Anne Morris v. John Holmes (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This is a summary process action based on lapse of time on a claimed oral month-to-month tenancy.   On November 8, 2010, the parties appeared before this Court for trial on the complaint.   Both parties were self-represented litigants.   The defendant, in his answer, disputed the existence of an oral month-to-month tenancy.   The defendant claims that he resides at the subject premises under a written one year rental agreement.   The plaintiff seeks to recover possession of 354 Laurel Street, Apartment 1S, Hartford, Connecticut.

The court has weighed all the evidence and assessed the testimony and credibility of the witnesses and reaches the conclusions set forth herein by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

FINDINGS OF FACT

In August 2010, the defendant inquired of the plaintiff's superintendant regarding an apartment for rent.   The superintendant, Luis Cruz, informed the plaintiff of the defendant's interest in renting an apartment.   The plaintiff authorized her representative, Luis Cruz, employed as her superintendant, to offer the defendant a one-year tenancy from September 1, 2010 through August 31, 2011 at an agreed upon monthly rental amount of $525.00 due on the first of each month.   The plaintiff, through her representative, offered a written rental agreement for the defendant's signature.   On or about August 26, 2010, the defendant signed the one-year rental agreement.   The defendant then took possession of the subject premises based on his understanding of the existence of a one year tenancy.

Before signing the written agreement, the plaintiff became aware of certain alleged negative behaviors of the defendant.   On the basis of these alleged behaviors, the plaintiff decided that she no longer wished to have the defendant as a tenant.   Therefore, the plaintiff did not sign the written rental agreement, believing this would vitiate the agreement.   By this time, however, the defendant had already taken possession of the premises with the consent of the plaintiff.   The plaintiff had also accepted money from the defendant pursuant to the agreement.

On September 15, 2010, the plaintiff had a Notice to Quit possession of the subject premises served on the defendant to vacate the premises on or before September 30, 2010.   The Notice to Quit and the Complaint indicate the basis for eviction as lapse of time.   As of the time trial, the defendant remains in possession of the subject premises.

DISCUSSION

The issue before the court is whether or not there is a valid and binding contract between the parties for a one-year tenancy.

“A lease is simply a type of contract and ordinary rules of contract interpretation and general rules of contract law apply to leases.”  Warner Associates v. Logan, 50 Conn.App. 90, 94-95 (1998).  “․ [W]hen a landlord specifies the terms for the future occupancy of the dwelling unit and the tenant continues in possession without objecting to those terms, it may be construed that the tenant has accepted those terms and a contract will be implied from the conduct of the parties.”  Welk v. Bidwell, 136 Conn. 603, 607 (1950).  “[A]cceptance may be shown by acts or conduct indicating assent to an offer or under appropriate circumstances, acceptance may be implied by the offeree's silence and inaction ․ moreover, regardless of actual intent, if the offeree's conduct leads the offeror reasonably to conclude that the offer is being accepted, acceptance has taken place as a matter of law.”   Greenfield v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital, Superior Court, Judicial District of New London, Docket No. 560884 (August 26, 2002).

“The rules governing contract formation are well settled.   To form a valid and binding agreement contract in Connecticut, there must be a mutual understanding of the terms that are definite and certain between the parties ․ to constitute an offer and acceptance sufficient to create an enforceable contract, each must be found to be based on an identical understanding by the parties.”  Duplissie v. Devino, 96 Conn.App. 673, 688, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 916 (2006).   Mutual assent presents a question of fact.  M.J. Daly & Sons, Inc. v. West Haven, 66 Conn.App. 41, 48, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 944 (2001).   Mutual assent is based on the parties' written or spoken words or by other acts.  Precision Mechanical Services, Inc v. Shelton Yacht & Cabana Club, Inc., 97 Conn.App. 258, 263, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 928 (2006).

In this case, the plaintiff testified that her decision not to sign the lease rendered the tenancy an oral month-to-month tenancy despite her previous offer to extend a one-year tenancy to the defendant.   However, “[p]arties are bound to the terms of a contract even though it is not signed if their assent is otherwise indicated.”  Ullman, Perlmutter & Sklaver v. Byers, 96 Conn.App. 501, 505-06 (2006);  Superior Roofing v. L. Holzner Electric Co., Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV04-0412565-S (February 8, 2007, Rodriguez, J.).  “[T]he fact that an oral agreement was later to be memorialized in writing does not make it any less enforceable.”  Nanni v. Dino Corp., 117 Conn.App. 61, 67 (2009).

Here, the undisputed evidence is that the plaintiff provided the defendant with an offer for a one-year tenancy for possession of the subject premises in consideration for a monthly rental payment of $525.00.   The defendant accepted the plaintiff's offer and tendered funds to the plaintiff's representative.   The Plaintiff allowed the defendant to take possession of the premises where he resided, with the plaintiff's consent for approximately two weeks before the plaintiff attempted to invalidate the contract by not signing the rental agreement.

The aforementioned facts indicate a clear and unambiguous oral contract for a one-year tenancy, beginning September 1, 2010, for the subject premises at $525.00 monthly.   The plaintiff cannot prevail in this action claiming lapse of time.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing the Court finds the following:

The plaintiff has failed to prove the claim for lapse of time by a fair preponderance of the evidence;

Judgment is entered in favor of the defendant.

By the Court

Hon. Vernon D. Oliver

Oliver, Vernon D., J.