Edward Vines v. Teresa Lantz et al. (2011)

RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS (# 102)

In this case, Edward Vines (Vines), a state prisoner confined to the custody of the Department of Corrections, seeks damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a declaratory judgment against four named individuals, the Commissioner of Corrections and three other former or present employees of the Department of Corrections.   In paragraphs four through seven of the complaint, Vines names each defendant and alleges that each is being sued in his or her “individual capacity as well as” his or her “official capacity.”

On August 14, 2009, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss.   On August 21, 2009, Vines filed a brief in opposition.   On February 15, 2011, the defendants reclaimed the motion to dismiss ¹ which appeared on the February 28, 2011 short calendar and was marked “take papers.”   The defendants set forth three grounds in their motion to dismiss:  (1) the action against them “in their official capacity” is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, (2) the action against them for negligence is barred by statutory immunity, see General Statutes § 4–165, and (3) the plaintiff has failed to plead “a viable 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.”

I.

“Claims involving the doctrines of common-law sovereign immunity and statutory immunity, pursuant to § 4–165, implicate the court's subject matter jurisdiction.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Mercer v. Strange, 96 Conn.App. 123, 128, 899 A.2d 683 (2006);  see Practice Book § 10–31.  “[A] subject matter jurisdictional defect may not be waived ․ [or jurisdiction] conferred by the parties, explicitly or implicitly ․ [O]nce raised, either by a party or by the court itself, the question must be answered before the court may decide the case.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Litchman v. Beni, 280 Conn. 25, 30, 905 A.2d 647 (2006).

The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to attack “the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.”  (Emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 544, 590 A.2d 914 (1991).  “A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.”   Upson v. State, 190 Conn. 622, 624, 461 A.2d 991 (1983).  “[I]n ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Lawrence Brunoli, Inc. v. Branford, 247 Conn. 407, 410–11, 722 A.2d 271 (1999).  “[I]t is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Stepney Pond Estates, Ltd. v. Monroe, 260 Conn. 406, 417, 797 A.2d 494 (2002).

In addition to generally construing pleadings “broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically,” Beaudoin v. Town Oil Co., 207 Conn. 575, 587–88, 542 A.2d 1124 (1988), Connecticut follows a liberal rule of construction of pro se pleadings.  Oliphant v. Commissioner, 274 Conn. 563, 569, 877 A.2d 761 (2005).   Although denominated in “three counts,” the pro se complaint filed on June 18, 2009 is best read as a whole.   In paragraphs eight through fourteen, the complaint sets forth factual allegations, as follows:  Vines was diagnosed in April 2004 with chronic low back pain and when he was transferred to the Cheshire Correctional Institution, on January 9, 2008, the staff was informed of this condition (¶¶ 8, 9).   Notwithstanding his request for a bottom bunk because of his chronic low back pain, he was housed on a top bunk without a ladder (¶¶ 10, 11).   He was issued a plastic chair to climb to the bunk and when he used it on January 15, 2008, it slid under him causing him to fall and injure himself including an aggravation of his lower back pain and additional injuries to his back, right shoulder, left elbow and left ankle (¶¶ 12, 13).   The defendants allowed him to remain on the floor “in agony for approximately four (4) hours” (¶ 14).   In paragraphs sixteen through twenty, the complaint alleges various administrative steps that Vines took to advise the defendants of his injuries and that the lack of ladders was an issue of inmate safety.   The complaint alleges a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in that Vines's fall and injury was a proximate cause of “defendants [sic] neglect to build bunk bed ladders' and also “a [known] ‘common pattern’ resulting in inmate injuries [sic]” in violation of Vines's rights under the eighth amendment and that the defendants acted with “reckless indifference to exercise due care in providing bunkbed ladders to prevent the plaintiff from injury” (¶¶ 21, 22).   In the prayer for relief, Vines states that he is seeking a declaratory judgment pursuant to General Statutes § 52–59 and damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.

II.

The defendants move to dismiss the complaint against them on the ground of sovereign immunity to the extent that it alleges they engaged in conduct in their “official capacity.”   When, as in this case, a complaint unambiguously alleges that a state official is sued in his or her “individual capacity,” it “is sufficient to commence a § 1983 action against a state officer in his individual capacity,” and is not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 Conn. 128, 141, 913 A.2d 415 (2007).   The defendants did not request that the plaintiff revise his complaint to separate the “official capacity” damages claims, which are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 311, 828 A.2d 549 (2003), from the individual capacity damages claims and the claims against the state seeking declaratory relief.   See Doe v. Heintz, 204 Conn. 17, 31, 526 A.2d 1318 (1987).

At this stage, the court does not have to determine whether “the pleaded facts are sufficient to establish liability ․” Sullins v. Rodriguez, supra, 281 Conn. 147.   The allegations of the complaint that each named defendant is being sued in his or her individual capacity are sufficient to foreclose the defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground of sovereign immunity.

III.

The defendants also move to dismiss the complaint against them on the ground of statutory immunity pursuant to General Statutes § 4–165.   Consequently, the court is required to “examine the pleadings to decide if the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts ․ with respect to personal immunity under § 4–165, to support a conclusion that the defendant[s] [were] acting outside the scope of [their] employment or willfully or maliciously.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Martin v. Brady, 261 Conn. 372, 376, 802 A.2d 814 (2002).

The complaint does not allege facts from which the court can infer that the plaintiff sustained injury which was caused by the defendants while acting outside the scope of their employment.   The Connecticut Supreme Court has construed the words “wanton, reckless or malicious” as used in § 4–165 to mean “such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action ․ [In sum, such] conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 181, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 325.   If there are allegations in a complaint from which the court “can infer that the defendants' conduct was indicative of such a state of mind or that the conduct rose to the level of egregiousness necessary to be considered wanton, reckless or malicious,” Martin v. Brady, supra, 261 Conn. 380, the complaint is not subject to dismissal under § 4–165.

The court agrees with the defendants that most of the allegations of the complaint against them are merely claims of common-law negligence which would be barred by § 4–165.   However, Vines has alleged that after he fell to the ground of his cell on January 15, 2008, injuring his back, right shoulder, left elbow and left ankle and aggravating his lower back pain, the defendants left him “laying on the floor in agony” for approximately four hours.   At this stage the court must accept this allegation as true, Witczak v. Gerald, 69 Conn.App. 106, 108, 793 A.2d 1193 (2002), and is compelled to draw the favorable inference that the defendants' conduct in leaving an injured inmate on the ground for a considerable period of time could have caused the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain and that, therefore, the alleged conduct is sufficiently egregious to bar dismissal on the ground of statutory immunity.

IV.

The defendants' final ground for dismissal is the failure to plead “a viable” § 1983 claim.   The defendants do not claim that Vines lacks standing to bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but rather claim that his allegations of negligence do not suffice to state a cause of action.  “[A] motion to dismiss is not designed to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint in terms of whether it states a cause of action.   That should be done, instead, by a motion to strike ․” (Citation omitted.)  Pratt v. Old Saybrook, 225 Conn. 177, 185, 621 A.2d 1322 (1993).

“The motion to dismiss is governed by Practice Book §§ 10–30 through 10–34.   Properly granted on jurisdictional grounds, it essentially asserts that, as a matter of law and fact, a plaintiff cannot state a cause of action that is properly before the court.”  Egrie v. Foisie, 83 Conn.App. 243, 247, 848 A.2d 1266, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 931, 859 A.2d 930 (2004).   The defendants cannot dispute that under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), an inmate may bring a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of the eighth amendment due to a prison official's deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs or the inmate's safety.  Faraday v. Commissioner of Correction, 288 Conn. 326, 328, 952 A.2d 764 (2008).   See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).   In paragraph 21 of the complaint, Vines alleges that the defendants' conduct was violative of the eighth amendment.   The defendants therefore cannot challenge the sufficiency of the allegations of this complaint by way of a motion to dismiss.

V.

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is denied.

LINDA K. LAGER

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The reclaim appears to have been in response to Vines filing a “motion for judgment” on February 3, 2011 that referred to the fact that the motion to dismiss had been pending without having been claimed for “nearly 2 years.” (# 107).  This court denied that motion in light of defendants' representation in their objection (# 108) that the motion to dismiss had been reclaimed..  FN1. The reclaim appears to have been in response to Vines filing a “motion for judgment” on February 3, 2011 that referred to the fact that the motion to dismiss had been pending without having been claimed for “nearly 2 years.” (# 107).  This court denied that motion in light of defendants' representation in their objection (# 108) that the motion to dismiss had been reclaimed.

Lager, Linda K., J.