IN RE: A.R.1 (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PETITIONS FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS, MOTION TO REVIEW PERMANENCY PLAN, AND MOTIONS TO TRANSFER GUARDIANSHIP

STATEMENT OF CASE AND PROCEEDINGS

In this child protection proceeding the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families (DCF) seeks to terminate the parental rights of mother, Karisha A., as to both of the named minor children;  of Todd L. as to A.;   and, of Eduardo R. as to M. DCF's Motion to Review Permanency Plan, filed June 10, 2009, and the mother's and maternal great-grandmother's objections thereto, filed June 11 and June 10, 2009, were consolidated with the termination petitions for trial.   Also consolidated for trial were Motions to Transfer Guardianship, filed by maternal great-grandmother and mother, on August 17, 2009, and September 7, 2009, respectively.

Todd L. was found by the court to be the biological father of A. on November 5, 2009.   On October 12, 2010, Todd L. consented to the termination of his parental rights to A.;   that consent was accepted by the court;  and DCF amended its petition to reflect consent.   Because of that adjudication, the remainder of this memorandum will not address Todd L. except as is necessary and relevant regarding disposition.

An ex parte order of temporary custody (OTC) was issued for the children on August 14, 2008, and specific steps were ordered.   The OTC was sustained on August 22, 2008;  specific steps were ordered again;  and mother signed these steps.

Eduardo R. was defaulted as to the neglect petition on September 18, 2008.   On February 2, 2009, neither mother nor Eduardo R. appeared for the neglect trial and the court entered defaults as to both of them.   On that same date, the court made factual findings;  adjudicated the children neglected;  denied motions to transfer guardianship to the maternal great-grandmother;  and entrusted the two girls to the care and custody of DCF until further court order.   In addition, the court ordered that the parties meet with the court services officer within two weeks of its decision in order to attempt agreement on specific steps, including steps for the maternal great-grandmother, who had been permitted to intervene in the neglect action.   Specific steps were signed by the maternal great-grandmother on February 23, 2009, and approved by the court on that same day.   However, after the neglect adjudication, no additional specific steps were ordered as to Eduardo R. or Karisha A.

Petitions for termination of parental rights were filed on June 15, 2009, alleging abandonment and failure to rehabilitate on the part of mother, and abandonment and lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship as to Eduardo R. Maternal great-grandmother's motion to intervene in the termination proceedings was granted.   The intervenor's motion to transfer guardianship to her was dismissed by the trial court, however, that judgment was reversed by the Appellate Court, on August 17, 2010.

Service on the respondents has been confirmed.   A finding of paternity was made by the trial court on December 7, 2010, regarding Eduardo R. as to M. This court has jurisdiction in this matter.   There are no other known pending proceedings affecting the custody of the children.   There are no claims of Indian tribal affiliation.

Trial on the consolidated matters proceeded on December 6 and 7, 2010.   Mother was not present at trial.²  Mother was diligently represented by counsel throughout the trial.   Also present at trial were Myrta M., the children's maternal great-grandmother who had previously intervened in the matter, maternal great-grandmother's attorney, counsel for the children, a DCF representative and counsel for DCF. DCF and maternal great-grandmother presented the testimony of witnesses and introduced documentary evidence.   Counsel for mother and for the children examined witnesses and fully participated in the trial but did not call any witnesses or introduce any documentary evidence.   As a result of the granting of motions filed by maternal great-grandmother on November 16, 2010, and DCF on November 30, 2010, the court has taken judicial notice of certain filings, dates, hearings and decisions in these matters, reference to which is made in this memorandum as warranted.

FACTUAL EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS

On August 4, 2008, DCF received a hotline referral that mother Karisha was incarcerated and that her two children had been left with maternal great-grandmother, who was already caring for four other minor children, one or more of whom were under an order of protective supervision.   On August 12, 2008, maternal great-grandmother took A. and M. to the hospital emergency room because A. had disclosed that she had been sexually abused by Eduardo R., the father of M., apparently while they were at the home of the maternal great-grandmother.

Mother

Mother, Karisha, is twenty-three years old.   Pursuant to what she has called a “family tradition,” Karisha moved into the home of her maternal grandmother, Myrta M., (the subject children's maternal great-grandmother) when Karisha was ten years of age.   She apparently joined other cousins who were already living there and was later joined by siblings.   Karisha started using heroin at about the age of eleven;  as of attaining the age of thirteen, she was using it regularly and she has developed an opiate addiction.   Karisha was sexually abused by her stepfather from the time she was nine years old until she was thirteen.   The stepfather was convicted on criminal charges related to those offenses and is currently incarcerated as a result of that conviction.

Mother's education ended after she completed the tenth grade-she recalls that she “acted up” in school and that she was “kicked out.”   Her parents and four of her siblings were engaged in substance abuse.   She has never been married and has no employment history.   Mother's criminal history includes convictions for assault in the third degree and failure to appear (misdemeanors) in 2005;  failure to appear (misdemeanor) and larceny in the second degree (felony) in 2008;  and, escape from incarceration (felony) in 2009.

At the time of DCF's assumption of temporary custody of the children under the OTC, August 14, 2008, mother had just commenced service of her two-year term of incarceration for the larceny conviction entered on August 8, 2008.   She was released to a halfway house in November 2008, but, on December 8, 2008, after attending a court hearing, mother did not return to the halfway house, and remained on “escape” status until April 30, 2009.   Although mother had regular once-per-month visitation with her girls while she was incarcerated, as arranged and implemented by DCF in bringing the children to the correctional facility, no visitation was sought by mother during the entire four-month “escape” period.   In addition mother did not contact DCF or make inquiries about her children during that entire four-month period and her whereabouts were unknown.   Mother admitted to using heroin during the escape period.   The escape conviction resulted in a one-year sentence.   DCF arranged for visitation to resume upon mother's re-incarceration in the spring of 2009.   Mother was released again in November 2009, but was arrested three weeks later for violation of parole.   Mother was last released from incarceration on October 8, 2010.   The DCF worker assigned to the case had asked mother in the summer of 2010, in anticipation of release, to immediately advise the worker of a new address so that visitation could be arranged.   Mother did not do so.   DCF was able to make contact with mother in late October as the result of DCF's inquiries to the maternal great-grandmother and mother related to DCF that she was living with a roommate, looking for a job, and contemplating enrolling in a GED program.   Mother was told that she needed an evaluation in order to assess her stability and whether substance abuse treatment was necessary, however, mother did not agree to such an evaluation.   By the time of the December 6, 2010 trial start, mother had engaged in only one visit with the children-a supervised visit on November 8, 2010.   Another visit had been scheduled for November 22, 2010, but mother did not appear at the visit or call as to why she would not be coming.   DCF attempted contact at the last known number, but without success.

When mother does visit with the girls, she interacts appropriately with them and both the girls and she are happy to be with one another.   It is clear that they love one another.   It is also clear that mother loves the girls, indeed, mother related to court-appointed psychologist that the reason that she did not go back to the halfway house in December 2008, was that she was experiencing despair as a result of her belief that she would never have her children returned to her care.

The court-appointed psychologist, Stephen M. Humphrey, evaluated mother in the winter of 2009/2010 while mother was incarcerated.   During the course of the interview, mother described much of the history set forth above and also related that she knew she could not care for her girls because of her incarceration and because she needed to address and overcome some significant personal issues.   Dr. Humphrey found that mother's behavior clearly reveals an antisocial personality in that she fails to conform to social norms in repeatedly engaging in actions that subject her to arrest;  she is impulsive and fails to plan ahead;  she shows consistent irresponsibility;  and also she demonstrates reckless disregard for the safety of others.   It was also the doctor's opinion that mother suffers from dependence on opiate drugs and a depressive disorder.   According to Dr. Humphrey, in light of the extent and nature of mother's substance abuse and trauma history, she is in need of ongoing psychotherapy, individual therapy, and placement in a group home or long-term residential placement, all of which would take considerable time.   Dr. Humphrey further opined that mother's afflictions preclude her from safely serving as a parent to her children.

Father

The whereabouts of Eduardo R., father of M., have been unknown since August 12, 2008, the day on which maternal great-grandmother ordered him to leave her home upon her learning of his alleged sexual assault upon A. For the last two and one-half years, he has made no attempts to contact his daughter or send messages to her;  he has not contacted DCF;  and he has not made any inquiries as to his daughter's health or well-being.   In summary he has not been present or available for his daughter physically, emotionally, financially, or otherwise.

The Children

At the time of DCF's removal of the children from their maternal great-grandmother's home, their fathers' whereabouts were unknown, their mother was incarcerated, and they had no other legal guardian.   Previously the children had lived with an aunt, with their mother, and also with their maternal great-grand mother.   The children were two and four years of age at the time.   Each of them was infested with lice and scabies.   A. had not had eight of her needed immunizations and M. was ill with asthma and allergies.   They had not had medical attention for some time, and, for the first seven months of their stay in their foster mother's home, the children's medical needs were such that they needed almost constant attention from the pediatrician.   Since placement, the children's physical health has improved significantly.

At the time of DCF's removal of the children, they were unruly and hyperactive, had no manners, and acted inappropriately with other people, so-called “boundary issues.”   While the girls' behavior and social skills have improved, A. and M. continue to exhibit some disturbing symptoms.   Dr. Humphrey noted that there are strong indications that A. was sexually abused in that there are reports of unusual sexualized behavior on her part, as well as “promiscuous attachment seeking.”   A. has suffered from recurrent nightmares, extreme anxiety, the need to cling excessively to her caregiver and she engages in sexually acting out, primarily with her younger sister.   M. suffers from both an attention deficit/hyperactivity and an eating, disorder.   She also engages in aggressive behavior and she has suffered from nightmares.   Both of the children are in therapy and have been diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.   According to Dr. Humphrey, while the children have improved, the effect of their past experiences has left them in need of continuing therapy.   Angeles Ramos, the children's therapist, has been working with A. since June 2009, and with M. since January 2010.   She has seen improvement and she does not believe there would be a negative impact on the children if their visits with their mother or their maternal great-grandmother were to cease.

Both children experience anxiety about where they will live in the future.   According to Dr. Humphrey, both of the girls have significant attachment problems, and it is especially important for these children to have permanency in their lives.   Although the children enjoy the visits that they do have with their mother, after the visits, the children exhibit more, or more intense, behavioral problems.

Since August of 2008, the children have been residing in their current foster home.   They have bonded with their foster mother, call her “mommy,” and they enjoy a loving relationship with her.   Their foster mother has two grown daughters who are close to A. and M. The foster mother has attended to the girls' medical, therapy and family needs.   The girls' regular schedule on weekdays involves typical family activities of breakfast, preparation for school, dinner, shower, homework and 8:00 p.m. bedtimes.   On weekends they eat out, go shopping or go to the movies.   Foster mom has taken the children to the Disney resort in Florida in each of the last two years.   She loves the children and would like to adopt them.

Maternal Great-grandmother

Myrta M. is a loving and caring woman who has attempted to assist her family to the best of her abilities.   It is clear that maternal great-grandmother loves her great-granddaughters very much, unfortunately, there are significant drawbacks to her ability to serve as their guardian.   Although the proven circumstances belie her denials, Myrta M. refuses to admit that A. and M. were suffering from the above-described medical afflictions when they entered the temporary custody of DCF. She also denies her inability to appropriately guide, protect and direct the children, which is contrary to the evidence presented in this matter

At the time of DCF's removal of the girls from maternal great-grandmother's home, Myrta M. had legal guardianship of her minor grandson and minor granddaughter, L. and Ala., as well as her two great grandsons, Ala.'s children.   All of them were living with maternal great-grandmother.   Ala. is no longer a minor, however, maternal great-grandmother still has legal guardianship of her grandson L., and her great grandsons (Ala.'s children).   Nevertheless, maternal great-grandmother has entrusted her legal wards to the different parents from whom guardianship was removed;  her legal wards no longer live with her;  and, she has moved to a one-bedroom apartment.   At trial in this matter, maternal great-grandmother testified that, if she had guardianship of A. and M., she would keep the girls with her.   However, she has also stated in the past that she would like to have guardianship of the girls so that she could “give” the children to their mother.

DCF has questioned, as does the court, the judgment of the maternal great-grandmother.   For example, despite the presence of several very young children in her home, she allowed an assortment of people to come in and out of the home on a regular basis, including substance abusers and people who were under the influence of substances.   None of Myrta M.'s children have completed high school and Myrta M. has stated that she does not believe anyone should or can force a teenager to attend school.

Maternal great-grandmother admits to prior substance abuse, including alcohol and illegal drugs, but she credibly clams that she has not used for more than twenty years.   She is not able to address guidance and discipline of children, indicating to Dr. Humphrey, for example, that either physical discipline or no discipline at all should be the norm.   Maternal great-grandmother does not understand why DCF has intervened in her family's life or why she must be involved in court proceedings for issues with her grandchildren and great grandchildren.

Maternal great-grandmother visits the girls twice a month.   While it is clear that the children have a bond with Myrta M., and vice versa, the children are very rambunctious and Myrta is not able to manage them.   She refuses to recognize that the children's hyperactivity needs to be addressed and controlled and she appears to be overwhelmed by the children and their behavior.   In addition, Myrta M. is easily distracted and frequently does not interact with the children during visits, engaging instead in activities such as using her cell phone.   Furthermore, maternal great-grandmother makes inappropriate comments to, or in front of, the children.

Maternal great-grandmother has had the benefit of parenting education arranged by DCF, and after two 12-week sessions, and clear effort on her part, she continues to experience difficulty in processing information that is necessary for her to effectively parent.   Dr. Humphrey evaluated Ms. M. and has opined that Ms. M's. beliefs and patterns of behavior are so entrenched that it is not likely that any therapeutic intervention would assist in improving her ability to appropriately and effectively care for her great granddaughters.

MOTION TO REVIEW PERMANENCY PLAN

Pursuant to the directives of General Statutes § 46b-129(k) and Practice Book 35a-14 § , this court has considered the evidence and finds that DCF has established, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that the permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption, filed on June 10, 2009, is an appropriate plan, and is in the best interests of both of the children.   The plan is approved, and the objections thereto are overruled.   The court also finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to achieve the plan.

MOTIONS FOR TRANSFER OF GUARDIANSHIP

Decision-making on a motion to transfer guardianship requires the court to consider whether the proposed guardian is suitable and worthy and whether the proposed placement would be in the best interests of the child, that is, whether such placement would foster the sustained growth, development, and well-being of the child, as well as the continuity and stability of the child's environment.  General Statutes § 46b-129(j);  In re Haley B., 81 Conn.App. 62, 67 (2004).

While this court finds that maternal great-grandmother is a caring and giving person, who has made significant efforts and sacrifices for her family, the court does not find that she is a suitable and worthy caregiver for these two young girls, nor that it would be in the best interests of A. and M. for their guardianship to be vested in the maternal great-grandmother.

Guided by the statutory directives, and the interpretative decisional law this court denies the motions for transfer of guardianship to the maternal great-grandmother.

ADJUDICATORY FINDINGS AND DISPOSITION as to PETITIONS TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS

The governing applicable statutory language provides that, upon hearing and notice, parental rights may be terminated on the following bases, as alleged in the petitions at issue, if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that:

(1) the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a-111b, ․ and

(2) termination is in the best interest of the child, and

(3)

(A) the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child;

(B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child;  ․

(D) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child;

General Statutes § 17-112(j).

Reasonable Efforts

Mother was incarcerated, or on escape status with whereabouts unknown, for the entire period of time from the date of the children's removal through the date of the termination petition, and, therefore, DCF could not provide mother with any rehabilitation programs.   DCF did encourage mother to take advantage of programs that were available to her while she was incarcerated, but mother did not do so before the filing of the petition.   DCF has provided visitation on a regular basis not only with mother but also with maternal great-grandmother.

In its efforts to locate Eduardo R., DCF has talked to relatives, searched criminal records and telephone directories, visited previous addresses, and otherwise engaged in “due diligence search” activities, without success.

The clear and convincing evidence establishes that DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify mother with the children and has also made reasonable efforts to locate Eduardo R.

Termination Basis-Failure to Rehabilitate-Mother

A hearing addressing the issue of termination of parental rights consists of two phases.   The initial adjudicatory phase addresses whether one or more grounds for termination exist and, if that is decided in the affirmative, the court moves on to the dispositional phase in which the court determines whether termination is in the best interests of the child.  In re Lukas K., 120 Conn.App. 465, 486, cert. granted on other grounds, 297 Conn. 914 (2010).

The Connecticut Appellate Court has interpreted the child protection statute to preclude termination of parental rights premised on subsection (3)(B) (failure to achieve personal rehabilitation) unless specific steps have previously been provided to the parent.  In re Justice V., 111 Conn.App. 500, 507-08, 510 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 911 (2009).   In that case, the court reasoned that a parent must be given fair warning of what the parent must do in order to be reunified with the child.  Id. at 507.   While In re Justice V. focuses on the specific steps to be provided after a neglect adjudication, namely under General Statutes § 46b-129(j), a review of that decision reveals that no specific steps were ever provided to the parent in that case at any time.³

Specific steps serve as fundamental guides to assist a parent to develop or re-establish the ability to care for the general and the specific needs of their children, to serve a constructive and guiding role as a parent, and to maintain a responsible position in the child's life.  In re Sarah Ann. K., 57 Conn.App. 441, 448 (2000);  In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 112, 124 (1992).

In the present case, although the court did not issue specific steps to mother at the time of the neglect adjudication, the court had issued specific steps at the time of the issuance of the ex parte OTC, and again at the time of the sustaining of the OTC. The steps provided the following agreement and notice, which mother signed on August 22, 2008:

As the above-named respondent, I hereby agree to cooperate with the above conditions approved and ordered by the court and recognize that non-compliance with these steps results in modification of the existing order or disposition.   I acknowledge that failure to achieve these specific steps will increase the chance that a petition may be filed to terminate my parental rights permanently so that my child may be placed in adoption.   I understand that I should contact my lawyer and/or DCF worker if I need help in reaching any of these steps.

In accordance with all of the applicable statutory and practice book requirements and directives, as well as the applicable decisional authority construing same, this court makes the following adjudicatory findings under the clear and convincing evidence standard.   As of the date of the filing of the termination petition, June 15, 2009, the children had been adjudicated neglected (February 2, 2009).   Mother's specific steps, acknowledged by her signature the form detailing them, dated August 22, 2008, provided her clear directives as to what she needed to do and a fair warning of potential consequences for failure to do so.   The steps included commitments to:  participate in available programs during her incarceration, learn effective parenting skills, not engage in substance abuse, and visit the children as often as DCF permitted.

As of June 15, 2009, the date of the filing of the termination petition, mother had been incarcerated for four months (from August through December 2008) and had not participated in any programs.   Thereafter, for four months commencing in December 2008, she did not visit or contact her children in any way, and she did not advise DCF of her whereabouts.   She also engaged in substance abuse during the period of time of her escape.

While mother provided some certificates that reference her participation in programs during a portion of her incarceration, including a substance abuse treatment program (certificate dated October 28, 2009);  group attendance at counseling (form dated September 29, 2009);  and completion of a trauma-survivors learning group session (certificate dated October 6, 2009), these programs were engaged in by mother after the termination petition had been filed;  and upon her re-incarceration after escape.   In addition, although she was released from prison once again in November 2009, mother was rearrested and she returned to prison three weeks later.   As this behavior itself reveals, mother had not developed “effective parenting skills” at the time of the termination petition, nor at any time thereafter.

The court is limited to consideration of events preceding the date of the filing of the termination petition or the latest amendment thereof in deciding whether a statutory basis for termination exists.   Practice Book § 35a-7.   The clear and convincing evidence reveals that, as of June 15, 2009, mother had not rehabilitated and there was no indication that she would do so within a reasonable period of time, considering the needs of her daughters.

The court may rely upon post-petition events in evaluating whether a parent's degree of rehabilitation supports a finding that restoration is foreseeable within a reasonable time.  In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742, 748 (2002);  In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 357 (2001);  In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230 (2000).   Mother's failure to notify DCF of contact information upon her release from prison in the fall of 2010 and her failure to take advantage of visiting with her children at that time reinforce the conclusion that the mother's achievement of appropriate parental skills for these children was not possible at any time in the reasonable future.

DCF has met its burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that mother has not achieved a degree of rehabilitation as would encourage a belief that she could assume responsible parenting of her daughters.

Termination Basis-Abandonment-Mother

Conduct that demonstrates a parent's lack of continuing interest in the child and a lack of concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare constitutes abandonment.  In re Jaime S., 120 Conn.App. 712, 732 (2010).   Indicia of interest include relatively regular and continuing, rather than sporadic, attempts to maintain contact with the child in person or through telephonic, postal or electronic means.  Id.;  In re Justice V., supra, 111 Conn.App. 514.   In addition, parental responsibility includes attention to the physical, educational, and emotional needs of the child.  In re Ashley E., 62 Conn.App. 307, 315 (2001).

When the children first came under DCF's care, in August 2008, mother was in prison.   In that same month, mother acknowledged that she had to actively engage in programs that would assist her in being the parent her two children needed, as well as visit the children as frequently as DCF could arrange and provide.   From August 2008, through December 2008, the only chance that the children had to be with their mother was the visitation which DCF arranged and accommodated during mother's incarceration.   Shortly after her release to a half-way house, mother completely disappeared from her children's lives for four months, from December 2008, through April 2009.   There was absolutely no attempt by her to contact the children or inquire as to their wellbeing during that time.   In addition, the escape, as mother surely must have known, put her at risk for the imposition of additional incarceration time and thus further limited access to her children, and additional delay in potential reunification.

DCF has established, by clear and convincing evidence, that mother abandoned the children.

Termination-Abandonment and No Parent/Child Relationship-Father

Eduardo R. has not been present in the life of M., in any way whatsoever, since August 2008, when the child was two years of age.

Based on the clear and convincing evidence, this court finds that he has abandoned the child and that there is no parent/child relationship.   The court further finds that allowing any additional time to attempt the establishment of such a relationship, even if Eduardo R. reappeared, would be detrimental to M.

Best Interests of the Children

Having found bases for termination, the court must now consider whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children, which interests encompass sustained growth and development, well-being, stability and continuity, on both environmental and personal bases.  In re Jaime S., supra, 120 Conn.App. 733-34;  In re Anthony H., 104 Conn.App. 744, 763-64 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 920 (2008).   The clear and convincing evidence, including the experts' recommendations, confirms that termination of mother's and fathers' parental rights is in the best interests of the children because of the needs of these children for continued appropriate parenting and protection, nurturing, stability, guidance, and permanency, as they have begun to experience in the last several years.   Even when there is a bond between a parent and a child, it still may be in the child's best interests to terminate parental rights.  In re Rachel J., 97 Conn.App. 748, 761, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 941 (2006).

The following findings, supporting that termination of parental rights of mother as to both girls, and of Eduardo R. as to M., is in the best interests of these children, are made in accordance with the directives of General Statutes § 17-112(k).

1. The timeliness, nature and extent of the services offered, provided and made available to the parents and the children to facilitate reunion.

DCF did all that it could to reunite mother with her children, and its efforts to do so were timely.   Diligent and efforts were made to locate Eduardo R., but were unsuccessful.

2. Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

DCF searched for Eduardo, made recommendations for mother to follow while she was in prison, and provided visitation to mother and children both before and after mother's escape from incarnation.

3. The feelings and emotional ties of the children with respect to the children's parents, any guardian(s) of such children's persons and any persons who have exercised physical care, custody or control for at least one year and with whom the children have developed significant emotional ties.

Except for a period of three weeks, mother was incarcerated, or on escape from confinement, from the time of the children's removal in August 2008 until mother's release from prison in October 2010.   The children visited with mother at prison, but could not even have that limited visiting time with mother when mother disappeared for four months.   During this entire period of time, the children have been nurtured by their foster mother.   The children have begun to experience a sense of stability and belonging and are making strides in overcoming the traumatic effects of their prior unfortunate childhoods.   The children are strongly bonded to their foster mother and her grown daughters.   The foster mother has attended to the medical needs of these children and provided them with a consistently caring family existence.   In addition, the foster mother has addressed, and continues to endure and address, the behavior that the children have exhibited in light of their prior physical and emotional deprivation and turmoil.

M. has spent more than half of her five-year life not knowing her father or hearing from or about him.

4. The terms of any applicable court order(s) entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent(s), and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order(s).

DCF has complied with the specific step directives.   Mother has not adhered to her specific steps agreement.   This information is not applicable to Eduardo R.

5. The age(s) of the children.

A. was born on June 25, 2004 and is 6 and one/half years of age.   M. is five years of age;  her date of birth is January 20, 2006.

6. The efforts the parents have made to adjust such parents' circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interests of the children to return such children home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parents have maintained contact with the children as part of an effort to reunite the children with the parents, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian(s) of the children.

Mother has made no such efforts, and, indeed, has engaged in actions that thwarted the timely return to a home with their mother.   Mother has made no contact at all with the foster parent.   Eduardo R. has made no efforts whatsoever.

7. The extent to which the parents have been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the children by the unreasonable acts or conduct of the other parents of the children, or the unreasonable acts of any other persons or by the economic circumstances of the parents.

No such acts or circumstances exist in this matter.

Having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist to terminate the parental rights, that termination would be in the children's best interests, and that the children have the need for a secure and permanent placement, with a focus on adoption, the court grants the petition to terminate the parental rights of respondent, Karisha A. to A. and M., of Todd L. as to A., and of Eduardo R. as to M.

The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is appointed the statutory parent of each of these children.

The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families shall file, within thirty days, a report as to the status of each of these children and shall also timely file any additional reports as are required by law.

The clerk of the Probate Court which has jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of either of these children shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at New Britain of the date that each adoption is finalized.

Judgment is entered accordingly.

BY THE COURT,

Constance L. Epstein, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN2. The court made inquiries regarding mother at the commencement of trial and was told by mother's attorney that the two had met recently and counsel had reminded mother at that time of the trial date.   On the afternoon of the first day of trial, the court read into the record a note from the clerk of the court reflecting a recorded telephone message left at the clerk's office by mother that morning indicating that she had to go to the hospital that day because of her asthma and then did not have transportation to court.   On the second day of trial, mother again was not present, and none of the individuals present had any information as to mother's whereabouts or why mother was not present.   DCF reported that it had given notice that it would provide transportation to court for mother..  FN2. The court made inquiries regarding mother at the commencement of trial and was told by mother's attorney that the two had met recently and counsel had reminded mother at that time of the trial date.   On the afternoon of the first day of trial, the court read into the record a note from the clerk of the court reflecting a recorded telephone message left at the clerk's office by mother that morning indicating that she had to go to the hospital that day because of her asthma and then did not have transportation to court.   On the second day of trial, mother again was not present, and none of the individuals present had any information as to mother's whereabouts or why mother was not present.   DCF reported that it had given notice that it would provide transportation to court for mother.

FN3. Under Connecticut's child protection statutes, specific steps must be issued by the court:  (1) upon the issuance of an ex parte order of temporary custody (OTC), General Statutes § 46b-129(b);  (2) upon the court's sustaining of an OTC, General Statutes § 46b-120(c);  and (3) upon the court's adjudication that a child is neglected, uncared-for, or dependent, General Statutes § 46b-129(j).The first statutory requirement for the issuance of specific steps was imposed in 1996 when PA. 96-246 § 18 directed that they be issued with any ex parte order of temporary custody (OTC).   In 1997, legislative enactments once again addressed specific steps, this time mandating the issuance thereof upon the court's adjudication or finding a child to be uncared-for, neglected or dependent.  P.A. 97-319, § 19.   In 1998, the General Assembly again addressed the required issuance of specific steps, this time mandating that they be ordered at the time of the OTC hearing, specifically directing that the court “ ․ shall provide to the commissioner and the parent or guardian specific steps necessary for each to take for the parent or guardian to regain or retain custody of the child or youth.”  P.A. 98-241, § 5. “Specific steps” had not been statutorily required as a prerequisite for termination of parental rights until 1998, when General Statutes §§ 17-112 and 45a-717 were amended to permit termination of parental rights on the basis of failure to rehabilitate as to the parent of a child who․ is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and such parent has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to 46b-129 as amended ․P.A. 98-241, §§ 8 and 9.It should be noted that at no time, up to and including the present, have the applicable statutes required the prior issuance of specific steps as to any other basis for termination, i.e., abandonment or lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship, as well as failure to rehabilitate of a parent whose parental rights to another child have previously been terminated and the child at issue at the present time is under seven years of age..  FN3. Under Connecticut's child protection statutes, specific steps must be issued by the court:  (1) upon the issuance of an ex parte order of temporary custody (OTC), General Statutes § 46b-129(b);  (2) upon the court's sustaining of an OTC, General Statutes § 46b-120(c);  and (3) upon the court's adjudication that a child is neglected, uncared-for, or dependent, General Statutes § 46b-129(j).The first statutory requirement for the issuance of specific steps was imposed in 1996 when PA. 96-246 § 18 directed that they be issued with any ex parte order of temporary custody (OTC).   In 1997, legislative enactments once again addressed specific steps, this time mandating the issuance thereof upon the court's adjudication or finding a child to be uncared-for, neglected or dependent.  P.A. 97-319, § 19.   In 1998, the General Assembly again addressed the required issuance of specific steps, this time mandating that they be ordered at the time of the OTC hearing, specifically directing that the court “ ․ shall provide to the commissioner and the parent or guardian specific steps necessary for each to take for the parent or guardian to regain or retain custody of the child or youth.”  P.A. 98-241, § 5. “Specific steps” had not been statutorily required as a prerequisite for termination of parental rights until 1998, when General Statutes §§ 17-112 and 45a-717 were amended to permit termination of parental rights on the basis of failure to rehabilitate as to the parent of a child who․ is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and such parent has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to 46b-129 as amended ․P.A. 98-241, §§ 8 and 9.It should be noted that at no time, up to and including the present, have the applicable statutes required the prior issuance of specific steps as to any other basis for termination, i.e., abandonment or lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship, as well as failure to rehabilitate of a parent whose parental rights to another child have previously been terminated and the child at issue at the present time is under seven years of age.

Epstein, Constance L., J.