Abdelbosset Ridene v. Veronica Ridene (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

These parties come to the court seeking a dissolution of their marriage.   They were married on the last day of 2003 in Hartford, Connecticut, but moved back and forth several times to various cities in Texas.   As of the time of the actual hearing the plaintiff had just recently relocated to San Antonio, Texas and the defendant who is currently in Virginia had plans to return to Texas as well.¹  The basic facts are clear, but anything beyond that is unclear.

The defendant wife was married and had four children when she met the plaintiff at a club.   She and the children's father were in the process of getting divorced.   The defendant is ten years older than the plaintiff, but the plaintiff wanted to marry her despite the age difference and despite the fact that she already had four children.   At the time of the marriage, he was an undocumented alien having apparently entered the United States legally but had remained beyond his permitted time.   The parties are both observant Muslims and during the course of their Connecticut marriage they divorced twice and remarried each other three times under Islamic law.²  It is also agreed by both parties that the defendant suffered two miscarriages during the course of the marriage and that as of June 25, 2009 the plaintiff became a naturalized United States citizen.   He left his wife within a few weeks of gaining that status.   He filed his dissolution complaint in Connecticut on January 11, 2010.   The other item upon which both parties agree is that they met with their Imam at their mosque in San Antonio, Texas on June 30, 2009 and entered into an agreement (the Agreement) with the help of that clergyman.   Both parties and the Imam signed this document which has been entered as plaintiff's exhibit # 1.   There was some confusion surrounding the date that it was executed because the handwritten document begins with “July 30, 2009,” but the last signature, that of Sheikh Aziz Amin, is dated June 30, 2009.   The defendant, who actually wrote out the Agreement, testified that the July reference was probably an error and all of the testimony about the events at that time supports that conclusion.   The parties also agree that the plaintiff paid the defendant a sum equivalent to $1,900 of the promised support of $1,950 as called for in their Agreement.

What is not clear is the nature of this marriage.   The plaintiff testifies that he was a dedicated and hard working husband struggling to support his wife and her four children from her first marriage.   He explains all of his proven misbehavior during the marriage by stating that such things occurred during periods when he and his wife were divorced “Islamically.”   He denies her allegations that he married her to enhance his immigration status and points to the Agreement to demonstrate that he was willing to go beyond what was expected of him to make the marriage work.   His argument is that when he and his wife remarried religiously the second time, he promised her a dowry in the form of a pilgrimage to Mecca and other religious sites in the Middle East. He claims that the rationale for him to pay her the sum of $6,295 in their Agreement was based on the cost of that trip which they never took.   He argues that no dowry is paid for a second marriage, but he did it as an act of good faith to win back his wife's affection.

The defendant's view is, not surprisingly, very different.   She presents a picture of a marriage that soured within months of the religious ceremony on March 21, 2008 which marked the beginning of their third Islamic marriage.   She testified that her husband was very moody and preoccupied with his friends and chatting up younger women in a variety of computer chat rooms.   She testified that despite his claim that he wanted children, he wanted her to abort her two pregnancies.   She claims that in the fall of 2008 he told her he wanted her to abort the fetus because the marriage was heading for divorce.   He was emotionally abusive to her, according to her testimony, especially during the times when she was pregnant.   She represented to the court that she heard him in conversations during which he told the other party that as soon as his citizenship was completed he would leave.

The plaintiff argues that his obligation to the defendant is spelled out in the Agreement and that should be the extent of any judgment of this court.   While there is no basis in our statutes or case law limiting the authority of the trial court to an agreement that has not been incorporated into the dissolution decree, some weight must be given to what is in essence a contract between the parties that was negotiated at arm's length and in good faith.   Under the terms of that Agreement, as has been alluded to above, the plaintiff promised to support his wife for three months identified as the waiting period.   It is not clear from the document or the testimony during the trial if that is a reference to Connecticut's statutory stay or some Islamic religious law.   The plaintiff's obligation under the Agreement totals $8,245 and the defendant testified that he paid $1,900 of that obligation.³  That leaves him with an additional debt under the Agreement of $6,345.   Interestingly enough, the claims for relief by the defendant are relatively close to that amount.   She claims that he should be responsible for her medical bills relating to the two miscarriages.   She has a bill for the first in the amount of $1,468.25.   The claimed bill for the second miscarriage is $4,000 which is net of the insurance coverage that they had at that time, but there is no documentation to support that claim.   The defendant testified that she was hospitalized for two days and had a D & C procedure as a result of the miscarriage.   She is also claiming that she paid the plaintiff's debts from her various student loan proceeds.   She testified that she paid a $900 loan that he had taken from her family friend who had also given him a job in Texas.   She also reported paying off payday loans of $1200 and $750 with tax refund proceeds.   The total of the full hospital bills and the $900 she took from her student loan would total $6,368.25.

The plaintiff points out, that under the terms of the Agreement, the repayment terms are very flexible and are dependent upon his circumstances.   The court has no authority to change the contractual arrangements made by the parties, but likewise, does not have to approve it as a part of the court's decree of dissolution.

The testimony of both parties supports the notion that the plaintiff has the ability to earn a gross salary of at least $26,000 per annum.   He testified about his employment experiences over the last few years and evidence of different salaries earned were presented to the court by way of exhibits.   The defendant also testified about her employment experiences.   She had been a manager in retail sales and worked as a teacher's aide.   Currently she is attempting to complete her education to earn a degree in elementary education, but her progress has not demonstrated any considerable drive to complete the process.   She is employable, but the court cannot determine an earning capacity beyond the minimum wage level.

After having reviewed the testimony of the parties and the exhibits offered as evidence, the court makes the following findings.

1. The court has jurisdiction to hear this matter;

2.  All statutory stays have expired;  the case management date having passed as of June 21, 2010;

3.  The allegations of the complaint are found to be true;

4.  The plaintiff is found to have contributed to the breakdown of the marriage in a more substantial fashion than did the defendant;

5. The court does not find the agreement of the parties dated June 30, 2009 to be fair and equitable;

6.  The court finds that the plaintiff has an earning capacity of at least $500 per week or $26,000 per annum;

7.  The court finds that the defendant has an earning capacity of $15,080 per annum based on The Texas Minimum Wage Act, Chapter 62 of the Texas Labor Code, as amended, which sets that amount at $7.25 hourly; 4

8. The court finds that the parties were married on December 31, 2003 and remain married under Connecticut law until the effective date of this judgment.   A claimed divorce or remarriage under Islamic law has not been proven.

The court having heard the instant matter and having reviewed the various statutory criteria including but not limited to Connecticut General Statutes §§ 46b-81 and 46b-82, HEREBY ORDERS:

1.  The marriage of the parties is dissolved and each is a separate and individual person;

2.  No alimony is awarded to either party;

3.  The plaintiff shall pay to the defendant as a property settlement the sum of $6,350.   He shall pay the sum of $1,050 on or before August 15, 2011 and thereafter pay installments of $300 per month commencing on the 15th day of September 2011 and continuing for sixteen additional consecutive monthly payments with a final payment in the seventeenth month of $200.   All such payments shall be made payable to Attorney Michael A. Lockaby, trustee for Veronica Trevino and delivered to him at 136 Dowd Avenue, Canton, CT 06109.   Any balance of the $6,350 remaining unpaid as of February 16, 2013 shall accrue interest at the rate of ten (10%) percent per annum and such interest shall not preclude the defendant from seeking an order of attorneys fees from a court of competent jurisdiction;

4.  Each party shall be solely liable for any and all debts as of the date of this judgment and beyond that they shall hold harmless and indemnify the other party from any liability stemming from any such debt;

5.  Each party shall retain, free and clear of any claim from the other party, any personal property now in their possession including but not limited to clothing, furniture, bank accounts, deferred income assets and motor vehicles, except that the plaintiff shall return to the defendant within thirty (30) days her children's birth certificates and Social Security cards;

6.  This judgment shall constitute res judicata as to any attempt by either party to seek enforcement of the June 30, 2009 agreement;  and

7.  The defendant is restored to her birth name and shall henceforth be known as Veronica Trevino.

By the Court,

Adelman, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The defendant actually participated by telephone for the entire hearing as had been allowed by an earlier court ruling..  FN1. The defendant actually participated by telephone for the entire hearing as had been allowed by an earlier court ruling.

FN2. Although the parties did not present any religious documentation to support the first two divorces, the undisputed testimony from both parties supports that this was their understanding of the facts.   There is a document of some sort for the last religious divorce which will be discussed in the body of the decision..  FN2. Although the parties did not present any religious documentation to support the first two divorces, the undisputed testimony from both parties supports that this was their understanding of the facts.   There is a document of some sort for the last religious divorce which will be discussed in the body of the decision.

FN3. She testified that he gave her the $1,800 in payments and paid $100 against her phone bill by agreement..  FN3. She testified that he gave her the $1,800 in payments and paid $100 against her phone bill by agreement.

FN4. Although the plaintiff was residing in Virginia at the time of the trial, her testimony was that such arrangements were only temporary and she planned to return to Texas where her mother lived..  FN4. Although the plaintiff was residing in Virginia at the time of the trial, her testimony was that such arrangements were only temporary and she planned to return to Texas where her mother lived.

Adelman, Gerard I., J.