IN RE: Charles H. (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

These actions are brought by The Department of Children and Families (“DCF” or “Petitioner”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of the biological mother and the biological father of Charles H. (hereinafter referred to as “Charles H.” or “child”).   The biological mother of this child is Regina H. (hereinafter referred to as “Regina H.” or “Mother”).   The biological father is Charles O. (hereinafter referred to as “Charles O.” or “Father”).

On 10/20/09, a 96–Hour Hold was issued on behalf of Charles H. On 10/23/09, Orders of Temporary Custody were filed on behalf of the above-named child.   The Orders of Temporary Custody and Neglect Petition were granted on 10/23/09 and subsequently sustained on 10/28/09.   On 1/22/10, Charles H. was adjudicated neglected and committed to the Department of Children and Families.

On 7/20/10, DCF filed a permanency plan of Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption which was approved on 9/2/10.

On 12/12/10, Petitions to Terminate the Parental Rights of Regina H. and Charles O. were filed as to Charles H.

On 12/14/10, the Court confirmed service on both parents.   Parents were present and advised of their rights, and denials were entered.

On 2/24/11, the court commenced trial.   Both Regina H. and Charles O. were present.   The trial was continued to 3/1/11 at 9 a.m.

At the time of trial, counsel for DCF submitted five exhibits (A–E).   Respondent Father and Mother testified.   Two witnesses testified for DCF and three witnesses testified on behalf of the Respondent Mother.

The court finds that there is no action pending in any other court affecting custody of this child and that this court has jurisdiction in this matter.

The grounds of the Petition for TPR as to the biological mother, Regina H., and as to Father, Charles O., are Failure to Rehabilitate.

The court has applied the burden of proof applicable to the Termination of Parental Rights, has reviewed the Neglect Petition and the social studies and exhibits that were submitted in evidence.   The court has utilized the applicable legal standards in considering the evidence and the testimony of any witnesses.

I

FACTUAL FINDINGSA. Background, Facts Substantiating Allegations of Neglect and Termination

During her pregnancy with Charles H., Mother, Regina H., tested positive for illegal substances on three occasions and was hospitalized at the Institute for Living in May and June 2009 for mental health concerns.   On 10/15/09, she tested positive for cocaine and Hartford Hospital recommended inducing labor in the interest of her unborn child, however, Mother left the hospital against medical advice.   Father, Charles O. had no plan for the infant's care.

Regina H. has an extensive history of substance abuse and mental health issues.   She admits to the use of illegal substances since the age of 23.   Her unresolved substance abuse and mental health issues are affecting her ability to parent.   As a result, she has three older children who have been in the care of their maternal grandmother for most of their lives.

Mother tested positive for cocaine during her pregnancy with Charles H. Following his birth, she participated briefly in mental health and substance abuse treatment services and then relapsed.   She has been actively using illegal substances, including crack cocaine, over the past ten months.

On 1/4/11, Mother admitted to DCF that she was actively abusing illegal substances and wanted to go into a residential treatment program to address her mental health and substance abuse issues.   At that time, she identified a program called the Re–Entry Ministry in Bridgeport, CT and was interested in attending their residential treatment services.   The Re–Entry Ministry program is a multi-faceted, Christian-centered home for women addicted to drugs and alcohol.   Women typically remain at the Re–Entry Ministry program for 12–18 months.   DCF made contact with the Re–Entry Ministry program and was told that Mother would have to call to schedule an intake appointment.   On 1/11/11, Mother reported that she had missed a scheduled intake appointment at the Re–Entry Ministry program a few days before.   DCF made contact with the Re–Entry Ministry program and was informed that they would accept Mother if she could be transported to their program.   On 1/11/11, Mother was transported by the Department to the Re–Entry Ministry program in Bridgeport, CT., was accepted into the program and is currently receiving residential treatment services.   DCF made contact with the Re–Entry Ministry program on 2/23/11 and was informed that Mother is prescribed Lithium and Wellbutrin daily and has monthly injections of Invega to address her diagnoses.

Father, Charles O., is unemployed and continues to reside in Mother's one bedroom apartment in New Britain, CT. He receives $200 per month in food stamps and medical insurance.   The rent for the apartment is $475 per month and is paid from Mother's income by her financial conservator.   The plan is for Mother to give up the apartment in the very near future.   Father is currently participating in parenting classes at the Village for Children and Families.   He has submitted to random urine screens at Wheeler Clinic in New Britain, CT. To date, the random urine screen results have been negative for substances.   He was scheduled for a mental health intake appointment at Community Mental Health Affiliates (CMHA) in New Britain, CT on 2/25/11.

Charles H. is placed in the relative foster home of his paternal aunt, Renee C. He has made satisfactory progress, however, he continues to require frequent medical appointments with the feeding team and gastrointestinal team at the Connecticut Children's Medical Center (CCMC) to address feeding and growth concerns.   Renee C. has reported to DCF that she is not interested in being a long-term placement for Charles H. Previously, maternal grandmother had expressed an interest in being a placement resource but she has not completed and submitted a licensing packet to the Department.   DCF has referred Charles H. to the DCF's Adoption Resource Exchange (ARE) in an effort to have the child teamed for placements that are willing to adopt.   In addition, DCF will be transferring his case to their permanency team so that adoptive resources can be pursued aggressively.

At this time, both parents receive supervised visitation with Charles H. Mother has supervised visits at the Re–Entry Ministry program in Bridgeport, CT, and Father has weekly visits supervised by the child's paternal aunt, Renee C., at her home.

Charles H. has been in DCF custody for more than 14 months.   It is in his best interest for the parental rights of his parents, Regina H. and Charles O., to be terminated.   Neither parent has been willing or able to provide competent, safe and nurturing parenting for the child.   Neither parent has availed themselves of services in order to improve their circumstances such that they can play a responsible role in their child's life.   Neither parent has been able to put the child's interest ahead of their own interests.   The child is a toddler who is completely dependent upon a competent caregiver to meet his needs.   He needs a permanent and stable living arrangement in order to grow and develop in a healthy manner.

B. Mother, Regina H.

Regina H. was born on 3/10/70 in Hartford, CT., the third child of Mary H. and Joseph H. Her mother is a retired Certified Nurse's Assistant (CNA) and her father is a retired police officer.   Her parents reside in Hartford, remain married, but have been separated for over 25 years.   Regina H. has three siblings who reside within the Greater Hartford area;  a brother Terrence H., and two sisters, Christina H. and Lisa H. She maintains on-going relationships with her parents and siblings.   Regina H. describes her parents as hardworking and her childhood as normal, with no substance abuse or domestic violence in her home.

Regina H. attended Moylan Elementary School in Hartford and Sunset Ridge Elementary School in East Hartford, CT. She was hospitalized at the Newington Children's Hospital for mental health issues.   She started using illegal substances when she was age 13 and described herself as a delinquent youth.   Regina H. attended Glastonbury and Hartford High Schools and Job Corps before receiving her GED in 1989.

Regina H. has worked as a cashier and in customer service jobs.   She worked at the Excel Center in Hartford, CT and left that employment in January 2009.   Recently, she obtained a job at the fast food restaurant, but due to her use of illegal substances, kept the job for only a few weeks.   She is currently unemployed and receives Social Security Disability (SSD) benefits and state cash assistance.

Mother has three older children:  Julienne B., age 18, Gabrielle B., age 16 and Jayme B., age 14, all of whom are in the care and custody of their maternal grandmother, Mary H. She obtained guardianship of the two oldest children through probate court and the youngest through DCF. Mother has made numerous attempts to regain custody of her two oldest children through the probate court, but each time her request has been denied due to her on-going substance abuse and mental health issues.

Mother has never been married and does not have military service.   She has a criminal history dating back to 1987 when she was arrested on 10/29/87 for Larceny 6 (5 days jail) and Failure to Appear (Nolle);  1/23/08, for Larceny 6 (45 days jail), Drug Paraphernalia (Nolle) and Assault Personnel (Nolle);  and 12/16/08 for Disorderly Conduct (Nolle).   She claims that the 12/16/08 arrest was due to a domestic violence incident with Father, Charles O. Mother admitted that she was likely under the influence of drugs when the argument over another female led to the confrontation.

C. Father, Charles O.

Charles O. was born on 10/3/59 in Hartford, CT., the third child of Charles O., Sr. and Veronica O. For many years, his father worked as a Guidance Counselor with the Hartford Public School system.   His mother is a retired school social worker and currently resides in California and his father is deceased.   Charles O. has two sisters, Renee C., who resides in West Hartford, CT;  and Colette E., who resides in California.

Charles O. describes his childhood as normal, with no substance abuse, domestic violence or child protective services' involvement.   In his home there was a strong emphasis on the importance of education, morality and a good work ethic.   He graduated from Windsor High School in 1978.

Since 2003, Charles O. has been employed briefly as a security officer, tennis instructor, and clerk at a local theatre.

When the case opened in October 2009, Father was apprehensive about completing recommended services due to uncertainty about his paternity of Charles H. At that time, he claimed that Mother often disappeared for days and may have had sex with other men when she used drugs.   Father's paternity was confirmed on 11/20/10.

Initially, Charles O. had been somewhat evasive in terms of keeping DCF informed of his address.   He had given his sister's address in West Hartford, Connecticut as his home address but when DCF began to explore his sister as a placement resource, it was discovered that Father did not live there.   In recent months, he has been residing in Mother's apartment in New Britain, Connecticut.   He has known her family for approximately 30 years and he has been in a relationship with Mother for approximately five years.

Father denies substance abuse or clinical needs.   He was reluctant initially to engage in individual counseling or to participate in a substance evaluation for fear of being financially responsible for these services.   Even though referrals were made by DCF, he verbalized that he was concerned that he would be billed for services at a later date.

D. Child, Charles H.

Charles H. is a 17–month–old African American male who was born on 10/18/09 in Hartford, CT. On 10/20/09, a 96–hour hold was invoked on his behalf and he was placed in a non-relative foster home.   At that time, Charles O. was not certain he was the father of the child and paternity testing was ordered.   Paternity was affirmed on 1/22/10 and during a court hearing on the same date, paternal aunt, Renee C. came forward as a placement resource.   She has a history with DCF dating back to 1995, when she received a referral and a neglect substantiation by the Department's Manchester office.   Renee C. requested a substantiation review with DCF, and upon being informed that her substantiation would be upheld and could not be overturned, she requested a substantiation review at the Department's administrative level.

In March 2010, Charles H. was referred to medical specialists to assess his emerging medical needs.   He was diagnosed with Failure to Thrive and Brachycephaly (flat head syndrome) for which he was required to wear a corrective cranial helmet.   An EEG was recommended to rule out seizures or other neurological issues.   He was referred to Birth to Three services to address issues related to his protruding tongue and developmental concerns.   He is monitored frequently by his primary care physician, a gastrointestinal specialist who assesses feeding issues and weight gain, and by a cranial technologist.

Charles H. was fitted with a cranial helmet on 4/22/10 with the expectation that he would need to wear the helmet for 4–6 months.   He was seen regularly (weekly/biweekly) for adjustments to the helmet by the cranial specialist;  use of the helmet was discontinued effective 11/5/10.

On 5/6/10, during a court hearing, DCF was informed that Renee C.'s neglect substantiation had been overturned at the Department's administrative level.   Following DCF's foster care licensing procedure, Charles H. was placed with paternal aunt, Renee C. on 6/11/10.

On 11/30/10, DCF was notified by the Connecticut Children's Medical Center's (CCMC) Digestive Diseases Group that Charles H. had not gained any weight in the prior month and as he had no significant improvement with his feeding difficulties, an upper endoscopy with anesthesia was scheduled for 12/6/10 to further evaluate his feeding issues.

Charles H. seems to be a happy and content child who is always smiling and playful, and has just recently started walking.   Renee C. is bonded to Charles H. and is providing him with the safety, stability, dependability and nurturance that he needs.

E. Relative Resources

Renee C. had stated recently that she did not want to care for Charles H. on a long-term basis and is not willing to adopt him.   Her desire was to be a temporary placement resource for him until his parents were able to rehabilitate.   Renee C. is aware that because the parents have been unable to rehabilitate to date, the Department's permanency plan is TPR and Adoption.   Upon hearing of this plan, Maternal grandmother, Mary H. and maternal aunt, Christina H. came forward as placement resources for Charles H. Maternal grandmother resides in Hartford in a four-bedroom apartment and has guardianship of Mother's other three children.   Maternal aunt resides in Hartford in a two-bedroom apartment.

F. Present Situation

See paragraph I, Factual Findings, Paragraphs A, B, and C, above.

II

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS ADJUDICATION

The court must determine whether the proof provides clear and convincing evidence that a pleaded ground exists to terminate Mother, Regina H.'s and Father, Charles O.'s rights as of the date of the filing of the petition.

A. Reasonable Efforts Finding

Unless a court has found in an earlier proceeding that efforts to reunify are no longer appropriate, in order to terminate parental rights DCF initially must show by clear and convincing evidence that it “has made reasonable efforts to locate the parents and to reunify the children with their parents, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parents are unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.”  C.G.S. Sec. 17a–112(j)(1).   “Reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.”  In re Jessica B., 50 Conn.App. 554, 566, 718 A.2d 997 (1998).

DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with Regina H. and Charles O.

Reasonable efforts to reunify Charles H. with Regina H. and Charles O. are no longer appropriate because of their inability to gain insight into their substance abuse, and their proven inability to rehabilitate and to provide the care that the child requires.

The parents are unwilling or unable to benefit from efforts because they have been unable to show progress in their rehabilitation with regard to mental health, substance abuse and parenting.   In addition, Father has been incarcerated for a majority of the time that his child has been in DCF custody.

DCF has been involved with this family since 1996.   The presenting problems with this family were substance abuse, lack of parenting skills, transiency and mental health issues.

Many reasonable and active efforts were made to prevent removal of the child and/or to reunify him with his parents.   Some of the agencies and providers are set out as follows:

Regina H. (Mother):

New Life Center—Residential Substance Abuse Treatment

Oxford Recovery House—Sober Residence

Rushford Dual Diagnosis Program, Drug Screenings, Hair Testing

Wheeler Clinic, Substance Abuse Evaluation, Random Drug Screens, Hair Testing

Community Health Services (CHS)—Medication Management

Gentiva Health Services—Visiting Nurses Association (VNA)

Charles O. (Father):

Alcohol Drug Rehabilitation Center (ADRC)—Substance Abuse Evaluation/Screen

Radiance Innovative Services (RIS) Father—Inclusive Parenting

Education Services Department of Social Services—Financial/Medical Assistance

Wheeler Clinic, Substance Abuse Evaluation, Random Drug Screens

LabCorp Paternity Testing

Charles H. (Child)

Connecticut Children's Medical Center (CCMC)—Feeding Team

Connecticut Children's Medical Center (CCMC)—Digestive Diseases, Specialty Group Cranial Technologies, Inc.

Birth to Three—Child Development Services

See Exhibit D for a more extensive reference to agencies and providers and an in-depth discussion of the attendance, participation, and insight with regard to Regina H. and Charles O.

Specific steps were ordered by the court for both Mother and Father on 10/28/09.   Attempts to comply with the expectations were made from time to time, but overall it appears that the parents were not fully engaged or found excuses to avoid compliance much of the time.

In addition, DCF has made reasonable efforts to achieve the Permanency Plan. All court findings were made by clear and convincing evidence.

B. Grounds for the Termination:  Failure to Rehabilitate—General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(1)—as to biological Mother, Regina H. and Biological Father, Charles O.

The Commissioner has alleged as a ground for termination that Mother and Father have failed to rehabilitate themselves after their child had been adjudicated as neglected.   This ground for termination, based upon a prior adjudication of neglect and a failure of personal rehabilitation, is clearly articulated in our statutes.  Conn. Gen.Stat. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(1) states in part that:

[t]he Superior Court ․ may grant a petition [to terminate parental rights] if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ the child under the age of seven years ․ has been found by the Superior Court ․ to have been neglected ․ and the parent has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.

Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a–112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent.  “ ․ [The statute] requires the trial court ․ to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [they] have achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [they] can assume a responsible position in [their] child's life.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873 (1999).  “․ [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the [parents have] improved [their] ability to manage [their] own life, but rather whether [they] have gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000).   See also In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, 718, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 769 A.2d 61 (2001);  In re Alelandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 259, 881 A.2d 450 (2005).

Whether the age and needs of the child would support allowance of further time for the parents to rehabilitate must also be considered.  In re Luis C., supra, 210 Conn. 157, 167–68, 5545 A.2d 722 (1989).   The reasonableness of the time period within which rehabilitation is sought to be accomplished is a question of fact for the court.  In re Davon M., 16 Conn.App. 693, 696, 548 A.2d 1350 (1988).   Also, in determining whether further allowance of a reasonable period of time would promote rehabilitation, a court can consider efforts made since the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights.  In re Sarah M., 19 Conn.App. 371, 377, 562 A.2d 566 (1989).

Several aspects of the clear and convincing evidence in this case compel the conclusion that Regina H. and Charles O. have yet to achieve a sufficient “level of rehabilitation ․ which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [they] can assume a responsible position in [their child's life].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000).   See In re Alejandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 259, 881 A.2d 450 (2005);  In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 769 A.2d 61 (2001).   The credible evidence in this case, presented through the TPR social study and exhibits, clearly and convincingly establishes that Regina H. and Charles O. have not achieved CGS § 17a–112(j)(3)(B1) rehabilitation.   The court credits the DCF reports which show that Regina H. and Charles O. have been unable to achieve their rehabilitation.

Ground B1—Failure to Rehabilitate as to Charles H. by biological Mother, Regina H.

See Section I, Factual Findings, Paragraphs A, B, C, D, and F above.

According to DCF's case record, Regina H. has been using crack cocaine since the age of 23 and has had mental health issues since 1991.   She has attended and failed numerous substance abuse treatment programs.   Her history with DCF dates back to 1996, due to substance abuse, mental health issues and neglect of her children.   She has a history of failing to comply with services to address the neglect of her children.   She has had six referrals to DCF. On 8/30/96, Mother gave birth to a son, Jayme R, who tested positive for cocaine on 8/30/96.   On 9/5/96, a referral was received from a nurse practitioner due to Mother's history of cocaine use, and having a newborn.   The allegations were unsubstantiated.

On 10/4/96, Regina H. received a referral from her provider stating that she had atypical psychosis.   Neglect as a result of a psychiatric problem of a parent with impact to a child was substantiated against Mother.

Regina H. had a substantiated report on 1/8/97 due to psychiatric issues.   On 8/18/97, an unsubstantiated referral was received from the Genesis Center stating that they had observed a burn on Jayme B. On 10/20/97, an unsubstantiated report from a nurse practitioner was received as Jayme R. was observed to have a different burn on his foot.

In 1998, Jayme R was committed to the Department and Transfer of Guardianship was given to the maternal grandmother, Mary H., who had custody of Mother's two older children.

On 11/10/97, Mother received a substantiated report for physical neglect as a result of inadequate shelter.

Mother used illegal substances during her most recent pregnancy in 2009.   According to DCF records, she also used illegal substances while on the prescribed psychotropic medication, Haldol.   She reported that she self-medicated with illegal substances when the Haldol did not work.   She was admitted to the Institute of Living (IOL) in May and June 2009, while pregnant, for mental health concerns.

Hartford Hospital Social Worker, Lydia Agramonte Gomez reported to DCF that Mother had tested positive for illegal substances while pregnant on 5/11/09 (marijuana), 5/22/09 (cocaine), and 10/15/09 (cocaine).   On 10/15/09, Hartford Hospital recommended inducing labor, given Mother's recent use of cocaine and in the interest of her unborn child.   She refused the recommendation and left the hospital against medical advice.   Charles H. was born on 10/18/09 and did not test positive for any illegal substances.

Following the birth of Charles H., Mother attended an intake appointment at the New Life Center residential substance abuse program in Putnam, CT. New Life Center has accommodation for six women and their children in substance abuse treatment.   Mother was accepted and admitted to the New Life Center on 10/22/09 with the understanding that her infant child would be placed with her on the 60th day of treatment.

On 12/3/09, Mother was informed by DCF that Charles H. would not be placed with her at the New Life Center.   This decision was based on Mother's progress with treatment, her lengthy history of mental health and substance abuse issues and the limited sobriety that she had achieved in treatment.   In addition, Mother's older children had been in the care of their maternal grandmother since infancy and she had not effectively parented any of her children.   She still needed to demonstrate a period of sustained sobriety outside of a treatment setting.

Regina H. was given an extension at the New Life Center until 1/22/10 without having her child placed with her.   On 12/17/09, she attended an intake appointment at the Oxford Recovery House in New Britain, CT, an unstructured and non-clinical setting that provides housing for alcohol and drug addicted individuals who are in recovery.   Individuals residing at the Oxford Recovery House are responsible for paying rent, attending three recovery meetings per week and purchasing their own groceries.   On 12/22/09, Regina H. voluntarily left the New Life Center and moved into the Oxford Recovery House.   At that time, she seemed content to be in a setting that lacked mental health or substance abuse treatment.

After a number of placements and attempts at placement, Regina H. began attending the Rushford Intensive Outpatient (IOP) dual diagnosis program in Meriden on 2/17/10.   On 3/16/10, Claudia Pina, a clinician at Rushford (IOP) reported that Mother had been compliant in terms of attendance and was very insightful.   She had a low tolerance or frustration level with regard to discussions about her children.   It was Ms. Pina's opinion that Mother would always need some level of supervision due to her psychiatric diagnosis.   While attending the Rushford IOP, Mother had two negative drug screens on 2/25/10 and 3/12/10.

On or around 3/8/10, Mother left the Oxford Recovery Home in New Britain, CT where she had been living since 12/22/10.   Initially, she reported to DCF that she left the Oxford House because the program was at risk of shutting down.   However, DCF was able to quickly ascertain that Mother had not been truthful in her claim.   At that time, she would not disclose where she was living but finally admitted that she left the program to pursue transitional housing and had gone to a shelter upon leaving Oxford Recovery Home.

On or around 3/17/10, DCF referred Mother to Hogar Crea which is a two-and-a-half–year residential substance abuse treatment program that offers a supported transitional living program.   Hogar Crea addresses an individual's need for substance abuse treatment;  increases their education and/or training competencies in order to prepare them to re-enter the community;  and also provides services for individuals who are working toward reunification with their children.   Mother failed to attend an intake appointment scheduled for 3/18/10.

In an attempt to obtain a more accurate drug screen sample, DCF referred Mother for a segmented hair test at Rushford Behavioral Health, Meriden, CT, and on 3/25/10, a hair sample was collected and found to be positive for cocaine.   Shortly thereafter, Mother stopped attending the Rushford Intensive Outpatient dual diagnosis program and did not attend any other program to address her substance abuse, mental health and parenting issues.   DCF has recommended on numerous occasions that Mother participate in an in-patient dual diagnosis program but she has refused, stating that she would lose her apartment.

Regina H. will not be able to assume a responsible position in the life of her child within a reasonable time period.   DCF has offered Mother multiple services, but she has failed to take full advantage of those services.   She has been unable to parent any of her children due to unresolved substance abuse and mental health issues.

Charles H. is a 17–month–old child who requires a stable and competent caretaker to meet all of his basic needs.   He has been in the care of his relative foster parent (paternal aunt) since birth.

Ground B1—Failure to Rehabilitate with Charles H. as to Biological Father, Charles O.

See Section I, Factual Findings, Paragraphs A, B, C, D and F, above.

On 10/23/09 and 5/26/10, Charles O. was referred by DCF to Wheeler Clinic in New Britain and Alcohol and Drug Recovery Center (ADRC) in Hartford, respectively, for substance abuse evaluations and urine screens.   At the Wheeler Clinic, he refused to sign paperwork necessary to complete the evaluation and he refused to attend ADRC's evaluation because it was scheduled on a Saturday.

DCF referred Charles O. to Wheeler Clinic for another substance abuse evaluation and random urine screen on 7/7/10.   He completed the substance abuse evaluation and no recommendation for on-going substance abuse treatment was made.   He also completed random urine screens on 8/12, 8/26, 9/10 and 10/14/10 and the results were negative for all drugs.

In an attempt to ascertain if Charles O. had any unmet mental health needs, he was referred by the Department to Radiance Innovative Services (RIS) on 6/15/10 for a mental health assessment;  for their father-to-father parenting program and for intensive case management services to assist him with meeting DCF's requirements and court ordered specific steps.

In July 2010 a mental health assessment was completed by RIS and received by the DCF on 7/16/10.   The assessment included a disclosure by Father in which he stated that he did not feel confident or adequate enough to take care of his son.   In addition, he disclosed that he had seen Mother smoke marijuana and drink alcohol, and he could recognize when she was under the influence of crack cocaine, her drug of choice.

Charles O. has a history of dependency on others in order to maintain his functioning.   The following treatment recommendations were made after diagnosis at RIS:

Father would benefit from therapy to address his past history of grief and loss;

Father would benefit from psycho-education and support regarding child development;

Father would benefit from a parent mentor or parent aide to assist with his skills in parenting and to increase his self esteem;

In the event that Father is identified as an appropriate caretaker, he would benefit from having someone who can help him coordinate services for his son (i.e. medical and birth to three).

Father would benefit from being connected with a service to help guide and support his vocational and educational endeavors.

Charles O. received parenting education and intensive case management services from RIS for sixteen weeks.   Further, DCF has offered Father multiple services but he has failed to take full advantage of those services.

Charles O. has had minimal involvement in the life of his son and he will not be able to assume a responsible position in the life of his child within a reasonable time period.

Summary of Adjudicatory Findings

This court has found that the Commissioner has proved the following adjudicatory grounds by clear and convincing evidence:  Mother, Regina H., and Father, Charles O., have failed to rehabilitate after a prior court finding of their having neglected Charles H.

III

DISPOSITION

Except in the case where termination is based on consent, if grounds have been found to terminate parental rights applying the appropriate standard of proof, the court must then consider whether the facts as of the last day of trial establish, by clear and convincing evidence after consideration of the factors enumerated in C.G.S. § 17a–112(k), that termination is in the child's best interest.   If the court does find that termination is in the child's best interest, an order will enter terminating parental rights.

A. C.G.S. § 17a–112(k) Criteria

The court has found by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory grounds alleged by DCF for the termination of parental rights have been proven.

Before making a decision whether or not to terminate Regina H.'s and Charles O.'s parental rights, as they did not consent, the court will consider and make findings on each of the seven criteria set forth in C.G.S. § 17a–112(k).  In re Romance M., 229 Conn. 345, 355, 641 A.2d 378 (1994).

These criteria and this court's findings, which have been established by clear and convincing evidence, are as follows:

1. “The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered or provided to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.”

This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify Charles H. with his parents.   Services were ordered in a timely manner and were appropriate for the circumstances at hand.

Considered carefully, the clear and convincing evidence shows that DCF offered timely, appropriate and comprehensive services to the respondent parents to facilitate their reunification with their child and made reasonable efforts to reunite them with their child.  In re Victoria B., 79 Conn.App. 245, 258–60, 829 A.2d 855 (2003).

Based on this clear and convincing evidence of the circumstances now present in this case, the court finds that Regina H. and Charles O. are unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts.  CGS § 17a–112(j)(1).   Their serious issues clearly and convincingly make them unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts.  In re Tyqwane V., 85 Conn.App. 528, 535–36, 857 A.2d 963 (2004).

Regina H. and Charles O. have been provided with many services to rehabilitate and return Charles H. to their care and the referrals were made in a timely manner to facilitate a successful reunification.   They were referred to services multiple times to encourage cooperation.

2. “Whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.”

This court finds that the clear and convincing evidence in this matter proves that the child's parents are presently unable and/or unwilling to benefit from such reunification services as was contemplated by the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

DCF has previously offered multiple services to Mother and Father.   DCF has made reasonable efforts to maintain contact with both parents.

3. “The terms of any court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all the parties have fulfilled their obligations of such order.”

The clear and convincing evidence indicates that Mother and Father have failed to fully comply with many of the steps ordered by the court.

4. “The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.”

The child has been able to exhibit only limited bonding with his parents, due to his parents' substance abuse and reluctance to accept their roles as parents.   He has developed a strong bond with his foster parent with whom he has lived since his removal by DCF.

5. “The age of the children.”

Charles H. is 17 months old.

6. “The efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return to such child's home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent provided that the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child.”

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parents have not made realistic and sustained efforts to conform their conduct to minimally acceptable parental standards.

The clear and convincing evidence indicates that the parents have continued to abuse substances up to the present time and have refused to cooperate with DCF or programs presented.

The court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parents have not made the changes necessary in their lifestyles that would indicate that they would be safe, responsible and nurturing parents for their child.   To permit the child to return to the parents' care would compromise the safety of the child.

7. “The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.”

This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that no unreasonable conduct by DCF, foster parents, Department of Correction or third parties prevented Regina H. or Charles O. from maintaining a relationship with their child, nor did their economic circumstances prevent such relationship, although the limitations and restrictions inherent in the foster care system remained in effect.

Father has maintained little meaningful contact with the child and the petitioner.   In order to improve his parenting bond with his child, he is in need of adequate parenting classes, mental health programs, adequate housing and gainful employment.

B. Best Interest of the Child—C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(2)

The court is next called upon to determine whether termination of Regina H.'s and Charles O.'s parental rights to Charles H. would be in his best interest.¹  Applying the appropriate legal standards ² to the clear and convincing facts of this case, the court finds this issue in favor of the State of Connecticut and DCF.

In determining whether termination of Regina H.'s and Charles O.'s parental rights would be in the child's best interest, the court has examined multiple relevant factors, including the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of his environment;  his length of stay in foster care;  the nature of his relationship with his biological parents;  and the degree of contact maintained with his biological parents.³  In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000);  In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000);  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999).   In a matter such as this, the court is further called upon to balance the child's intrinsic needs for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with his parents.   See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (the child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).

Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter establishes that it is not in the child's best interest to continue to maintain any legal relationship with his parents.

The clear and convincing evidence also shows that the child's parents have failed to gain insight into becoming safe, nurturing and responsible parents for the child.   The clear and convincing evidence shows that their judgment and conduct remains questionable, and has not improved since the child was taken into DCF care.

The parents' performance clearly and convincingly shows that they lack the attributes and characteristics necessary to fulfill valid parental roles.   Their recalcitrance concerning referrals clearly and convincingly shows that, without commitment to consistent substance abuse treatment, as well as individual and parenting counseling, it is likely that they have extinguished what little chance they ever had to be able to serve as safe, nurturing and responsible parents for any child.

An additional factor to consider in this case is time.   The clear and convincing evidence demonstrates the child's pressing need for permanence and stability.   Unfortunately, much time would be required for Mother and Father to show that they have forsaken substance abuse, addressed their issues, undertaken the necessary counseling and succeeded in it, established themselves in the community and shown that they were capable of being safe, nurturing and responsible parents to their child.

Charles H. cannot delay his need for permanence and stability in exchange for his parents' uncertain future.

Based upon the parents' behavior and performance so far, this court cannot foresee them ever having the ability or the opportunity to be able to follow the regimen necessary for this child to maximize his abilities and achievements.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that the time needed for the parents to attempt to rehabilitate and establish themselves in the community as safe, nurturing and responsible parents, if that were possible, is time that their child cannot afford.

The parents' performance clearly and convincingly shows that they lack the attributes and characteristics necessary to fulfill valid parental roles.   Their conduct clearly and convincingly shows that it is unlikely that they will ever be able to conform their behavior to appropriate norms or be able to serve as safe, nurturing and responsible parents for this child.

Our courts have recognized that “long-term stability is critical to a child's future health and development ․” In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 709, 741 A.2d 873 (1999).   Furthermore, “[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence” when resolving issues related to the permanent or temporary care of neglected children.  In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 934 (1991), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1992);  see also In re Juvenile Appeal (84–CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).   The court is obliged to agree with DCF and concludes that the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that the child is entitled to the benefit of ending, without further delay, the period of uncertainty as to the availability of his biological parents as caretakers.

Having balanced the child's individual and intrinsic needs for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with his parents, the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that the child's best interests cannot be served by continuing to maintain any legal relationship to his parents.  Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. 313–14.

Accordingly, with respect to the best interests of the child as contemplated by CGS § 17a–112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, including the testimony and evidence presented, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Regina H. and Charles O. as to Charles H. is in the best interests of the child in question.

The linchpin to a determination of rehabilitation necessarily includes a finding that the parent can begin parenting within a reasonable period of time.   To allow for a further additional and significant period of time, easily more than one year for Father to achieve a degree of reasonable rehabilitation, runs counter to our court's long recognized preference for permanency.   Indeed, it would result in this young child being raised with not only the specter of upheaval but the goal of such.   This, the court cannot allow.   The question is not simply one of rehabilitation;  it is whether the particular needs of the child can be met within a reasonable timeframe.   See In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App., 384–85.

IV

CONCLUSION

The court having considered all statutory considerations and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for termination of parental rights, further finds upon all the facts and circumstances presented, that it is in Charles H.'s best interest to terminate the parental rights of Regina H., the biological Mother of the child and Charles O., the biological Father of the child.   Accordingly, it is ordered that their parental rights to Charles H. are hereby terminated.

It is further ordered that the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families be appointed the statutory parent for this child for the purpose of securing an adoptive family and a permanent placement for this child.

The statutory parent is ordered to file the appropriate written reports with the court, as are required by state and federal law and which show the efforts to effect the permanent placement of this child.

BY THE COURT,

WOLLENBERG, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The final element of the termination of parental rights statute, CGS § 17a–112(j), requires that before granting a duly noticed petition for such termination, the court must find, “by clear and convincing evidence ․ (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child ․”.  FN1. The final element of the termination of parental rights statute, CGS § 17a–112(j), requires that before granting a duly noticed petition for such termination, the court must find, “by clear and convincing evidence ․ (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child ․”

FN2. “Termination of parental rights means the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child's parent or parents ․ Termination of parental rights is a most serious and sensitive judicial action.  In re Barbara J., 215 Conn. 31, 44, 574 A.2d 203 (1990).”  (Citation omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Steven N., 57 Conn.App. 629, 632, 749 A.2d 678 (2000).  “[T]he question ․ to be decided in a dispositional phase is whether it is in the best interests of the child to sever the parent-child relationship.   That is different from the question of who should have custody of the child if termination of parental rights is determined to be in the best interests of the child.   See Practice Book § 33–5.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 776, 740 A.2d 896 (1999).  “In making this determination, the trial court can consider all events occurring prior to the date of the dispositional hearing, including those occurring after the filing of the termination petition.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Kasheema L., 56 Conn.App. 484, 488, 744 A.2d 441, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 945, 747 A.2d 522 (2000)..  FN2. “Termination of parental rights means the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child's parent or parents ․ Termination of parental rights is a most serious and sensitive judicial action.  In re Barbara J., 215 Conn. 31, 44, 574 A.2d 203 (1990).”  (Citation omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Steven N., 57 Conn.App. 629, 632, 749 A.2d 678 (2000).  “[T]he question ․ to be decided in a dispositional phase is whether it is in the best interests of the child to sever the parent-child relationship.   That is different from the question of who should have custody of the child if termination of parental rights is determined to be in the best interests of the child.   See Practice Book § 33–5.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 776, 740 A.2d 896 (1999).  “In making this determination, the trial court can consider all events occurring prior to the date of the dispositional hearing, including those occurring after the filing of the termination petition.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Kasheema L., 56 Conn.App. 484, 488, 744 A.2d 441, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 945, 747 A.2d 522 (2000).

FN3. “[T]he genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999)..  FN3. “[T]he genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999).

Wollenberg, William L., J.T.R.