Hugo Piacenzo et al. v. Mark Tolster et al. (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE (# 113) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This is an action for damages and losses allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs, Hugo and Mary Piacenzo, as a result of a motor vehicle collision between the plaintiffs' automobile and a 2002 Freightliner truck owned by defendant Elrac, Inc., leased to Santa Fuel and driven by defendant Mark Tolster.

The action was brought in two counts, first count being the claim of Hugo Piacenzo and second count being the claim of Mary Piacenzo.   The defendants in both counts are Mark Tolster and Elrac, Inc.

Defendant Elrac, Inc. has moved for summary judgment against the plaintiffs for the reason that as lessor of the truck, Elrac, Inc. cannot be held liable for the acts of the driver under the provisions of 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a) (2005), also known as the Graves Amendment.   That federal law provides, in relevant part, that “[a]n owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person ․ shall not be liable under any law of any State of political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle ․ for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease if-(1) the owner ․ is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing of motor vehicle;  and (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner.”   In order for the Graves Amendment to be applicable, both prongs must be met.

The plaintiffs have filed an objection to the relief sought in the motion for summary judgment pointing out that in paragraph 6i of both the first and second counts, the plaintiffs have alleged that the injuries and losses each of them sustained were caused by the carelessness and negligence of the defendant Elrac, Inc., in that at the time of the collision “the defendant-operator was operating said truck when it was not equipped with brakes adequate to bring it to a controlled stop within the distance and under the conditions prescribed and when the brakes were not in good working order, all in violation of the Connecticut General Statutes, Section 14-80.” ¹

Defendant Elrac, Inc. argues that (1) as pled, the allegation of negligence and carelessness is directed only against the operator Tolster for driving a truck which had defective brakes;  and (2) even if the that paragraph could be read to include an allegation against Elrac, Inc., such an allegation is preempted by 49 U.S.C. § 30106.

“Practice Book ․ [§ 17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ․ In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Miles v. Foley, 253 Conn. 381, 385-86 (2000).

The primary issue raised by the movant is the preemption of the carelessness and negligence claims as a result of 49 U.S.C. § 30106.   If the plaintiffs had sought to make Elrac, Inc. vicariously responsible for the negligence of the operator, Tolster, that argument would have been persuasive.   As pled, however, the plaintiffs have alleged that their vehicle was struck from behind as it was stopped for a light on Pershing Drive and that there was, indeed, negligence on the part of the owner in that it leased a truck which had defective brakes and that as a result of those defective brakes the rear end collision occurred causing the damages and losses sustained by the plaintiffs.

Those allegations have raised a genuine issue of material fact.   In opposing a motion for summary judgment, a party is not required to present evidence necessary to prevail at trial, only evidence sufficient to raise issues of fact.  Vaillancourt v. Latifi, 81 Conn.App. 541, 544 (2004).

It should be noted that the plaintiffs' allegation of carelessness and negligence on the part of the defendant, Elrac, Inc. was not a claim of statutory negligence under 14-154a, C.G.S, which is legislation designed to permit an injured party to impute the negligence of a driver to the owner who rented or leased the vehicle to the driver.   The allegation of negligence and carelessness alleged by the plaintiffs in their complaint alleges negligence on the part of Elrac, Inc. Such an allegation takes the case out of the Graves Amendment because the second prong is not met.

For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment is hereby denied.

BY THE COURT,

JOSEPH DOHERTY, JUDGE

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The plaintiffs also argued that 49 U.S.C. § 30106 was not applicable because there was no evidence that Elrac, Inc. was in the business of renting or leasing motor vehicles.   That argument was not pursued after an affidavit was filed by Elrac, Inc. averring that it was, in fact, in that business..  FN1. The plaintiffs also argued that 49 U.S.C. § 30106 was not applicable because there was no evidence that Elrac, Inc. was in the business of renting or leasing motor vehicles.   That argument was not pursued after an affidavit was filed by Elrac, Inc. averring that it was, in fact, in that business.

Doherty, Joseph W., J.