IN RE: Kamora W.1 (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

These actions are brought by The Department of Children and Families (“DCF” or “Petitioner”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of the biological mother and the biological father of Kamora W. (hereinafter referred to as “Kamora W.” or “the child”).   The biological mother of this child is Lorraine P. (hereinafter referred to as “Lorraine P.” or “Mother”) and the biological father is Anthony W., (hereinafter referred to as “Anthony W.” or “Father”).

On 4/28/08, DCF invoked a 96-hour hold on behalf of Kamora W.

On 5/2/08, Neglect Petitions and Motions for Orders of Temporary Custody were filed on behalf of the child with the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford.   An OTC was granted on 5/2/08, and sustained on 5/9/08 for Father and on 6/12/08 for Mother.   On 7/28/08, the child was adjudicated neglected/uncared for and was committed to the care and custody of the Department of Children and Families.

On 3/17/09, the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford approved a Permanency Plan of Reunification with Father, Anthony W., and thereafter revised the Permanency Plan to Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption.

On 1/27/10, Petitions to Terminate the Parental Rights of Lorraine P. and Anthony W. were filed.

On 2/25/10, the court confirmed abode service on Mother and Father.   Father was present, was advised and applied for an attorney.   Mother was not present and on 3/16/10, a default was entered with regard to Mother.   On 9/24/10, the default as to Mother was vacated.

On 1/10/11, the court commenced trial and Mother and Father were present.   The trial was continued to a second day of 1/11/11 and again to 1/13/11 for argument.   At the time of trial, counsel for DCF submitted twenty-three exhibits (A-W) and seven witnesses testified for DCF. Father submitted eight exhibits and testified on his own behalf.

On conclusion of argument on 1/13/11, the Court ordered the parties to submit briefs within two weeks.

The court finds that there is no action pending in any other court affecting custody of this child and that this court has jurisdiction in this matter.

The grounds of the Petition for TPR as to the biological Father and Mother are Failure to Rehabilitate under General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(B-1) and as to Mother only, Abandonment and No Ongoing Parent-Child Relationship.

The court has applied the burden of proof applicable to the Termination of Parental Rights and Neglect Petitions, has reviewed the Neglect Petition and the social studies and exhibits that were submitted in evidence.   The court has utilized the applicable legal standards in considering the evidence and the testimony of any witnesses.

I

FACTUAL FINDINGSA. Background, Facts Substantiating Allegations of Neglect and Termination

On 12/28/07, a report was received by DCF from Pam Fowler, a nurse at St. Francis Hospital in Hartford, alleging neglect of Kamora W. by Mother, Lorraine P.

Mother tested positive for cocaine at the time of delivery and admitted to having problems with crack cocaine.   She claimed to have used three months prior to delivery but she tested positive for cocaine after Kamora W.'s birth.   Kamora W. was born prematurely at 25 weeks and 5 days gestation and was placed in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU)/Special Care Unit at St. Francis Hospital.

Dr. Indira Panthagani was the neonatologist at Saint Francis hospital providing medical care for Kamora W. See Dr. Panthagani's affidavit for medical information regarding Kamora W., which is attached to the OTC affidavit.

A DCF social worker was assigned to this case on 2/6/08, and after reviewing the case records, established that this family has a history with DCF dating back to 6/29/92, due to physical neglect, emotional neglect, and abandonment of child Equilla H. There have been three neglect substantiations since 6/29/92.

Mother was involved with DCF as a child and was raised primarily by her maternal great-grandmother, Equilla G. Physical neglect of Equilla H. by Mother was confirmed in 1992.   In 1996, physical and emotional neglect and abandonment of Equilla H. was confirmed and she was committed to DCF. In 1997, DCF transferred guardianship of Equilla H. to Equilla G. due to the child's parents' abandonment of her and their unaddressed substance abuse.

Mother's substance abuse history began at age 17 when she began drinking and experimenting with drugs.   At the age 22, Mother became addicted to crack cocaine.   She reported that she was diagnosed with bi-polar disorder and depression, and that she has a history of self-mutilation.   She received mental health treatment at Capital Region and was assigned to a case manager.   Mother was non-compliant with mental health treatment and was not taking her psychotropic medication.

Father, Anthony W., has verbally acknowledged paternity of Kamora W. He has had an ongoing relationship with Mother, Lorraine P., for the past 11-13 years.   He claims that he is no longer involved romantically with Lorraine P. due to her ongoing substance abuse but he continues his involvement with her because they have a daughter, Kamora W., together.   Father does not have any other children.

B. Mother, Lorraine P.

Mother, Lorraine P., was born in Hartford, Connecticut on 1/15/74 to Alice P. and Ronald H. She is the first child born to her mother and the second child born to her father.   Lorraine P. was raised by her maternal great-grandmother due to her mother's youth, but she had ongoing contact with her mother.   She met her father and his relatives when she was eleven years old, however, she did not have any ongoing relationship with them.   She recalled that her great-grandmother was very strict and did not allow her to have friends over to visit or to go to their homes.

Mother attended Hartford public schools through junior high.   At age 14, she transferred to Windsor High School where she became aggressive toward her peers and the faculty and was eventually expelled.   She ran away from home for days at a time to hang out with her friends.   She made a suicide attempt by ingesting numerous aspirins and was hospitalized in the psychiatric ward of Mt. Sinai Hospital for three months.   During this time period, she continued to display increased oppositional and aggressive behaviors;  these episodes often resulted in her being placed in full restraint for her protection.   She was not given any medication as Equilla G. disapproved of such treatment.   Lorraine P. convinced her great grandmother to let her come home, and for a short period of time she complied with the rules.   However, she soon returned to her old behavior patterns, including running away from home.

At age 15, Lorraine P. was institutionalized at the Institute of Living (IOL) for three months.   Her behavior improved and she was discharged back to Equilla G. A short time later, she ran away again and Equilla G., who no longer wanted the responsibility of caring for Lorraine P., called DCF. Lorraine P. was placed at the Douglas House shelter in New Haven where she stayed for a month, and then was reported missing.   She claims she went to New York with peers from the Douglas House, but she later returned to Equilla G.'s home.

At age 16, Lorraine P. became pregnant and because Equilla G. did not want the responsibility of caring for her and her child, Lorraine P. became emancipated and went to live with her maternal aunt, Gloria G. In 1991, Mother gave birth to Equilla H. There was no ongoing contact with the father, Marlon H., as he had a history of incarceration.   Mother received assistance through DSS in the form of cash assistance, medical insurance and food stamps.   She was employed for a short time but has no substantial work history.

Mother has a long history of arrests dating back to 1991.   She was charged with Larceny 1, 2, and 3;  Failure to Appear in Court;  Threatening;  Disorderly Conduct;  Possession of Narcotics;  Prostitution;  Tampering with Evidence;  Assault 2 and 3;  Breach of Peace;  and Criminal Mischief.

Mother began experimenting with cocaine and alcohol at age 21.   In 1995, she became high and paranoid about caring for her 4-year-old daughter and called the Hartford Police to ask for assistance.   DCF was notified and Equilla H. was subsequently placed under DCF's custody.   Mother did not attend any of the court hearings and DCF transferred guardianship to Equilla G. Mother became transient and visited Equilla H. only when her great grandmother allowed her to.

In 1996 Lorraine P. met Anthony W. at his cousin's home and subsequently had a relationship with him over the next 13 years.

In 1999 Lorraine P. was admitted to the Institute of Living (IOL) and was diagnosed as Schizophrenic.   She was placed on medication, but she did not comply with taking it as prescribed.

In 2000 Lorraine P. was arrested when she became physically abusive to Anthony W.'s mother and was charged with assault.

In 2003 Lorraine P. became a patient of Capital Region Mental where she was diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder.

On 12/28/07, Mother gave birth to Kamora W. at St. Francis Hospital in Hartford.   Kamora W. was born prematurely at 25 weeks and 5 days gestation and weighed 1 lb. 5 oz. due to Mother's use of crack cocaine during her pregnancy.   Kamora W. was placed on a ventilator for the first 50 days of her life.   On 01/10/08, she had surgery for a heart valve repair, known as Patent Ductus Arteriosus repair.   While she was hospitalized, both Mother and Father visited her on a regular basis.

C. Father, Anthony W.

Father, Anthony W., was born in Hartford, Connecticut to Myrtle W. and Alander M. He is the youngest of three siblings.   He was born with paralysis in his right arm and this required surgery and physical therapy.   He has no other medical issues.   He is of African-American descent and was raised by both of his parents.   He denies any domestic violence, alcohol or drug issues in his family of origin and states he had a positive childhood.

Anthony W. attended local Hartford schools but failed to graduate high school.

Anthony W. has been employed in various jobs.   His first job as a dishwasher at Valley Steak House lasted six months, after which he became interested in painting and was trained for that profession.   At age 20, he went to Job Corps and took metal technology as a trade.   After completion of that course, he worked on a couple of jobs as a metal technician.   Thereafter, he completed a 5-week training course in truck driving.   He worked as a tractor-trailer driver for 5 years and was employed by Beauty Enterprise Shipping and Receiving for another 5 years.   For the past five years he has been employed full-time by Warehouse Electrical Wholesales in shipping and receiving as a truck driver.

Anthony W. has a good relationship with his family members.   He denies ever using substances and claims to drink on social occasions.   He has never been married and has one child, Kamora W. with Lorraine P. He claimed that their relationship was unstable due to Lorraine P.'s ongoing use of substances and her physical abuse toward him which resulted in her arrest.   Anthony W. had one other romantic relationship that lasted 5 years.

Anthony W. has a minimal criminal history;  he was last arrested in 1990.

D. Child, Kamora W.

Kamora W. was born on 12/28/07, at 25 weeks and 5 days gestation, weighing 1 lb., 5 oz.   She spent the first 50 days of her life in the hospital because of complications due to her prematurity.

Kamora W. was discharged from the hospital on 05/05/08 and was classified as medically complex.   She was born with multiple medical complications including Rio prenatal drug exposure, Sip Patent Ductus Arteriosus repair on 1/10/08, Episodes of Sepsis, Respiratory complication which required incubation, Sip Inguinal hernia repair on 4/23/08, GERD, Reflux, Laryngeomalacia, and ROP. Although Kamora W. was medically stable, she was still susceptible to illness.   Her respiratory system was compromised requiring Albuterol treatment with a nebulizer.   Kamora W. is small for her age and is reportedly a very picky eater;  her intake is supplemented with Ensure.   She is current with her medical appointments and has gained weight.   She does not need to continue to see an optometrist unless a problem is noted.   Kamora W. is not currently in need of any mental health treatment;  however, due to Mother's diagnosis, this child will need to be closely monitored in the future.

Kamora W. does not have any behavioral issues.   She is developing her own personality and seems to enjoy playing with other children in the foster home.

Kamora W. has received Birth to Three services through CREC for delays in speech, language and development.

At five months of age, Kamora W. was discharged from the hospital into a medically complex foster home.   She was there from 5/23/08 to 6/04/09.   At that time she was moved to another medically complex foster home where she remained until 7/15/10, when she was placed in a two-parent legal risk foster home.   The family has two other children, ages 6 and 9. Kamora W. is very attached to all family members as well as their extended family and her foster parents are enthusiastic about adopting her.

E. Relative Resources

See Section II, paragraph B, Ground B1 as to Father, Anthony W.

F. Present Situation

See Exhibit L. dated 1/5/11.

G. Siblings for Whom Petitions are not Filed

Kamora W. has one half sister, Equilla H., who was born on 9/2/91.   Equilla H. was removed from her Mother's care at the age of 4 and was subsequently raised by her great grandmother under a Transfer of Guardianship.

II

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS ADJUDICATION

The court must determine whether the proof provides clear and convincing evidence that a pleaded ground exists to terminate Mother, Lorraine P.'s and Father, Anthony W.'s rights as of the date of the filing of the petition.

A. Reasonable Efforts Finding

Unless a court has found in an earlier proceeding that efforts to reunify are no longer appropriate, in order to terminate parental rights, DCF initially must show by clear and convincing evidence that it “has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the children with their parents, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parents are unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.”  C.G.S. Sec. 17a-112(j)(1).   “Reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.”  In re Jessica B., 50 Conn.App. 554, 566, 718 A.2d 997 (1998).

The Court finds that reasonable efforts have been made by DCF to provide appropriate and suitable services to reunify Kamora W. with both Mother, Lorraine P. and Father, Anthony W. (See Exhibits A, B, D, G, I and L.) While Mother has claimed an interest in reunification to some degree, she has been unwilling or unable to benefit from those services and programs offered.  (See exhibits cited above.)

On the other hand, Father, Anthony W., has worked hard and accomplished much from the time of Kamora W.'s birth on 12/28/97 until the present, a period of over three years;  with the exception of the substance abuse efforts, he has gained advances in the ability to parent and care for Kamora W.

In addition, DCF has made reasonable efforts to achieve the Permanency Plan. All court findings were made by clear and convincing evidence.

B. Grounds for the Termination:  Failure to Rehabilitate-General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(1)-as to biological Mother, Lorraine P. and as to biological Father, Anthony W.

The Commissioner has alleged as a ground for termination that Mother and Father have failed to rehabilitate themselves after their child had been adjudicated as neglected.   This ground for termination, based upon a prior adjudication of neglect and a failure of personal rehabilitation, is clearly articulated in our statutes.  Conn. Gen.Stat. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(I) states in part that:

[t]he Superior Court ․ may grant a petition [to terminate parental rights] if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ the child has been found by the Superior Court ․ to have been neglected ․ and the parent has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.”

Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a-112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent.  “ ․ [The statute] requires the trial court ․ to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [they] have achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [they] can assume a responsible position in [their] child's life.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873 (1999).  “ ․ [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the [parents have] improved [their] ability to manage [their] own life, but rather whether [they] have gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000).   See also In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, 718, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 769 A.2d 61 (2001);  In re Alejandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 259, 881 A.2d 450 (2005).

Whether the age and needs of the child would support allowance of further time for the parents to rehabilitate must also be considered.  In re Luis C., supra, 210 Conn. 157, 167-68, 5545 A.2d 722 (1989).   The reasonableness of the time period within which rehabilitation is sought to be accomplished is a question of fact for the court.  In re Davon M., 16 Conn.App. 693, 696, 548 A.2d 1350 (1988).   Also, in determining whether further allowance of a reasonable period of time would promote rehabilitation, a court can consider efforts made since the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights.  In re Sarah M., 19 Conn.App. 371, 377, 562 A.2d 566 (1989).

Several aspects of the clear and convincing evidence in this case compel the conclusion that Lorraine P. and Anthony W. have yet to achieve a sufficient “level of rehabilitation ․ which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [they] can assume a responsible position in [their child's life].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000).   See In re Alejandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 259, 881 A.2d 450 (2005);  In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 769 A.2d 61 (2001).   The credible evidence in this case, presented through the TPR social study and exhibits, clearly and convincingly establishes that the parents have not achieved CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(B1) rehabilitation.   The court credits the DCF reports which show that they have been unable to achieve rehabilitation.

Ground B1-Failure to Rehabilitate after Adjudication as to Kamora W. by Lorraine P., Mother.

On 5/9/08, specific steps were issued by the Court for Mother and Father.   (Exhibit G.) Critical to the specific steps were:

a.  Develop stronger parenting skills;

b. Keep all appointments and visits set by DCF and others;

c. Keep whereabouts known to DCF and attorneys;

d. Participate in counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals;

e. Develop skills to maintain sobriety and establish sobriety supports;

f. Improve financial status and establish safe and stable housing;  and

g. Have no further involvement with the criminal justice system.

Mother has not kept most of her scheduled appointments;  has been whereabouts unknown for much of the time from Kamora W.'s birth to the present;  has visited with the child only sporadically;  has not complied with parenting classes and individual therapy sessions as recommended;  has not addressed her mental health and substance abuse;  continues her transiency;  and has been involved with criminal activities to the point of incarceration and further probation.

Mother has a significant history of substance abuse dating back to 1995.   Although she has participated in treatment services in the past, she has never established any significant period of sobriety.   She is also dealing with mental health issues and has been placed on medication and offered services, but she has not complied with treatment.

It is apparent that Mother recognizes her failings in rehabilitation as she has, on a number of occasions, admitted her choices to forgo the efforts made on behalf of DCF to offer assistance.

At the time of trial, Mother's basic argument to the court was that she “agreed that Father, Anthony W. should have custody of Kamora.”   The record accurately reflects that Mother has never been reliably involved and has had no interest in addressing any of her frailties with regard to her parenting or caretaking of the child.

Mother will not be able to assume a responsible position in the life of her child within a reasonable period of time.   Her failure to benefit from over three years of DCF intervention demonstrates an inability to safely parent Kamora W. in the foreseeable future.

Kamora W. is a thirty-seven-month-old child with significant medical and dental needs that require the care of a stable and competent caretaker for every aspect of her well being.   She receives extensive services from Birth to Three in the areas of physical and occupational therapy and will require ongoing services to ensure her needs are adequately met.

Ground B1-Failure to Rehabilitate after Adjudication as to Kamora W. by Anthony W., Father.

Kamora W. has been in the care of non-relative caretakers from the time of her birth on 12/28/07 until the present, a period of more than three years.  (See Section I, Factual Findings, Paragraph D, Child for a complete history of Kamora W. and her placements.)

On 3/17/08, a permanency plan for reunification with Father was approved by the court.   At that same court hearing it was noticed that DCF had received the results of a hair test on Father that was positive for cocaine.   At that time Father agreed to comply with any treatment necessary.   Dates were set by the court for an ICJR of Father's progress on 9/17/09, and a MRP on 1/20/10.

On 9/17/09, it was noted by Father's attorney that there were setbacks with his client;  he was in support of maternal great-aunt (“MGA”) being investigated for placement and there was no objection to MGA intervening.   It was also reported by DCF that a new Permanency Plan of TPR and Adoption was to be filed.   On 11/19/08, the plan for TPR and Adoption was approved by the court and MGA was to be investigated for placement.   MGA was subsequently unable to get licensing.

On 2/25/10, the date set for a TPR, Father entered denials, was assigned an attorney and a CMC was set for 4/5/10.   Mother was not present in court, however, abode service was confirmed, and thereafter, on 3/16/10, a default was entered as to Mother.

On 9/24/10, the default ordered on 3/16/10 was opened and vacated, Mother was to be appointed a new attorney and the TPR trial was continued to 10/25/10.   On 9/30/10, the TPR trial was marked off and continued to 10/14/10 to determine new trial dates.

On 10/14/10, a new trial was ordered for 1/10/11, MGA was removed from all cases, and a plan for TPR and Adoption was approved.

At the commencement of the trial on 1/10/11, DCF's motion for judicial notice was granted without objection.   DCF presented 26 exhibits (A-W) and Father presented 8 exhibits (1-8);  all exhibits were entered without objection.   The trial was continued to 1/11/11 after a hearing on the first day, and at the conclusion of evidence, was continued to 1/13/11 for argument.   On 1/13/11, the court ordered briefs to be submitted by 1/28/11.   Only father filed a brief.   On 1/10/11, three witnesses-Claudia Ramon, DCF;  Katie Petersen, ADRC;  and Michael Ciarroccki, Foster Father testified;  and on 1/11/11, Mary Kent, DCF and Anthony W., Father testified.

As noted previously, at the outset of this matter Father was evidencing a day-to-day living situation that was stable and he was determined to comply with most of the reunification efforts facilitated by DCF. (See Exhibit F.) Thereafter, it became evident that Mother was spending time at Father's residence and there appeared to be a relationship between Mother and Father.   From time to time Mother would become confrontational and aggressive towards Father, and as a result, domestic violence issues were probable.   Anthony W. was told that this situation could have an effect on reunification and that he should request a protective order.   He did not react positively to this advice, and eventually Lorraine P. was released from a Sober House to live with Anthony W. during her probation.  (See Exhibits D, F and L.) It does not appear from the evidence that Anthony W. is exercising any control over ending this relationship.

Kamora W. is a medically fragile child.   As reported, Anthony W. has made admirable efforts to succeed in his rehabilitation as it relates to Kamora W., but there is the lack of a support system to care for this child when Father is unable to do so.   Several names of family members, friends and others have been mentioned at different times, but none of these people have come forward and can be reasonably relied upon to provide parental-type care for Kamora W. when Father is unavailable.  (See Exhibits F, H, I and K.) One relative who had originally been allowed to intervene later stated:  “No family members are stable enough to care for Kamora.”  (See Exhibit I at page 5.) The absence of a support system, coupled with the fact that Anthony W. still has a relationship with Lorraine P. which might open the door for Mother's involvement in Kamora W.'s life, would definitely not be acceptable to this Court.   Also, while daycare was mentioned on a number of occasions, nothing certain has been put forward.   If anything were possible over the last three years it should be, at the very least, in the planning stages.   It is not anticipated that this service could be put in place within a reasonable period of time.

Anthony W.'s failure to recognize the detrimental effect his substance abuse will have on Kamora W. cannot be overlooked.   A positive test for cocaine on 2/18/09 was followed by participation in an ADRC program, which was successfully completed on 12/14/09.   However, Father had a positive hair test for cocaine on 2/13/10.  (See Exhibits E, J, K, R, S and T.)

The court takes notice of the fact that Anthony has attended and been active in his association with service providers with regard to parenting and care for Kamora W. This information must be balanced with the parental responsibilities for the day-to-day care of the child and the meeting of her needs.

In observing the seeming reluctance of Anthony W. to break off his relationship with Lorraine P., his disinterest in dealing permanently with his substance abuse issues, and the lack of setting forth a firm support system to meet the needs of Kamora W., considering the three-year period of time in which these issues could have been addressed, the court does not believe that the necessary rehabilitation can be achieved within a reasonable time frame given the age and needs of the child.

Summary of Adjudicatory Findings

This court has found that the Commissioner has proved the adjudicatory grounds by clear and convincing evidence that Father, Anthony W. and Mother, Lorraine P. have failed to rehabilitate.

III

DISPOSITION

Except in the case where termination is based on consent, if grounds have been found to terminate parental rights applying the appropriate standard of proof, the court must then consider whether the facts as of the last day of trial establish, by clear and convincing evidence, after consideration of the factors enumerated in C.G.S. § 17a-112(k), that termination is in the child's best interest.   If the court does find that termination is in the child's best interest, an order will enter terminating parental rights.

A. C.G.S. § 17a-112(k) Criteria

The court has found by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory grounds alleged by DCF for the termination of parental rights have been proven.

Before making a decision whether or not to terminate Lorraine P.'s and Anthony W.'s parental rights, as they did not consent, the court will consider and make findings on each of the seven criteria set forth in C.G.S. § 17a-112(k).  In re Romance M., 229 Conn. 345, 355, 641 A.2d 378 (1994).

These criteria and this court's findings, which have been established by clear and convincing evidence, are as follows:

1. “The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered or provided to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.”

This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify Kamora W. with her parents.   Those services were ordered in a timely manner and were appropriate for the circumstances at hand.

Considered carefully, the clear and convincing evidence shows that DCF offered timely, appropriate and comprehensive services to the respondent parents to facilitate [their] reunification with [their] child and made reasonable efforts to reunite [them] with [their] child.  In re Victoria B., 79 Conn.App. 245, 258-60, 829 A.2d 855 (2003).

Based on this clear and convincing evidence of the circumstances now present in this case, the court finds that Lorraine P. and Anthony W. are unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts.  CGS § 17a-112(j)(1).   Their serious issues clearly and convincingly make them unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts.  In re Tyqwane V., 85 Conn.App. 528, 535-36, 857 A.2d 963 (2004).

2. “Whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.”

This court finds that the clear and convincing evidence in this matter proves that the parents are presently unable and/or unwilling to benefit from such reunification services as was contemplated by the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

DCF has previously offered multiple services to the parents.   DCF has made reasonable efforts to maintain contact with both parents.

3. “The terms of any court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all the parties have fulfilled their obligations of such order.”

The clear and convincing evidence indicates that Mother has failed to fully comply with most of the steps ordered by the court, and Father has failed to comply with many of the steps as ordered.

4. “The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to her parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.”

The child has exhibited little bonding with her Mother due to her failure to comprehend the services offered and fully understand their implementation for the benefit of her child and the parent-child relationship.   Mother's mental health issues and substance abuse issues prevent her from engaging in consistent feelings and emotional ties to her child.

The child has shown some bonding with her Father, but since the placement in the present foster home, this seems to be diminishing.

5. “The age of the child.”

Kamora W. was born on 12/25/07 and is thirty-seven months old.

6. “The efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return to such child's home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent provided that the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child.”

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parents have not made realistic and sustained efforts to conform their conduct to minimally acceptable parental standards.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parents have not made the changes necessary in their lifestyles that would indicate that they would be safe, responsible and nurturing parents for Kamora W. To permit the child to return to her parents' care would compromise the safety of the child.

7. “The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.”

This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that no unreasonable conduct by DCF, foster parents, caregivers, the Department of Corrections or third parties prevented Lorraine P. or Anthony W. from maintaining a relationship with Kamora W., nor did their economic circumstances prevent such relationship, although the limitations and restrictions inherent in the care system remain in effect.

B. Best Interest of the Child-C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(2)

The court is next called upon to determine whether termination of Lorraine P.'s and Anthony W.'s parental rights to Kamora W. would be in her best interest.²  Applying the appropriate legal standards ³ to the clear and convincing facts of this case, the court finds this issue in favor of the State of Connecticut and DCF.

In determining whether termination of Lorraine P.'s and Anthony W.'s parental rights would be in the child's best interest, the court has examined multiple relevant factors, including the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of her environment;  her length of stay in foster care;  the nature of her relationship with her biological parents;  and the degree of contact maintained with her biological parents.⁴  In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000);  In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000);  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999).   In a matter such as this, the court is further called upon to balance Kamora W.'s intrinsic needs for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with her parents.   See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).

Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter establishes that it is not in Kamora W.'s best interest to continue to maintain any legal relationship with her parents.

The clear and convincing evidence also shows that the child's parents have failed to gain insight into becoming safe, nurturing and responsible parents for her.   The clear and convincing evidence shows that their judgment and conduct remains questionable, and has not improved since their child was taken into DCF care.

The parents' performance clearly and convincingly shows that they lack the attributes and characteristics necessary to fulfill valid parental roles.   Their recalcitrance concerning referrals clearly and convincingly shows that without commitment to consistent mental health and other treatment, as well as individual and parenting counseling, it is likely that they have extinguished what little chance they ever had to be able to serve as safe, nurturing and responsible parents for any child.

An additional factor to consider in this case is time.   The clear and convincing evidence demonstrates Kamora W.'s pressing need for permanence and stability.   Unfortunately, much time would be required for Mother and Father to show that they have forsaken selfish abuses, addressed their issues, undertaken the necessary counseling and succeeded in it, established themselves in the community and shown that they were capable of being safe, nurturing and responsible parents for their child.   Kamora W. cannot delay her need for permanence and stability for her parents' uncertain future.

Based upon the parents' behavior and performance so far, this court cannot foresee them ever having the ability or the opportunity to be able to follow the regimen necessary for this child to maximize her abilities and achievements.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that the time needed for the parents to attempt to rehabilitate and establish themselves in the community as safe, nurturing and responsible parents, if that were possible, is time that their child cannot afford.

The parents' performance clearly and convincingly shows that they lack the attributes and characteristics necessary to fulfill valid parental roles.   Their conduct clearly and convincingly shows that it is unlikely that they will ever be able to conform their behavior to appropriate norms or be able to serve as safe, nurturing and responsible parents for Kamora W.

Our courts have recognized that “long-term stability is critical to a child's future health and development ․” In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 709, 741 A.2d 873 (1999).   Furthermore, “[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence” when resolving issues related to the permanent or temporary care of neglected children.  In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 934 (1991), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1992);  see also In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).   The court is obliged to agree with DCF and concludes that the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that Kamora W. is entitled to the benefit of ending, without further delay, the period of uncertainty as to the availability of her biological parents as caretakers.

Having balanced Kamora W.'s individual and intrinsic needs for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with her parents, the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that the child's best interest cannot be served by continuing to maintain any legal relationship to her parents.  Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. 313-14.

Accordingly, with respect to the best interest of the child as contemplated by CGS § 17a-112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, including the testimony and evidence presented, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Lorraine P. and Anthony W. as to Kamora W. is in the best interest of the child in question.

IV

CONCLUSION

The court having considered all statutory considerations and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for termination of parental rights, further finds upon all the facts and circumstances presented, that it is in Kamora W.'s best interest to terminate the parental rights of Lorraine P., the biological Mother of the child and Anthony W., the biological Father of the child.   Accordingly, it is ordered that their parental rights to Kamora W. are hereby terminated.

It is further ordered that the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families be appointed the statutory parent for this child for the purpose of securing an adoptive family and a permanent placement for this child.

The statutory parent is ordered to file the appropriate written reports with the court, as are required by state and federal law and which show the efforts to effect the permanent placement of this child.

BY THE COURT,

WOLLENBERG, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN2. The final element of the termination of parental rights statute, CGS § 17a-112(j), requires that before granting a duly noticed petition for such termination, the court must find, “by clear and convincing evidence ․ (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child ․”.  FN2. The final element of the termination of parental rights statute, CGS § 17a-112(j), requires that before granting a duly noticed petition for such termination, the court must find, “by clear and convincing evidence ․ (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child ․”

FN3. “Termination of parental rights means the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child's parent or parents ․ Termination of parental rights is a most serious and sensitive judicial action.  In re Barbara J., 215 Conn. 31, 44, 574 A.2d 203 (1990).”  (Citation omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Steven N., 57 Conn.App. 629, 632, 749 A.2d 678 (2000).  “[T]he question ․ to be decided in a dispositional phase is whether it is in the best interests of the child to sever the parent-child relationship.   That is different from the question of who should have custody of the child if termination of parental rights is determined to be in the best interests of the child.   See Practice Book § 33-5.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 776, 740 A.2d 896 (1999).  “In making this determination, the trial court can consider all events occurring prior to the date of the dispositional hearing, including those occurring after the filing of the termination petition.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Kasheema L., 56 Conn.App. 484, 488, 744 A.2d 441, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 945, 747 A.2d 522 (2000)..  FN3. “Termination of parental rights means the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child's parent or parents ․ Termination of parental rights is a most serious and sensitive judicial action.  In re Barbara J., 215 Conn. 31, 44, 574 A.2d 203 (1990).”  (Citation omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Steven N., 57 Conn.App. 629, 632, 749 A.2d 678 (2000).  “[T]he question ․ to be decided in a dispositional phase is whether it is in the best interests of the child to sever the parent-child relationship.   That is different from the question of who should have custody of the child if termination of parental rights is determined to be in the best interests of the child.   See Practice Book § 33-5.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 776, 740 A.2d 896 (1999).  “In making this determination, the trial court can consider all events occurring prior to the date of the dispositional hearing, including those occurring after the filing of the termination petition.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Kasheema L., 56 Conn.App. 484, 488, 744 A.2d 441, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 945, 747 A.2d 522 (2000).

FN4. “[T]he genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999)..  FN4. “[T]he genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999).

Wollenberg, William L., J.T.R.