William Dotson v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

The present matter stems from allegations that the defendant, Stephen Bzdrya, sexually assaulted the plaintiff, William Dotson, over a number of years while the plaintiff was a minor and Bzdrya was a priest employed by the defendant Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation (the diocese).   Such abuse is alleged to have occurred while the plaintiff was an altar server and seeking spiritual guidance at St. Francis Church of New Haven and St. Hedwig Church of Naugatuck, also defendants in the case.   Before the court are a number of discovery motions filed by the defendants.

The court will address each motion in turn.

I Motions # 106, # 110

Motions for protective order # 106 and # 110, filed by the diocese, St. Francis Church and St. Hedwig Church (the corporate defendants) and Bzdyra, respectively, seek to limit the right of the plaintiff's attorney to disseminate discovery materials to the public.   They argue that such protective orders are necessary in order to protect their right to a fair trial because the dissemination of information may poison prospective jurors, thereby impairing their right to jurors from a cross-section of the community.   In addition, Bzdyra moves to seal any transcript or videotape of his deposition on the ground that public disclosure of his videotaped deposition or deposition transcript will be damaging to his reputation, character and credibility.¹  The plaintiff objects to these motions.   Motions for a protective order limiting discovery are provided for by Practice Brook § 13-5.²

“Such orders may provide that discovery be had only on specified terms and conditions ․ and that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the judicial authority.”  Welch v. Welch, 48 Conn.Sup. 19, 828 A.2d 707 (2003).  “The extent of discovery and use of protective orders is clearly within the discretion of the trial judge.”   Carrier Corp. v. Home Insurance Co., judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 88 352383 (February 11, 1992, Schaller, J.) (6 Conn. L. Rptr. 3, 4).  “That discretion applies to decisions concerning whether the information is material, privileged ․ or within the disclosing party's knowledge, possession or power ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 59-60, 459 A.2d 503 (1983).

The party seeking a protective order under Practice Book § 13-5 bears the burden of establishing good cause.   Schramm v. Stelly, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 00 0081681 (June 25, 2001, Cremins, J.) (30 Conn. L. Rptr. 41, 42).  “Good cause has been defined as a sound basis or legitimate need to take judicial action ․ Good cause must be based upon a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.”  (Internal and external quotation marks and citations omitted.)  Welch v. Welch, supra, 48 Conn.Sup. 20.

The plaintiff argues that parties to litigation have first amendment freedoms with regard to information obtained through discovery and are free to disseminate that information.   However, as a general rule, “raw discovery materials exchanged among parties, but not filed with the court, are not open to the public ․ The principles underlying public access [to court documents] ․ are inapplicable to such material, and consequently, unfettered access to discovered material not filed with the court never has been the norm.”  (Citations omitted.)  Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 292 Conn. 1, 36, 970 A.2d 656, cert. denied sub nom., Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. New York Times Co., U.S., 130 S.Ct. 500, 175 L.Ed.2d 348 (2009).  “[R]ules authorizing discovery ․ are a matter of legislative grace.   A litigant has no first amendment right of access to information made available only for purposes of trying his suit.”  Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984).  “[I]t is significant to note that an order prohibiting dissemination of discovered information before trial is not the kind of classic prior restraint that requires exacting first amendment scrutiny.  Id., 34.   Thus, “information obtained through civil discovery authorized by modern rules of civil procedure would rarely, if ever, fall within the classes of unprotected speech [for the purposes of first amendment protections] ․” Id., 31.   This general rule applies to pre-trial depositions.  Id., 33.

The plaintiff asserts that, in the context of sexual abuse cases involving priests, there is a “trend rejecting secrecy” of documents and the Supreme Court “frowned upon broad protective orders” in Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, 276 Conn. 168.   However, the issue of a protective order regarding deposition testimony and other pre-trial discovery materials that had not been filed in support of an issue for adjudication was not before the court, and therefore, not addressed in that decision.   The plaintiff further asserts that the subsequent Supreme Court decision in that case, Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, 292 Conn. 1, stands for the proposition that documents, including deposition transcripts, are required to be disclosed.   In fact, the Court expressly stated that documents, including portions of deposition transcripts, which were part of the court file but had not been marked in support of a particular motion or presented for an adjudicative action were not judicial documents and therefore, “not subject to a presumption of public access.”  Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, 292 Conn. 52-53.   The Court held, inter alia, that such documents were to remain sealed, pursuant to pre-trial sealing orders.   Id., 52, n.33.

Having determined that a protective order preventing the dissemination of discovery materials does not violate the plaintiff's first amendment interest, the court must determine whether the defendants have established good cause for the protective orders sought.  “Restrictions on the use of discovery materials may be warranted where the allegations are of an inflammatory nature and publication of discovery material would serve no better purpose than to titillate the public ․ In considering the imposition of a protective order the court must consider the reasonable privacy interests of the defendants ․ as well as injury to their professional standing which could result from dissemination of discovery materials prior to trial.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Reed v. Zizka, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 95 0555221, 95 0555222 (May 28, 1998, Aurigemma, J.).

In his motion, Bzdyra argues that there is good cause for a protective order because such protective order is necessary to protect his reputation, character and credibility.   The court is not persuaded that the potential dissemination of information obtained through discovery would be so damaging to Bzdyra's reputation, character or credibility to warrant a protective order.   There is no allegation or specific evidence presented for the court to conclude that Bzdyra is a practicing priest and that negative press would impede his ability to practice his ministry.

Both the corporate defendants and Bzdyra argue that there is good cause for the court to issue a protective order because such order is necessary to protect the right of each defendant to obtain a fair trial by jury.   The court is mindful that “[i]t is, after all, the business of the Superior Court to provide private litigants an opportunity to adjust their grievances on their merits in a fair trial culminating in a final judgment ․ A fair and impartial jury obtained from a fair cross section of the community, is an indispensable component of a fair jury trial.”  (Citations omitted.)  Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 93 0300272 (December 8, 1994, Levin, J.).

Despite the plaintiff's argument that the defendants have not established “anything beyond a general fear of publicity,” the evidence presented by the defendants demonstrates that allegations against the defendants have attracted significant media attention.   In addition, the court takes judicial notice of the media coverage of this case and other allegations of sexual abuse involving Bzdyra.   Such coverage would only increase if his deposition or other discovery materials are disseminated, thereby threatening the parties' right to a fair trial in the court.   See Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 93 0300272.   Moreover, there is not a valid public interest in observing Bzdyra's deposition testimony, as it may later be found to be irrelevant to the resolution of the present case.   Thus, the court finds that the corporate defendants and Bzdyra have presented evidence to establish good cause for the court to issue a protective order preventing the plaintiff from disseminating any videotaped deposition testimony, transcripts of such testimony and any other information obtained through discovery and not filed with the court in order to protect the parties' right to a fair trial.   In light of the foregoing, the court grants both motions for protective order.

Regarding Bzdyra's motion to seal his deposition testimony and “any information obtained from him in the discovery process,” a party may file a motion to seal a file or limit disclosure of certain documents, pursuant to Practice Book § 11-20A.   That section provides in relevant part “(c) Upon written motion of any party ․ the judicial authority may order that files, affidavits, documents, or other materials on file or lodged with the court or in connection with a court proceeding be sealed or their disclosure limited only if the judicial authority conclude that such order is necessary to preserve an interest which is determined to override the public interest in viewing such materials.”  “[Section] 11-20A codifies the common-law presumption of public access to judicial documents, meaning any document filed with the court that the court reasonably could rely on in support of its adjudicatory function.”  (Emphasis added.)  Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, 292 Conn. 30.  “[J]udicial documents are those filed with a court upon which the court reasonably could rely in the performance of its adjudicatory function ․” Id., 47-48.

In the present case, Bzdyra seeks a motion to seal that will apply to “any information obtained from him through the discovery process ․” However, § 11-20A does not apply to the defendant's future deposition testimony or to any other discovery materials already obtained by the plaintiff which have not been filed with the court.   As a result, Bzdyra's motion to seal is premature and is, therefore, denied.

II Motions # 114, # 115

Motions # 114 and # 115, a motion for protective order and an objection to a request for production, respectively, were filed by the diocese in response to the plaintiff's September 2, 2010 notice of deposition.   In that notice of deposition, the plaintiff stated that it intended to take a videotaped deposition of the keeper of records for the diocese at the office of the plaintiff's attorney in New Haven, CT. In addition, the notice commands the keeper of the records to bring and produce the “entire file, any and all documents ․ regarding Bzdyra, all investigative materials concerning the claim of sexually inappropriate comments by Bzdyra ․”;  Bzdyra's “priest file or general personal file ․ any other personnel board file or similar file which contains documents referring to any alleged sexual contact by Stephen Bzdyra, and all files (including documents and emails) related to Stephen Bzdyra ․ or anything else related to his service within the Roman Catholic Church ․”

In motion # 114, the diocese requests that the court order that the scope of inquiry at such deposition be “limited with respect to the relevant time period and privileged matters ․” The diocese also requests that the court order that the deposition take place at the law office of its attorney in Hartford, pursuant to Practice Book § 13-29.   In motion # 115, the diocese objects to the request for production on numerous grounds.   The diocese's arguments can be separated into three distinct categories:  (1) the plaintiff's request for production is overly broad;  (2) the request seeks privileged information and materials;  and (3) the compelled disclosure of church documents constitutes an entanglement of government in religion sufficient to violate the first amendment.   Each argument will be discussed in turn.

A.

As an initial matter, the court addresses the diocese's request that the deposition of its keeper of records take place at the offices of the diocese's attorney, pursuant to § 13-29.   Under Practice Book § 13-29(a), a defendant who is a state resident may be compelled to give a deposition in the county where he or she resides or within thirty miles of that residence or at such other place that a judge orders.  Practice Book § 13-29(f) provides that, for “an officer, director or managing agent of a corporate party ․ the place of examination shall be determined as if the residence of the deponent were the residence of the party.”

The diocese does not specify the subsection of § 13-29 upon which it relies.   Moreover, it failed to brief the request in its memorandum of law in support of its motion for protective order # 116.   The court is unaware of the location of the “residence” of the diocese and, as a result, cannot assume that a deposition held in New Haven would be unreasonable, pursuant to § 13-29.   Thus, the diocese's request that the court order the deposition of its keeper of records to be held in Hartford is denied.

B.

The diocese argues that the plaintiff's notice of deposition and discovery request is “overbroad.”   It contends that discovery should be limited to materials that are material, relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.   Specifically, it argues that the request for “everything” related to Bzdyra's service with the Roman Catholic Church is overly broad and should be more specific.   The diocese cites no Practice Book authority for its objection.   In his omnibus memorandum on the scope of discovery, the plaintiff argues that his request is justified.³

The scope of discovery in civil matters is governed by Practice Book § 13-2, which provides in relevant part:  “a party ․ may obtain ․ discovery of information or disclosure, production and inspection of papers, books or documents material to the subject matter involved in the pending action, which are not privileged ․ Discovery shall be permitted if the disclosure sought would be of assistance in the prosecution or defense of the action ․” Pursuant to Practice Book § 13-27(g), a notice of deposition served on a party deponent may be accompanied by a request for the production of documents and tangible things.  Practice Book § Section 13-9(c) requires that “[t]he request [for production] shall clearly designate the items to be inspected either individually or by category.”

“Discovery is confined to facts material to the plaintiff's cause of action and does not afford an open invitation to delve into the defendant's affairs ․ A plaintiff must be able to demonstrate good faith as well as probable cause that the information sought is both material and necessary to his action ․ A plaintiff should describe with such details as may be reasonably available the material he seeks ․ and should not be allowed to indulge a hope that a thorough ransacking of any information and material which the defendant may possess would turn up evidence helpful to [his] case ․ What is reasonably necessary and what the terms of the judgment require call for the exercise of the trial court's discretion.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Berger v. Cuomo, 230 Conn. 1, 6-7, 644 A.2d 333 (1994).

In addressing the scope of discovery, the court first addresses the relevant time period for the purposes of discovery.   The plaintiff's complaint does not refer to the time period when the sexual abuse is alleged to have occurred.   In its motion # 115, the diocese states that “plaintiff's counsel indicates that the [plaintiff's] claims relate to the 1985-1990 time frame.”   The diocese argues that the production of information should be limited to the time period during Bzdyra's alleged misconduct.   It contends that information involving Bzdyra after the alleged misconduct is immaterial and irrelevant.   In response, the plaintiff asserts that it is seeking discovery for the time period between 1985 and 1990, and for the two years prior to and two years after that time period.

The court finds that the plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating that information pertaining to any time prior to 1985 and after 1990 is material and necessary in pursuing his case against the defendants.   Thus, this court orders that the scope of the deposition noticed on September 2, 2010 and the accompanying request for production are to be limited to information and documents pertaining to the period between 1985 and 1990.

C.

The court next addresses the diocese's objection to the plaintiff's request for “all files ․ related to Bzdyra” and “everything ․ related to his service within the Roman Catholic Church.”   In fact, these requests are part of the request for Bzdyra's “priest file or general personal file ․ or any other personnel board file or similar file which contains documents referring to any alleged sexual contact by ․ Bzdyra, and all files (including documents and emails) related to ․ Bzdyra including:  complaints of abuse, employments files, transfers to different locations ․ reprimands, grievances, internal investigations ․ or anything else related to his service within the Roman Catholic Church, including communications with the vatican concerning Bzdyra, and all files pertaining to the plaintiff.”   This large and broad request is properly characterized as a request for Bzdyra's personnel file or files.

General Statutes § 31-128f concerns the disclosure of information in an employee's personnel file and provides in relevant part:  “No individually identifiable information contained in the personnel file or medical records of any employee shall be disclosed by an employer to any person or entity not employed by or affiliated with the employer without the written authorization of such employee except where the information is limited to the verification of dates of employment and the employee's title or position and wage or salary or where the disclosure is made ․ pursuant to a lawfully issued ․ judicial order ․” Personnel file is defined in General Statutes § 31-128a(5) as “papers, documents and reports, including electronic mail and facsimiles, pertaining to a particular employee that are used or have been used by an employer to determine such employee's eligibility for employment, promotion, additional compensation, transfer, termination, disciplinary or other adverse personnel action including employee evaluations or reports relating to such employee's character, credit and work habits.   Personnel file does not mean ․ medical records ․ [or] documents which are being developed or prepared for use in civil, criminal or grievance procedures ․”

The legal precedent is clear that “the contents of personnel files, though not immune from discovery, must only be disclosed in response to requests that directly relate to legitimate issues in the case material that is clearly material and relevant.”   Piveronas v. Franciscan Friars Assumption B.V.M. Province, Inc., Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Stamford, Docket No. X08 CV 07 5009962 (August 31, 2009, Jennings, J.T.R.).  “The disclosure of such information [contained in a personnel file] must be carefully tailored to a legitimate and demonstrated need for such information in any given case.   Where disclosure of the personnel file would place in the hands of a [party] irrelevant or personal and sensitive information concerning ․ [another], the entire file should not be disclosed.   No [party] has the right to conduct a general fishing expedition into the personnel records of [another] ․ Because discovery of matters contained in a ․ personnel file involves careful discrimination between material that relates to the issues involved and that which is irrelevant to those issues, the judicial authority should exercise its discretion in determining what matters should be disclosed ․ Because the law furnishes no precise or universal test of relevancy, the question must be determined on a case by case basis according to the teachings of reason and judicial experience ․” (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., Superior Court, supra, Docket No. CV 93 0300272.  “The trial court should make available to the [party] only information it concludes is clearly relevant and material to the issue involved.”  Id.

The proper procedure for the court to follow in making a determination on the discovery of documents contained in Bzdyra's personnel file is to conduct an in camera inspection of the documents involved.  “In camera review by the court reasonably satisfies the plaintiff's need for information necessary to establish his case while respecting a civil defendant's limited expectation of privacy in his personnel files as reflected in the implicit policy of ․ § 31-128f that the documents in such files not be cavalierly divulged by an employer.”  Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., Superior Court, supra, Docket No. CV 93 0300272.   Without access to Bzdyra's personnel file, the court cannot assess the materiality or relevance of the contents of such file.   The diocese is hereby ordered to produce to the court Bzdyra's priest file or general personal file or any other personnel board file or similar file which contains documents referring to any alleged sexual contact by Bzdyra with the plaintiff, and all files (including documents and emails) related to Bzdyra including:  complaints of abuse, employment files, transfers to different locations, reprimands, grievances, internal investigations, which deal with the period of Bzdyra's service with diocese between 1985 and 1990.

With respect to the plaintiff's request for “anything else related to [Bzdyra's] service within the Roman Catholic Church, including communications with the Vatican ․” The court finds that this portion of the request is not sufficiently tailored to demonstrate a legitimate and demonstrated need for such information.   Moreover, in its responses to the diocese's objection, the plaintiff has not made a showing that such information is material to the subject matter of his claims against the defendants.   As a result, the diocese's objection to that portion of the plaintiff's request for production is sustained.

D.

The diocese also contends that the request for production seeks documents that are not subject to discovery.   Specifically, it objects to the plaintiff's request for production on the ground that the request does not exempt materials covered by the following privileges:  priest/penitent;  doctor/patient;  psychiatrist/patient;  psychologist/patient and attorney/client.   In addition, the diocese asserts that the request for production includes materials covered by the work product doctrine, materials prepared in anticipation of litigation, documents governed by existing confidentiality documents and those within the scope of the “self-critical analysis doctrine.”

The court declines to address each of these privileges or bars to disclosure in turn because it cannot determine whether such privileges or bars to disclosure apply to the documents sought by the plaintiff.  “[W]ith respect to privilege claims generally, [the Supreme Court has] held that where the confidential status of otherwise discoverable information is apparent, a claim of privilege may be disposed of without further inquiry ․ Where the nature of a document is not patently discernible from the face of the discovery request, however, the burden of establishing immunity from discovery rests with the party asserting the privilege.”  (Internal citation omitted.)  Babcock v. Bridgeport Hospital, 251 Conn. 790, 847-48, 742 A.2d. 322 (1999).  “It is insufficient for the party invoking the privilege to do so solely by way of factual assertions made by an attorney in a memorandum of law to the court.”   Id., 843.

The court orders that to the extent that bonafide claims of privilege or exemptions from disclosure exist, they should be asserted by a privilege log for the court to review in camera which shall be filed no later than March 15, 2011.   In such privilege log, the diocese shall identify each document claimed to be privileged by a general description, date, author, recipient(s);  and succinctly state the source or privilege or exemption from disclosure.   If the diocese believes that a general description of the document is insufficient for the court to determine whether the asserted privilege or bar to disclosure applies, it may submit such document or documents for in camera review.

E.

With regard to the plaintiff's request for the diocese's “entire file, any and all documents ․ all investigative materials concerning the claim that resulted in ․ Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford ․” the court finds that such file and/or documents are outside the scope of what is material and relevant to the present case.   As a result, the diocese's objection to that portion of the plaintiff's request for production is sustained.

F.

The diocese objects to the plaintiff's request for production of “the Archival File or Secret Archival File” or any file known as a “379 File,” “489 File” or “any file pertaining to Section 490 of the Code of Canon Law” on the ground that the forced disclosure of the contents of a secret archive maintained pursuant to canon law would violate the separation of church and state and the protections of the first amendment and the “religion clauses of the Connecticut Constitution.”   It asserts that “Canon 489 § 1” provides that “There is also to be a secret archive in the diocesan curia, or at least a safe or file in the ordinary archive, completely closed and locked which cannot be removed from the place, and in which documents to be kept secret are to be protected most securely.”   The diocese contends that the compelled disclosure of documents would violate canon law and an investigation into the employment relationship between a church and its clergy violate first amendment protections.

The first amendment to the United States constitution provides, in relevant part, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ․” Similarly, Article first, § 3, of the Connecticut Constitution provides, in relevant part:  “The exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination, shall forever be free to all persons in the state ․”

The religious freedoms embraced in the first amendment apply to the states through the fourteenth amendment.   See Snyder v. Newtown, 147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770 (1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 299, 81 S.Ct. 692, 5 L.Ed.2d 688 (1961).   The first amendment established a “wall of separation between Church and State ․” Griswold Inn, Inc. v. State, 183 Conn. 552, 558-59, 441 A.2d 116 (1981).   However, the United States Supreme Court has “consistently held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Employment Division, Dept. Of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990).   Moreover, “the first amendment does not create blanket tort immunity for religious institutions or their clergy, thus allowing clergy and clerical institutions to be sued for the torts they commit.”  Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 921 F.Sup. 66, 73 (D.Conn.1995).

The diocese cites Rweyemamu v. Commission of Human Rights & Opportunities, 98 Conn.App. 646, 911 A.2d 319 (2006), cert. denied, 281 Conn. 911, 916 A.2d 51, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 886, 128 S.Ct. 206, 169 L.Ed.2d 144 (2007), in support of its contention that “internal church documents relating to clergy are protected from disclosure of under the first amendment.”   The issue before court in that case, however, was whether the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities and the Superior Court had jurisdiction over an employment discrimination dispute between a priest and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Norwich, based on the application of the “ministerial exception.”  “[T]he ministerial exception is judicial shorthand for two conclusions:  the first is that the imposition of secular standards on a church's employment of its ministers will burden the free exercise of religion;  the second, that the state's interest in eliminating employment discrimination is outweighed by a church's constitutional right of autonomy in its own domain.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 652.   The holding and reasoning of that case is limited to the ministerial exception to secular intervention in religious employment practices.  Id., 654-55.

The diocese correctly notes that “the internal governance of a religious institution, including the employment of ministers and clergy, is a protected religious belief of the institution.”  Rweyemamu v. Commission of Human Rights & Opportunities supra, 98 Conn.App. 653.   However, the court does not read the case law presented in the diocese's memorandum as a bar to the production of ecclesiastical documents pertaining to clergy.   Moreover, courts in Connecticut have consistently held that claims against religious institutions stemming from sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated by a member of the clergy can be adjudicated without violating the first amendment.   See Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, supra, 921 F.Sup. 74;  Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 45 Conn.Sup. 397, 716 A.2d 967 (1998);  Reed v. Zizka, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV950555221S (March 5, 1998, Aurigemma, J.).   As a result, it is difficult for the court to imagine that the compelled disclosure of certain documents that are maintained pursuant to canon law would result in an entanglement of the court in church matters sufficient to result in a violation of the diocese's first amendment rights.   Thus, the diocese's objection to the plaintiff's request to produce documents from a secret archive is overruled to the extent that it contains documents which pertain to the time period between 1985 to 1990 and are relevant to the plaintiff's claims.   To the extent that the diocese believes that any such documents are properly categorized as part of the plaintiff's employment file and are protected by § 31-128f, as discussed in part II B, infra, the diocese may present these documents to the court for in camera review.

III Motions # 128, # 129

Motions # 128 and # 129, a motion for protective order and an objection to the plaintiff's request for production, respectively, were filed in response to the plaintiff's October 28, 2010 notice of deposition.   In that notice of deposition, the plaintiff once again seeks to take the deposition of the diocese's keeper of records and “the person most knowledgeable concerning the salary, benefits, assets, holdings, monies, retirement accounts or benefits, stipends, real estate, real property and tax documentation” of Bzdyra.   The request for production seeks the complete personnel file and records of Bzdyra including assets held by Bzdyra and “evidence of salary, benefits, assets, holdings, monies, retirement accounts or benefits, stipends, real estate, real property and tax documentation.”   The diocese seeks a protective order and objects to the request for production on the ground that the disclosure of personnel records is barred by § 31-128f.   The court notes that the plaintiff did not address these motions in his “omnibus memorandum” on the scope of discovery, except to reiterate his request for all documents and files “pertaining” to Bzdyra.

The court sustains the diocese's motions # 128 and # 129 and, consistent with the discussion of the plaintiff's previous request for Bzdyra's entire personnel file in part II C, infra, orders that the diocese submit the requested documents as part of Bzdyra's personnel file for in camera review.   Such production shall be limited to the time period between 1985 and 1990, consistent with part II, B of this opinion.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the plaintiff is not to disseminate any information obtained through discovery, unless such material has been filed with the court in conjunction with some adjudicative action and is unsealed.   The deposition of the diocese's keeper of records shall be had at the office of the plaintiff's attorney in New Haven, Connecticut.   The scope of such deposition is to be limited to the time period between 1985 and 1990.   The diocese is to submit the contents of Bzdyra's personnel file or files that pertain to the time period from 1985 to 1990 to this court for in camera review.   The diocese is further ordered to produce other relevant documents for that time period to the plaintiff.   If the diocese has a bona fide claim of privilege, it shall assert such claims in a privilege log for in camera review by the court.

Woods, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The court notes that Bzdyra has not yet been deposed by the plaintiff..  FN1. The court notes that Bzdyra has not yet been deposed by the plaintiff.

FN2. Section 13-5 states in relevant part:  “Upon motion by a party from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the judicial authority may make any order which justice requires to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following:  (1) that the discovery not be had;  (2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions ․ (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery;  (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters;  (5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the judicial authority;  (6) that a deposition ․ be opened only by order of the judicial authority;  (7) that a trade secret ․ not be disclosed ․ (8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the judicial authority.”.  FN2. Section 13-5 states in relevant part:  “Upon motion by a party from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the judicial authority may make any order which justice requires to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following:  (1) that the discovery not be had;  (2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions ․ (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery;  (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters;  (5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the judicial authority;  (6) that a deposition ․ be opened only by order of the judicial authority;  (7) that a trade secret ․ not be disclosed ․ (8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the judicial authority.”

FN3. The court notes that, in his omnibus memorandum, the plaintiff requests that the court “enter an order covering all documents and files pertaining to ․ all claims of abuse alleged to have occurred at either the St. Francis or the St. Hedwig parishes [regardless of the alleged perpetrator's identity] ․” The court declines to address this request because it has not been presented to the diocese.   In fact, both notices of deposition addressed in this decision, and the accompanying requests for production, are limited to files pertaining to Bzdyra and the plaintiff and do not mention either St. Francis or St. Hedwig parishes at all..  FN3. The court notes that, in his omnibus memorandum, the plaintiff requests that the court “enter an order covering all documents and files pertaining to ․ all claims of abuse alleged to have occurred at either the St. Francis or the St. Hedwig parishes [regardless of the alleged perpetrator's identity] ․” The court declines to address this request because it has not been presented to the diocese.   In fact, both notices of deposition addressed in this decision, and the accompanying requests for production, are limited to files pertaining to Bzdyra and the plaintiff and do not mention either St. Francis or St. Hedwig parishes at all.

Woods, Glenn A., J.