Raymond Chowaniec v. Tina Deloughery (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

On June 10, 2008, the plaintiff, Raymond Chowaniec, filed a two-count complaint against the defendant, Tina Deloughery.   In the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that on or about January 5, 2007, he was driving his vehicle southbound on Route 147 in Durham, Connecticut and the defendant was driving her vehicle northbound on Route 147.   The plaintiff avers that as both parties approached the intersection of Route 147 and Maple Avenue, the defendant crossed the center line and collided with the plaintiff's vehicle;  thereby causing injuries to the plaintiff.   In count one, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant's negligence caused the collision.   In count two, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant's recklessness caused the collision.   The defendant filed a motion to strike count two and a memorandum of law in support of the motion on July 24, 2008.   The plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion on July 28, 2008.   This court heard oral argument on this matter on December 20, 2010.

DISCUSSION

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).  “The proper method to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint is to make a motion to strike prior to trial.”  Gulack v. Gulack, 30 Conn.App. 305, 309, 620 A.2d 181 (1993).  “[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   American Progressive Life & Health Ins. Co. of New York v. Better Benefits, LLC, 292 Conn. 111, 120, 971 A.2d 17 (2009).  “Moreover ․ [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged ․ It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted ․ Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 318, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006).   The court must “construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  American Progressive Life & Health Ins. Co of New York v. Better Benefits, LLC, supra, 292 Conn. 120.

The defendant moves to strike count two on the ground that the plaintiff failed to allege a cause of action for common-law recklessness or statutory recklessness under General Statutes § 14-295.   The defendant argues that the plaintiff fails to specifically allege that the defendant engaged in reckless conduct.   The plaintiff argues that he satisfied the pleading requirements of § 14-295 by alleging that the defendant violated §§ 14-218a, 14-222, and 14-237 deliberately or with reckless disregard;  and that such violations were a substantial factor in causing his injuries.

Section 14-295 provides in relevant part:  “In any civil action to recover damages from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, ․ 14-222 ․ [or] 14-237 ․ and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property.”  “There has been a split of authority in Superior Court decisions as to what degree of specificity is required in pleading recklessness [arising] from the different constructions the courts have placed on the term specifically pleaded.”   Cooke v. Maynard, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 10 6012259 (September 21, 2010, Wilson, J.).   The defendant acknowledges this split of authority and argues that the minority view is the proper interpretation.   “[T]he minority view ․ holds that a plaintiff must not only plead a statutory violation as set forth in § 14-295, but also facts that would support a claim of reckless conduct at common law.”   Liedke v. Paquette, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 10 6004043 (August 2, 2010, Swienton, J.).

This court recently addressed the split of authority in Luciano v. Lopez, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 10 6013983 (December 16, 2010, Woods, J.).   In Luciano, this court found the majority view to be persuasive.   Under the majority view, “a claim for statutory recklessness is legally sufficient so long as it alleges that the defendant deliberately or with reckless disregard violated one of the statutes enumerated in § 14-295, and further asserts that the violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries.”   Lindquist v. Smith, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Milford, Docket No. CV 08 5006579 (November 2, 2009, Ronan, J.T.R.).   Under the majority view, “as long as the general requirements of the statute are met, such pleading is enough to survive a motion to strike and to state a cause of action under § 14-295.”   Braumann v. Clavette, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 09 5027558 (April 27, 2010, Wilson, J.).

In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant deliberately or with reckless disregard violated General Statutes §§ 14-218a, 14-222a and 14-237 and that such violations were a substantial factor in causing the injuries to the plaintiff.   In viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action of statutory recklessness under § 14-295.

For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the motion to strike.

Woods, J.

Woods, Glenn A., J.