Estate of Jonathan R. Cook et al. v. Arthur King Hall (2011)

MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER # 117

FACTS

The plaintiffs, Ronald P. Cook and Jean Roche Cook, the co-administrators of the estate of Jonathan R. Cook (the decedent), commenced this action by service of process on the defendant, Arthur King Hall, on May 4, 2010.   In their complaint, dated March 30, 2010, the plaintiffs allege the following facts.   On the evening of September 3, 2009, the defendant and the decedent were on a vessel being operated by the defendant and owned by the defendant's father, Bennett Hall. The defendant was operating the vessel with the general authority of its owner pursuant to General Statutes § 52-182.   At approximately 9:30 p.m., the defendant was operating the vessel when it suddenly and violently collided with a seawall, resulting in the decedent's death.   In counts one and two of their complaint, the plaintiffs set forth claims of negligence and recklessness, respectively, against the defendant.   The state of Connecticut also filed criminal charges against the defendant with regard to the aforementioned incident.

On March 2, 2010, Bennett Hall, the father of the defendant and owner of the vessel involved in the accident, filed a petition in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut for exoneration from and/or limitation of liability under the Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 183(a).   This petition sought to limit Bennett Hall's liability for any loss, damage, injury or destruction caused by or resulting from the aforementioned incident involving the defendant and the decedent.   On June 9, 2010, the District Court issued an order staying further prosecution of all actions, suits, and proceedings related to the relevant incident until the resolution of the federal court proceedings.

On September 3, 2010, the defendant filed a motion for protective order in state court, requesting that the court postpone his upcoming deposition in this civil case against the plaintiffs.   The defendant asserted that his deposition should be postponed on the ground that allowing the deposition to go forward would compromise and interfere with the preparation of his pending criminal trial.   On September 9, 2010, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant's motion for protective order on the ground that there were several areas of inquiry not related to the criminal matter and because inquiries into the defendant's assets are appropriate considering the limited insurance coverage available.   On October 8, 2010, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion for protective order on the ground that, inter alia, the Shipowners' Limitation Act applies only to the ship owner and not the ship operator.

DISCUSSION

CONCURRENT JURISDICTION

The federal courts are vested with admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.   U.S. Const., art.   III, § 2. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333, however:  “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of:  (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.”  “[T]he saving to suitors clause preserves remedies and the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts over some admiralty and maritime claims.”  Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 445, 121 S.Ct. 993, 148 L.Ed.2d 931 (2001).   The clause “preserves a plaintiff's right to a common law remedy ‘in all cases where the common law is competent to give it.’  “ In re Lockheed Martin Corp., 503 F.3d 351, 354 (4th Cir.2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1017, 128 S.Ct. 2080, 170 L.Ed.2d 815 (2008), quoting Leon v. Galceran, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 185, 191, 20 L.Ed. 74 (1870).

Federal admiralty jurisdiction is exclusive only as to actions in rem, “that is, where a vessel or thing is itself treated as the offender and made the defendant by name or description in order to enforce a lien ․ It is this kind of in rem proceeding which state courts cannot entertain.”  (Citation omitted;  emphasis omitted.)  Magruda v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 560, 74 S.Ct. 298, 98 L.Ed. 290 (1954).   State courts, however, may hear actions in personam, “that is, where the defendant is a person, not a ship or some other instrument of navigation.”  Id., 360-61.  “A state, having concurrent jurisdiction, is free to adopt such remedies, and to attach to them such incidents, as it sees fit so long as it does not attempt to make changes in the substantive maritime law.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Magruda v. Superior Court, supra, 346 U.S. 560-61, citing Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 124, 44 S.Ct. 274, 68 L.Ed. 582 (1924).  “[F]ederal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over in rem actions, federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over in personam actions ․ and the effect of the [saving to suitors] clause is to give an in personam plaintiff ‘the choice of proceeding in an ordinary civil action, rather than bringing a libel in admiralty.’  “ (Citation omitted;  emphasis omitted.)  In re Chimenti, 79 F.3d 534, 537 (6th Cir.1996).

Under Section 1333, the plaintiff “suitor” has two different options:  First, the claimant may invoke federal admiralty jurisdiction under the grant of original subject matter jurisdiction over admiralty, maritime, and prize cases set out in Section 1333.   Neither complete diversity of citizenship nor a minimum amount in controversy need be shown under the statute, but, if alternative bases of federal subject matter jurisdiction exist, the plaintiff must affirmatively invoke admiralty jurisdiction.   On the other hand, most plaintiffs will have no right to a trial by jury if they invoke the federal court's general admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.

“Second, by virtue of the saving-to-suitors clause, the plaintiff also has the option of either asserting his claim [at] law in a state court or bringing suit in a United States district court.   However, to pursue the latter choice, the general requirements of complete diversity of citizenship and jurisdictional amount in controversy must be satisfied.”  (Citations omitted.)   14A C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure (3d Ed.1998) § 3672, p. 303-10.

I. SHIPOWNERS' LIMITATION OF LIABILITY ACT

The plaintiff argues that the defendant's motion for protective order should be denied on the ground that the Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 183(a), does not apply to the defendant and cannot be relied upon to the plaintiffs' civil action against the defendant.

The Shipowner's Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 183(a), generally limits a shipowner's liability for collisions at sea to the value of the shipowner's interest in the vessel and its freight.   Section 185(b) provides in relevant part that when a shipowner petitions a federal District Court for limitation of liability, “all claims and proceedings against the owner with respect to the matter in question shall cease.”  “The purpose of the limitation act is to release the ship owner from some liability for conduct of the master and other agents of the owner for which these parties were themselves liable.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Zapata Haynie Corp. v. Arthur, 926 F.2d 484, 485 (5th Cir.1991).  “Once an owner, who is subject to a claim against his ship, files a limitation complaint and posts appropriate security, he is generally entitled to an injunction enjoining ‘the further prosecution of any action or proceeding against the [owner] or his property with respect to any claim subject to limitation in the action.’   Rule F(3).   This provision applies to both state and federal proceedings.”   Complaint of Paradise Holdings, Inc., 795 F.2d 756, 761 (9th Cir.1986), 479 U.S. 1008, 107 S.Ct. 649, 93 L.Ed.2d 705 (1986).

When addressing an issue of statutory interpretation, the court must begin with the language of the statute itself.  Larnie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004).   If the language of the statute is unambiguous, the court must enforce it in accordance with its terms.  Id. “Where a statute is unambiguous and there is no room for interpretation or construction of this provision, we cannot circumvent its clear words ․ We refuse to enact judicial legislation.”  Zapata Haynie Corp. v. Arthur, supra, 926 F.2d 487.

Section 187 of the Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act expressly provides that the limitation of liability provided by the statute “[applies] to owners only, not to masters, officers, or seamen.”  Zapata Haynie Corp. v. Arthur, supra, 926 F.2d 485.   This section provides in relevant part:  “Nothing in Sections 182, 183, and 184 to 186 of this Appendix shall be construed to take away or affect the remedy to which any party may be entitled, against the master, officers, or seamen, for or on account of any ․ injury ․ or on account of any negligence ․ of such master, officers, or seamen, respectively, nor to lessen or take away any responsibility to which any master or seaman of any vessel may by law be liable ․” “Pursuant to the statute and the rules promulgated thereunder, once a shipowner has filed his federal limitation action in compliance with the law, ‘all claims and proceedings against the owner or the owner's property with respect to the matter in question shall cease.’  “ In re J.E. Brenneman Co., Inc., 277 F.Sup.2d 518, 522 (E.D.Pa.2003), quoting 28 U.S.C. Rule F(3) (Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims).  “The various provisions of the Act are not ambiguous, nor are they in conflict with one another:  the Act requires stays of proceedings against ship owners;  it does not permit stays of proceedings against masters.”  Zapata Haynie Corp. v. Arthur, supra, 926 F.2d 486.

“Although the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit may be right in finding that the purposes of the Act are inconsistent with the remedies reserved by § 187, it is not within the province of this Court to reconcile any such inconsistencies when the language of the Act is plain ․ The Act provides for stays of litigation against ship owners, not masters;  therefore, we find that a stay of litigation against the master is not within the scope of the Act. Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, Rule F also states that it permits enjoining proceedings against the owner, and makes no reference to enjoining proceedings against any other parties.   Furthermore, Section 187 plainly states that the provisions of the Act pertaining to stays of proceedings against the owner (§§ 182, 183, 184, 185 and 186) are not to be construed to affect the remedy to which any party may be entitled against the master.”  Zapata Haynie Corp. v. Arthur, supra, 926 F.2d 486.¹  The Zapata court further emphasized:  “[T]his Court cannot interpret § 187 to allow results that we believe Congress would wish;  we must interpret the language that Congress actually wrote ․ Accordingly, the plain language of 46 U.S.C.App. § 187 requires us to hold that a state court suit against a master need not be stayed pending a decision in a shipowner's limitation proceeding in federal court.”  Id., 486-87;  see In re Towing, Inc., 434 F.Sup.2d 383, 385 (E.D.La.2006) (unambiguous language of § 187 prevents court from considering congressional goals and requires giving effect to plain meaning of statute).

In the present case, the District Court order stated that until the resolution of the federal court proceedings related to this matter, no actions, suits or proceedings may be brought against Bennett Hall, the owner of the vessel, or against his property, with regard to the incident at hand.   Pursuant to the Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act, this order applies only to the ship owner, Bennett Hall, and not to the ship operator, the defendant.   As a result, the District Court order does not stay the plaintiffs' civil action against the defendant.

Accordingly, the Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act does not apply to the defendant and the District Court's order in the federal matter does not stay the plaintiffs' civil action against the defendant.

II. MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

“Upon motion by a party from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the judicial authority may make any order which justice requires to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following:  (1) that the discovery not be had ․” Practice Book § 13-5.  “The extent of discovery and use of protective orders is clearly within the discretion of the trial judge.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Longwood Engineered Products, Inc. v. Polyneer, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Windham at Putnam, Docket No. CV 04 0072627 (September 7, 2004, Potter, J.).  “The discovery rules are designed to facilitate trial proceedings and to make a ‘trial less a game of blindman's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practical extent.’  “ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Perez v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 7 Conn.App. 514, 519, 509 A.2d 552 (1986).

“The party seeking to bar a deposition must make a threshold showing that there is good cause that the protective order issue.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Schramm v. Stelly, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 00 0081681 (June 25, 2001, Cremins, J.) [30 Conn. L. Rptr. 41].  “Good cause has been defined as ‘a sound basis or legitimate need to take judicial action.’  “ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Pavlo v. Slattery, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Milford, Docket No. CV 03 0083541 (February 20, 2004, Bear, J.) (36 Conn. L. Rptr. 557).  “A finding of good cause must be based on a particular factual demonstration of potential harm, not on conclusory statements.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Sarfaty v. PNN Enterprises, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV 02 0280255 (April 19, 2004, Tanzer, J.).

“As a starting point, where there are parallel civil and criminal proceedings, the court has authority to stay discovery ․ if required by the interests of justice.”   Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 07 5010093 (January 11, 2008, Bellis, J.) (44 Conn. L. Rptr. 786).  “[A] court may decide in its discretion to stay civil proceedings, postpone civil discovery or impose protective orders and conditions when the interests of justice seem to require such action ․ The court must make such determinations in the light of the particular circumstances of the case.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Farricielli v. State, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV 0905386369 (January 8, 1997, McWeeny, J.) [18 Conn. L. Rptr. 520].  “In making [the] determination [to stay a matter], the court should balance:  (1) the private interest of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously with the civil litigation as balanced against the prejudice of the plaintiffs if delayed;  (2) the private interests of and burden on the defendant;  (3) the convenience to the courts;  (4) the interest of persons not parties to the civil litigation;  and (5) the public interest.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Wilcox v. Webster Ins., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 07 5010093.

In Wilcox v. Webster Ins., supra, the plaintiffs, who were involved in a multi-vehicle collision, sued a company that procured insurance coverage for the plaintiffs' business (Webster) and the insurer itself in connection with the incident.   The plaintiffs alleged that the insurer's failure to properly defend and indemnify the plaintiffs exposed them to criminal prosecution by the state.   The main issue in the civil suit was whether the plaintiffs' business had insurance coverage in place on the date of the accident.   After the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to compel the depositions of certain Webster employees, the state of Connecticut, through the Division of Criminal Justice (DCJ), subsequently moved to intervene in order to request a stay of all depositions.   It later amended its motion to intervene and submitted a memorandum in support thereof, requesting a stay of all deposition and discovery pending completion of the plaintiffs' criminal proceedings.

Analyzing the five-factor test previously set forth, the court held that discovery should be stayed until the resolution of the criminal charges pending against the plaintiffs.   The court stated:  “While the plaintiffs certainly have an interest in proceeding with their civil litigation, the stay would affect discovery only, and not the action in its entirety ․ Very little prejudice would result to the plaintiffs ․” Id. The court also emphasized that temporarily staying discovery would avoid inconvenience to the court and promote judicial efficiency:  “In fact, should civil discovery be temporarily stayed, later civil discovery may be streamlined, and issues may be narrowed, since transcripts from the criminal trial will be available to the civil parties.”  Id. The court further noted that “the states' ability to protect the public's interest in prosecuting crime would be thwarted if the plaintiffs, intentionally or unintentionally, were permitted to circumvent the criminal discovery process by accessing the more liberal discovery available in civil litigation.”  Id. In addition, although the public interest in prosecuting criminal cases is strong, allowing the plaintiffs access to civil discovery “may very well reveal the states' strategy, and could possibly have a chilling effect on the state's witnesses.”  Id.;  see Mateus v. Thomas, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 04 0489457 (November 10, 2005, Lopez, J.) (40 Conn. L. Rptr. 276) (on similar facts, holding that defendant's deposition should be delayed until pending criminal matter is resolved).

In the present case, based on the case law set forth above, the defendant's deposition in the civil case should be stayed until the resolution of the pending criminal charges against him.   Staying discovery would result in little prejudice to the plaintiffs, promote judicial efficiency, promote the public interest and avoid potentially revealing the state's strategy in the parallel criminal case.

CONCLUSION

As stated earlier, the U.S. District Court's order in the federal matter does not stay the plaintiffs' civil action against the defendant pursuant to the Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act. However, for the reasons stated above concerning the criminal case, the defendant's motion for protective order is hereby granted.

By the Court

Richard E. Burke, Judge

FOOTNOTES

FN1. In Complaint of Paradise Holdings, Inc., 795 F.2d 756 (9th Cir.1986), the Ninth Circuit held that § 187 should not be read “in isolation from the rest of the act” and that the Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act should be construed “in a manner that best promotes each of Congress' goals.”  Id., 762.   The majority of cases dealing with this issue have criticized the holding of Complaint of Paradise Holdings, Inc. on the ground that the relevant statutory provisions are unambiguous and that the purpose of the Act should not be taken into consideration..  FN1. In Complaint of Paradise Holdings, Inc., 795 F.2d 756 (9th Cir.1986), the Ninth Circuit held that § 187 should not be read “in isolation from the rest of the act” and that the Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act should be construed “in a manner that best promotes each of Congress' goals.”  Id., 762.   The majority of cases dealing with this issue have criticized the holding of Complaint of Paradise Holdings, Inc. on the ground that the relevant statutory provisions are unambiguous and that the purpose of the Act should not be taken into consideration.

Burke, Richard E., J.