Angelia M. Rafter v. Timothy D. Aldrich (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION REGARDING PERMANENT RESTRAINING ORDER

A review of the record reveals that the parties, never married, are the parents of Tayler Aldrich born February 14, 1998 and Zeth Aldrich born April 25, 2001.   The mother had initiated an action for the care, custody and support of the children dated February 4, 2002 and judgment entered, pursuant to an agreement dated July 25, 2002, granting joint custody of the children with primary residence with the mother and reasonable rights of visitation in the father.

The father's access to the children has been progressively curtailed due to allegations of neglect, allegations of sexual abuse, allegations of physical abuse, alcohol abuse, driving under the influence of alcohol, anger management, and domestic violence.   The Department of Children and Families conducted an investigation and substantiated charges of physical and sexual abuse on March 28, 2007 against the father.   Ultimately, the father was arrested on charges of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a minor, charges which were later dismissed.

The mother had applied for and was granted a restraining order against the father on March 30, 2007, which has been continued through and including this date.   The father has had no contact with the children in at least three years and the mother has had sole custody.

On December 14, 2010, the parties appeared, with counsel and the Guardian ad litem, and entered a stipulation regarding custody, access and the restraining order granting to the mother sole custody of the minor children, no contact whatsoever between the father and the children and that the restraining order would continue.   The parties were given until December 28, 2010 to file memoranda in support of their positions.

The question presented is whether the restraining order, issued pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes (CGS) § 46b-15 should be continued permanently.   The respondent does not oppose a restraining order nor contest the factual allegations;  he simply argues that the restraining order should be extended for six months at a time.   The applicant argues that the restraining order should be continued permanently.

LEGAL DISCUSSION

In Rondeau v. Parenteau, 2010 Conn.Super. Lexis 263 (2010, dos Santos, J.) [49 Conn. L. Rptr. 287], the court permitted a permanent restraining order.   The court in Allshouse v. Farmer, 1997 Ct.Sup. 2220 (1997, Tierney, J.) [19 Conn. L. Rptr. 4], likewise found that under certain circumstances, a court may enter a permanent civil restraining order.   Finally, the court in Toal v. Toal, 2008 Ct.Sup. 3738 (2008, Gordon, J.) permanently extended a restraining order.

CGS § 46b-15(d) provides that “no order of the court shall exceed six months, except that an order may be extended by the court upon motion of the applicant for such additional time as the court deems necessary ” (emphasis provided).   The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous that the courts are given the discretion to extend a restraining order longer than six months.   Otherwise, the italicized language above would be mere surplusage.

It should also be noted that in addition to the statutory authority of CGS § 46b-15, the court has the authority to enter a permanent injunction under CGS § 52-471 and the “inherent equitable powers in family matters to enter orders protecting the welfare of the parties.”  LaCroix v. LaCroix, 189 Conn. 685, 689 (1983).

Under the egregious factual circumstances in the instant case, no one, including the defendant, would argue that a restraining order should not issue.   Under such extraordinary circumstances however, the court finds that justice requires and the law permits the imposition of a permanent restraining order.

For the foregoing reasons, the existing restraining order is continued permanently.

Shluger, J.

Shluger, Kenneth L., J.