Judith K. Fusari v. Amy F. Goodusky (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

I

Judith K. Fusari (Fusari) seeks to institute this matter through an application for waiver of fees pursuant to General Statutes § 52–259b.¹  Fusari alleges that she is unable to pay the filing fees or marshal fees due to her financial condition.   Inasmuch as Fusari meets the financial requirements of subsection (b) of the statute, this court has no discretion and, therefore, waives the filing fee.

II

Fusari alleges several counts ² against Amy Goodusky, an attorney, essentially for defending her client by filing a motion to strike in a different matter, Fusari v. Hospital of Central Connecticut, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 10 5015187.   She alleges that Goodusky moved to strike her November 17, 2010 complaint for failure to state a claim and based upon the statute of limitations.   Additionally, she alleges that Goodusky moved to strike her motion for final judgment because it was filed prematurely with the complaint before the return date.   She alleges that Goodusky's motion to strike was improper because she is a minor and has a mental condition ․ that exempts a time-barred concern or an early motion for final judgement.

“[I]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of pro se litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the pro se party ․ Although we allow pro se litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Solomon v. Connecticut Medical Examining Board, 85 Conn.App. 854, 861, 859 A.2d 934 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 906, 868 A.2d 748 (2005).

“Practice Book § 10–1 requires each pleading to ‘contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts' and a signature on a pleading constitutes ‘a certificate ․ that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it.’  Practice Book § 4–2(b).  This court possesses inherent authority to limit the filing of frivolous or repetitive lawsuits that ultimately are destined for withdrawal or dismissal ․ As the United States Supreme Court has observed in a somewhat analogous setting, a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.”   (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   In re 34 Fee Waiver Applications by Frank Perrelli, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven (October 27, 2008, Lager, J.).

In the present case, the proposed suit interferes with the rights of the other party, Goodusky, and fails to comply with our rules.   It is clear from a review of the allegations, reading them in the light most favorable to Fusari, she seeks to institute this suit because she disagrees with Goodusky's filing of the motion to strike in the pending suit.   Fusari must address her issues in that action.   See generally Hatch v. Spofford, 22 Conn. 485, 494 (1853).   Additionally, her allegations are patently frivolous as they are irrational and improper.   See In Re 34 Fee Waiver Applications by Frank Perrelli, supra, Superior Court, citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992).

This type of improper, proposed suit is not an isolated instance for Fusari.   In addition to the present matter, Fusari has filed several other actions against attorneys because she disagreed with their positions.   See, e.g., Fusari v. Urbaniak, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 10 5034720 (March 30, 2010, Berger, J.).   This court has dismissed these actions and Fusari has been informed in memoranda of decision that her filings are improper.

“The power of a court to manage its dockets and cases by the imposition of sanctions to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases is of ancient origin.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   In the Matter of Presnick, 19 Conn.App. 340, 347, 563 A.2d 299, cert. denied, 213 Conn. 801, 567 A.2d 833 (1989).  “[T]he Court waives filing fees and costs for indigent individuals in order to promote the interests of justice.   The goal of fairly dispensing justice, however, is compromised when the Court is forced to devote its limited resources to the processing of repetitious and frivolous requests.   Pro se petitioners have a greater capacity than most to disrupt the fair allocation of judicial resources, because they are not subject to the financial considerations—filing fees and attorney's fees—that deter other litigants from filing frivolous petitions.”  In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 180, 111 S.Ct. 596, 112 L.Ed.2d 599 (1991).

Fusari consistently attempts to disrupt “the fair allocation of judicial resources” by filing proposed complaints against opposing counsel in other cases simply for representing their clients' interests and espousing a position different from her own.   But for the specific language of § 52–259b that allows no discretion on the waiver of the filing fee upon a proper showing of indigency, this case, and many of her others, would presumably not have been filed.   Yet, because of the statute, the filing fee is waived and this case is filed.

Nevertheless, this court, in light of its inherent authority, dismisses this action sua sponte.   See In Re 34 Fee Waiver Applications by Frank Perrelli, supra, Superior Court.   The taxpayers of this state need not spend any further monies on this patently frivolous case.   A copy of this memorandum of decision shall be forwarded by the clerk to Fusari and Goodusky.

Berger, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Section 52–259b provides:  “(a) In any civil or criminal matter, if the court finds that a party is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees payable to the court or to pay the cost of service of process, the court shall waive such fee or fees and the cost of service of process shall be paid by the state.“(b) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that a person is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process if(1) such person receives public assistance or (2) such person's income after taxes, mandatory wage deductions and child care expenses is one hundred twenty-five per cent or less of the federal poverty level.   For purposes of this subsection, ‘public assistance’ includes, but is not limited to, state-administered general assistance, temporary family assistance, aid to the aged, blind and disabled, supplemental nutrition assistance and Supplemental Security Income.“(c) Nothing in this section shall preclude the court from finding that a person whose income does not meet the criteria of subsection (b) of this section is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process.   If an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee or fees or the cost of service of process is denied, the court clerk shall, upon the request of the applicant schedule a hearing on the application.”.  FN1. Section 52–259b provides:  “(a) In any civil or criminal matter, if the court finds that a party is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees payable to the court or to pay the cost of service of process, the court shall waive such fee or fees and the cost of service of process shall be paid by the state.“(b) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that a person is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process if(1) such person receives public assistance or (2) such person's income after taxes, mandatory wage deductions and child care expenses is one hundred twenty-five per cent or less of the federal poverty level.   For purposes of this subsection, ‘public assistance’ includes, but is not limited to, state-administered general assistance, temporary family assistance, aid to the aged, blind and disabled, supplemental nutrition assistance and Supplemental Security Income.“(c) Nothing in this section shall preclude the court from finding that a person whose income does not meet the criteria of subsection (b) of this section is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process.   If an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee or fees or the cost of service of process is denied, the court clerk shall, upon the request of the applicant schedule a hearing on the application.”

FN2. Fusari sets forth twenty-six counts, but only includes allegations as to the first three counts..  FN2. Fusari sets forth twenty-six counts, but only includes allegations as to the first three counts.

Berger, Marshall K., J.