Richard Murphy v. Ardelle Cowie (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE # 116

FACTS

The plaintiff, Richard Murphy, commenced this action by service of process on the defendant, Ardelle Cowie, on May 3, 2010.   In his complaint, dated April 29, 2010, the plaintiff alleges the following facts.   The defendant conducts business under the name of Chelsea Company, which owns and manages residential rental properties in New Haven, Connecticut.   On or about February 2, 1998, the plaintiff commenced employment with the Chelsea Company.   Sometime after 2005, the plaintiff desired to enter into an employment agreement with the defendant to secure the plaintiff's position and protect him from termination at will.   According to the plaintiff, both parties entered into an agreement which specified, inter alia, that the period of the plaintiff's employment would be automatically renewed every two years, provided that the plaintiff's performance was satisfactory, and that his compensation would remain the same with a provision allowing for possible increases.   The plaintiff alleges that his performance was satisfactory at all relevant times.   The plaintiff further alleges, however, that on or about December 10, 2008, the defendant's employee told the plaintiff that he would have to accept a significant reduction in his compensation or face termination.   He was subsequently terminated for refusing to accept the reduction in compensation.

Count one of the plaintiff's complaint alleges breach of a written contract.   Counts two through six allege breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of oral contract, promissory estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent misrepresentation, respectively.

On May 19, 2010, the defendant filed a motion to strike, accompanied by a memorandum of law.   The plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to strike on June 23, 2010.   The court heard oral argument on June 7, 2010, and denied the defendant's motion to strike on July 13, 2010.   On July 22, 2010, the defendant filed an amended motion to strike counts two through six of the plaintiff's complaint, which was accompanied by a memorandum of law.   The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the second motion to strike on October 20, 2010.   The court heard oral argument on October 25, 2010.

DISCUSSION

“[A] party may challenge the legal sufficiency of an adverse party's claim by filing a motion to strike.”  Vertex, Inc. v. Waterbury, 278 Conn. 557, 564, 898 A.2d 178 (2006).  “We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint that has been stricken and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency ․ Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 252, 990 A.2d 206 (2010).   The court must “construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  American Progressive Life & Health Ins. Co. of New York v. Better Benefits, LLC, 292 Conn. 111, 120, 971 A.2d 17 (2009).  “The modern trend ․ is to construe pleadings broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically ․ As long as the pleadings provide sufficient notice of the facts claimed and the issues to be tried and do not surprise or prejudice the opposing party, we will not conclude that the complaint is insufficient to allow recovery.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Data-Flow Technologies, LLC v. Harte Nissan, Inc., 111 Conn.App. 118, 132, 958 A.2d 195 (2008).

I

AMENDED MOTION TO STRIKE

The defendant argues in her amended motion to strike that counts two through six of the plaintiff's complaint are legally insufficient because each of those counts fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.   The plaintiff argues that each of his claims are legally sufficient, and further asserts that the defendant is precluded from filing an amended motion to strike because the court has previously denied the defendant's initial motion to strike.

“Most courts which have considered the issue have found that successive motions to strike are not appropriate ․ [I]n numerous cases, the judges of the Superior Court have concluded that the rules of practice preclude a party from filing successive motions to strike when the grounds raised in a later motion could have been raised in the initial motion ․ Practice Book [§ 10-41] provides that each motion to strike shall set forth each such claim of insufficiency and shall distinctly specify the reason or reasons for each claimed insufficiency ․ Practice Book [§ 10-43] provides that a judge deciding a motion to strike in which more than one ground is asserted shall specify the ground relied upon in striking a claim ․ [Because] [t]he Practice Book provides for pleading multiple grounds in a single motion to strike and, further, provides that pleadings are to advance after the adjudication of each enumerated pleading, a defendant may not impede the progress of the suit by dividing his grounds and pleading them in consecutive motions to strike ․ [Therefore], a defendant who has failed to raise all grounds for striking a complaint may not [later] file a second motion to strike asserting additional grounds.”  (Emphasis added;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Stuart v. Freiberg, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 04 0200508 (July 9, 2008, Tobin, J.).   There are exceptions to this rule, however, which allow a party to file a subsequent motion to strike even after his or her first motion to strike has been denied.  “[A]t least three superior courts have addressed circumstances that are similar to those presently before the court ․ Specifically, those courts were presented with successive motions to strike in which the defendants' previous motions had been denied for failing to articulate the grounds of the motion in violation of the Practice Book rules.   In each of these cases, the court determined that successive motions were appropriate.”  (Citations omitted.)  Id. Stuart v. Freiberg, supra, Docket No. CV 04 0200508.

In Knickerbocker v. Village Apartments Properties, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 0058389 (September 23, 1992, Pickett, J.) (7 Conn. L. Rptr. 414), the court noted that the “Practice Book ․ [does] not prohibit [a party] from filing a second motion to strike.”   Further, in Irahieta v. Donaldson, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 01 0182260 (December 12, 2001, Adams, J.), the court found that “[t]he defendant's ․ [successive] motion to strike was prompted by ․ a failure of the [the previous motion] on a matter of form.  [The defendant] thus is not improperly attempting to assert additional or different grounds in each successive motion.   To the contrary, each successive motion and memorandum are substantively identical to the ones filed previously.   Moreover, the plaintiff has not been subject to any delay or prejudice.  [The defendant] wasted no time in addressing the defect in form of the second motion, indeed, the third motion is dated the very same day that the second motion was denied, and, within one week, the defendant's third motion, his supporting memorandum and the plaintiff's opposition memorandum had all been filed.   Finally, the plaintiff has suffered little prejudice, if any, in terms of the time and effort required to respond to each successive motion, the plaintiff herself having filed each time a substantively identical opposition memorandum.   For these reasons, this court rejects the plaintiff's claim of procedural impropriety and considers [the defendant's] motion on the merits.”

In Stuart v. Freiberg, supra, Docket No. CV 04 0200508, the court emphasized that “the cases that have precluded successive motions generally addressed circumstances in which the moving party asserted new grounds in a successive motion.   Unlike those cases, however, the defendant in the present case is not attempting to assert new grounds.   Instead, he merely seeks to rectify a mistake regarding the form of her earlier motion.   Indeed, the new motion is almost identical to the previous motion and does not require the plaintiffs to exert or expend additional time or effort in addressing the defendant's arguments.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id.

Similarly, in the present case, the defendant filed a second motion to strike in order to rectify a mistake in the form of her first motion, which was denied in part for failure to specify the reasons for each claimed insufficiency.   Although the defendant's first motion was denied by the court, it was accompanied by a memorandum of law which set forth the grounds upon which the defendant based her argument.   Her second motion to strike distinctly specified the reasons for each claim of legal insufficiency.   Thus, the defendant did not assert any additional or different grounds in the successive motion to strike, but only sought to correct a defect in the form of her earlier motion.

In addition, similar to the plaintiff in Stuart v. Freiberg, supra, the plaintiff in the present case did not suffer from any delay or prejudice by the defendant's filing of a second motion to strike.   The plaintiff was not subject to any delay because the defendant filed her second motion to strike on July 22, 2010, only nine days after her first motion to strike was denied.   Further, the plaintiff suffered little prejudice in terms of the time and effort required to respond to the second motion to strike.   The plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to the defendant's second motion to strike was substantively identical to his first memorandum in opposition, which demonstrates that the defendant did not raise additional or different grounds for her motion that could have been raised in the initial motion.

The plaintiff cites to Estate of Derose v. Estate of Blacker, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at Norwich, Docket No. 5100561 (August 24, 2007, Hurley, J.T.R.), for the proposition that the defendant's amended motion to strike is improper.   The court in Estate of Derose, however, denied the plaintiff's amended motion to strike for several reasons that are not relevant to the present case:  the plaintiff failed to amend his/her pleadings within thirty days of the return date pursuant to Practice Book sec 10-60(a), filed the amended motion to strike without first requesting leave to amend, and failed to cite to any legal authority in the memorandum of law in support of the motion to strike.   The plaintiff also cites to Phaneuf v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 166 Conn. 449, 451, 352 A.2d 291 (1974), where the court emphasized:  “After filing an answer, it was improper for the defendant to file any motion addressed to the complaint without seeking the permission of the court.”   This does not support the defendant's argument, however, as the defendant has not filed an answer in the present case.   Further, Phaneuf does not specifically address the issue of whether a party may file a second motion to strike, after its first motion to strike has been denied, that merely corrects an issue of form and does not raise additional or different grounds that could have been raised in the initial motion.

Furthermore, the court in Stuart v. Freiberg, supra, stated:  “[T]he sufficiency of the plaintiffs' complaint can and must be resolved at some point.   For example, the defendant can address the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' complaint in the form of a summary judgment motion ․ While the fact that there are alternative procedural vehicles for attacking a complaint's legal sufficiency might appear to weigh in the plaintiffs' favor, such mechanisms also make it clear that the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs' complaint will be addressed at some point.   Accordingly, concerns regarding judicial economy weigh in favor of the court addressing the defendant's present motion to strike ․ If the court were to deny the defendant's motion to strike based upon procedural grounds business would not be facilitated, nor justice advanced.   Instead, the court would simply be delaying an inevitable examination of the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' complaint.   This delay might well require both parties to expend needless time, effort and money.   As such a result appears to contradict the purpose of the Practice Book rules, the court finds that it is appropriate to entertain and decide the defendant's motion to strike.”  (Citation omitted.)  Id.

For the foregoing reasons, the court will consider the defendant's amended motion to strike on the merits.

II

MOTION TO STRIKEABreach of Oral Contract

The defendant moves to strike the third count of the complaint, breach of oral contract, on the ground that employment contracts for an indefinite term are terminable at will and because the plaintiff does not allege that the parties agreed on any definite terms of employment.

“The elements of a breach of contract action are the formation of an agreement, performance by one party, breach of the agreement by the other party and damages.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Keller v. Beckenstein, 117 Conn.App. 550, 558, 979 A.2d 1055, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 913, 983 A.2d 274 (2009).  “To form a valid and binding contract in Connecticut, there must be a mutual understanding of the terms that are definite and certain between the parties ․ If the minds of the parties have not truly met, no enforceable contract exists.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Duplissie v. Devino, 96 Conn.App. 673, 688, 902 A.2d 30, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 916, 908 A.2d 536 (2006).

The plaintiff alleges that he expressed his desire to enter into an employment agreement with the defendant in order to secure his employment and protect him from termination at will.   According to the plaintiff, both parties entered into an employment agreement setting forth the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's employment and which specified, inter alia, “the period of the plaintiff's employment [would] be automatically renewed every two years, provided that the plaintiff's performance was satisfactory ․ If the plaintiff's performance was unsatisfactory, the agreement would terminate within one year.”   Under the agreement, the plaintiff's compensation would remain the same with a provision for possible increases.   The plaintiff further alleges that “after discussing the terms of the agreement, the plaintiff assented to those terms and the two parties entered into the agreement and the contract commenced immediately.”   The plaintiff claims he has been injured by the defendant's breach of contract in that the termination of his employment has caused (1) substantial damages for pecuniary losses and mental anguish;  (2) loss of employment in his chosen field and loss of benefits of his employment;  and (3) personal, emotional and financial damages.   The plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to establish that he has been injured and, therefore, has set forth a legally sufficient cause of action for breach of contract.

The defendant also argues that employment contracts for an indefinite term are terminable by either party at will, without cause.  “As a general rule, contracts of permanent employment, or for an indefinite term, are terminable at will.”  D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School, 202 Conn. 206, 211 n.1, 520 A.2d 217 (1987).   The parties to an employment agreement, however, may modify the default rule of employment at will by contract and make an employee terminable only for good cause.  Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 234 Conn. 1, 15, 662 A.2d 89 (1995).  “An employment contract for a definite or determinable term ․ may be terminated by either party only for good or just cause.   Good cause, as distinguished from the subjective standard of unsatisfactory service, is defined as [s]ubstantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse [or a] legally sufficient ground or reason ․ Good cause or ‘[j]ust cause’ substantially limits employer discretion to terminate, by requiring the employer, in all instances, to proffer a proper reason for dismissal, by forbidding the employer to act arbitrary or capriciously ․ In any contract of employment for a fixed period, an employee prematurely discharged without good or just cause may recover damages.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Slifkin v. Condec Corp., 13 Conn.App. 538, 549, 538 A.2d 231 (1988).

The plaintiff alleges that the parties entered into an employment agreement which specified that his period of employment would be automatically renewed every two years as long as his performance was satisfactory and would terminate if his performance was unsatisfactory.   These facts sufficiently allege the plaintiff was terminable only for good cause, not at will.   The plaintiff asserts that he was prematurely discharged without good cause, as his performance was satisfactory at all times and there was no valid reason for the defendant to terminate his employment before the end of his employment agreement.   Specifically, the plaintiff states that he was fired after refusing to accept a significant reduction in his compensation or he would be terminated, even though the operating employment agreement provided that the plaintiff's compensation would remain the same with a provision for possible increases.

The defendant's motion to strike count three of the plaintiff's complaint is denied.

B

Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

The defendant moves to strike count two of the complaint, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, on the ground that the plaintiff has not alleged a violation of an important public policy.

“It is axiomatic that the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing is a covenant implied into a contract or a contractual relationship ․ The covenant of good faith and fair dealing presupposes that the terms and purpose of the contract are agreed upon by the parties and that what is it in dispute is a party's discretionary application or interpretation of a contract term ․ [T]he existence of a contract between the parties is a necessary antecedent to any claim of breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Hoskins v. Titan Value Equities Group, 252 Conn. 789, 793, 749 A.2d 1144 (2000).  “The common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract requires that ‘neither party [will] do anything that will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement ․ Essentially it is a rule of construction designed to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties as they presumably intended.’  “ Elm Street Builders, Inc. v. Enterprise Park Condominium Assn., Inc., 63 Conn.App. 657, 665, 778 A.2d 237 (2001).  “Thus, in order to establish a cause of action for a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the plaintiff must plead the following elements:  ‘[1] that the plaintiff and the defendant were parties to a contract under which the plaintiff reasonably expected to receive certain benefits;  [2] that the defendant engaged in conduct that injured the plaintiff's right to receive some or all of those benefits;  and [3] that when committing the acts by which it injured the plaintiff's right to receive benefits it reasonably expected to receive under the contract, the defendant was acting in bad faith.’  “ Le v. Saporoso, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 09 5028391 (October 19, 2009, Domnarski, J.).

“To constitute a breach of that covenant [of good faith and fair dealing], the acts by which a defendant allegedly impedes the plaintiff's right to receive benefits that he or she reasonably expected to receive under the contract must have been taken in bad faith ․ Bad faith in general implies ․ a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one's rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister motive ․ Bad faith means more than mere negligence;  it involves a dishonest purpose.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Jones v. H.N.S. Management Co., 92 Conn.App. 223, 227, 883 A.2d 831 (2005).  “[T]he following types are among those which have been recognized [as examples of bad faith] in judicial decisions:  evasion of the spirit of the bargain;  ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Elm Street Builders, Inc. v. Enterprise Park Condominium Ass'n., Inc., supra, 63 Conn.App. 667.

In the present case, the plaintiff has alleged the following facts:  (1) the plaintiff and the defendant were parties to an employment agreement under which the plaintiff reasonably expected his compensation to remain the same with a provision for possible increases;  (2) the defendant impeded the plaintiff's right to receive benefits that he or she reasonably expected under their contract by unilaterally demanding a change in the plaintiff's compensation and by terminating the plaintiff when he refused to accept the change;  (3) the defendant's conduct was in bad faith, as she “intentionally neglected and refused to perform its duties and obligations under the contract to the plaintiff's detriment.”   The plaintiff clearly alleges that the defendant refused to fulfill a duty or contractual obligation for an interested motive.   Further, the plaintiff alleges that the parties entered into the agreement in order to ensure that he could be terminated only for good cause, and that the defendant's actions constituted an evasion of the spirit of the bargain.   Therefore, the plaintiff has set forth a sufficient cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.¹

The defendant's motion to strike count two of the plaintiff's complaint is denied.

C

Promissory Estoppel

The defendant moves to strike count four of the plaintiff's complaint, promissory estoppel, on the ground that the plaintiff has not alleged the existence of a clear and definite promise which the defendant could reasonably have expected to induce reliance.

Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, “[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of a promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.”   Stewart v. Cendant Mobility Services Corp., 267 Conn. 96, 104, 837 A.2d 736 (2003), citing 1 Restatement (Second), Contracts § 90, p. 242 (1981).  “[A]ny claim of estoppel is predicated on proof of two essential elements:  the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief;  and the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury.”  Wellington Systems, Inc. v. Redding Group, Inc., 49 Conn.App. 152, 162, 714 A.2d 21, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 905, 720 A.2d 516 (1998).  “[A] promisor is not liable to a promisee who has relied on a promise if, judged by an objective standard, he had no reason to expect any reliance at all.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Stewart v. Cendant Mobility Service Corp., supra, 267 Conn. 104-05.

Count four of the plaintiff's complaint alleges the following facts.   Paragraph 16 states that the plaintiff decided he would leave the defendant's company to start his own business “unless the defendant could provide him with an employment agreement to secure the plaintiff's position and protect him from termination at will.”   The parties subsequently entered into such an agreement securing the plaintiff's position and providing that his compensation would remain the same with a provision for possible increases.   After the parties entered into the employment agreement, he abandoned his efforts to start his own business and fully committed his efforts to the defendant's business.   On December 10, 2008, the defendant's employee told the plaintiff that he would have to accept a significant reduction in his compensation or he would be terminated, and that he was terminated for refusing to accept the reduction in compensation.   In paragraph 29, the plaintiff alleges that he detrimentally relied on the provision in the employment agreement that he would be justly compensated for his work under the terms set forth by the defendant.   Therefore, the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to show that he reasonably expected he would be justly compensated for his work under the agreement, that he relied on these promises to his detriment and that injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.

The defendant cites to D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School, supra, 202 Conn. 214, for the proposition that a plaintiff claiming promissory estoppel must have relied on a promise that reflects a present intent to commit, rather than an intent to commit some time in the future.   In that case, however, the court stated that the plaintiff asserted that she relied on representations merely indicating that the defendants intended to commit to a future employment agreement.  “Contrary to the plaintiff's assertion, these representations manifested no present intention on the part of the defendants to undertake immediate contractual obligations to the plaintiff ․ At most, the defendants made representations to the plaintiff concerning the expectation of a future contract, but they stopped short of making the plaintiff a definite promise of employment on which she could reasonably have relied.”  Id., 214-15.   In contrast, the plaintiff in the present case alleges that he relied on a written promise reflecting the defendant's present intent to commit, not an intent to commit in the future.   According to the plaintiff, the parties entered into an employment agreement stating in part that the plaintiff's compensation would remain the same with a provision for possible increases.   The defendant's assertions that the plaintiff fails to allege that he reasonably relied on any promise made by the defendant or that the plaintiff only seeks to rely on negotiations about a future contract are without merit.

The defendant's motion to strike count four of the plaintiff's complaint is denied.

D

Negligent Misrepresentation

The defendant moves to strike count five of the plaintiff's complaint, negligent misrepresentation, on the ground that the plaintiff does not allege that the plaintiff justifiably relied on false information provided by the defendant.

“[The Supreme Court] has long recognized liability for negligent misrepresentation ․ [It has] held that even an innocent misrepresentation of fact may be actionable if the declarant has the means of knowing, ought to know, or has the duty of knowing the truth.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC, 298 Conn. 124, 143-44, 2 A.3d 859 (2010).  “The governing principles [of negligent misrepresentation] are set forth in similar terms in § 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977):  One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment ․ supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Kramer v. Petisi, 285 Conn. 674, 681, 940 A.2d 800 (2008).

In the present case, the plaintiff sets forth a legally sufficient cause of action for negligent misrepresentation.   The plaintiff alleges that the defendant knew or should have known that its representations to the plaintiff regarding the length of his employment and his compensation were false or inaccurate, and that the plaintiff would reasonably and justifiably rely on such representations.   Therefore, the plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a cause of action grounded in negligent misrepresentation.

The defendant's motion to strike count five of the plaintiff's complaint is denied.

E

Fraudulent Misrepresentation

The defendant moves to strike count six of the plaintiff's complaint, fraudulent misrepresentation, on the ground that the plaintiff fails to allege that the defendant engaged in any fraudulent actions.

“The essential elements of an action in common law fraud, as we have repeatedly held, are that:  (1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact;  (2) it was untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it;  (3) it was made to induce the other party to act upon it;  and (4) the other party did so act upon that false representation to his injury ․ Under a fraud claim of this type, the party to whom the false representation was made claims to have relied on that representation and to have suffered harm as a result of the reliance.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC, 298 Conn. 124, 142, 2 A.3d 859 (2010).

In the present case, the allegations set forth in the plaintiff's complaint set forth a legally sufficient cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation.   The plaintiff alleges that the defendant made false representations as statements of fact, reflected in the employment agreement between the parties.   He further alleges that the defendant knew that such representations were false or inaccurate at the time they were made, that they were made for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff's reliance, and that the plaintiff relied on these representations to his detriment.   Therefore, the plaintiff has sufficiently set forth a cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation.

The defendant's motion to strike count six of the plaintiff's complaint is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's amended motion to strike counts two through six of the plaintiff's complaint is denied.

Brian T. Fischer, Judge

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The defendant argues that a plaintiff must allege a violation of an important public policy in order to set forth a claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.   On this view, the plaintiff's cause of action is not legally sufficient as he does not allege such a violation.   The requirement that a plaintiff allege a violation of an important public policy, however, applies only to an employee at will.   “[T]he many employees without bargaining power to obtain employment for a definite term are entitled to judicial protection when the cause for dismissal is derived from some important violation of public policy.”   (Emphasis added.)  Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc., 193 Conn. 558, 569, 479 A.2d 781 (1984).   The plaintiff alleges that he was not an employee at will, but that he could only be terminated for good cause;  therefore, the plaintiff is not required to allege a violation of an important public policy..  FN1. The defendant argues that a plaintiff must allege a violation of an important public policy in order to set forth a claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.   On this view, the plaintiff's cause of action is not legally sufficient as he does not allege such a violation.   The requirement that a plaintiff allege a violation of an important public policy, however, applies only to an employee at will.   “[T]he many employees without bargaining power to obtain employment for a definite term are entitled to judicial protection when the cause for dismissal is derived from some important violation of public policy.”   (Emphasis added.)  Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc., 193 Conn. 558, 569, 479 A.2d 781 (1984).   The plaintiff alleges that he was not an employee at will, but that he could only be terminated for good cause;  therefore, the plaintiff is not required to allege a violation of an important public policy.

Fischer, Brian T., J.