Brenda Chieka v. Stanley Chieka (2011)

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The plaintiff who was a resident of Franklin, Connecticut initiated this action for dissolution of marriage with a complaint that was returned to the court on May 12, 2009.   At the time, the defendant was a resident of Norwich, Connecticut.

The court finds that it has jurisdiction and that all statutory stays have expired.

A limited contested trial was held before the undersigned on April 21, 2010.   The plaintiff was represented by counsel and the defendant was self-represented.

The court has fully considered the criteria of General Statutes §§ 46b-81, 46b-82, 46b-84, 46b-56, 46b-56c and 46b-62 as well as the evidence, applicable case law, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and arguments of counsel in reaching the decisions reflected in the orders that issue in this decision.

FACTUAL FINDINGS

The court finds that the following facts were proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

1. The plaintiff and the defendant, whose maiden name was Coyer, were married on May 22, 1992 at Norwich, Connecticut.

2. One of the parties has resided continuously in the state of Connecticut for at least one year prior to the commencement of this action.

3. The marriage of the parties has broken down irretrievably without the prospect of reconciliation.

4. There is one child under the age of 23 born to the wife since the date of the marriage;  namely, Nicholas Chieka born June 7, 1990.   They have another child who is over the age of 23.   No other children have been born to the wife since the date of the marriage.

5. Neither party has received assistance from any State or local agency.

6. At the time of the marriage, the parties had few assets and most of the marital estate was accumulated during the course of the marriage.

7. During most of the marriage, the husband had a gambling addiction, abused alcohol, was unemployed for long periods of time and was emotionally abusive.   The cause of the dissolution is found to be the husband's.

8. The parties stipulated that they would share equally the expense for their son Nicholas to attend college at a cost, not to exceed the expense for an in-state resident at the University of Connecticut pursuant to CGS § 46(b)-56c.

9. The parties own three pieces of real estate, one occupied by the husband, one occupied by the wife and one residential rental property.

10. There presently exists as marital assets the home at 59 Woodside Avenue, Norwich, occupied by the husband, with a value of $191,000 and a mortgage of $130,000 or equity of $61,000;  the home at 69 Woodside Avenue, Norwich, occupied by a tenant worth $183,000 with a mortgage of $137,000 and equity of $46,000;  the home at 75 Lebanon Road, Franklin, occupied by the wife, worth $157,000 with a mortgage of $144,000 for a net equity a $13,000;  the wife's Jeep worth the $3,000;  the wife's life insurance worth $2,900;  the wife's retirement accounts worth $27,000;  the husband's Ford pickup worth $600;  the husband's Silverado worth $500;  the Chevrolet Camaro of uncertain value;  the wife's wrongful termination lawsuit of uncertain value;  the husband's 401(k) plan of uncertain value and the John Deere tractor worth $1,000.

11. The parties' debt includes the wife's unsecured debt of approximately $34,000, taxes on 69 Woodside Avenue of $6,600 and the son's student loan, cosigned by her in the amount of $12,000 as well as the husband's unsecured debt in the amount of $35,000.

12. The husband dissipated at least $131,000 which he admits to losing in gambling.   He had received a workers' compensation settlement of $56,000 in 2001 and in 1998, he received a personal injury settlement of $230,000.   He recently inherited a one-quarter interest in a piece of real estate worth $186,000.

13. The wife is seeking no order of alimony.   The husband is seeking an order of one dollar per year in alimony.

14. The husband, representing himself, has been the subject of numerous contempts, restraining orders and motions to compel compliance.   On April 5, 2010, the court found him in contempt and ordered him incarcerated with that order stayed until the date of trial.   That particular contempt was based on his following and coming to the plaintiff's place of employment.   Since there had been no further such incidents, the court vacated the order of incarceration.

15. The wife is 46 years old, has a 12th grade education and has worked two jobs during much of the course of the marriage and presently still works two jobs.   She had back surgery in 1999 and has a torn rotator cuff.   The husband has a history of gambling addiction, alcohol abuse and is presently takes antidepressant medication.   He previously had lucrative employment working in nuclear power plants.   Although he voluntarily banned himself from the Connecticut casinos in the past, he is presently a dealer at Foxwoods.

16. The husband has a debt to the wife for past bills of $4,988 and was assessed $1,000 in attorneys fees on February 1, 2010.   On April 5, 2010, the defendant was found in contempt and ordered to pay an additional $750 in attorneys fees and costs, and thus, owes to the plaintiff $6,738.

LEGAL DISCUSSION

“The rendering of judgment in a complicated dissolution case is a carefully crafted mosaic, each element of which may be dependent on the other.”   Gervais v. Gervais, 91 Conn.App. 840, 841, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 919 (2005).

Regarding the distribution of property, Connecticut General Statutes § 46b-81 states.

In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court, after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party, except as provided in subsection (a) of Section 46b-51, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income.   The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.

The court in Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783 (1995), held that the purpose of § 46b-81 was “to recognize that marriage is, among other things, a shared enterprise or joint undertaking in the nature of a partnership to which both spouses contribute-directly and indirectly, financially and nonfinancially-the fruits of which are distributable at divorce.”  Id., 797-98.  Ranfone v. Ranfone, 103 Conn.App. 243, 250-51 (2007).

The court in Picton v. Picton, 111 Conn.App. 143 (2008), held that “an equitable distribution of property should take into consideration [each spouse's] contributions to the marriage, including homemaking activities and primary caretaking responsibilities”;  id., 311;  and that “a determination of each spouse's contribution within the meaning of ․ § 46b-81 includes nonmonetary as well as monetary contributions.”  Id., 153.

“A court may accept or reject such evaluations in whole or in part and ascribe its own valuations to real estate ․ The valuation of real estate is a matter of opinion based on all of the evidence and at best is an approximation to be determined by the fact finder.  Giulietti v. Connecticut Ins. Placement Facility, 205 Conn. 424, 430-31 (1987).”  Martin v. Martin, 90 Conn.App. 145, 150 (2007).

“Trial courts are empowered to deal broadly with property and its equitable division incident to dissolution proceedings ․ The trial court is granted the authority, pursuant to Section 46b-81, to order the sale of the marital home without any act by either the husband or the wife, when in the judgment of the court is the proper mode to carry the decree into effect.”  Martin v. Martin, 99 Conn.App. 145, 154 (2007).

ORDERS

The court orders the following.

1. The parties shall share equally the expense for their son Nicholas to attend college at a cost, not to exceed the expense for an in-state resident at the University of Connecticut pursuant to CGS § 46(b)-56c.

2. The husband shall retain the real estate at 59 Woodside Avenue.   He shall be solely responsible for all mortgage, taxes, insurance and expenses associated therewith.

3. The court orders transferred to the wife the real estate located at 69 Woodside Avenue, Norwich, Connecticut and 79 Lebanon Road, Franklin, Connecticut pursuant to § 46b-81(b) free and clear of any claim by the husband.   She shall be responsible for all mortgage taxes insurance and maintenance associated therewith.

4. The wife shall retain her retirement accounts, her life insurance, her Jeep automobile, the proceeds of her wrongful discharge lawsuit, the Camaro and the John Deere tractor.

5. The husband shall retain his inherited real estate, his 401(k) plan, his Silverado and his Ford pickup truck.

6. Neither party will pay or receive alimony.

7. The parties shall be equally responsible for the student loan in the event that their son does not make the payments.

8. The husband shall be responsible for his Bank of America loan in the amount of $20,000, his Chase loan in the amount of $10,000, his Home Depot bill in the amount of $1,500, his Household Finance bill in the amount of $344, his Citibank bill in the amount of $1,000, his legal fees, 50% of the wife's Chase accounts in the total amount of $17,539 and the wife's Discover bill in the amount of $6,100, the court finding that the majority of these bills were accumulated due to the husband's unemployment, spending or gambling.

9. The wife shall be responsible for her HSBC loan, her GM loan in the amount of $6,300, 50% of her Chase accounts in the total amount of $17,539 and the taxes on 69 Woodside Avenue in the amount of $6,600.

10. Each shall keep their own bank accounts.

11. Each shall pay their own counsel fees.

12. Each party shall be solely responsible for all debts they have been ordered to pay and they shall hold harmless and indemnify the other thereon.

13. The husband shall pay to the wife within 120 days the sum of $6,738 as previously ordered.

14. The wife's birth name is ordered restored.

15. Dissolution may enter.

Shluger, J.

Shluger, Kenneth L., J.