Aretha Crandall v. State of Connecticut Department of Children and Families (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, # 117

The defendant, State of Connecticut, Department of Children and Families (“DCF”), moves for summary judgment with regard to the plaintiff's claim of discrimination made pursuant to General Statutes § 46a–60(a)(1) in her complaint dated December 10, 2007.   The defendant contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence that would support her claims that she was discriminated against based on her race or color.

I

FACTS

The plaintiff, Aretha Crandall (Crandall) has been an employee of the State of Connecticut, Department of Children and Families (DCF) since May 5, 2000, as a children services worker, at Riverview Hospital.¹  Crandall, an African American female, was initially hired to work part-time, but her position became permanent on September 7, 2001.   She was terminated from her employment as a direct result of an incident which occurred on January 31, 2007.   Crandall had been assigned to supervise a medically fragile child at the Riverview facility, and was seated in a hallway directly in front of the child.   She was rocking in a rocking chair, with a baseball cap over her eyes.   Her supervisor, Dr. Lisa Hayden, approached her and called her name because she appeared to be sleeping, and asked her if she needed a cup of coffee.   Crandall got up from her post and took a short break while Hayden supervised the child.   As a result of this incident, Hayden filed an incident report stating that Crandall was asleep on the job, and Crandall was placed on administrative leave with pay.

An investigation was performed of the incident.   An employee stated that she saw Crandall with a hat over her eyes, slumped in her chair, not interacting with the child, and gently snoring.²  The investigation concluded that Crandall had violated the employee conduct policy in that she violated the neglected duty employee policy, and was dismissed from her position as a children services worker.³

Starting in 2003 and leading up to this incident, Crandall had received various reprimands, ranging from a formal counseling memorandum for tardiness, unprofessional and non-therapeutic interactions with the patient population, and attendance violations in January 2003, December 2003, and July 2004, respectively, to a letter of reprimand for violating the DCF attendance policy and neglect of duty policy in December 2003, and September 2004, to a work suspension as a result of two separate incident reports for violating employee conduct.   For the period from September 1, 2003, through August 31, 2004, she received an overall unsatisfactory annual service rating.

After her termination from employment, Crandall filed a complaint with the State of Connecticut, Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (“CHRO”).   On August 9, 2007, CHRO dismissed her complaint for failure to state a claim for relief with no reasonable possibility that a further investigation would result in a finding of reasonable cause, and released the matter from its jurisdiction.   On December 10, 2007, Crandall filed the complaint in superior court, alleging that she had been discriminated against based on her race and color in violation of General Statutes § 46a–60(a)(1).   She also filed a grievance regarding her termination.   On March 19, 2008, an arbitrator issued an award finding that Crandall's discharge was without just cause and imposed a 15–day suspension instead.   Crandall was reinstated and made whole for all lost wages, benefits and seniority for the period following the 15–day unpaid suspension.⁴  The award made no finding regarding the issue of alleged discrimination, and did not address her previous disciplinary history in its decision.

II

STANDARD OF REVIEW 5

“Practice Book § 17–49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving patty is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Allen v. Cox, 285 Conn. 603, 609, 942 A.2d 296 (2008).  “In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issues of fact.   The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law.   The courts hold the movant to a strict standard.   To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact ․ As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Zielinski v. Kotsoris, 279 Conn. 312, 318–19, 901 A.2d 1207 (2006).

“[Practice Book § 17–46] sets forth three requirements necessary to permit the consideration of material contained in affidavits submitted in a summary judgment proceeding.   The material must (1) be based on personal knowledge;  (2) constitute facts that would be admissible at trial;  and (3) affirmatively show that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Barrett v. Danbury Hospital, 232 Conn. 242, 251, 6454 A.2d 748 (1995).

“When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue ․ Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue ․ It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue.   Mere assertions of fact ․ are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17–45].”  Id.

“Although the court must view the inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion ․ a party may not rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment ․ A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Tuccio Development, Inc. v. Neumann, 111 Conn.App. 588, 594, 960 A.2d 1071 (2008).

III

DISCUSSION

The plaintiff alleges that she was discriminated against based on her race and color in violation of General Statutes § 46a–60(a)(1) when she was terminated by DCF. General Statutes § 46a–60(a)(1) provides in relevant part that:

(a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section:  (1) For an employer, or the employer's agent, except in the case of a bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of the individual's race, color, religious creed, age, sex, marital status, national original, ancestry, present or past history of mental disorder ․

Connecticut courts look to federal law for guidance in interpreting state employment discrimination law and employ the burden-shifting analysis set out by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).  Craine v. Trinity College, 259 Conn. 625, 636–37, n.6, 791 A.2d 518 (2002).  “Under this analysis, the employee must first make a prima facie case of discrimination.   The employer may then rebut the prima facie case by stating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for the employment decision in question.   The employee must demonstrate that the reason proffered by the employer is merely a pretext and that the decision actually was motivated by illegal discriminatory bias.”   Id.

Employing the McDonnell Douglas framework, the court first considers whether the plaintiff has met her burden of proving a prima facie case of illegal discrimination as alleged in her complaint.   There are four elements to a prima facie case for discriminatory termination.   The plaintiff must produce evidence that:  (1) she is a member of a protected class;  (2) her job performance was satisfactory;  (3) she was terminated;  and (4) the termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.   See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, 411 U.S. 802.

The defendant claims that the plaintiff cannot meet two of the elements necessary for a prima facie case of discrimination.   First, it claims that the plaintiff's job performance was not satisfactory, and second, she cannot establish that she was terminated under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.   The defendant does not dispute that the plaintiff is within the protected class, and that she suffered an adverse employment action, i.e., termination.

Between January 2003 and October 2007, she received five formal counseling memorandums pertaining to her absenteeism and/or tardiness, one formal counseling memorandum addressing her unprofessional and non-therapeutic interactions with patients, two letters of reprimand, and an overall unsatisfactory annual service rating for the 2003–2004 years.   She was also written up twice and suspending for violating employee conduct.   Given the facts underlying the January 2007, in that she was asleep while caring for child who obviously required a great deal of attention since Crandall was assigned one-on-one with the child, clearly demonstrate that she was unable to perform her duties as a children services worker satisfactorily.

Furthermore, the plaintiff has not alleged any facts that her termination occurred under circumstances which would give rise to an inference of discrimination.   Her main claim seems to be that three other employees were accused of sleeping while on duty and neither were terminated.⁶  Although Crandall alleges that she was treated less favorably than employees of other races who were similarly situated in all material respects, and therefore a race or color based discriminatory motive may be inferred, the facts do not support this conclusion.⁷

Christine Hubbard, a Caucasian, was issued a 15–day suspension for neglect of duty (less than alert) via a stipulated agreement.   Ms. Hubbard had a previous disciplinary history that related to attendance, and no history of disciplinary actions for violating employee conduct or unprofessional and non-therapeutic interactions with children at the hospital like the plaintiff did.   The second employee was Israel Caro, a Hispanic, who was investigated for being less than alert but the allegations of the investigation were unsubstantiated and no action was taken.   The third employee, Edna Baldwin, a Caucasian, was investigated for neglect of duty regarding her judgment relative to her duties and responsibilities for leaving a unit door open resulting in a patient leaving the premises.   She retired prior to the conclusion of the investigation.   Deft.'s Exh. 3, Affidavit of Jeanette Perez.

The plaintiff does not offer any evidence to refute the defendant's evidence that her job performance was anything but unsatisfactory.   The evidence relied upon by the plaintiff via her own statements in her deposition viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff could not be viewed as creating an inference of discrimination.   Therefore, the plaintiff has failed to provide evidence that the actions taken against other employees demonstrate a pretext of discrimination against the plaintiff.   The court finds that the plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

Assuming that even if the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of discrimination, there is no evidence which refutes the defendant's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for her termination.   While Crandall's dereliction of duty concerning the January 31, 2007 incident could alone appear to warrant dismissal, this was not the first incident in which she exhibited inappropriate behavior with patients or performed her job unsatisfactorily.   She had repeated violations of work policy and non-therapeutic interactions with patients, which resulted in a danger to DCF and the patients.   Her termination on April 4, 2007, was a direct consequence of her repeated inappropriate actions and said termination was authorized under DCF policy.

Once the defendant articulated its nondiscriminatory reasons for termination, the plaintiff must prove that the employer's reasons were a pretext for discrimination.   As discussed above, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether DCF's explanation is pretextual.   Summary judgment is appropriate where the “plaintiff create[s] only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred.”   Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 147 L.Ed.2d 105, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000).

IV

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.

Swienton, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Riverview Hospital provides comprehensive care to children and adolescents with severe mental illness and related behavioral and emotional problems who cannot be safely assessed or treated in a less restrictive setting.   Defendant's Exh. 2..  FN1. Riverview Hospital provides comprehensive care to children and adolescents with severe mental illness and related behavioral and emotional problems who cannot be safely assessed or treated in a less restrictive setting.   Defendant's Exh. 2.

FN2. The plaintiff's memorandum of opposition inaccurately states that one of the employees interviewed stated she was “surprised” at the allegation that Crandall was sleeping, “since it would be difficult for the plaintiff to fall asleep at 7:30 p.m. in such a public location.”   These allegations of fact are not supported by the record, and is one of several instances wherein the plaintiff misstates the facts or provides no supporting evidence..  FN2. The plaintiff's memorandum of opposition inaccurately states that one of the employees interviewed stated she was “surprised” at the allegation that Crandall was sleeping, “since it would be difficult for the plaintiff to fall asleep at 7:30 p.m. in such a public location.”   These allegations of fact are not supported by the record, and is one of several instances wherein the plaintiff misstates the facts or provides no supporting evidence.

FN3. This policy defined neglect of duty as including “being absent from work without reasonable notice or permission[,] ․ being less that alert or [i]nattentive to job functions and responsibilities[,] ․ [and] being drowsy or sleeping on the job,” and that “[t]he penalty for neglect of duty may include disciplinary action up to and including suspension and dismissal.”   Deft.'s Exhibit 2..  FN3. This policy defined neglect of duty as including “being absent from work without reasonable notice or permission[,] ․ being less that alert or [i]nattentive to job functions and responsibilities[,] ․ [and] being drowsy or sleeping on the job,” and that “[t]he penalty for neglect of duty may include disciplinary action up to and including suspension and dismissal.”   Deft.'s Exhibit 2.

FN4. Because the plaintiff was reinstated with full pay, benefits and seniority, her claim for lost wages is based upon lost overtime opportunities which were part of her annual income..  FN4. Because the plaintiff was reinstated with full pay, benefits and seniority, her claim for lost wages is based upon lost overtime opportunities which were part of her annual income.

FN5. The plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to the summary judgment motion sets forth the standard of review based upon federal civil procedure..  FN5. The plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to the summary judgment motion sets forth the standard of review based upon federal civil procedure.

FN6. The court is unclear whether the plaintiff makes this argument in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, or whether she makes this argument in order to articulate that the dismissal is only a pretext and was in fact motivated by illegal discrimination.   The plaintiff's brief fails to set forth the burden shifting analysis required.   In any event, the court will address the argument in terms of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination..  FN6. The court is unclear whether the plaintiff makes this argument in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, or whether she makes this argument in order to articulate that the dismissal is only a pretext and was in fact motivated by illegal discrimination.   The plaintiff's brief fails to set forth the burden shifting analysis required.   In any event, the court will address the argument in terms of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.

FN7. The complaint alleges that “[n]o white Caucasian Children Service Worker at Riverview Hospital ever has been dismissed for sleeping on the job.”   Complaint, ¶ 9..  FN7. The complaint alleges that “[n]o white Caucasian Children Service Worker at Riverview Hospital ever has been dismissed for sleeping on the job.”   Complaint, ¶ 9.

Swienton, Cynthia K., J.