Aimee Rochler v. Jeffrey Rochler (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The parties were married on September 17, 1993 in Wallingford, Connecticut and have lived continuously in Connecticut since approximately 1998.   The family has never received state or municipal assistance.   The plaintiff wife is approximately forty-two years old and the defendant husband is approximately forty-five years old.   The plaintiff wife is healthy.   In 2003 the defendant began experiencing epileptic seizures for which he is prescribed dilantin.

Four children are issue of the marriage ranging in ages from seventeen to seven years old.   The parties entered into a final parenting plan in March of 2010,¹ therefore the multiple day dissolution trial which spanned over a three-month period, centered primarily on the parties finances and assets.   Both parties engaged in dilatoriness regarding disclosure of personal and business financial records and significant court time was relegated to the production of personal and business documents and extensive cross examination surrounding said documents.

The plaintiff wife is the proprietor of the Rhythm and Dance Academy (RDA) which she purchased in 2003 for $25,000.²  The plaintiff works fifteen to twenty hours a week during the school year and although the RDA's generates little to no income in the summer, the plaintiff spends the summer months working on open houses, camps, sales and building toward a fall enrollment.   Although the plaintiff is the owner of RDA, she is not a dancer nor is she qualified to teach dance.

Historically, the family's gasoline usage for their private vehicles and some prior car payments were run through RDA as well as the family's cell phone expenses.   The plaintiff values the business at $25,000, she takes drawers from the business and weekly nets approximately $435.³

The defendant husband has previously owned a series of different businesses in the printing industry.   In the early to mid-1990s he simultaneously owned businesses in New Hampshire and in New Haven.   One of the businesses was sold for a profit and said profit was used to pay off debt.   The other business was closed.⁴  After the New Hampshire business ceased, the family relocated from New Hampshire to Rhode Island in the fall of 1996.   The defendant then began working for Color Time as a store manager and after approximately one year he became an employee of W.B. Mason, and then Hartford Office Supply.   Three and a half years after the defendant joined Hartford Office Supply the company was bought by Staples.   The defendant presently remains employed by Staples as an account manager for large accounts such as schools and towns.   In 2009, the defendant grossed in excess of $105,000 (Defendant's exhibit A) and in 2010 the defendant grossed in excess of $107,000.  (Defendant's exhibit F.) Recent changes in his income has him presently netting approximately $1,000/week, a portion of which is in the form of a bonus.

Although the defendant at the onset of trial denied the existence of any other self-owned businesses, during trial it was gleaned that a printing business entitled JH Rock Associates, L.L.C. was in operation from approximately 2008 to early 2010.⁵  JH Rock Associates' sole client was the Shrine of the Infant of Prague.   The Shrine stopped doing business with the defendant because the defendant stopped returning calls or picking up samples of appeal letters for scheduled mailing.   Plaintiff's exhibit 26 reflects payments by the Shrine to JH Rock Associates in excess of $86,000 from January of 2008 through June of 2010.   Plaintiff's exhibit 24, portions of which are difficult to decipher, reflect JH Rock Assoc. billed the Shrine, at a minimum, in excess of $72,000 from January of 2008 through December of 2009.   The defendant initially testified, after paying suppliers and expenses, an estimated net of approximately $500 from JH Rock Assoc. for 2008-2009.   He subsequently testified that as of 2010 JH Rock owed suppliers/vendors money and therefore had no net profit.   The defendant testified that given the nominal to nonexistent profit margin and increasing time constraints involving his Staple employment and the present dissolution action, he elected to cease operating JH Rock in 2009 and he claims any 2010 transactions were in the nature of winding down the business with the Shrine.

The evidence and testimony presented regarding JH Rock Assoc. is insufficient for this court to accurately determine the business's profit/loss status or for this court to substantively conclude the defendant intentionally dissipated assets by electing to cease operation of the business.⁶

Moreover, arriving at an accurate accounting of the defendant's overall personal and business finances based on the testimony and exhibits presented at trial is likewise a daunting task.   The defendant either personally or in the name of a business has or had multiple banking accounts over the past several years, in addition to the parties' joint family account.   An accurate identification of all of the defendant's accounts was not completed until December of 2010.⁷  The defendant co-mingled personal and business monies and moved money into and out of accounts in a frenetic and unorthodox way.   Hours of court time were spent with the plaintiff accusing the defendant of intentionally hiding assets or dissipating assets.   The plaintiff persistently insinuated the defendant was deliberating trying to mislead the court about his past and present financial situation.   The court offered the plaintiff a continuance of the trial in order to have a forensic accounting evaluation conducted.⁸  The plaintiff declined the court's offer.

At the very least, the defendant's bookkeeping and financial management methods are haphazard, sloppy and poorly executed.⁹  Just as with the JH Rock business, however, whether the defendant engaged in a calculated attempt to conceal other assets or to improperly dissipate other assets cannot be conclusively discerned from the evidence presented at trial.

Besides the defendant's 401k the only other significant marital asset was the marital home.   The parties purchased the marital home at 4 Union Street in Wallingford in 2000.   By 2003 the parties wanted/needed a larger home but were unable to find an acceptable home in their present school district.   Both parties desired to remain in their present school district and the parties therefore refinanced their home and enlarged their 1,200 sq. foot home to a 2,400 sq. foot home.   Upon the defendant vacating the marital home in late September or early October of 2009, he agreed to, and the court so ordered, he continue to pay the monthly mortgage.   By agreement of the parties the marital home was sold in December of 2009.   However, unbeknownst to the plaintiff until the closing, the defendant had elected to only partially pay the mortgage and consequently the parties owed an additional $8,500 at the closing.   The parties netted slightly more than $12,500 from the closing and by agreement of the parties said proceeds have been in held in escrow for distribution pursuant to this dissolution action.

The court finds that it has jurisdiction of the matter presently before it.   All statutory stays have expired.   The court finds that the marriage has broken down irretrievably.   The marriage is hereby dissolved and the parties are declared to be single and unmarried.   After considering all of the statutory criteria set forth in C.G.S. § 46b-84, as to child support;  C.G.S. § 46b-82, as to the assignment of alimony;  C.G.S. § 46b-81, as to assignment of property and transfer of title;  C.G.S. § 46b-63, as to restoration of maiden name;  C.G.S. § 46b-62, as to the payment of attorneys fees, as well as the applicable case law and the evidence presented at trial, the court enters the following additional orders.

Child Support/Health Insurance

Pursuant to the child support guidelines formulated and dated January 11, 2011, the court enters the following orders:  The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff $325/week in child support.   The plaintiff shall be responsible for 52% and the defendant shall be responsible for 48% of any un-reimbursed or out of pocket medical expenses for the minor children, which shall include dental, orthodontic, psychiatric or psychological expenses.   The defendant shall pay the plaintiff 48% of any documented work-related daycare expenses.

The defendant shall maintain health insurance for the minor children for as long as it remains available to him at a reasonable cost.   The defendant shall not electively change health insurance carriers or make any substantive changes or modifications regarding the children's health care insurance without notifying the plaintiff thirty days in advance of any proposed modifications or changes.¹⁰  The defendant shall provide the plaintiff within fourteen days of the judgment with written documentation of the current health insurance and information regarding deductibles, copays and extent of medical coverage.   The defendant shall cooperate in any attempts the plaintiff makes to access information from the health care insurance provider.

The plaintiff shall be responsible for obtaining and maintaining health insurance for herself.   If she elects to COBRA the defendant's health insurance, he shall fully cooperate with said process but all costs associated with COBRA shall belong solely to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff shall claim Haylee and Noelle as dependents and the defendant shall claim Nolan and Oliver as dependents for income tax purposes.

Educational Support Order

The court finds that had the parties' remain an intact family, the parties would have more likely than not have provided support to the child or children for higher education or private occupational school.   By agreement of the parties the court hereby retains jurisdiction over post second educational support orders pursuant to C.G.S. 46b-56c.

Alimony

Throughout the marriage the defendant has abused marijuana.   The plaintiff's opposition to the defendant's ongoing marijuana use rose exponentially as the children aged and after the onset of the defendant's epileptic seizure disorder in 2003.   Although the defendant repeatedly promised to stop using marijuana he failed to do so.

The plaintiff also credibly testified as to the defendant's controlling and paranoid behaviors.   For years prior to the filing of the dissolution action, the defendant would routinely accuse the plaintiff of infidelity.   The defendant was convinced the plaintiff was having affairs either with her customers' fathers or with a Quinnipiac student employed by RDA. The defendant involved the parties' children in his attempts to corroborate his suspicions and he repeatedly demanded access to the plaintiff's cell phone and/or cell phone records to vindicate or obviate his suspicions.¹¹  The defendant would awaken the plaintiff in the middle of the night to have her convince him of her faithfulness or to have sex.¹²

The defendant's claim that the plaintiff abused alcohol during the marriage is unsubstantiated.   What is clear to the court is that both parties desired a standard of living which was often equal to or in excess of their actual income.   To the parties' credit, they appeared to have worked collaboratively, up until the mid-2000s, in supporting each other in their individual business enterprises.   The plaintiff helped the defendant with his books in his various business ventures and assumed the bulk of the parenting responsibilities while the defendant commuted and worked either for himself and/or for others.   The defendant participated in the physical labor expended in the moving of RDA to new premises and in the renovations to the original and subsequent dance studios.   Both parties, at least until mid-2009, ostensibly acquiesced to the family spending habits.   Not surprisingly, the fiscally marginal manner the parties were operating under when living together quickly deteriorated when two households instead of one required financing, when the parties struggled with physically and emotionally separating from each other and when tens of thousands of dollars were expended on attorneys fees and/or guardian ad litem fees.

The defendant is at significantly greater fault for the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage than the plaintiff.   His impulsiveness and obsessiveness, combined with his chronic marijuana use, made the plaintiff's day-to-day living very difficult.   The defendant shall pay the plaintiff alimony in the amount of $200/week for a period of ten years.   Said alimony is taxable to the plaintiff and deductible by the defendant.   The alimony is nonmodifiable upward as to term and shall terminate upon the death of either party, the plaintiff's remarriage or her cohabitation as defined by C.G.S. 46b-86(b).

The defendant shall receive no alimony from the plaintiff.

The defendant's December 20, 2010 financial affidavit reflects an effective life insurance policy through his employer in an amount twice his salary.   The defendant shall maintain said life insurance for as long as it remains available to him at a reasonable cost.   The plaintiff shall be the named beneficiary in an amount no less than equal to the outstanding alimony obligation.  (Initially $200/week x 52 weeks x ten years equals $104,000;  year 2:  $200/week x 52 weeks x nine years equals $93,600;  and so forth for each year thereafter.)   If the value of the existing life insurance policy exceeds the owed alimony than the remainder of the policy shall act as collateral toward the defendant's child support obligation.   In April of each year the defendant shall furnish written proof to the plaintiff of the existence of said life insurance and proof that he is current in the payment of the premium.

Escrow Funds from Sale of Marital Home

All but $1,000 of the outstanding equity from the prior sale of the marital home (approximately $12,567) shall belong solely to the plaintiff.   The remaining $1,000 shall immediately be paid to the GAL to satisfy the defendant's outstanding obligation to the GAL.¹³

Staples 401K

At trial the plaintiff insinuated the defendant concealed the substantive existence of the 401k and he improperly liquidated 401k funds during the pendency of this dissolution action.

The 401k statements reflect both parties' names on the monthly account statements and said monthly statements were addressed to 4 Union Street-the marital residence in which the plaintiff remained a resident of for several months after the defendant moved out in the fall of 2009.   Therefore the plaintiff's claim the defendant attempted to conceal the 401k's substantive existence is not supported by the evidence.

Two loans, one in the amount of $15,000 and one in the amount of $12,000 were obtained from the defendant's Staples 401k.   Not surprisingly, the parties' disagree as to the status of one of the loans.   Collectively, the loans were incurred to partially fund the enlargement of the marital home, to pay off joint debt and to renovate RDA. On the defendant's December 20, 2010 financial affidavit he reports $8,904.86 remains outstanding on one of the loans and $3,824.25 on the other loan.   Presently, approximately $184 is automatically deducted from the defendant's paycheck toward repayment to the 401K of the two loans.   The defendant claims the entire $15,000 loan went to RDA and only an unspecified portion was repaid.

The plaintiff credibly testified the $15,000 loan was deposited into the family checking account on May 27, 2008, of which $8,350 was loaned to RDA. The money loaned RDA was paid back to the joint family account over the next four months and the money not loaned to RDA was used to pay various personal credit cards, utilities, medical bills, groceries and family activities and miscellaneous expenses.   The court credits the plaintiff's testimony and finds RDA did repay the loaned money.   The financial soundness of the repayment of the loan back into the family account instead of back into the 401k is questionable but is consistent with the parties' fiscal management practices.   Because it was a mutually agreed upon decision the defendant cannot now claim he should be compensated or credited the loaned money.

The remaining issue deals with the defendant's liquidation of over $22,000 from the 401k via etrade transactions.  “[A]t a minimum, dissipation in the marital dissolution context requires financial misconduct involving marital assets, such as intentional waste or a selfish financial impropriety, coupled with a purpose unrelated to the marriage.”  [Gershman v. Gershman, 286 Conn. 341, 351 (2008) ], Shaulson v. Shaulson, 125 Conn.App. 734, 740 (2010).

The defendant cashed in excess of $13,900 in 2009 and $8,900 in 2010 from his 401k etrade account.   He claims it went towards attorney fees, therapist fees and guardian ad litem fees.   Again, absent a forensic evaluation, this court's fact finding capability is significantly hampered.   It is clear the defendant's disjointed, disorganized and jumbled financial management style carried over to his 401k etrade account.   Again, the evidence presented suggests chaotic and haphazard spending habits ¹⁴ and frenetic transfers into and out of accounts but given the evidence before the court it appears more of an inability to live within means than intentional and willful concealment or dissipation of assets.

The defendant's 401k shall be shared by the plaintiff receiving 60% and the defendant receiving 40% of the value of the 401k.   The value of the 401k shall be as of the date of judgment.   The parties shall share equally in the costs associated with the execution of said order, such as but not limited to the cost of a qualified domestic relation order.   Any outstanding loan balance against the 401k shall not be deducted when determining the value of the 401k as of the day of judgment.

RDA

The business known as RDA shall remain the sole possession of the plaintiff.   The plaintiff shall be solely responsible for any debts associated with RDA and the defendant shall be held harmless.

JH Rock Assoc.

The defendant shall remain the sole owner of the business known as JH Rock and the plaintiff shall be held indemnified and held harmless for any debt associated with JH Rock.

Automobiles

The plaintiff shall retain sole possession of her automobile and indemnify and hold the defendant harmless for any expenses associated with said vehicle.   The defendant shall retain sole possession of his automobile and hold the plaintiff harmless for any expenses associated with said vehicle.

Debt

The plaintiff alleges outstanding debt slightly over $100,000, a combination of RDA debt and personal debt.   Approximately $46,000 of said debt is owed to the plaintiff's parents and another approximate $20,000 is RDA credit card debt.   The defendant alleges debt in excess of $150,000, a combination of personal and business debt.   Of the $150,000 of defendant's debt, $70,000 or $80,000 is owed to his divorce attorney to whom he testified he has already paid $13,000.¹⁵

For the reasons discussed previously, the defendant shall be solely responsible for any outstanding balances owed on the loans from his 401k (pursuant to his December 20, 2010 financial affidavit outstanding balances totaled approximately $12,728).

Each party shall be solely responsible for the debts listed on their most recent financial affidavit and hold the other party harmless, with the exception of the outstanding joint loan owed to Don and June Conradi in the amount of $30,000.   The parties' shall each be equally responsible for the repayment of said loan.

Restoration of prior Name

The plaintiff's maiden name of Conradi shall be restored.

Attorneys Fees

Each party shall be responsible for their individual attorney fees.

Outstanding Arrearages

Regarding motion # 204, in September of 2010, the court, Gould, J., held the defendant in contempt for nonpayment of child support and medical expenses and found an arrearage of $3,600.   The defendant was ordered to pay $75/week toward the arrearage.

The outstanding arrearage now stands at $4,258.90.   In light of the financial orders pursuant to this dissolution judgment, the defendant shall pay $25/week toward the arrearage until paid in full.

Motion for Sanctions (# 191)

The defendant alleges the following:  On July 8, 2010 the parties appeared in front of the court, Markle, J., and after hearing from the parties, the court scheduled back-to-back depositions for Monday, July 12, 2010.   The plaintiff did not object nor was there any discussion with the court regarding the defendant's request for documents outlined in schedule A or with the subject matters to be addressed in the plaintiff's deposition.   Nonetheless, on Friday afternoon, July 9th the plaintiff fax-filed a motion for protective order with the court dealing with the Monday a.m. deposition.   Although the plaintiff appeared for the deposition she did so without any documents and asserted the protection of the requested protective order.

The plaintiff is hereby sanctioned for her non-production of requested documents at the July 12th deposition.   Any issue or objection the plaintiff had regarding the requested documents should have been brought to the court's attention in the July 8th hearing.   Plaintiff's counsel's eleventh hour filing of a motion for protective order, given the sequence of events, constitutes noncompliance with the spirit of Judge Markle's July 8th order.   Of the requested relief sought in motion # 191 the only practical relief that can now be afforded is attorney fees.   Given the totality of the circumstances of this case and the defendant's own lackluster performance in disclosing financial documents in a timely manner, the court declines to order the payment of attorneys fees to the defendant in the prosecution of motion # 191.

Bernadette Conway, Judge

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The March 2010 court orders are incorporated by reference into this opinion..  FN1. The March 2010 court orders are incorporated by reference into this opinion.

FN2. The plaintiff wife worked outside the home early on in the marriage..  FN2. The plaintiff wife worked outside the home early on in the marriage.

FN3. The plaintiff was ordered by the court to produce monthly business records for RDA. Given the plaintiff's concern about protecting the privacy of her client's accounts, particularly in light of the defendant's unfounded suspicions regarding her relationship with her clients' fathers, the court proposed the RDA business records be reviewed by the court in camera to minimize any unnecessary dissemination of third party personal information.   At the return trial date the plaintiff produced a profit and loss summary but not the monthly business statements.   Trial was recessed for the plaintiff to comply with the court order.To a lesser extent than the defendant, the plaintiff who demonstrated a keen understanding of her business and personal finances, intermittently suffered lapses of memory and/or an inexplicable inability to understand a rudimentary accounting or book keeping question..  FN3. The plaintiff was ordered by the court to produce monthly business records for RDA. Given the plaintiff's concern about protecting the privacy of her client's accounts, particularly in light of the defendant's unfounded suspicions regarding her relationship with her clients' fathers, the court proposed the RDA business records be reviewed by the court in camera to minimize any unnecessary dissemination of third party personal information.   At the return trial date the plaintiff produced a profit and loss summary but not the monthly business statements.   Trial was recessed for the plaintiff to comply with the court order.To a lesser extent than the defendant, the plaintiff who demonstrated a keen understanding of her business and personal finances, intermittently suffered lapses of memory and/or an inexplicable inability to understand a rudimentary accounting or book keeping question.

FN4. The defendant husband claims both businesses were closed and debts were paid off.   The plaintiff wife claims the New Hampshire business went bankrupt..  FN4. The defendant husband claims both businesses were closed and debts were paid off.   The plaintiff wife claims the New Hampshire business went bankrupt.

FN5. Although JH Rock Assoc. is listed with a zero value on most of the defendant's several financial affidavits, on the first day of trial the defendant testified he was last self-employed in 1999 and emphatically denied owning/operating any businesses other than the two previously discussed printing businesses..  FN5. Although JH Rock Assoc. is listed with a zero value on most of the defendant's several financial affidavits, on the first day of trial the defendant testified he was last self-employed in 1999 and emphatically denied owning/operating any businesses other than the two previously discussed printing businesses.

FN6. As will be discussed shortly, the court offered the plaintiff a continuance in order to obtain a forensic accounting of the defendant's finances, particularly in light of the belated disclosure of the details of JH Rock Assoc.   The plaintiff declined the court's offer.   The court also raised concerns about the mere admitting of documents into evidence, absent expert forensic testimony.   Notwithstanding the court's concerns, no forensic testimony was proffered and subsequently minimal factual findings are possible.Nonetheless, the defendant's lack of candor regarding the substantive aspects of JH Rock Assoc. is troubling.   His listing of it in his financial affidavits (with the exception of a September 24, 2009 affidavit) and attaching a zero dollar value does not negate his testimony under oath that he had been last self-employed in 1999.   Too often during the course of the trial, the defendant's initial testimony was subsequently amended, altered or revised..  FN6. As will be discussed shortly, the court offered the plaintiff a continuance in order to obtain a forensic accounting of the defendant's finances, particularly in light of the belated disclosure of the details of JH Rock Assoc.   The plaintiff declined the court's offer.   The court also raised concerns about the mere admitting of documents into evidence, absent expert forensic testimony.   Notwithstanding the court's concerns, no forensic testimony was proffered and subsequently minimal factual findings are possible.Nonetheless, the defendant's lack of candor regarding the substantive aspects of JH Rock Assoc. is troubling.   His listing of it in his financial affidavits (with the exception of a September 24, 2009 affidavit) and attaching a zero dollar value does not negate his testimony under oath that he had been last self-employed in 1999.   Too often during the course of the trial, the defendant's initial testimony was subsequently amended, altered or revised.

FN7. Trial commenced on September 24, 2010.   An attempt to continue the trial on November 5th was aborted in order to allow both sides an opportunity to produce court ordered financial documents.   Trial resumed on December 20th and concluded on December 21st..  FN7. Trial commenced on September 24, 2010.   An attempt to continue the trial on November 5th was aborted in order to allow both sides an opportunity to produce court ordered financial documents.   Trial resumed on December 20th and concluded on December 21st.

FN8. Over thirty documents, the bulk of which pertained to banking or other financial accounts were admitted into evidence..  FN8. Over thirty documents, the bulk of which pertained to banking or other financial accounts were admitted into evidence.

FN9. For example, the defendant deposited his personal income tax return into the JH Rock Assoc. bank account.   He then paid the plaintiff money he personally owed her from the account.   Monies were paid from the JH Rock account into the parties' joint house account.   The defendant also cashed in restricted stock from his Staples employment and deposited the proceeds into the JH Rock account.   To complicate matters further, the defendant claims he received approximately $14,000 in loans from a family member.   Suffice it to say it is impossible for this court to follow the flow of funds into and out of the defendant's various accounts.Although the plaintiff contends the above recitation proves an intent to deceive and conceal, it is equally plausible the defendant's less than stellar fiscal management style stems from an insufficient knowledge base;  his track record of three defunct businesses arguably supports such a premise..  FN9. For example, the defendant deposited his personal income tax return into the JH Rock Assoc. bank account.   He then paid the plaintiff money he personally owed her from the account.   Monies were paid from the JH Rock account into the parties' joint house account.   The defendant also cashed in restricted stock from his Staples employment and deposited the proceeds into the JH Rock account.   To complicate matters further, the defendant claims he received approximately $14,000 in loans from a family member.   Suffice it to say it is impossible for this court to follow the flow of funds into and out of the defendant's various accounts.Although the plaintiff contends the above recitation proves an intent to deceive and conceal, it is equally plausible the defendant's less than stellar fiscal management style stems from an insufficient knowledge base;  his track record of three defunct businesses arguably supports such a premise.

FN10. Testimony the last day of trial revealed the defendant had switched health insurance carriers in July of 2010 without notifying the plaintiff.   As a result of the change in carriers, the plaintiff now incurs the full cost of any doctor's visit until an unidentified deductible is reached..  FN10. Testimony the last day of trial revealed the defendant had switched health insurance carriers in July of 2010 without notifying the plaintiff.   As a result of the change in carriers, the plaintiff now incurs the full cost of any doctor's visit until an unidentified deductible is reached.

FN11. The defendant spent several thousand dollars on a private investigator in 2009 but was unsuccessful in obtaining any evidence of the plaintiffs purported infidelity..  FN11. The defendant spent several thousand dollars on a private investigator in 2009 but was unsuccessful in obtaining any evidence of the plaintiffs purported infidelity.

FN12. The defendant has pending sexual assault in the fourth degree, risk of injury to a minor and possession of a controlled substance charges.   The allegations stem from a May 2010 incident allegedly involving the defendant's then live-in girlfriend's fifteen-year-old daughter.   The incident is subsequent to the filing of the present dissolution action and subsequent to the parties' separation.   The court attributes no weight to the pending criminal charges in fashioning financial orders in this case..  FN12. The defendant has pending sexual assault in the fourth degree, risk of injury to a minor and possession of a controlled substance charges.   The allegations stem from a May 2010 incident allegedly involving the defendant's then live-in girlfriend's fifteen-year-old daughter.   The incident is subsequent to the filing of the present dissolution action and subsequent to the parties' separation.   The court attributes no weight to the pending criminal charges in fashioning financial orders in this case.

FN13. The GAL did a herculean job in a highly contentious case.   To the parents' credit and to the minor children's benefit, a mutually agreeable final parenting plan was court ordered in March of 2010.   Although the defendant is court ordered to make two separate $500 payments to the GAL over the' next several months, given the totality of the circumstances in this case and the courts' financial orders, the GAL's outstanding fee shall be paid directly from the escrow account..  FN13. The GAL did a herculean job in a highly contentious case.   To the parents' credit and to the minor children's benefit, a mutually agreeable final parenting plan was court ordered in March of 2010.   Although the defendant is court ordered to make two separate $500 payments to the GAL over the' next several months, given the totality of the circumstances in this case and the courts' financial orders, the GAL's outstanding fee shall be paid directly from the escrow account.

FN14. Notwithstanding the defendant's chronic complaint of overwhelming financial obligations, he paid expenses of female friends.   For instance he testified that in October of 2009 he was dating a woman who bounced a $700 check owed to a third party which he elected to cover for her.   Whether reimbursement for said expenditure occurred (the defendant claims he was reimbursed) does not alter or alleviate the difficulty this court has in reconciling the defendant's chronic complaint of insufficient funds with his habitual pattern of discretionary excessive spending..  FN14. Notwithstanding the defendant's chronic complaint of overwhelming financial obligations, he paid expenses of female friends.   For instance he testified that in October of 2009 he was dating a woman who bounced a $700 check owed to a third party which he elected to cover for her.   Whether reimbursement for said expenditure occurred (the defendant claims he was reimbursed) does not alter or alleviate the difficulty this court has in reconciling the defendant's chronic complaint of insufficient funds with his habitual pattern of discretionary excessive spending.

FN15. To date the defendant testified he has paid $24,000 in attorney fees:  $13,000 to Cohen and Wolf (dissolution action);  $5,000 to his criminal attorney for the pending Meriden criminal court charges;  $4,000 in GAL fees and $200 to Attorney Hassett.   The itemized payments do not total $24,000.   The defendant also testified at various times to various sources from which his attorney fees/GAL fees were paid from..  FN15. To date the defendant testified he has paid $24,000 in attorney fees:  $13,000 to Cohen and Wolf (dissolution action);  $5,000 to his criminal attorney for the pending Meriden criminal court charges;  $4,000 in GAL fees and $200 to Attorney Hassett.   The itemized payments do not total $24,000.   The defendant also testified at various times to various sources from which his attorney fees/GAL fees were paid from.

Conway, Bernadette, J.