Vivienne Howard v. DBA (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The plaintiff owned residential real estate known as 44 Barton Circle, North Haven CT. Her basement sustained water damage.   She hired the defendant to remove the damaged portions, repair and improve the basement.   She claims, in her May 11, 2009 three-count Complaint, that the defendant breached his contract with her, engaged in unfair trade practices and was unjustly enriched by his conduct.   The defendant denied the plaintiff's claims.   The case was tried to the court on August 25, 2010.

Count One:  breach of written contract claim

The plaintiff signed a “Basement Contract,” Ex. 2, on 11-03-08 with GP Developer.   The contract incorporated an October 26, 2008 “Proposal Agreement” between GP Developer and plaintiff concerning the subject property.   One version of the “Proposal Agreement” is attached to Ex 2 and reflects changes from an initial version of the “Proposal Agreement.”   Ex 1. Both versions of the Proposal Agreement describe five phases of work over an estimated 6-week period.   The revised Proposal Agreement incorporated into the “Basement Contract” lists work costing $20,000.00 (twenty thousand dollars).

The court notes that the October 26, 2008 “Proposal Agreement” stapled to the “Basement Contract”, Ex 1, is not signed by the defendant and is an incomplete copy of the “Proposal Agreement.”   A comparison of exhibits 1 and 2 demonstrates pages missing from the revised Proposal Agreement that was incorporated into the “Basement Contract.”   Additionally, Ex. 2, includes a photocopy of the revised Proposal Agreement stapled to the “Basement Contract” that has faint and illegible margin notes that were never explained by testimony.   In short, the plaintiff did not introduce into evidence the entire legible written agreement of the parties.

Determining the rights of the parties to a written contract, with illegible margin notes and missing pages, is impossible.   The court cannot possibly know what agreements were on the missing pages, how or whether the content of those missing pages affects the pages that are present or creates additional obligations of the parties.

“When interpreting a contract, we construe the contract as a whole and all relevant provisions are considered when determining the intent of the parties.”  Shawmut Bank Connecticut, N.A. v. Connecticut Limousine Service, Inc., 40 Conn.App. 268, 272, 670 A.2d 880, cert. denied, 236 Conn. 915, 673 A.2d 1143 (1996).  “The law prefers an interpretation which gives effect to all parts of the contract rather than one which leaves a portion of the contract ineffective or meaningless.”   11 S. Williston, Contracts (4th Ed. Lord 1999) § 32:9, p. 440.  Rogal v. Randall, 115 Conn.App. 89, 96 (2009).

The burden of proof rests on the plaintiff in a claim for breach of a written contract to prove the terms of the alleged written agreement between the parties.   The plaintiff has failed to meet that burden.   The court will not speculate as to the terms or conditions or obligations on missing pages and illegible margin notes found on the documents offered as evidence of the written agreement.

Judgment enters for the defendant on this count as the plaintiff has failed to establish the terms, conditions and obligations of the written contract between the parties and further establish that the defendant has breached those contractual obligations.

Count 2 Unfair trade practice claim

The plaintiff claims that the defendant violated CGS 42-110b, et seq, by contracting to make home improvements when “it (sic) was not registered as a Home Improvement Contractor, as required by § 20-429 1 of the Connecticut General Statutes(.),” paragraph VIII of Counts Two and Three.   Subsection (8) of said statute does provide that “No home improvement contract shall be valid or enforceable against an owner unless it:  ․ (8) is entered into by a registered salesman or registered contractor.”   The defendant admitted that he did not possess a home improvement contractor's registration certificate issued by the State of Connecticut at the time when the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant was executed.

As noted, CGS 20-429 states that no home improvement contract is valid or enforceable against the property owner unless the contract complies with the statutory requirements.   Clearly, this contract did not comply with the requirements of the home improvement contractor statutory scheme.   But, the defendant is not seeking to establish the validity or to enforce the “Basement Contract” against an owner.   Instead, this case involves an owner, the plaintiff, seeking to establish a breach of the contract that the cited statute declares not valid or enforceable by the contractor.   Therefore, CGS § 20-429 is inapplicable to the instant case.

However, the defendant admitted that when he entered into the agreement to renovate the plaintiff's basement, he did not possess a home improvement contractor's registration certificate.   A violation of the act “shall be deemed an unfair or deceptive trade practice under subsection (a) of Section 42-110b.”  General Statutes § 20-427(c), Campagnone v. Clark, 116 Conn.App. 622, fn 6 (2009).

The plaintiff proved she contracted with the defendant for basement renovations costing $20,000.00.   She fired the defendant mid-way through the job and hired replacement contractors.   She paid a total of $21,486.64 to the defendant and the replacement contractors to complete the job.

The court finds the plaintiff has proved that she sustained damages of $1,486.64 proximately resulting from the defendant's failure to possess a HIC registration certificate.   The court finds a reasonable attorneys fee in connection with said prosecution of this CUTPA claim is $496.00

Judgment enters for the plaintiff in the amount of $1,982.64 on Count Two.

Count Three unjust enrichment

“Unjust enrichment is a broad and flexible remedy.  Breen v. Judge, 124 Conn.App. 147, 158, 4 A.3d 326 (2010).   Recovery is rooted in the equitable principle that it is “contrary to equity and good conscience for the defendant to retain a benefit which has come to him at the expense of the plaintiff.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  National CSS, Inc. v. Stamford, 195 Conn. 587, 597, 489 A.2d 1034 (1985).  “Unjust enrichment is a common law doctrine allowing damages for restitution, that is, the restoration to a party of money, services or goods of which he or she was deprived that benefited another.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Gagne v. Vaccaro, 80 Conn.App. 436, 440 n. 2, 835 A.2d 491 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 920, 846 A.2d 881 (2004).  “In calculating restitution damages, the trial court balances the equities of the parties to determine where the loss should fall ․ This balancing of equities is a matter within the trial court's broad discretion.”  (Citation omitted.)  Polverari v. Peatt, 29 Conn.App. 191, 203, 614 A.2d 484, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 913, 617 A.2d 166 (1992).   Waterview Site Services v. Pay Day, 125 Conn.App. 561, 571 (2010).

The plaintiff paid the defendant a total of $10,000.00 (ten thousand dollars) in three checks.   Ex. 3. The checks are payable to “GE Development” when Ex. 2-”Basement Contract”-identifies the “Contractor” as GP DEVEPLORER (sic).   However, the defendant admitted receiving and negotiating the checks in connection with the subject renovation.   The payments were:  $5,000.00 on 11/04/08;  $2,000.00 on 11/05/08 and $3,000.00 on 11/08/08.   Neither the amounts nor the timing of the payments conform to the “Payment plan” found in the revised “Proposal Agreement” incorporated into the “Basement Contract,” Ex 2, the supposed agreement of the parties.

The defendant does business using the name “GP Developer,” see Ex 1 and 2. The evidence, Ex. 8, proved that “GP Developers, LLC” is a business entity separate from the defendant and the defendant is the sole member and registered agent of such entity.   However, that entity was neither a party to the agreements involved in this case nor a party in this case though the plaintiff's checks were payable as noted above.

On 11/12/08 the defendant obtained a building permit from the Town of North Haven for the basement work at plaintiff's property.   Ex. 4.

Defendant testified that he did substantially perform the work described in Phase One and Phase Two. The evidence established that some of the work described in Phases One, Two, Three and Four of the revised Proposal Agreement incorporated into the Basement Contract was done by the defendant or his subcontractors.

Paul Rivera, defendant's project manager, also testified that Phase One was completed.   Further, the defendant claimed he hired subcontractors to do rough plumbing and further recommended a plumber, Reginald Maynard, who did install the toilet in the basement-this is a portion of the Phase Four work in the Proposal incorporated into the Basement Contract.   The defendant claimed to have purchased the toilet and necessary ‘injector pump,’ at a cost of $900.00, and had his subcontracted plumber install the same.   Defendant claimed to have paid the subcontracted plumber $1,500.00.

The plaintiff testified that the defendant did not complete the basement job.   The defendant admits the same.

She testified that when she discharged the defendant from the job, the basement plumbing was not complete.   The defendant admits the same.

She testified that had to hire an electrician to do all the electrical work and a contractor, Extreme Building and Remodeling, to tear out some of the defendant's work and complete the general contracting work remaining.   Part of this testimony was contradicted by both documentary and testimonial evidence.

The plaintiff produced an undated two-page typewritten document, Ex 6, apparently prepared by Extreme Building and Remodeling, entitled “Description of Job.” Comparing and contrasting the work described in Ex. 6 with the work described in Ex. 2 does substantiate some of the claims of both parties:  some work described in Ex. 2 was completed by the defendant and his subcontractors and some work was not done.   For instance, in spite of the differing language that the defendant and Extreme Building used to describe the work, there seems no mention in Extreme Building's ‘Description of Job’ for the demolition and preparation work described in defendant's Phase One. However, some of the work described in defendant's Phase Two is described in Extreme Building's ‘Description of Job,’ page 1, paragraphs 1 and 2. Without evidence from plaintiff's substitute workmen, differentiating between work competently completed by either set of workmen is difficult.

The plaintiff produced $6,500.00 (six thousand five hundred dollars) of checks payable to Extreme Building and Remodeling.   Ex. 6. She also claimed she paid cash, but had no receipt or other documentation to support whether and/or how much cash she paid to Extreme to complete its work.   She offered an undated several page typewritten document, apparently from Extreme Building, entitled “Description of Job.” Ex. 6. The court cannot determine whether that document was an estimate, that is a proposal for work proposed to be done, or an invoice for work actually performed.   No contract between the plaintiff and Extreme Building that might conform to the HIC statute was offered into evidence.

However, the Extreme Building's “Description of Job” stated “All work includes materials and labor Total:  $11,700.”   Ex. 6. There was no proof that all the work so described in Ex. 6 was done or that the plaintiff paid for all the work.   The court is left to guess and speculate as to what work was performed at what price.   Plaintiff did claim that Extreme Building had to rip out some of the work previously done by the defendant, but no description of what work was done or what cost associated with that work was offered.   Plaintiff offered no witness from Extreme Building and Remodeling.

On 12/10/08 the plaintiff paid Reginald Maynard $2,250.00 (two thousand two hundred fifty dollars), Ex. 5, as a deposit on plumbing work.   The plumbing work described by the parties' written agreement was partially completed by Maynard according to several witnesses:  the plaintiff, the defendant, and Paul Ribera, who was described as the defendant's project manager, who said “the rough plumbing was done before she (plaintiff) threw us off the job for not using her electrician.”   Also, comparing the invoice/estimate for work to be completed, as prepared by the plumbing contractor, G & R Plumbing and Heating LLC, hired by plaintiff after she fired the defendant, there is no listing for rough plumbing.   Therefore, some evidence substantiates the defendant's claim that the rough plumbing work, a part of Phase Two of the parties' agreement, was done prior to the defendant being discharged from this job.

As the subject project began, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that demolition and renovations the basement desired by the plaintiff would cost $20,000.00, with a schedule of payments following completion of “phases” of work.   See Ex. 2.

The plaintiff paid the defendant $10,000.00 ignoring the schedule of payments described in the parties' written agreement.   The plaintiff also paid the plumber recommended by the defendant, Maynard, $2,250.00.   Thereafter the plaintiff fired the defendant claiming that the defendant's work was shoddy, not done on time and that the defendant was using unlicensed craftsmen.   Once she'd fired the defendant, the plaintiff hired another contractor, Extreme Building and Remodeling, LLC, to complete the job.   The plaintiff paid Extreme Building and Remodeling at least $6,500.00 to complete the work.   The plaintiff also paid G & R Plumbing and Heating LLC $1,400.00, Ex. 7 to complete the plumbing.   The plaintiff also paid Eli Fletcher $1,336.64.   Therefore, plaintiff's expenses, for the work described in the instant parties' written agreement, total at least $21,486.64.

Though the plaintiff produced a 03/27/10 G & R Plumbing and Heating LLC $1,400.00 (one thousand four hundred dollars) bill marked “PAID,” that bill was addressed to Larry Rhoden of 44 Barton Circle, No. Haven, CT. Larry Rhoden is not the plaintiff nor was he identified as an agent of the plaintiff.   The bill was for work at 44 Barton Circle including ‘remove and reinstalled injection toilet system in basement,’ ‘install shower diverter and shower arm, install shut offs, drain and faucet on basement vanity as well as water supply.’   The Basement Contract, Ex 1, did call for installation of ‘bathroom fixtures, including shower, sink vanity and toilet.”   Since the March 27, 2010 G & R bill describes a ‘reinstallation’ of the toilet in the basement, this seems to confirm the defendant's claim that the “injector pump” and toilet was installed by Maynard in December 2008.   The plaintiff offered insufficient explanation of why there was a 15-month delay between the discharge of the defendant from the job site in December of 2008 and the G & R Plumbing work in March 2010 or as to what was meant by a ‘reinstallation’ of the injection toilet.   The plaintiff did not produce anyone from G & R Plumbing to explain the work performed.

The plaintiff paid $2,250.00 to Maynard, the plumber hired by the defendant.   Maynard apparently did the rough plumbing, part of Phase Two, and installed the toilet, part of Phase 3. Eventually the plaintiff paid G & R Plumbing & Heating LLC an additional $1,400.00.   However, plaintiff offered no proof as to what portion of the initial $20,000.00 price was devoted to plumbing costs or any other testimony of the value of Maynard's work/materials.   It's impossible to know whether the plaintiff's $2,250.00 payment for plumbing services was too much, too little or just enough for the work and materials that Maynard provided.

The plaintiff produced an 11/20/09 $1,000.00 receipt from and a 9/21/09 $336.64 check to Eli Fletcher, pages 5 & 6 of Ex 6, but neither the receipt nor the check-nor any other document offered by the plaintiff-explain whether the work Fletcher did was within the scope of the work that defendant previously had agreed to do.   The plaintiff did testify that Fletcher's work was part of the same work she'd originally contracted with the defendant to perform.

The agreement between the parties, at least so much as was memorialized in Ex. 2 which is dated 11/3/08, provided that the defendant would perform demolition and preparation in Phase One of the project and receive $8,000.00 (eight thousand dollars) “at the end of Phase One”(.), Ex 2, page 3 (marked page 2 of 3 in handwritten lettering by the parties).   The defendant does appear, according to the testimony, the comparison of the work to be completed as described in Extreme's ‘description of job’°” and the plaintiff's payment to the defendant, to have completed all the Phase One work as described in Ex. 2. He was, according to Ex. 2, entitled to receive $8,000.00 at the completion of Phase One. However, the plaintiff had already paid the defendant $10,000.00.

Defendant claims to have paid the following:  his plumber $1,500.00, his electrician $1,200.00 and purchased a $900.00 ‘injector pump.’   He also claimed to have purchased various carpentry materials.   He offered no documentation for any of these expenses though the electrician did confirm the $1,200.00 payment.

Plaintiff discharged defendant from the job site because “the defendant failed to complete the work contracted for within the specified time period, and attempted to complete the plumbing and electrical work with unlicensed tradesmen thus causing the plaintiff to incur additional costs in order to cover her contract damages and complete the work(.)”  Complaint paragraph IV each count.

She proved that the defendant did not have a Home Improvement Contractors registration certificate in October of 2008.   Defendant claimed he possessed a State of Connecticut new home construction contractor's registration certificate and possession of that certificate excused his need for a HIC registration certificate on this basement renovation work.   Even if the defendant did possess a new home construction contractor's registration certificate at the time he entered into this agreement to renovate the plaintiff's basement, he did need a home improvement registration certificate.  Connecticut General Statutes § 20-428(4) ² exempts the defendant from the need for a home improvement contractor's registration certificate only when the defendant was constructing a new home, as defined by law.   In this instance, he was not constructing a new home, therefore, he was not exempt from the need for a home improvement contractor's registration certificate to do the work at hand, Bahjat v. Dadi, 123 Conn.App. 10, 15-16 (2010).

Plaintiff did not prove that the defendant used unlicensed electricians or plumbers.   She did not prove that time of completion of the project was agreed to be ‘of the essence,’ as she alleged in paragraph III of all counts, nor did she prove that she “paid a deposit of $8,000.00 when she signed the contract(.)” as alleged in Paragraph III of all counts.

She did prove her dissatisfaction with the defendant, his subcontracted labor and his business associate.   She did prove that the defendant did not appear to do the work as scheduled, that she complained, that no improvement in attendance occurred and that she was deeply dissatisfied with defendant's efforts, the efforts of the subcontractors hired by the defendant and eventually locked the defendant out of the premises.   The ‘proposal agreement,’ Ex 2, page 3, does provide a handwritten margin note that states the defendant will do “everything needed to make good to satisfaction of owner.”   The plaintiff was dissatisfied, advised the defendant, the defendant failed to correct the tardiness, absence from the work site, rude behavior of his business associate and was discharged from the job.   The defendant agreed to leave the job.

The defendant claimed that he spent a great deal of time and energy doing ‘other work’, extra work upstairs in the new addition on the plaintiff's home that involved both labor and materials, for the plaintiff.   He offered this work as an excuse for not timely attending to the work he'd agreed to perform.   He claims he was not paid for this work.   This work was not claimed in any of the pleadings of the case, and, though the court is sympathetic to defendant's claims that he did the work without pay, that matter is not before the court.   The defendant admitted that he had no agreement, oral or written, with the plaintiff for payment, in fact, he testified that he did this work ‘just to help out.’

The defendant hired Lou Passariello, a licensed electrician, to perform electrical work at the subject premises.   Mr. Passariello testified during the trial.   He claimed that he ran all electrical wire for the basement renovation, put up the electrical boxes, wired for the smoke detectors and an exhaust fan was purchased, wired and installed.   Passariello testified that defendant paid him $1,200.00 for the work Passariello did in the basement.

The defendant claimed that the plaintiff ‘threw his project manager off the job accusing him of stealing’ and ‘threw the electrician off the job accusing him of failing to have a license or a permit’ to do the work.   No persuasive evidence was offered about any stealing.   Passariello testified he has been licensed by the State of Connecticut for many years.   Passariello admitted that he did not have an electrical permit but that he was ready to obtain the same later the very day the plaintiff asked him to leave the job, but that before he could apply for a permit, he had to see the scope of the work so as to properly apply for the permit.   Passariello had previously described completing extensive work on the job.   Clearly he had ample time to assess the scope of the work so as to apply for a permit before the date he was discharged if he had time to complete the extensive work he described.   In short, his explanation for failure to obtain an electrical permit was unpersuasive.

Additionally, defendant claims that he purchased, for $900.00, and left in place at the plaintiff's premises, a toilet and an ‘injector pump.’   The defendant claimed that he paid the plumber he hired $1,500.00 to do the rough plumbing.   The defendant offered no receipts for materials purchased nor labor costs claimed to be paid to the electrician or plumber.   Plaintiff did not deny that defendant purchased these materials and that she has kept and used the same.   The defendant also claimed that he paid for and left other materials at the job site, but offered insufficient evidence or proof of what materials were left and the value of those materials.

The defendant claimed that he earned all the money he was paid by the plaintiff.   As noted above, he was paid $10,000.00.   As noted above, the written agreement between the parties, at least so much as was offered into evidence, indicates that the defendant was entitled to receive $8,000.00 at the end of Phase One. The evidence established that Phase One, essentially demolition work in the basement, was substantially completed at the time the plaintiff asked the defendant to leave the job.

The rough plumbing and electrical work are a part of Phase Two, as described in the parties' written agreement.   Ex. 2. However, the defendant offered no evidence that the rough plumbing and electrical work or the balance of the work described in Phase Two was completed.   If Phase Two was completed, the parties' agreement indicates the defendant was then entitled to receive an additional $6,000.00.   Clearly some of the work in Phase Two was not completed.   Given the lack of detail in the parties' agreement, the court cannot and will not guess or speculate as to what work was done or the value of the work done in Phase Two of the parties' agreement.

Therefore, the court concludes that the defendant was unjustly enriched by the sum of $2,000.00 being the difference between the $10,000.00 he received and the $8,000.00 he was entitled to receive upon completion of Phase One of the parties' agreement.

Wherefore, judgment enters for the plaintiff as to count three only in the amount of $2,000.00.

Wherefore, judgment enters for the plaintiff as to counts two and three only in the amount of $3,982.64.

Zemetis, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Sec. 20-429.   Required contract provisions.   Negative option provisions prohibited.   Contract considered home solicitation sale.   Contractor-financed contract.   Recovery of payment for work performed. (a) No home improvement contract shall be valid or enforceable against an owner unless it:  (1) Is in writing, (2) is signed by the owner and the contractor, (3) contains the entire agreement between the owner and the contractor, (4) contains the date of the transaction, (5) contains the name and address of the contractor and the contractor's registration number, (6) contains a notice of the owner's cancellation rights in accordance with the provisions of chapter 740, (7) contains a starting date and completion date, and (8) is entered into by a registered salesman or registered contractor.   Each change in the terms and conditions of a contract shall be in writing and shall be signed by the owner and contractor, except that the commissioner may, by regulation, dispense with the necessity for complying with the requirement that each change in a home improvement contract shall be in writing and signed by the owner and contractor.(b) No home improvement contract shall be valid if it includes any provision obligating the owner to instruct the home improvement contractor, by a date determined by such contractor, that periodic home improvements are not to be performed unless it also includes a provision requiring the contractor to remind the owner of that obligation by means of a card or letter mailed to the owner and postmarked not earlier than twenty days, and not later than ten days, prior to such date.(c) The contractor shall provide and deliver to the owner, without charge, a completed copy of the home improvement contract at the time such contract is executed.(d) The commissioner may, by regulation, require the inclusion of additional contractual provisions.(e) Each home improvement contract entered into shall be considered a home solicitation sale pursuant to chapter 740 and shall be subject to the requirements of said chapter regardless of the location of the transaction or of the signing of the contract.   Each home improvement contract in which the owner agrees to repay the contractor an amount loaned or advanced to the owner by the contractor for the purposes of paying for the goods and services provided in such contract, or which contains a finance charge, (1) shall set forth the information required to be disclosed pursuant to the Truth-in-Lending Act, Sections 36a-675 to 36a-685, inclusive, (2) shall allow the owner to pay off in advance the full amount due and obtain a partial refund of any unearned finance charge, and (3) may contain a finance charge set at a rate of not more than the rate allowed for loans pursuant to Section 37-4.   As used in this subsection, “finance charge” means the amount in excess of the cash price for goods and services under the home improvement contract to be paid by the owner for the privilege of paying the contract price in installments over a period of time.(f) Nothing in this section shall preclude a contractor who has complied with subdivisions (1), (2), (6), (7) and (8) of subsection (a) of this section from the recovery of payment for work performed based on the reasonable value of services which were requested by the owner, provided the court determines that it would be inequitable to deny such recovery..  FN1. Sec. 20-429.   Required contract provisions.   Negative option provisions prohibited.   Contract considered home solicitation sale.   Contractor-financed contract.   Recovery of payment for work performed. (a) No home improvement contract shall be valid or enforceable against an owner unless it:  (1) Is in writing, (2) is signed by the owner and the contractor, (3) contains the entire agreement between the owner and the contractor, (4) contains the date of the transaction, (5) contains the name and address of the contractor and the contractor's registration number, (6) contains a notice of the owner's cancellation rights in accordance with the provisions of chapter 740, (7) contains a starting date and completion date, and (8) is entered into by a registered salesman or registered contractor.   Each change in the terms and conditions of a contract shall be in writing and shall be signed by the owner and contractor, except that the commissioner may, by regulation, dispense with the necessity for complying with the requirement that each change in a home improvement contract shall be in writing and signed by the owner and contractor.(b) No home improvement contract shall be valid if it includes any provision obligating the owner to instruct the home improvement contractor, by a date determined by such contractor, that periodic home improvements are not to be performed unless it also includes a provision requiring the contractor to remind the owner of that obligation by means of a card or letter mailed to the owner and postmarked not earlier than twenty days, and not later than ten days, prior to such date.(c) The contractor shall provide and deliver to the owner, without charge, a completed copy of the home improvement contract at the time such contract is executed.(d) The commissioner may, by regulation, require the inclusion of additional contractual provisions.(e) Each home improvement contract entered into shall be considered a home solicitation sale pursuant to chapter 740 and shall be subject to the requirements of said chapter regardless of the location of the transaction or of the signing of the contract.   Each home improvement contract in which the owner agrees to repay the contractor an amount loaned or advanced to the owner by the contractor for the purposes of paying for the goods and services provided in such contract, or which contains a finance charge, (1) shall set forth the information required to be disclosed pursuant to the Truth-in-Lending Act, Sections 36a-675 to 36a-685, inclusive, (2) shall allow the owner to pay off in advance the full amount due and obtain a partial refund of any unearned finance charge, and (3) may contain a finance charge set at a rate of not more than the rate allowed for loans pursuant to Section 37-4.   As used in this subsection, “finance charge” means the amount in excess of the cash price for goods and services under the home improvement contract to be paid by the owner for the privilege of paying the contract price in installments over a period of time.(f) Nothing in this section shall preclude a contractor who has complied with subdivisions (1), (2), (6), (7) and (8) of subsection (a) of this section from the recovery of payment for work performed based on the reasonable value of services which were requested by the owner, provided the court determines that it would be inequitable to deny such recovery.

FN2. See. 20-428.   Exemptions.  This chapter shall not apply to any of the following persons or organizations:  (1) The government of the state, municipalities of the state or any department or agency of the state or such municipalities;  (2) the government of the United States or any of its departments or agencies;  (3) any school, public or private, offering as part of a vocational education program courses and training in any aspect of home improvements;  and (4) any person holding a current professional or occupational license issued pursuant to the general statutes, and any person registered pursuant to Sections 25-126 to 25-137, inclusive, provided such person engages only in that work for which such person is licensed or registered.(emphasis added, ed.).  FN2. See. 20-428.   Exemptions.  This chapter shall not apply to any of the following persons or organizations:  (1) The government of the state, municipalities of the state or any department or agency of the state or such municipalities;  (2) the government of the United States or any of its departments or agencies;  (3) any school, public or private, offering as part of a vocational education program courses and training in any aspect of home improvements;  and (4) any person holding a current professional or occupational license issued pursuant to the general statutes, and any person registered pursuant to Sections 25-126 to 25-137, inclusive, provided such person engages only in that work for which such person is licensed or registered.(emphasis added, ed.)

Zemetis, Terence A., J.