George Jackson v. Hartford Board of Education (2009)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE AND OBJECTION TO MOTION TO STRIKE

FACTS

In this action for discriminatory practice under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), the plaintiff, George Jackson, has made several demands for relief including, inter alia, punitive damages and attorneys fees.   The defendant, Hartford Board of Education, has filed a motion to strike the demand for relief of punitive damages.

There are three issues raised in the defendant's motion to strike.   The first issue is whether punitive damages may be properly claimed against a municipal entity.   If so, the second issue is whether punitive damages are authorized in a civil action for discriminatory practice under CFEPA.   The third issue is whether a plaintiff may claim both punitive damages and attorneys fees.   The court will address these issues in different order than that of their assertion.

LEGAL STANDARD

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).   Pursuant to Practice Book Section 10-39(a)(1), when a party seeks to contest the “legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint, counterclaim, or cross claim, or of any one or more counts thereof, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ․ that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof.”   A motion to strike admits all well-pleaded facts.   Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co., 179 Conn. 541, 427 A.2d 822 (1980).

DISCUSSION

I.

Section 46a-104 of the Connecticut General Statutes states, “The court may grant a complaint in an action brought in accordance with Section 46a-100 such legal and equitable relief which it deems appropriate including, but not limited to, temporary or permanent injunctive relief, attorneys fees and court costs.”

The threshold question is whether this statute precludes the award of punitive damages.   There is a split of authority on this issue.   Those courts which allowed a claim for punitive damages include Perez v. Lane, No. CV 05 4006238 S (Aug. 7, 2007, Gilardi, J.);  Ware v. State, No. CV 064023567 S (Jan. 16, 2007) (Rittenband, J.);  Gur v. Nemeth-Martin Personnel Cons., No. CV98 0331118 S (Mar. 20, 2001, Adams, J.) (dicta suggests punitive damages are allowed under Section 46a-104);  Brightly v. Abbott Terrace Health Center, No. CV 98 0148584 S (Feb. 27, 2001, Rogers, J.) [29 Conn. L. Rptr. 102] (dicta suggests punitive damages are allowed under Section 46a-104);  Collier v. Department of Public Safet y, No. CV 96 80659 (May 3, 1999, Arena, J.) [24 Conn. L. Rptr. 433];  and Cantoni v. Xerox Corporation, No. CV 98 0582705 S (Feb. 3, 1999, Fineberg, J.) [24 Conn. L. Rptr. 38].

Those courts which precluded a claim for punitive damages include Roman v. Department of Corrections, No. HHB CV 05 5000278 S (Aug. 10, 2006, Shaban, J.) [42 Conn. L. Rptr. 35] (based upon sovereign immunity of State);  Trimachi v. Workers' Compensation Comm'n, No. CV 97 0403037 S (Jun. 14, 2000, Devlin, J.) [27 Conn. L. Rptr. 469];  and Craine v. Trinity College, No. CV 95 0555013 S (Dec. 27, 1999, Peck, J.).  Section 1-1(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes states, “In the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language;  and technical words and phrases, and such as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood accordingly.”   Section 1-2z states, “The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.   If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.”

There is statutory itemization in Section 46a-104.  “Unless there is evidence to the contrary, statutory itemization indicates that the legislature intended the list to be exclusive.”  Bridgeport Hospital v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 232 Conn. 91, 101, 653 A.2d 782 (1995), citing State v. Kish, 186 Conn. 757, 766, 443 A.2d 1274 (1982), overruled in part on other grounds [emphasis added].   The evidence to the contrary here is the legislature's utilization of the phrase, “including, but not limited to ․” There is no intrinsic evidence that the legislature intended to preclude the award of punitive damages in addition to attorneys fees.   Rather, the wording of the statute, “including, but not limited to,” is inclusive, rather than preclusive.¹  Therefore, the court finds no prohibition of the award of punitive damages under Section 46a-104.

II.

The defendant next asserts that punitive damages are limited to attorneys fees and costs.   Punitive damages may not exceed the amount of the expenses of litigation in the suit, less taxable costs.  Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 488, 234 A.2d 825 (1967).   However, the expenses of litigation are not limited to attorneys fees.   Litigation expenses may include not only reasonable attorneys fees, but also any other nontaxable disbursements reasonably necessary to prosecuting the action.  Berry v. Loiseau, 23 Conn. 786, 827, 614 A.2d 414 (1992).   While courts often award attorneys fees as punitive damages, punitive damages may encompass more, such as expenses incurred by the prevailing party which are not statutorily compensated costs.

Additionally, there is nothing prohibiting the award of both punitive damages and attorneys fees.   For example, in a CUTPA action, the plaintiff may receive both punitive damages, Section 42-110g(a), and attorneys fees Section 42-110g(d).  In a CUTSA action, “the court may award punitive damages in an amount not exceeding twice any award made under subsection (a) and may award reasonable attorneys fees to the prevailing party.”   Section 35-53(b).  The legislature has authorized the banking commissioner to recover punitive damages and reasonable attorneys fees in the case of any wilful violation of a stay or injunction in connection with an involuntary liquidation of a foreign bank's business or property.   Section 36a-428n(k)(5).   Therefore, the court finds no mutual exclusivity for punitive damages and attorneys fees.

III.

The plaintiff also asserts that the award of punitive damages against a municipal entity is against public policy.   No claim of immunity is asserted.   Although the Hartford Board of Education may be deemed to be a municipal entity for some purposes or an agent of the State for others, it is a political subdivision of the State of Connecticut and not immune to CFEPA.   Section 46a-51(10).

If the legislature had intended to cloak the State and its political subdivisions with immunity from the punitive components of Section 46a-104, it could have done so.   Rather, the legislature explicitly made these political entities subject to the provisions of CFEPA.   Lest the defendant be concerned that the award of punitive damages would be a windfall to a fully compensated plaintiff, Newport v. Fact Concept, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267, 101 S.Ct. 2748 (1981), the term “punitive damages” is somewhat of a misnomer as such damages are compensatory.   Punitive damages may not exceed the amount of the expenses of litigation in the suit, less taxable costs.  Collens, supra.   Should the plaintiff prevail in his claim for punitive damages, at best, he will become fully compensated for his litigation expenses and no more.   The court finds that the award of punitive damages pursuant to Section 46a-104 does not violate public policy.

ORDER

The defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's claim for relief of punitive damages (104) having been considered, it is hereby DENIED.   The plaintiff's objection to motion to strike (107) having been considered, it is hereby SUSTAINED.

Young, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Even if extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute were necessary, an extrinsic review of the legislative history reveals no discussion as to punitive damages, although attorneys fees were mentioned on numerous occasions..  FN1. Even if extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute were necessary, an extrinsic review of the legislative history reveals no discussion as to punitive damages, although attorneys fees were mentioned on numerous occasions.

Young, Robert E., J.