Steven Talenti et al. v. Morgan & Brother Manhattan Storage Company, Inc. et al. (2011)

Memorandum of Decision

On April 18, 2006 the plaintiffs, Steven Talenti and Tonianne Talenti filed a six-count complaint against the defendant Morgan & Brother Manhattan Company, Inc. (“Morgan”) and Morgan's president, Jeffrey Morgan (“Jeffrey').   In the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that Steven Talenti had been an employee of Morgan for approximately twelve years when he failed a mandatory company drug test and was summarily discharged at Morgan's corporate headquarters in Greenwich. lmmediately thereafter, Morgan, acting through an employee, sent an e-mail from that office to all of its employees in Connecticut, New York and New Jersey, advising that the plaintiff had failed a drug test and had been discharged.   In counts one through six of the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged (1) a violation of General Statutes § 31-51x, (2) a violation of General Statutes § 31-51u, (3) invasion of privacy, (4) a prima facie tort, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress and (6) loss of consortium.   The complaint also alleged that the lawsuit “arises under and is governed by the laws of the state of Connecticut.”

The defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety on the ground of a lack of personal jurisdiction was granted by the court (Karazin, J.).   In its decision the court stated:  “The court finds that (1) the plaintiffs are not Connecticut residents, (2) they do not maintain a usual place of business in Connecticut or (3) their statutory claims are not within the scope of General Statutes § 33-929.   Accordingly, they cannot maintain an action against a New York corporation [in Connecticut].”   On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court, finding that the court had personal jurisdiction over both defendant Morgan and defendant Jeffrey.   Talenti v. Morgan & Brother Manhattan, Co., Inc. 113 Conn.App. 845 (2009).

After remand and further proceedings the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on October 29, 2010 which was argued before the court on December 20, 2010.   In their motion for summary judgment the defendants seek to have the court enter judgment for the defendants on the plaintiff's first and second counts on the ground that neither General Statutes § 31-51x nor General Statutes § 31-51u are applicable to plaintiff Steven Talenti since he was employed by defendant Morgan in New York and not in Connecticut.   After argument, the court reserved decision on the defendants' motion.

Since hearing argument, it has come the court's attention that, on February 5, 2010, this matter was assigned for trial on a date certain-March 1, 2011.   Practice Book § 11-13(b) requires:  “Whenever a short calendar matter or reclaim is filed in case which has been assigned for trial the filing party shall place the words ‘assigned for trial’ on the bottom of the first page of the document and on any short calendar reclaim slip.”   Neither the defendant's motion for summary judgment nor any of the briefs filed in support of that motion complied with this requirement.

Practice Book § 17-44 provides, in relevant part, “On any action ․ any party may move for a summary judgment at any time, except that the party must first obtain the judicial authority's permission to file a motion for summary judgment after the case has been assigned for trial.”   The file in this case reflects that a scheduling order was signed by counsel for the parties and approved by the court (Brazzel-Massaro, J.) on August 19, 2009.   That scheduling order required that any motion for summary judgment had to be filed by May 7, 2010 and responded to no later than June 18, 2010.   That scheduling order was superceded by a scheduling order dated February 5, 2010 signed by counsel for the parties and approved by the presiding judge for civil matters (Adams, J.).   That order required that any motions for summary judgment be argued by November 8, 2010.   The second scheduling order can and will be considered as “the judicial authority's permission to file a motion for summary judgment after the case has been assigned for trial.”   However, the record does not reflect that the defendants obtained either a motion for permission to file a motion for summary judgment that could not be heard until after November 8, 2010,¹ or a motion seeking to amend the February 5, 2010 scheduling order.

The logic behind Judge's Adams order is inescapable, he wanted any judge hearing a motion for summary judgment to have no less than 100 days after argument and before the assigned trial date to issue a decision on any motion for summary judgment.   Respect for the requirements of the Practice Book and the operative scheduling order as well as the sound administration of justice requires this court to deny the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

David R. Tobin, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Practice Book § 17-45 that a motion for summary judgment “shall be placed on a short calendar to be held not less than fifteen days following the filing of the motion ․” Since the defendant's motion was filed on Tuesday October 26, 2010, the earliest short calendar on which it could have been heard would have been that on November 15, 2010, a week after the deadline specified in the operative scheduling order.   If the plaintiffs had availed themselves of the automatic 30-day extension provided for in Practice Book § 17-45, the earliest short calendar on which the motion could have been heard would have been December 4, 2010, nearly a month following the deadline..  FN1. Practice Book § 17-45 that a motion for summary judgment “shall be placed on a short calendar to be held not less than fifteen days following the filing of the motion ․” Since the defendant's motion was filed on Tuesday October 26, 2010, the earliest short calendar on which it could have been heard would have been that on November 15, 2010, a week after the deadline specified in the operative scheduling order.   If the plaintiffs had availed themselves of the automatic 30-day extension provided for in Practice Book § 17-45, the earliest short calendar on which the motion could have been heard would have been December 4, 2010, nearly a month following the deadline.

Tobin, David R., J.