State of Connecticut v. Brandon Bellamy (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE

MOTION TO SUPPRESS IDENTIFICATION

The defendant, Brandon Bellamy, filed a Motion to Suppress Identification, specifically of witnesses Errol Salkey, Natasha Thompson, and Krystal Alexis.   On October 1, 2010, the court heard testimony from the New Haven Police Sergeant Reggie Sutton.   On October 4, 2010, before commencing evidence in the trial, the court orally denied the defendant's Motion to Suppress Identification.   This is the written memorandum which corresponds to the court's October 4th ruling on the record.

The evidence produced at the hearing established the following credible facts:  that each of the witnesses were shown photo boards which consisted of pictures of eight similar looking black males.   The photo boards were identical to each other, but were reproduced as an original to each witness.   Each witness was interviewed independently from each other.   For each witness, Sgt. Sutton first established whether each actually saw the suspect who would be identified.   Next, Sgt. Sutton then determined whether each witness knew the suspect prior to the incident and whether each witness knew the suspect's name-in this case a nickname, “Fresh.”   After establishing a basis of knowledge for the identification, Sgt. Sutton then presented the photo board to each witness independently and told each witness that the suspect's picture may or may not be in the photo array.   Each witness selected the photo of the defendant.   Sgt. Sutton did not advise each witness not to talk to each other about the identification;  however, no proof was introduced that any such conversation had taken place between the witnesses.

The defendant has the burden of proving that the identification resulted from an unconstitutional procedure.  State v. Pollitt, 205 Conn. 132, 162 (1987).  “Absent constitutional barriers, so long as the witness has identified the defendant with reasonable probability, whether the identification is the result of a photo display, a lineup, a show-up, or otherwise, the evidence is admissible.”  State v. Ledbetter, 185 Conn. 607, 612 (1981).   Any weakness in an identification goes to the weight of the evidence rather than the admissibility.  State v. Figueroa, 235 Conn. 145, 159 (1995).   The court finds that this identification was sufficiently reliable to be admissible and any uncertainty or inconsistency could be explored on cross-examination.

In determining whether a pretrial identification procedure violated a defendant's due process rights, the inquiry is two-pronged.  State v. Marquez, 291 Conn. 122, 141 (2009).   First, was the particular identification procedure employed unnecessarily suggestive?   If it is not, then inquiry is concluded.   Second, if the procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, was the identification nevertheless reliable in light of the totality of the surrounding circumstances?  Id. “[A]n out-of-court eyewitness identification should be excluded on the basis of the procedure used to elicit that identification only if the court is convinced that the procedure was so suggestive and otherwise unreliable as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”  (Emphasis omitted.)  Id., 142.

The Supreme Court in clarifying “unnecessarily suggestive” focused on the mechanics of the procedure and the behavior of the administering officers.   State v. Marquez, supra, 291 Conn. 141-45.   The court finds in this case that the law enforcement procedure was not suggestive.   The photo array used by the police in this case contained pictures of individuals who looked substantially similar.   See State v. Owens, 38 Conn.App. 801, 804-08 (1995).   The defendant's photograph was not prominently displayed or otherwise highlighted in an impermissible manner.   In the court's opinion, the evidence established that the officer administering the identification procedure remained neutral and did nothing to influence the witness in making the identification.

Even if the identification procedure had been unnecessarily suggestive, the court finds that the identification by the witnesses was nonetheless reliable given the totality of the circumstances.   Most compelling, in this determination, is the fact that each of the witnesses and the defendant were known to one another prior to the incident and the identification.

“Absent a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, [w]e are content to rely upon the good sense and judgment of American juries, for evidence with some element of untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury mill.   Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has some questionable feature.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Reid, 254 Conn. 540, 555-56 (2000).

Based on the aforementioned reasons, the defendant's Motion to Suppress Identification is denied.

By the Court

Alexander, J.

Alexander, Joan K., J.