Walter Lawson v. Warden (2010)

DECISION

THE COURT:  All right.   The following will constitute the decision of this Court.   Madam Court Reporter, please prepare a partial transcript from this point forward for my signature.

The Court's going to deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and I'm going to explain why.   It was particularly telling when Mr. Lawson in his testimony made the comment that if he had it to do over, he would go all the way to get his day in court because he didn't do this properly.   The key and important part of that statement by Mr. Lawson is that he doesn't have it to do over.

What is of particular note in this case and dispositive of the case is the fact that this was a plea of guilty, and in particular, a plea of guilty under the doctrine, the Alford Doctrine, which, of course, refers to the U.S. Supreme Court case of North Carolina versus Alford, 400 U.S. 25 1970.

Now, in this case, Mr. Lawson was facing numerous counts, not just the ones to which he pled guilty.   As a result of the global settlement of all of the cases pending against Mr. Lawson, the petitioner, he pled to three separate counts, kidnapping, risk of injury and admitted a violation of probation.   All of the other charges that were levied against Mr. Lawson were nolled.

Now, it's important to consider what the Alford Doctrine means, and what it means is that a petitioner, a defendant, has the right to plead guilty even though he may not agree with all of the facts that have been alleged by the prosecution, and he does so because he feels that the plea bargain is advantageous to him, and he would rather take-he would rather plead guilty than run the risk of going to trial and receive a higher sentence after trial.

Well, that's precisely what happened here.   Mr. Lawson, the petitioner, took a global settlement, and while he may have some argument, certainly in his mind at least, as to whether he committed the crime of kidnapping, he bargained for this agreement, and he got the benefit of his bargain.

Now, addressing the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, of course, any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy both prongs of the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland versus Washington, 466 U.S. 688.

First, the petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient, and that requires showing counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as counsel guaranteed for the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.

If and only if the petitioner manages to get over this first hurdle, then the petitioner must clear the second hurdle by proving the deficient performance of the lawyer prejudiced the defense, and this required showing that the counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable, and unless a defendant can make-a petitioner can make both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.

In short then, the petitioner must show both deficiency and prejudice.   A failure to prove both, even though counsel's trial performance may have been substandard, will result in a denial of the petition.

Now, although Strickland applies generally to the evaluation of whether ineffective assistance of counsel during criminal proceedings has infringed on a petitioner's constitutional rights, the United States Supreme Court has articulated a modified prejudice standard for cases in which the conviction has resulted from a guilty plea, and that would be Hill versus Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 1985.

The Hill case requires that the petitioner demonstrate that he would not have pleaded guilty, that he would have insisted upon going to trial, and that the evidence that had been undiscovered or the defenses he claimed should have been introduced were likely to have been successful at trial.   Copas versus Commissioner.

So, in other words, the petitioner must first prove that the performance by his trial counsel was deficient, and that absent this deficient performance, the petitioner would have pled not guilty, would have gone to trial and been acquitted.

Now, trial in this Court of a habeas petition is not an opportunity to attempt to relitigate a case in a different manner.   A habeas court may not indulge in hindsight to reconstruct the circumstances surrounding the challenged conduct, but must evaluate the acts or omissions from trial counsel's perspective at the time of the trial, Beasley versus Commissioner of Corrections.

The Court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, Henry versus Commissioner of Corrections.   And a reviewing court, a habeas court, is free to find against the petitioner on either ground, whichever is easier, Nardini versus Manson, 207 Connecticut 118.

Now, a criminal defendant, of course, has an absolute right to plead not guilty and demand that the state be held to its enormous and justifiably high burden of proof, and that is proof beyond all reasonable doubt.   A criminal defendant may do so even in the face of overwhelming evidence which points inexorably towards conviction.

On the other hand, in the interest of obtaining certainty and a more favorable resolution of the two, a criminal defendant may voluntarily waive all of his or her precious constitutional rights and accept the pretrial settlement offer of the state.

Guilt or the degree of guilt is at times uncertain and elusive.   An accused, though believing in or entertaining doubts respecting his innocence might reasonably conclude that a jury would be convinced of his guilt and that he would fare better in the sentence by pleading guilty, and again, see North Carolina versus Alford, 400 U.S. 35 at page 23.

The petitioner was facing numerous charges at the time he accepted this plea agreement, and it's clearly understandable then why the petitioner, even if he were firmly convinced of his innocence as to the kidnapping charge, would have made the voluntary decision to plead guilty in order to beyond what would be expected of a public defender representing a client in a case such as this.   She clearly and fully investigated and determined the facts.   She contacted every one of the witnesses that the petitioner identified to her as ones who may provide favorable information.   The Court cannot conclude that there is any deficient performance on the part of Attorney Jones.

Moreover, having reviewed the plea transcript, the Court sees no defects whatsoever in the plea canvass.   There is absolutely no reason why this plea of guilty should be set aside.

As a result then, the Court will deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and, Madam Clerk, you may serve the appeal papers upon the petitioner.

Stanley T. Fuger, J.

Fuger, S.T., J.