IN RE: Isaiah O.-R.1 (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The Department of Children and Families (DCF) has brought petitions to terminate the parental rights (TPR) of Madeline O. and Angel R. to two minor children, Isaiah and Elijah, twins born on February 6, 2009, on the grounds that each respondent has abandoned the children, has no ongoing parent-child relationship with them, and has failed to rehabilitate himself or herself.   Trial of this matter was scheduled to begin on September 7, 2010, at which time all parties and the minor children appeared with counsel.   Before trial began, counsel for the respondent mother orally moved to set aside a default entered previously against Ms. O. After an evidentiary hearing, that motion was denied, and the respondent mother and her counsel left after being excused by the court from the remainder of the proceeding.   Trial then commenced, during which the petitioner called two persons as its witnesses—the original DCF social worker, Antoinette Raynor, and a subsequent social worker, Beatrice Velasquez—and also introduced numerous documentary exhibits into evidence.   Neither the respondent father nor the minor children offered any evidence and, following closing arguments, the matter was adjourned.

After the conclusion of evidence, however, the court rescinded its order denying Ms. O's motion, for reasons stated in a written order dated September 10, 2010, vacated the default, and opened the evidence for further proceedings.   The parties appeared again with counsel on February 16, 2011, at which time Ms. O. submitted a written consent to termination of her parental rights regarding the two children on a form promulgated by the office of the chief court administrator.   After a thorough canvas, the court accepted the consent upon finding that the respondent mother had knowingly and voluntarily consented to termination of her parental rights, with full awareness of the consequences of doing so and after having been adequately and effectively advised by her attorney, and that her attorney had reviewed the consent with her and had been present for the court's canvas of the respondent.   The court granted the petitioner's oral motion to amend the petitions as to the respondent mother so as to plead the sole ground of consent, after which Ms. O. and her attorney left the courtroom.   The petitioner thereafter offered two additional exhibits without objection and the evidence was then closed.   The matter is now ready for decision.

The court finds that the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters has jurisdiction over the pending matter.   The court finds that proper service has been made on all parties.   No action is pending in any other court affecting custody of these children.

I

FACTUAL FINDINGS

The court has carefully considered all of the evidence, including the social study and other exhibits and the testimony presented, according to the standards required by law.   Upon such consideration, the court finds that the following facts were proven by clear and convincing evidence at trial, as well as additional facts included in later sections of this decision.

A

History

On February 27, 2009, DCF took the two minor children into custody on a 96–hour hold pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–101g ² after receiving reports from a social worker at Saint Francis Hospital in Hartford that two physical altercations had occurred there while the mother was hospitalized prior to and after the birth of the twins who are the subject of this proceeding.   The social worker also told DCF that there was a history of domestic violence between the two parents.   During an interview at the hospital, the mother denied any domestic violence between the parents but did tell a DCF social worker that Mr. R. had become “loud with her stepdaughter ․ due to her coming to the hospital under the influence of substances” and that he had been barred from further entry into the maternity unit of the hospital;  the other incident had involved an argument between two of her daughters.   She also told the DCF worker that she had lost her housing during her hospital stay, which had lasted for two months.   DCF spoke with the respondent father, who said that he had been living with an aunt but would soon have a studio apartment of his own.   DCF also learned that he had a history of arrests for drug and assault charges, but he claimed to have been clean and sober for the last two years.   When the hospital reported to DCF on February 27, 2009, that it was ready to discharge the children, DCF took them into custody.   The court, Dannehy, J., thereafter entered an order of temporary custody (OTC) on March 3, 2009.   Neither parent appeared at the preliminary hearing on the OTC on March 13, 2009, at which time the court, Wollenberg, J., entered defaults against both parents on the OTC and sustained the OTC. The accompanying neglect petition alleged that the children were neglected by being denied proper care and attention and permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to their well-being.   Both parents entered written pleas of nolo contendere to the count of neglect by reason of being permitted to live under injurious conditions, the mother on June 10, 2009, and the father on July 16, 2009.   On that latter date, the twins were adjudicated as having been neglected under conditions injurious to their wellbeing and committed to DCF.

Evidence introduced at the TPR trial showed that on July 16, 2009, the court entered orders of specific steps with regard to both parents on the standard form used for that purpose, and Mr. R. signed that form on that same day.   Among the specific steps particularly relevant to this proceeding, he was ordered to keep all appointments set by DCF, visit the children as often as permitted by DCF, have no further involvement with the criminal justice system, participate in individual and parenting counseling with specifically-identified treatment goals, submit to substance abuse evaluation and any recommended treatment, and cooperate with court-ordered evaluations or testing and recommended service providers.   The “identified treatment goals” for his counseling were to “provide safe and nurturing parenting” and “address domestic violence in his relationships and unaddressed mental health issues.”   Mr. R. had been arrested in March 2009 for an assault in which he broke the collar bone of the respondent mother's 17–year–old daughter and convicted on April 17, 2009, of assault in the third degree, for which he received a sentence of six months in jail, and he was still incarcerated at the time of the specific steps order in July;  thus, rather than identifying any particular service provider, the specific steps ordered him to cooperate with programs offered by the Department of Corrections until his release.   Another specific step was that he was ordered to have no further involvement with the criminal justice system.

Mr. R. was incarcerated until September 2009, and during his stay in jail DCF provided him with two visits with the twins.   After his release on September 19, 2009, DCF offered him supervised weekly visits of two hours, but he missed five of those visits, stopped visiting the twins altogether after October 27, 2009, and has not seen either of the children since then.   On December 8, 2009, after the twins had been in DCF custody for more than nine months, DCF filed a motion to review permanency plan, as required by General Statutes § 46b–129(k)(1) ³ and court rule.⁴  As no objection was filed by the respondents or children to that motion, it was granted on January 19, 2010,⁵ and the court, Dannehy, J. approved the permanency plan for the two children submitted by DCF of terminating the parental rights of the respondents and adoption.

The petitions to terminate the respondents' parental rights to these two children were thereafter filed on March 15, 2010, with an initial appearance date of April 15, 2010.   The proceedings were continued until April 29, 2010, at which time Mr. R. orally moved for visitation, in response to which the court, Dannehy, J., ordered monthly visitation.   After notifying the court that day of the department's intention to file a written motion to suspend Mr. R.'s visits, on May 21, 2010, DCF filed such a motion, in conjunction with which DCF filed a status report dated May 3, 2010, which was introduced into evidence in this proceeding.   It reported that on March 19, 2010, Mr. R. had been arrested and incarcerated pretrial on a bond of $75,000 on charges of assault in the second degree, breach of peace in the second degree, interfering with an officer, and use of drug paraphernalia.   It further stated that Mr. R. had not visited with the children since October 27, 2009, had never provided any financial support for either child, had never sent them any cards, gifts or letters, had never shown any interest in their health or welfare, had not made inquiries about them or requested visitation between November 24, 2009, and April 28, 2010, and had “been non-compliant with DCF services and visitation,” all facts this court finds proven by clear and convincing evidence.   On June 1, 2010, the court, Dannehy, J., granted that motion, over the objection of Mr. R.

B

The Minor Children

Elijah and Isaiah O.-R. were born at St. Francis Hospital on February 17, 2009, and taken into DCF custody on the order of temporary custody ten days later.   They have been in the same foster home since then and have adjusted and bonded to this family.   They are developing within the average range of prematurely-born children and are medically up-to-date.   During the few visits they had with the respondent father, all occurring before they were less than 10 months old, he would talk to them, hug and kiss them, but DCF social worker Antoinette Raynor, who was present for all of those visitations, observed that “the twins did not show any reaction to him.”   When asked at trial to explain that comment in the social study in support of the DCF permanency plan, she testified that “You know, ․ if you're consistent enough with visitation they'll have some kind of sense as to who you are ․ But I didn't—didn't get that.”   In contrast, she testified credibly that when she visited the foster mother's home, the twins “appeared very bonded ․”

DCF social worker Beatrice Velasquez was first assigned to the twins' case in April 2010, and she offered credible testimony about their relationship with the foster mother and her extended family.   When Velasquez visited the foster mother's home for the first time, the twins clung closely to the foster mother, and they acted similarly on Velasquez's other visits to the home.   The foster mother's grown daughter, that daughter's husband and their teenage son also have an apartment in the same building as the foster mother, and these relatives have frequent contact with the twins.   Velasquez has observed the twins interacting with the daughter, her husband, and the teenage son, and she testified credibly that the twins respond to the grown daughter in much the same way as they do to the foster mother.   They even call the adult daughter “mama.”   She said that the foster mother's extended family interact well with the twins and are “very focused on the children's needs and their emotions and—and how they respond to different people.”   When the son-in-law picked up the twins during one of Velasquez's visits, they did not want to be let down and started crying when he tried to do so.   Velasquez also described credibly that the teenage grandson is sensitive to the twins' nervousness around strangers and “actually tries to kind of engage them in his own way to get the twins to feel comfortable with whoever they're—is coming into the home.”   Velasquez further testified credibly that on her visits to the foster home she could see “the love that these children are receiving in this foster home and the attachment that they appear to have with the foster—not only foster mother but her extended family.”

II

ADJUDICATORY DECISION

Trial of a petition to terminate parental rights has two phases, adjudication and disposition.   In the adjudicatory phase of the proceeding, the court must make separate determinations as to reasonable efforts and the statutory grounds for termination.

A

Reasonable Efforts

General Statutes Section 17a–112(j)(1) ⁶ requires the court to find whether

There is clear and convincing evidence that DCF has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent;  and

There is clear and convincing evidence that DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.

No finding of reasonable efforts is required if the basis of the termination is parental consent,⁷ if the court determines, at a hearing on a motion under General Statutes § 17a–111b,⁸ that such efforts are not required, or if the court has approved a permanency plan other than reunification.⁹  Although such a plan was approved in this case, DCF has not requested this court to rely on that earlier ruling.   With respect to the statutory element of reasonable efforts to locate and reunify required for termination pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1), the court finds by clear and convincing evidence as follows:

a. Reasonable efforts to locate

Location of the respondent father has never been an issue, as he was served in-hand with the petition and has appeared throughout the proceedings.   The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts in this respect.

b. Reasonable efforts to reunify

The department made reasonable efforts to reunify the twins with the respondent father.   It offered reasonable visitation until he showed that he was no longer interested in them or seeing them.   As discussed below, DCF offered him reasonable services to help him regain custody.   Those services were appropriate and designed to lead to the reunification of father and children.   Mr. R. was unable to benefit from the services, however, because of his lack of cooperation and failure to attend what was offered despite numerous referrals and appointments made by and with DCF. The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify the twins with Mr. R. The court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. R., having repeatedly refused to avail himself of the services offered by DCF, was unwilling to benefit from those efforts.

B

Statutory Grounds for Termination

As to the respondent mother, the ground for termination is her consent, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(i), set forth in footnote 7 above.   As to the respondent father, the petitioner has abandoned its claim of no on-going parent-child relationship and is instead proceeding on the grounds of failure to rehabilitate and abandonment under General Statutes § 17–112(j)(3).   Each statutory basis set forth in § 17a–112(j)(3) is an independent ground for termination.  In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 293, 618 A.2d 1 (1992).   To prevail in its non-consensual termination of parental rights case against Mr. R., DCF must prove at least one of these statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence.   See In re Michael B., 49 Conn.App. 510, 512, 714 A.2d 1279, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 919, 722 A.2d 807 (1998).   Only one ground need be established, however, for the granting of a TPR petition.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984).

Under Practice Book § 35a–7(a), in the adjudicatory phase of the proceeding, “the judicial authority is limited to evidence of events preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment, except where the judicial authority must consider subsequent events as part of its determination as to the existence of a ground for termination of parental rights.”   See In re Anthony H., 104 Conn.App. 744, 757, 936 A.2d 638 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 920, 943 A.2d 1100 (2008).   Where the ground alleged involves failure to rehabilitate under § 17a–112(j)(3)(B) or (E), however, as here, “[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time.”  In re Jennifer W., 75 Conn.App. 485, 495, 816 A.2d 697, cert. denied 263 Conn. 917, 821 A.2d 770 (2003);  see also In re Joseph L., 105 Conn.App. 515, 527, 939 A.2d 16 (2008), and In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000).

In the present case, the petitioner filed the petition for termination of the respondents' parental rights on March 15, 2010.   As there have been no amendments to the petition related to the respondent father, that date is the adjudicatory date for purposes of the trial on termination of his parental rights.   In the adjudicatory phase of this proceeding, the court has considered the evidence related to circumstances and events prior to the adjudicatory date, insofar as the allegations pertaining to abandonment are concerned.   With regard to the allegations of his failure to achieve rehabilitation, the court has also considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances occurring through the close of evidence in February 2011.

a. Abandonment— § 17a–112(j)(3)(A)

The petitioner has asserted, as a statutory ground for terminating the parental rights of the respondent father, that he has abandoned the minor children.  General Statutes § 17a–112(j) of the provides that “[t]he Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence ․ (3) that:  (A) The child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child ․” The court must determine whether the petitioner has proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mr. R. had, as of the adjudicatory date, abandoned the two minor children at issue here.

“In adjudicating a petition to terminate parental rights on the ground of abandonment, the court's focus is on the parent's conduct.”  In Re Jaime S., 120 Conn.App. 712, 994 A.2d 233 (2010).  “A lack of interest in the child is not the sole criterion in determining abandonment ․ General Statutes [Rev. to 1995] § 17a–112(b)(1) [now § 17a–112(j)(3)(A) ] defines abandonment as the [failure] to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child ․ Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child ․ Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare ․” In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 17–18, 632 A.2d 1122, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993).   The statute requires DCF to show by clear and convincing evidence that a parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child.  “Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern,” “not ․ a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child.”  Id., 18.  “The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes:  (1) express love and affection for the child;  (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child;  (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing, and medical care;  (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile;  and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance ․” (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. R. had, as of the adjudicatory date, abandoned these two children.   He had had virtually no contact with them for almost five months.   While he was incarcerated between March and September 2009, DCF brought the children to the correctional institution for two visits with him.   After his release from incarceration in September 2009, he had the opportunity, on his own, to show his interest, concern and responsibility for the twins;  to express his love and affection to them, to demonstrate his willingness and ability to meet their needs for food, shelter, clothing, and medical care, and to furnish them with moral and social guidance, but he missed five of the weekly visits offered to him and then stopped visiting them altogether, and he renewed his request for visitation only after the petition had been filed.

After his release from incarceration in September 2009, Mr. R. told the DCF social worker, during a visit with the children at the DCF office the next month, that he was living at a certain address in East Hartford.   The DCF social worker provided him with a bus pass so that he had transportation to get to the DCF office for his visits with the children.   But his last visit with them prior to the filing of the TPR petition in March 2010 was in October 2009 (and he has not seen them since then).   After the respondent mother and father missed several subsequent scheduled visits, the DCF social worker went to Mr. R.'s East Hartford home in late November 2009 because, she explained, “I just took it upon myself to go to see what's going on because—you know, they haven't seen the kids at that point for a whole month.”   When asked at trial “what did they tell you as to why they missed the visit?” the social worker testified credibly that he offered her no valid excuse as to why he had missed this visit:  “[I]t was like excuses;  like—you know, I had this to do ․” Since the twins were removed from their parents' care at the hospital in February 2009, Mr. R. has never brought to visits or sent them cards, gifts, or letters.   He did not acknowledge their first birthday.   After he stopped visiting the children, he never contacted DCF to inquire about their well-being.   He never provided any financial support for either child.   The petitioner has established by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. R. failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his children and has met the requisite level of proof to demonstrate that he has abandoned them within the meaning of § 17a–112(j)(3)(A).

b. Failure to Rehabilitate— § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)

General Statutes Section 17a–112(j)(3)(B) provides that

The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence ․ that ․ (3) ․ (B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b–129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child;  ․

The statute authorizes terminating parental rights to a child previously found to have been neglected or uncared for if the parent fails to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, the parent could assume a reasonable position in the life of that child.   The statute also requires that a parent be provided with “specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child ․” See In re Justice V., 111 Conn.App. 500, 507, 959 A.2d 1063 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 911, 964 A.2d 545 (2009) (stating that specific steps “give the parent fair warning of what is required to be reunited with the child”).

As noted recently by another trial court, “[s]pecific steps serve as fundamental guides to assist a parent to develop or re-establish the ability to care for the general and the specific needs of their children, to serve a constructive and guiding role as a parent, and to maintain a responsible position in the child's life.”   In re A.R. and M.R., Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Child Protection Session at Middletown, docket numbers HP14–CP08–009539–A and HP14–CP08–009540–A (February 9, 2011) (Epstein, J.), citing In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000), and In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 112, 124, 614 A.2d 832 (1992).  “A parent's compliance with court-ordered expectations or specific steps entered at the time of the neglect adjudication is relevant, but not dispositive to the rehabilitation finding.”  In re Dylan C., 126 Conn.App. 71, 80–81, (2011).   As recently explained by the Appellate Court,

“Personal rehabilitation as used in [§ 17a–112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent ․ [The statute] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time ․ [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation she has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date she can assume a responsible position in her child's life.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873, reargument denied, 251 Conn. 924, 742 A.2d 364 (1999).  “[I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 384, 784 A.2d 457 (2001).  “Terminating a parent's rights is not ordered to punish a parent who has not tried to rehabilitate;  it is ordered so as not to punish a child by denying [the child] a safe permanent home with proven competent caretakers because [the] biological mother has tried hard but continues to be incapable of providing such a home for [the child].”  In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Sup. 468, 477, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff'd, 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 A.2d 1255 (1998), cert. denied, 248 Conn. 902, 732 A.2d 177 (1999).

In Re Joseph W., 121 Conn.App. 605, 997 A.2d 512 (2010).  “What is a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis,” depending on the age and needs of the particular child.  In re Shannon S., 41 Conn.Sup. 145, 154, 562 A.2d 79, aff'd, 19 Conn.App. 20, 560 A.2d 993 (1989).   The court must thus determine whether the petitioner has proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mr. R. had, after having been provided with specific steps, failed, as of the adjudicatory date of March 15, 2010, or the close of evidence to achieve the required degree of personal rehabilitation.

On July 16, 2009, both twins were found to have been neglected and were committed to the Commissioner of DCF, in whose care they have remained to this date.   The specific steps ordered in July 2009 directed Mr. R. to participate in individual and parenting counseling so that he could learn how to provide safe and nurturing parenting, address domestic violence in his relationships, and address mental health issues;  to submit to substance abuse assessment;  and avoid further involvement with the criminal justice system.   After his release from incarceration in September 2009, the DCF social worker referred him to Intercommunity Mental Health in East Hartford for individual therapy and a domestic violence assessment and gave him letters containing the dates and times of two appointments she had made for him there, but he did not attend either one of them.   The social worker also gave him a letter with the date and time for an appointment with the Fatherhood Initiative Program that DCF wanted him to attend, but he did not attend that appointment either.   Although Mr. R. had taken an enrichment course on parenting skills while incarcerated in 2009, the Fatherhood Initiative Program would have provided him with additional parenting skills and helped him obtain employment.

Although Mr. R. had completed a substance abuse program while in jail in 2009, it was reasonable for DCF to want to assess his commitment to remaining substance-free after his release from incarceration, but when DCF referred him for substance abuse assessment, he did not comply with those referrals.   Despite the order in the specific steps that he avoid further involvement with the criminal justice system, he committed new criminal offenses, including a felony involving violence against another person.   As a result he was arrested, held in lieu of bond, and sentenced to 18 months incarceration.   He was incarcerated on those new charges when the TPR petition was filed, and it was unknown then how long he would be in jail.   Evidence at the TPR trial established that he was convicted on those charges in July 2010, and on the last date of trial his maximum release date was not until September 2011.   Even were he to participate in another substance abuse program while incarcerated, DCF would still need to know whether he could maintain sobriety and remain free of illegal substances once back in the community.

The evidence thus establishes that Mr. R. failed to take advantage of the services and referrals offered to him by DCF and that were intended to help him assume a responsible position in the twins' lives.   His past unwillingness to cooperate with the services offered by DCF offers no hope that he might act differently in the future.   Moreover, he committed new criminal acts that led to additional incarceration and postponed even further the day when, even if should he, at some time in the future, decide to avail himself of such services, he could assume a responsible position in their lives.   The possibility that he might change his mind and then benefit from those services is so remote as to be speculative, rather than offering a reasonable prospect of sufficient rehabilitation in within a reasonable time.

The twins are still quite young, having only turned two years old on the second day of trial.   At their age, they need the steady and consistent hand of a reliable caretaker who can meet their needs for the basic human necessities of food, medical care and shelter, can protect them from physical harm and danger since they are still too young to do so themselves, and can nourish them and help them grow emotionally, cognitively, and psychologically.   The evidence is clear and convincing that Mr. R. had not sufficiently rehabilitated himself to the extent that he was in a position to assume these responsibilities or any responsible position in their lives on the adjudicatory date, at the conclusion of evidence, or, considering the age and needs of each child, at any reasonable or even foreseeable time in the future.   The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner has met its burden and therefore finds for the petitioner on this ground for termination.

III

DISPOSITION

“A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition ․ If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase.   In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interest of the child.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 52, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998).   Even with a consent, the court must conduct a hearing to determine whether clear and convincing evidence establishes that termination is in the best interest of the child.   Unlike the adjudicatory phase, on disposition the court may consider information through the close of the evidentiary hearing.   In the dispositional phase of this case the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events up to and including February 16, 2010, the date upon which the evidence in this matter was concluded.

A

Required Statutory Findings as to Respondent Father

In making the dispositional decision in a non-consensual case, “the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors” specified in General Statutes § 17a–112(k).¹⁰  See, e.g., In re Tabitha P., 39 Conn.App. 353, 664 A.2d 1168 (1995).   As required by the statute, the court has considered the statutory factors and makes the following written findings, which the court has considered in determining whether it is the best interest of each of these children to terminate the parental rights of the respondent father.  In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000):

(1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent— § 17a–112(k)(1).

As discussed above, DCF offered Mr. R., and referred him to, a reasonable and appropriate array of services and programs intended to facilitate his reunion with the children.   These included referrals for individual counseling and domestic violence assessment at InterCommunity Mental Health in East Hartford (but he did not attend the appointment)s, to the Fatherhood Initiative program through Community Renewal Team to improve his parenting skills and help him find employment (but he did not follow up this appointment either) and for substance abuse evaluation and screening that he did not attend.

(2) Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended—17a–112(k)(2).

As discussed above, the court finds that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunite the respondent father with his children pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

(3) The terms of any court orders entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which the parties have fulfilled their expectations— § 17a–112(k)(3).

On July 16, 2009, the court ordered the respondent father to comply with the following orders to regain custody of the twins:

Keep all appointments set by or with DCF. Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the child(ren)'s court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem.

Mr. R. did not comply with this order.   He missed appointments for visitation with the children at the DCF office, for individual therapy and domestic violence assessment at Intercommunity Mental Health in East Hartford, an appointment at the Fatherhood Initiative program to obtain additional parenting skills and help him obtain employment, and two appointments for a substance abuse evaluation and drug screening.

Keep whereabouts known to DCF and your attorney.

There was a period of time when he did not comply with this order, but for most of the period after entry of the specific steps he did.

Visit child(ren) as often as DCF permits and demonstrate appropriate parent/child interaction during visits.

Although he participated in visits provided by DCF while he was incarcerated from March through September 2009, he missed numerous weekly visits offered to him after his release and then stopped visiting them at all after October 2009, despite DCF offering him visits and bus transportation to DCF for the visits.

Participate in parenting and individual counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals.

Although Mr. R. took an enrichment program while incarcerated, he did not complete parenting or individual counseling ordered in the Specific Steps and to which he was referred after his release from incarceration.

Submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations regarding treatment.

Although referred to the Wheeler Access program for a substance abuse evaluation on two occasions, the respondent father did not attend either appointment.

Submit to random drug testing;  the time and method of that testing shall be at the discretion of DCF.

Although referred to the Wheeler Access program for drug screenings on two occasions, the respondent father did not attend either appointment.

Use providers recommended by DCF.

As noted above, the respondent father did not comply with this order.

Secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income.

After his release from incarceration, the respondent father did obtain adequate housing in East Hartford.   There was no evidence offered about whether he obtained lawful income.

No substance abuse.

There is no evidence about whether the respondent father complied with this expectation, since he did not attend the substance abuse evaluations and screenings to which DCF referred him.

No further involvement with the criminal justice system.

Mr. R. was arrested for assault in the second degree and other offenses in March 2010 and was convicted of the assault charge in July 2010 and sentenced to 18 months of incarceration.

On that same day, the court ordered DCF to refer the respondent father to appropriate services, and the services that DCF offered to Mr. R., described above and elsewhere in this decision, were reasonable and appropriate for the purpose of facilitating his reunion with the children.

On April 29, 2010, six weeks after the filing of the TPR petition, the court ordered DCF to provide the respondent with monthly visitation with Mr. R., who was incarcerated at the time.   DCF scheduled such visitation, but before it began the court granted a DCF motion to suspend visitation on June 1, 2010.

(4) The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardian of his person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties— § 17a–112(k)(4).

Not having seen the children since October 2009, the respondent father and respondent mother have no bond with them.   The twins are instead closely bonded to the foster mother, who has cared for the children virtually their entire lives, and her grown daughter, and these are the adults to whom the children look for their day-to-day care and nurture and to meet their needs.

(5) The age of the children— § 17a–112(k)(5).

Elijah and Isaiah were both born on February 16, 2009, and are two years old.

(6) The efforts the parent has made to adjust his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return him to his home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child— § 17a–112(k)(6).

Mr. R. made virtually no effort to adjust his conduct or circumstances to make it in the best interest of the children to be united with him.   He stopped having contact with the children after only a few weeks in the community following his release from incarceration in September 2009 and did not take any steps to address the substance abuse, domestic violence, mental health issues that had interfered in the past with his ability to provide adequate care for these children.

(7) The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent— § 17a–112(k)(7).

Neither the petitioner nor the respondent mother hindered the respondent father from developing or maintaining an adequate relationship with the twins.   DCF encouraged him to have a relationship with his children, to see them, and to address the issues that prevented him from having such a relationship or being able to care for them.   His economic circumstances did not prevent reunification or a meaningful relationship with his children because DCF offered bus passes to defray the cost of his transportation to DCF to visit the children or to attend appointments at community service providers to which DCF referred him.

B

Best Interest of the Child

The final element of the termination of the parental rights statute, § 17a–112(j), requires that, before granting a petition for such termination, the court must find “by clear and convincing evidence ․ (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child ․” In determining whether terminating the respondents' parental rights would be in the best interests of the minor children here, the court has considered various factors, including the twins' interest “in sustained growth, development, well-being, and in the continuity and stability of [their] environment;” Capetta v. Capetta, 196 Conn. 10, 16, 490 A.2d 996 (1985);  their ages and needs;  the length and nature of their stay in foster care;  the nature of their relationship with their biological and foster parents;  the limited contact maintained with the biological parents and the potential benefit or detriment of their retaining a connection with their biological parents;  their genetic bond to each parent, In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999);  and, with regard to the respondent father, the seven statutory factors and the court's findings thereon.   The court has also balanced the children's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the potential benefit of maintaining a connection with their biological parents.   See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).   The best interest standard is inherently flexible and fact-specific to each child, giving the court broad discretion to consider all the different and individualized factors that might affect a specific child's welfare.

The credible and reliable evidence establishes by clear and convincing evidence that terminating the parental rights of Madeline O. and Angel R. is in the best interest of each of these two children.   Neither parent has played an active role in their lives or shown an interest in the twins for a considerable period of time.   DCF encouraged both respondents to maintain a meaningful relationship with the children, but neither the respondent mother nor the respondent father maintained contact with the children.   DCF referred Mr. R. to a reasonable array of services that could have helped him remediate the issues that had led to DCF taking custody of the twins, but he failed to address the issues that prevented him from being an adequate caretaker.   Elijah and Isaiah are only two years old, an age at which they are unable to protect themselves, and they must therefore rely on responsible adults to meet their basic material needs for food, shelter, and medical care and their more intangible, but equally important needs for love, nurture and guidance.

The evidence shows that neither parent is ready or able to provide adequate care for these children either now or in the reasonable future.   Isaiah and Elijah were removed from parental care two years ago and have been in the same foster home since then.   The twins have known only their foster mother and her extended family as parent and family.   They are very bonded to the foster mother, fit well in her home and with her extended family, and look to them for care, nurture, and protection.   The foster mother provides them with a good, nurturing, and stable home and is willing to adopt them.

Though a court in the dispositional phase may properly consider the suitability of proposed adoptive parents when addressing a the child's best interest;  see In re Vincent D., 65 Conn.App. 658, 666, 783 A.2d 534 (2001), and In re Baby Girl B., supra, 224 Conn. 275, (holding that “once a ground for termination has been shown to exist, the suitability and circumstances of adoptive parents, in an appropriate proceeding, may be considered.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   This court “has fully adhered to the time-honored rule that ‘a judicial termination of parental rights may not be premised on a determination that it would be in the child's best interests to terminate the parent's rights in order to substitute another, more suitable set of adoptive parents.’  “ In Re Felicia S., Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Child Protection Session at Middletown, docket no.   CP01–011139–A (December 29, 2004) (Rubinow, J.), quoting In re Baby Girl B., supra, 224 Conn. 280.   Yet, as Judge Keller aptly noted in a recent TPR case,

The federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 670 et seq. as amended, and General Statutes § 46b–129(k)(1) mandate that after 12 months in foster care, a child must have a plan for a permanent home.   Our supreme court has noted consistently the importance of permanency in children's lives.   Virtually all experts, from many different professional disciplines, agree that children need and benefit from continuous, stable home environments.   Foster care should be a strictly limited episode in the life of a child.

(Citations omitted;  internal quotations omitted.)   In Re Genesis H., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Juvenile Matters at Hartford, docket no.   H12–CP09–012773–A (January 11, 2011).   After two years in foster care, it could not possibly be in the best interest of either of these two children, neither of whom has had significant parenting time or attention from either respondent, to languish even longer in foster placement to see if their father or mother will show up again in their lives and then make sufficient progress for reunification.   The twins each need a home that can meet their needs;  yet neither respondent parent offers the remotest prospect of being able to offer that either now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.   Their normal childhood need for permanence and stability can only be met by completely severing their legal ties with the respondents and granting the department's petitions to terminate the parental rights of Madeline O. and Angel R. to these two children.

IV

ORDERS OF TERMINATION

The court having considered all the statutory criteria, having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for the termination of each respondent's parental rights, and having further found by clear and convincing evidence, upon consideration of all of the facts and circumstances presented, that it is in each child's best interest to terminate the parental rights of the respondent parents, it is hereby ORDERED:

The department's petitions for termination of parental rights are granted and judgment may enter terminating the parental rights of Madeline O. and Angel R. in Isaiah and Elijah

Pursuant to General Statutes Sec. 17a–112(m),¹¹ it is ordered that the commissioner of the Department of Children and Families be appointed statutory parent for the children so that they may be placed for adoption.   In securing the adoption, the court urges the department to give first preference to the present foster parent.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(o) ¹² and Practice Book Section 35a–14(g),¹³ the statutory parent shall file a written report on the case plan for the children, the permanency plan, and the status of the children with the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford on or before April 7, 2011 at 9:00 a.m. A written status report on implementation of the plan will be due by July 1, 2011.   As a permanency plan was most recently approved by the court, Dyer, J., on November 30, 2011, a motion to review the permanency plan for the twins, in accordance with General Statutes § 46b–129(k), is to be shall be filed on or before October 24, 2011, and a hearing to review such plan will be held on November 29, 2011 at 12:00 noon.

Additional reports and/or motions to review of the plan for the child will be filed in accordance with state and federal law at least every three months until such time as the children's adoptions are finalized.

The department is also ordered to notify the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford in writing when the adoptions are finalized.

Pursuant to an agreement between the Chief Court Administrator and the Chief Probate Court Administrator, the clerk of the Probate Court that has jurisdiction over any subsequent adoptions of these children is ordered to notify in writing the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford of the date when said adoptions are finalized.

BY THE COURT

STEPHEN F. FRAZZINI

JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

FOOTNOTES

FN2. Section 17a–101g provides in relevant part as follows:  “(e) If the Commissioner of Children and Families, or the commissioner's designee, has probable cause to believe that the child or any other child in the household is in imminent risk of physical harm from the child's surroundings and that immediate removal from such surroundings is necessary to ensure the child's safety, the commissioner, or the commissioner's designee, shall authorize any employee of the department or any law enforcement officer to remove the child and any other child similarly situated from such surroundings without the consent of the child's parent or guardian ․ (f) The removal of a child pursuant to subsection (e) of this section shall not exceed ninety-six hours.   During the period of such removal, the commissioner, or the commissioner's designee, shall provide the child with all necessary care ․”.  FN2. Section 17a–101g provides in relevant part as follows:  “(e) If the Commissioner of Children and Families, or the commissioner's designee, has probable cause to believe that the child or any other child in the household is in imminent risk of physical harm from the child's surroundings and that immediate removal from such surroundings is necessary to ensure the child's safety, the commissioner, or the commissioner's designee, shall authorize any employee of the department or any law enforcement officer to remove the child and any other child similarly situated from such surroundings without the consent of the child's parent or guardian ․ (f) The removal of a child pursuant to subsection (e) of this section shall not exceed ninety-six hours.   During the period of such removal, the commissioner, or the commissioner's designee, shall provide the child with all necessary care ․”

FN3. General Statutes Section 46b–129(k)(1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “Nine months after placement of the child or youth in the care and custody of the commissioner pursuant to a voluntary placement agreement, or removal of a child or youth pursuant to section 17a–101g or an order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, whichever is earlier, the commissioner shall file a motion for review of a permanency plan.”.  FN3. General Statutes Section 46b–129(k)(1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “Nine months after placement of the child or youth in the care and custody of the commissioner pursuant to a voluntary placement agreement, or removal of a child or youth pursuant to section 17a–101g or an order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, whichever is earlier, the commissioner shall file a motion for review of a permanency plan.”

FN4. Practice Book Section 35a–14(a) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “Motions for review of the permanency plan and to maintain or revoke the commitment shall be filed nine months after the placement of the child or youth in the custody of the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families pursuant to a voluntary placement agreement, or removal of a child or youth pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–101g or an order of a court of competent jurisdiction whichever is earlier.”.  FN4. Practice Book Section 35a–14(a) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “Motions for review of the permanency plan and to maintain or revoke the commitment shall be filed nine months after the placement of the child or youth in the custody of the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families pursuant to a voluntary placement agreement, or removal of a child or youth pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–101g or an order of a court of competent jurisdiction whichever is earlier.”

FN5. See General Statutes Section 46b–129(k)(1), which provides, in pertinent part, that “Any party seeking to oppose the commissioner's permanency plan ․ shall file a motion in opposition not later than thirty days after the filing of the commissioner's motion for review of the permanency plan, which motion shall include the reason therefor,” and Practice Book Section 35a–14(b), stating that “If there is no objection or motion for revocation filed, then the motion may be granted by the judicial authority at the date of said hearing.”.  FN5. See General Statutes Section 46b–129(k)(1), which provides, in pertinent part, that “Any party seeking to oppose the commissioner's permanency plan ․ shall file a motion in opposition not later than thirty days after the filing of the commissioner's motion for review of the permanency plan, which motion shall include the reason therefor,” and Practice Book Section 35a–14(b), stating that “If there is no objection or motion for revocation filed, then the motion may be granted by the judicial authority at the date of said hearing.”

FN6. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a–111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to section 17a–111b, or determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required, ․”.  FN6. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a–111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to section 17a–111b, or determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required, ․”

FN7. General Statutes Section 17a–112(i) provides as follows:  “The Superior Court upon hearing and notice, as provided in sections 45a–716 and 45a–717, may grant a petition for termination of parental rights based on consent filed pursuant to this section if it finds that (1) upon clear and convincing evidence, the termination is in the best interest of the child, and (2) such parent has voluntarily and knowingly consented to termination of the parent's parental rights with respect to such child.”.  FN7. General Statutes Section 17a–112(i) provides as follows:  “The Superior Court upon hearing and notice, as provided in sections 45a–716 and 45a–717, may grant a petition for termination of parental rights based on consent filed pursuant to this section if it finds that (1) upon clear and convincing evidence, the termination is in the best interest of the child, and (2) such parent has voluntarily and knowingly consented to termination of the parent's parental rights with respect to such child.”

FN8. General Statutes Section 17a–111b provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “(a) The Commissioner of Children and Families shall make reasonable efforts to reunify a parent with a child unless the court (1) determines that such efforts are not required pursuant to subsection (b) of this section or subsection (j) of section 17a–112, ․ (b) The Commissioner of Children and Families or any other party may, at any time, file a motion with the court for a determination that reasonable efforts to reunify the parent with the child are not required ․ The court may determine that such efforts are not required if the court finds upon clear and convincing evidence that:  (1) The parent has subjected the child to the following aggravated circumstances:  (A) The child has been abandoned, as defined in subsection (j) of section 17a–112;  ․”.  FN8. General Statutes Section 17a–111b provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “(a) The Commissioner of Children and Families shall make reasonable efforts to reunify a parent with a child unless the court (1) determines that such efforts are not required pursuant to subsection (b) of this section or subsection (j) of section 17a–112, ․ (b) The Commissioner of Children and Families or any other party may, at any time, file a motion with the court for a determination that reasonable efforts to reunify the parent with the child are not required ․ The court may determine that such efforts are not required if the court finds upon clear and convincing evidence that:  (1) The parent has subjected the child to the following aggravated circumstances:  (A) The child has been abandoned, as defined in subsection (j) of section 17a–112;  ․”

FN9. General Statutes Section 17a–111b provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “(a) The Commissioner of Children and Families shall make reasonable efforts to reunify a parent with a child unless the court ․ (2) has approved a permanency plan other than reunification pursuant to subsection (k) of section 46b–129.”.  FN9. General Statutes Section 17a–111b provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “(a) The Commissioner of Children and Families shall make reasonable efforts to reunify a parent with a child unless the court ․ (2) has approved a permanency plan other than reunification pursuant to subsection (k) of section 46b–129.”

FN10. General Statutes Section 17a–112(k) provides as follows:  “Except in the case where termination is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding:  (1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent;  (2) whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended;  (3) the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order;  (4) the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties;  (5) the age of the child;  (6) the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child;  and (7) the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.”.  FN10. General Statutes Section 17a–112(k) provides as follows:  “Except in the case where termination is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding:  (1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent;  (2) whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended;  (3) the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order;  (4) the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties;  (5) the age of the child;  (6) the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child;  and (7) the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.”

FN11. General Statutes Section 17a–112(m) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “The Superior Court may appoint a statutory parent at any time after it has terminated parental rights if the petitioner so requests.”.  FN11. General Statutes Section 17a–112(m) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “The Superior Court may appoint a statutory parent at any time after it has terminated parental rights if the petitioner so requests.”

FN12. General Statutes Section 17a–112(o) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “in the case where termination of parental rights is granted, the guardian of the person or statutory parent shall report to the court not later than thirty days after the date judgment is entered on a case plan, as defined by the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, for the child which shall include measurable objectives and time schedules.   At least every three months thereafter, such guardian or statutory parent shall make a report to the court on the progress made on implementation of the plan.   The court may convene a hearing upon the filing of a report and shall convene and conduct a permanency hearing pursuant to subsection (k) of section 46b–129 for the purpose of reviewing the permanency plan for the child no more than twelve months from the date judgment is entered or from the date of the last permanency hearing held pursuant to subsection (k) of section 46b–129, whichever is earlier, and at least once a year thereafter while the child remains in the custody of the Commissioner of Children and Families.”.  FN12. General Statutes Section 17a–112(o) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “in the case where termination of parental rights is granted, the guardian of the person or statutory parent shall report to the court not later than thirty days after the date judgment is entered on a case plan, as defined by the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, for the child which shall include measurable objectives and time schedules.   At least every three months thereafter, such guardian or statutory parent shall make a report to the court on the progress made on implementation of the plan.   The court may convene a hearing upon the filing of a report and shall convene and conduct a permanency hearing pursuant to subsection (k) of section 46b–129 for the purpose of reviewing the permanency plan for the child no more than twelve months from the date judgment is entered or from the date of the last permanency hearing held pursuant to subsection (k) of section 46b–129, whichever is earlier, and at least once a year thereafter while the child remains in the custody of the Commissioner of Children and Families.”

FN13. Practice Book Section 35a–14(g) provides in pertinent part as follows:  “Where a petition for termination of parental rights is granted, the guardian or statutory parent of the child or youth shall report to the judicial authority not later than thirty days after the date the judgment is entered on a permanency plan and on the status of the child or youth.   At least every three months thereafter, such guardian or statutory parent shall make a report to the judicial authority on the implementation of the plan, or earlier if the plan changes before the elapse of three months.   The judicial authority may convene a hearing upon the filing of a report and shall convene and conduct a permanency hearing for the purpose of reviewing the permanency plan for the child no more than twelve months from the date judgment is entered or from the date of the last permanency hearing held in accordance with General Statutes § 46b–129(d), whichever is earlier, and at least once a year thereafter while the child or youth remains in the custody of the commissioner of the department of children and families.”.  FN13. Practice Book Section 35a–14(g) provides in pertinent part as follows:  “Where a petition for termination of parental rights is granted, the guardian or statutory parent of the child or youth shall report to the judicial authority not later than thirty days after the date the judgment is entered on a permanency plan and on the status of the child or youth.   At least every three months thereafter, such guardian or statutory parent shall make a report to the judicial authority on the implementation of the plan, or earlier if the plan changes before the elapse of three months.   The judicial authority may convene a hearing upon the filing of a report and shall convene and conduct a permanency hearing for the purpose of reviewing the permanency plan for the child no more than twelve months from the date judgment is entered or from the date of the last permanency hearing held in accordance with General Statutes § 46b–129(d), whichever is earlier, and at least once a year thereafter while the child or youth remains in the custody of the commissioner of the department of children and families.”

Frazzini, Stephen F., J.