of her panties.   In the Safe Home she was observed to be masturbating.   On account of these developments DCF had an assessment made by the Child and Family Agency of Southeastern Connecticut.  (Exhibit K.)

During the evaluation, Jasmin disclosed information that had been previously been disclosed to the social worker and to foster parents.   The disclosure include an older male friend of her mother, Howard, had “put his yucky tongue” in her mouth.   Jasmin reports having seen Kristal engaged in sex with a man.   Five-year-old Jasmin was able to draw a picture of a girl laying down (drawing her private hole) and a boy at an angle above her (with his private that hangs down).  (Exhibit K p.7.)

Jasmin took a series of tests that measure developmentally common behaviors for children and those that are more likely to indicate sexual abuse.   The evaluation raised the possibility of other sexual exposure and sexual experiences for Jasmin given the lifestyle of her mother.   Based upon the interview and testing the clinician reported:

“Jasmin ․ seems to be cognitively and emotionally dysregulated, evidenced by her restlessness, impulsivity, sexual reactivity, poor boundaries and inappropriate behaviors.   It is clear she has been exposed to multiple developmental traumas, including exposure to sexual events (events that included Jasmin and events that she witnessed), feelings of being in immediate danger, and witnessing family violence.   It seems that she could benefit from continuing individual treatment to address these developmental traumas as well as increase her ability to regulate herself emotionally and cognitively.”

During Sandra's testimony in court she was asked about Jasmin's disclosures.   With respect to Jasmin humping her stuffed animals, Sandra thought that was normal behavior as she reported she had done that as a child herself and said Kristal had done this as well, but, she claimed, they grew out of it.

With respect to Jasmin seeing Kristal engage in sex, Sandra said “[T]hat's news to me.   She was dating Mike. She was 18.   She was babysitting Jasmin.   He was her boyfriend.”   A seemingly satisfactory response to Sandra.

With respect to Howard sticking his yucky tongue in Jasmin's mouth, she said “[H]e doesn't think like we think.   He never goes after anything sexual.”   (Crying) “I know I was always present when she was there.”  “I didn't believe Howard could do that.”   So the mother does not believe her daughter.

3. Failure to Rehabilitate:

The ground alleged against the mother is failure to rehabilitate, C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i).   This ground alleges in the petition that on March 17, 2009, the child was found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and the parents have failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and the needs of the child, either of them could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.   The factual determination for this court is whether the mother has achieved rehabilitation as contemplated under C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B), that is, rehabilitation sufficient to render her able to care for Jasmin.

Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a–112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent ․ [The statute] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time ․ [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [she] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [she] can assume a responsible position in her child's life.

In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674 (1999) at 706.

It is a matter of record that the child was previously adjudicated neglected and uncared for on March 17, 2009.   The court is satisfied that Sandra has not achieved, nor is she likely to achieve, a level of rehabilitation which would encourage the belief that at some reasonably foreseeable time she could effectively parent this child.   While the court is aware of her nominal compliance with the Specific Steps, the test as indicated above is rehabilitative status.   She has deceived her individual counselor and is not obtaining any significant benefit from the counseling.   She has not satisfied the court, the probation office nor DCF that she has a legitimate form of income.   She told the drug rehabilitation program on June 1, 2009, that she had worked for James Laundromat as a cleaner for 11 years.  (Respondent's Exhibit 14.)   As noted by the psychologist, Sandra says whatever she thinks will please the listener.   She is not burdened by factual accuracy.

The DCF worker and the probation officer visited Sandra's apartment.   Both were struck by the confusion and clutter of the apartment.   She was twenty minutes late for her attendance at court.   These things are strongly supportive of a lack of personal organization.   The caretaker for Jasmin must be personally well-organized and prompt to appointments with service providers and therapists.

While she has completed the SCADD drug program, she had completed two prior inpatient programs and one outpatient treatment program in the past and has relapsed after each program.   Her psychological profile indicates her prognosis is guarded.

Her history of parenting is monumentally dysfunctional.   Her psychological profile does not demonstrate the profile of a person who could raise a child with above average neediness.   Her reactions to Jasmin's sexual experiences are shockingly inadequate.

A child needs affection, consistent firmness, reliable daily structure, appropriate discipline, a caretaker that understands the child's needs, provides adequate shelter, nurturance, and support.   Sandra remains poorly organized and unreliable and does not appreciate the needs of the child.   Her own neediness is so great for approval that she could not begin to adequately and firmly discipline Jasmin.

The petitioner has met her burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.

4. DISPOSITION

As to the dispositional phase of this hearing on the petition for termination of parental rights, the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events up to and including the date upon which the evidence in this matter was completed.   During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child.  In re Eden F., supra at 689.

The court makes the following seven written findings as to Sandra only.   As indicated it would serve no useful purpose to address the unknown father:

(1) As to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the mother and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with respondent, the court finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts over many years for the mother.   The court finds that the mother is unable to benefit from the offered services.

(2) As to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, the court finds that DCF offered appropriate and available services.   The mother was reunified with her child and then ended up living with an unrelated male who threw her and the child out of the house.   Sandra ended up assaulting her oldest daughter and subsequently retreating to her use of heroin and to prostitution.   DCF has attempted to install services for reunification but DCF cannot compel a person to benefit from the services.

(3) As to the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, the court finds that specific steps were entered in this case to assist the mother to obtain a reunification with Jasmin.   Sandra did not benefit from services.

(4) As to the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties, the court finds that the child does have an emotional bond with the biological parent.   That bond however is not a substitute for parental competence.   The child has adjusted very well in the foster home and the foster parents are providing the day-to-day physical, emotional, moral and educational support the child needs.   The foster parents are committed to the care of Jasmin and would like to adopt her.

(5) As to the age of the child, Jasmin is seven years old.   She was born on November 5, 2003.   The child's attorney recommends permanency which can only be achieved in this case through termination of the parent's rights.⁴

(6) As to the efforts the parents have made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the children to return such children home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child, the court has previously addressed this issue.   Giving the mother additional time would not likely enable her to adjust her circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to be reunited within a time-frame suitable for Jasmin.  In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 167, 554 A.2d 722 (1989);  In re Juvenile Appeal, 183 Conn. 11, 15, 438 A.2d 801 (1981).

(7) As to the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the children by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent, the court finds no unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parents or third parties.

With respect to the best interests of the child contemplated by C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Sandra L. and John Doe the unknown father to the child, is in the best interest of Jasmin.   Permanency, consistency and stability are crucial for children.   Jasmin is seven years old and deserves to know her permanent home.   The child is now in a foster home where she is very well cared for by foster parents who are fully committed to her.

In finding that termination of the respondents' parental rights would be in the child's best interest, the court has examined multiple relevant factors including the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of her environment;  the length of stay in foster care;  the nature of the relationship with foster parents and biological parent;  the degree of contact maintained with their biological parents;  and their genetic bond to respondent.  In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000);  In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000).

ORDER

It is accordingly, ORDERED that the parental rights of Sandra and John Doe, a/k/a, the defaulted Anthony G. (Driscoll, J. 3/8/11), are hereby terminated as to the minor child, Jasmin.   The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for this child.

With regard to the permanency plan for the child, the court hereby approves the plan of termination of parental rights and adoption and finds that such plan is in the best interest of the child.   The court also finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to effectuate the permanency plan.   A case report shall be submitted within thirty days of this judgment, and such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law.

The Clerk of the Probate Court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of the child shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Waterford, 978 Hartford Turnpike, Waterford, CT 06385 of the date when said adoption is finalized.

Judgment may enter accordingly.

Foley, Sr. J.

FOOTNOTES

FN2. Sandra often did time in jail on the various charges.   This pretrial jail time is not reflected in her criminal conviction history.   Therefore it is not reported here..  FN2. Sandra often did time in jail on the various charges.   This pretrial jail time is not reflected in her criminal conviction history.   Therefore it is not reported here.

FN3. Opioids are pain relief prescriptive drugs.   Sandra had a history of opiate addiction to physically and psychologically addictive drugs that are constituents or derivatives of opium such as heroin..  FN3. Opioids are pain relief prescriptive drugs.   Sandra had a history of opiate addiction to physically and psychologically addictive drugs that are constituents or derivatives of opium such as heroin.

FN4. Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).   The Appellate Court has also noted, “[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence ․” In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1994)..  FN4. Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).   The Appellate Court has also noted, “[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence ․” In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1994).

Foley, Francis J., S.J.