David Taylor v. DOC (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS

The plaintiff David Taylor brings this action as a petition seeking a declaratory judgment that would have the effect of compelling the defendant to act favorably on Taylor's request for a transfer of his incarceration to the United Kingdom, under the provisions of an international treaty and under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 18-91a.   The defendant Commissioner of Correction has moved to dismiss, alleging, among other grounds, that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action.   The court agrees with the defendant's position and dismisses the petition.

FACTS

The plaintiff is a citizen of the United Kingdom who is incarcerated by the Connecticut Department of Correction (“DOC”) pursuant to a criminal conviction.   The United States and the United Kingdom are among the parties to a multilateral international treaty known as The Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons.   The United States became a party to the treaty in 1983.   Taking onto account the provisions of the treaty, Connecticut passed a statute in 1993 that permitted-but did not require-the DOC to participate in a transfer program that would allow foreign citizens to serve out their Connecticut sentences in their home countries.  Conn. Gen.Stat. § 18-91a.   The plaintiff has applied to the DOC to be allowed to serve out his sentence in the U.K. but the defendant has denied his application.   In his papers opposing the defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the plaintiff alleges and argues that he meets all the criteria for transfer under the treaty and the statute, and that the defendant is setting arbitrary pre-conditions in denying the plaintiff's application.   The plaintiff petitions the court for a declaratory injunction that would have the court declare the defendant's conduct to be arbitrary and not in keeping with the DOC's obligations under the treaty and the statute.   The plaintiff seeks an order that would essentially compel the defendant to reverse the decision denying the plaintiff's transfer to the U.K. and permit a prompt transfer.

THE CONNECTICUT STATUTE

Conn. Gen.Stat. § 18-91a(a) provides in pertinent part.

If a treaty between the United States and a foreign country provides for the transfer or exchange of convicted offenders to the country of which they are citizens or nationals, the Commissioner of Correction may, on behalf of the state and subject to the terms of the treaty, consent to the transfer or exchange of offenders and take any other action necessary to initiate the participation of the state in the treaty.   No offender shall be transferred or exchanged under this section unless he consents to such transfer or exchange.

THE CONCEPT OF STANDING

In order for the plaintiff to maintain this action, he must have standing to do so;  that is, he must allege facts indicating that some official action has caused him to be deprived of a right conferred by law such that he has suffered an injury.   Absent such a fact, the court has no jurisdiction to hear the case and must dismiss the action for lack of standing.   In order to determine whether the plaintiff has standing, the court must look to the interests and the parties that were designed to be protected under the various statutes cited by the plaintiff.   Only if the statutory provisions, including here the treaty, the federal and Connecticut statutes, and the U.S. Constitution, can be understood as granting to persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief can the case proceed.  McWeeny v. Hartford, 287 Conn. 56, 65, 946 A.2d 862 (2008).

THE STANDING OF THE PLAINTIFF

There is nothing in the treaty, the federal statute-18 U.S.C. § 4100-or the Connecticut statute that confers any right on the plaintiff.   In his petition the plaintiff is explicit in asking that the court construe the term “may” in the Connecticut statute-”the Commissioner may consent to the transfer”-to mean “shall,” in order, the plaintiff argues, to effectuate legislative intent.   But the only legislative intent evident from the statute is to wholly vest in the Commissioner the discretion to make all such transfer decisions.   Nor can the plaintiff point to a constitutional right, since it is well-established that a state prisoner has no right under the U.S. Constitution to be housed in the institution of his choosing.  Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244-46, 103 S.Ct. 1741 (1983).

Because it is clear that the decision on a requested international prisoner transfer rests solely with the Commissioner, it is equally clear that the plaintiff, despite his personal feeling of aggrievement, is not within any class of persons upon whom a right was conferred in any of these texts.   See Albuquerque v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 124 Conn.App. 866, 874-76 (2010).   The plaintiff is not legally injured or aggrieved.   He lacks standing to maintain this action.

CONCLUSION

Because the plaintiff lacks standing, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff's claims.   The defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted.

Patty Jenkins Pittman, Judge

Pittman, Patty Jenkins, J.