Stephen J. Bruno v. Lisa Bruno (2011)

Axelrod, Sidney, J.T.R. Opinion Title MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JOINDER RE CHRISTINA BRUNO, POSTJUDGMENT, CODED 534, AND INTERESTED PERSON CHRISTINA BRUNO'S OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR JOINDER, CODED 543 The court overrules interested person Christina Bruno's objection to motion for joinder and grants the defendant's motion for joinder of Christina Bruno except for the following claims which are not under the jurisdiction of the family court and should therefore be filed in the civil court.   The claims under paragraphs 17, 25, 33, 35, 36 and 37 are stricken in full.   So much of the claim under paragraph 46 that alleges “lost wages, loss of enjoyment of life, sleepless nights, anxiety, apprehension, despair and depression” is also stricken.   So much of paragraph 46 as alleges “punitive damages” is also stricken.   In deciding the issue of a motion for joinder the court, in In re Devon B., 264 Conn. 572, 825 A.2d 127 (2003), stated in part as follows:  Practice Book § 9–18 provides:  “The judicial authority may determine the controversy as between the parties before it, if it can do so without prejudice to the rights of others;  but, if a complete determination cannot be had without the presence of other parties, the judicial authority may direct that they be brought in.   If a person not a party has an interest or title which the judgment will affect, the judicial authority, on its motion, shall direct that person to be made a party.”   Id., 577.  “Necessary parties ․ are those [p]ersons having an interest in the controversy, and who ought to be made parties, in order that the court may act on that rule which requires it to decide on, and finally determine the entire controversy, and do complete justice, by adjusting all the rights involved in it ․ [B]ut if their interests are separable from those of the parties before the court, so that the court can proceed to a decree, and do complete and final justice, without affecting other persons not before the court, the latter are not indispensable parties.” [fn12] (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Napoletano v. CIGNA Healthcare of Connecticut Inc., 238 Conn. 216, 225–26 n.10, 680 A.2d 127 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103, 117 S.Ct. 1106, 137 L.Ed.2d 208 (1997).  “A party is deemed necessary if its presence is absolutely required in order to assure a fair and equitable trial ․ Biro v. Hill, 214 Conn. 1, 6, 570 A.2d 182 (1990).”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Caswell Cove Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Milford Partners, Inc., 58 Conn.App. 217, 224, 753 A.2d 361, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 922, 759 A.2d 1023 (2000).   Id., 579–80. [fn12] In the past, there had been a distinction between “necessary” and “indispensable” parties.   See Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 139, 15 L.Ed. 158 (1855) (defining both terms).   Over time, however, this distinction has become less pronounced;  see Sturman v. Socha, 191 Conn. 1, 6, 463 A.2d 527 (1983) (recognizing that misleading nature of terms “has resulted in a blurring of the distinction typically drawn between them”);  and provisions of our Practice Book and General Statutes currently refer only to necessary parties.   See, e.g., Practice Book §§ 9–6 and 9–24;  General Statutes §§ 8–8(f) and 12–638n.   Id., 580.  “The decision whether to grant a motion for the addition of a party to pending legal proceedings rests generally in the sound discretion of the trial court.”   Id. “In essence, the trial judge's discretion should be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Sturman v. Socha, 191 Conn. 1, 7, 463 A.2d 527 (1983).   Id., 581.  “The necessary parties rules originated in equity and expressed the principle that a court of equity, once it undertook a case, would not do justice ‘by halves' but would seek to clean up the whole controversy.”   F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure (3d Ed.1985) § 10.11, pp.531–32. Id., 586 The remaining allegations in the motion for joinder claim that the plaintiff made over $1,000,000 in cash transfers to the interested person Christina Fiorito/Bruno in four separate transactions on June 10, 2009 and June 12, 2009.   They further allege that interested person Christina Fiorito/Bruno forged the defendant's signature on various documents to assist the plaintiff's theft of $202,056.51 from a secured escrow account held in the names of both the defendant and plaintiff.   The various allegations in the motion for joinder lead the court to conclude based on the standard established in In Re Devon B., that joinder of Christina Fiorito/Bruno should be granted, and the court therefore grants the defendant's motion for joinder regarding Christina Fiorito/Bruno.   In granting the motion for joinder, this court has not ruled on the issue of whether any of the allegations in the motion for joinder are correct.   That issue will be determined when the court hears the evidence on the ex parte injunctions coded 480, 494.50 and 545.   Sidney Axelrod, Judge Trial Referee