IN RE: Jaime T. (2009)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PETITION

The Commissioner of the department of children and families (“DCF” or “department”) filed a petition dated August 7, 2008 seeking to terminate the parental rights of the respondent father (“father”) and mother (“mother”).   Personal service of the petition was found by the court.   Mother appeared and was appointed counsel.   Father failed to appear and was defaulted.   His attorney in the pending neglect case was appointed his guardian ad litem for location purposes pursuant to practice book § 33a-4(b).  His guardian ad litem was able to speak with father, but not to secure father's appearance in court.   This court has jurisdiction.   Father's default stands.

The child was appointed an attorney.   A separate guardian ad litem (“GAL”) was appointed for the child.   On March 16, 2009, mother appeared in court with counsel, and tendered a consent to the termination of her parental rights.   Mother was canvassed as to her consent, which then was accepted, and mother's parental rights were terminated.   On March 30, 2009, a default trial was held as to father.   Father was aware of the trial date and elected not to attend.   At trial, the court heard testimony from the DCF social worker, and a report from the guardian ad litem.

“The hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition ․ In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights exists by clear and convincing evidence.   If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase.   In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interest of the child.”  (Citation omitted.)  In re Shaun B., 97 Conn.App. 203, 206, 903 A.2d 246 (2006).

“In order to terminate a parent's parental rights under § 17a-112, the petitioner is required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that:  (1) the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify the family;  General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1);  (2) termination is in the best interest of the child;  General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(2);  and (3) there exists any one of the seven grounds for termination delineated in § 17a-112(j)(3).”

“The sole ground alleged in this petition was that the [respondent] had failed to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(ii), which allows for termination if a child has been found to be neglected, and the [parent has] “failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child ․ Personal rehabilitation ․ refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role s a parent ․ [and] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time ․ The statute does not require [a parent] to prove precisely when [he] will be able to assume a responsible position in [his] child's life.   Nor does it require [him] to prove that [he] will be able to assume full responsibility for [his] child, unaided by available support systems.   It requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [he] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [he] can assume a responsible position in [his] child's life.”   (Citations omitted;  emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 628-29, 847 A.2d 883 (2004).

The court finds the following by clear and convincing evidence.

Jamie was born on August 19, 1998 to the respondent parents.   Jamie has three siblings and one half sibling.   All are the children of mother.   Jamie's half sibling is the oldest of the sibling group.   Jamie is the middle child.   Well before Jamie's birth, Jamie's mother was involved in a short term marriage fraught with emotional and physical abuse.   After approximately 18 months of marriage, mother separated from her husband.   While her dissolution was pending, mother met Jamie's father.   Mother and father married approximately two months after mother's dissolution judgment was final.   Mother says father subjected her to years of emotional and physical abuse, including controlling behaviors, all of which were witnessed by their children.   Father was in the Navy, and mother says his sea deployments were only partial respites from the abuse, as he never left her with sufficient funds to make ends meet.   As family circumstances deteriorated, they eventually came to DCF's attention.   The parents alleged that Jamie made sexual advances toward her siblings, and that the children were beyond the parents' control.

On June 22, 2006, DCF filed neglect petitions on all the children.   An order of temporary custody for Jamie was granted to the department on June 30, 2006.   She has been in the custody of DCF ever since.   Jamie was adjudicated neglected and committed to DCF on October 17, 2006.   Her commitment has been maintained since then.   The court found, on April 29, 2008, that continuing efforts to reunify were no longer required.   DCF filed the termination of parental rights petition on August 7, 2008.

The presenting issues when Jamie came into care were, in part, the mental health needs of father, domestic violence in the home, possible sexual abuse of Jamie by father, poor supervision of the children including Jamie, truancy, and the children and home appearing filthy and unkempt.   Specific steps were issued to father on October 17, 2006 to address these concerns.   Father was uncooperative and uncaring.   For over two years he has not contacted Jamie in person or by phone, letter, cards, or computer.   He has refused therapeutic interventions, other than a brief period of individual treatment as reported by father which he would not allow DCF to confirm.   Father also was in family therapy for a period of less than one month in September 2006.   Father has refused further intervention.   He has only had contact with DCF when he is found at home during unannounced visits.   During these visits the home has appeared unhygienic and smelling of animal feces.   When the DCF worker spoke with father at an unannounced home visit on March 17, 2009 to personally advise father of the trial date, father said he thought his parental rights were terminated already, and declined to attend court.

Father has chosen to make no effort to rehabilitate, and there is no reasonable prospect that he will.   Accordingly, the department has proven by clear and convincing evidence that father is unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, that reunification efforts were found to be no longer required, and that Jamie was adjudicated neglected and father has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, he could assume a responsible position in her life.

Dispositionally, the court must consider Jamie's best interests, taking into account the seven factors set forth in General Statutes § 45a-112(k).  In doing so the court considers and makes the seven statutory findings as follows.

1. The timely nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and child by an agency to facilitate reunion of the child with the parent.

DCF offered on a timely basis visitation, referrals for family, individual, and substance abuse treatment, and case management services.

2. Whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

Reasonable efforts were made prior to the court finding them no longer required.

3. The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order.

As noted above, specific steps were ordered for father on October 17, 2006.   They included the requirement that he visit his child, or maintain contact with his child and DCF. Father refused to do so.   Father participated for a brief and inadequate time in family and individual therapy, but did not sustain his treatment.

4. The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person, and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.

Jamie loves her family, but knows she can not live with them, nor can she ever expect her parents to provide for her.   She has a bond with a former foster parent whom the department is pursuing as a potential permanent placement.

5. The age of the child.

Jamie is ten years old.

6. The efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child.

Father, as noted above, has abandoned his daughter, maintaining no contact with her.   He initiates no contact with DCF. No efforts at adjusting his circumstances have been maintained by him.

7. The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.

No such prevention was shown, other than a suggestion that father left counseling years ago because the therapist would not accept his insurance.   Father did not pursue any assistance regarding this claim.

The child's GAL reports, and the evidence confirms, that Jamie still loves her parents and siblings.   Jamie has substantial emotional needs and issues which prevent her from being placed with her siblings, guardianship of whom was transferred to their grandparents in July 2007.   Jamie has been difficult to place.   As stated before, Jamie loves her parents, but recognizes that they will never be able to care for her.   Jamie's therapist strongly supports termination.   Jamie's GAL supports termination and adoption and hopes an adoptive home can be located.   The child needs to be freed for adoption.   Her father's neglect cannot continue.

In considering the evidence through the conclusion of the trial, and the seven statutory factors, the court's guidepost for disposition is the best interest of the child, which must be decided by clear and convincing evidence.   Long-term stability is essential to a child's health and development.   The children's guardian ad litem recommends termination and adoption so the child will be provided for properly.   The court agrees, based upon the clear and convincing evidence previously discussed.

Wherefore, after due consideration of the child's need for a secure, permanent placement, and the totality of the circumstances, and having considered all statutory criteria, and having found by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts to reunify were no longer required, and grounds exist to terminate father's parental rights, and that it is in the child's best interest to do so, the court orders:

That the parental rights of respondent father, are hereby terminated as to his child Jamie;

That the commissioner of the department of children and families is appointed the statutory parent for the purpose of securing an adoptive family for the child;

That a permanency plan shall be submitted to the court within thirty days, and such further reports shall be filed with the court as required by law;

That the Clerk of the Probate Court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of the child shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Waterford of the date when said adoption is finalized, as shall DCF.

BY THE COURT

John C. Driscoll, J.

Driscoll, John C., J.