LLC v. Charnina Smith et al. (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION REGARDING DECEMBER 15, 2010 MOTION TO OPEN JUDGMENT AND MOTIONS TO DISMISS

On November 30, 2010 judgment after trial entered in favor of the plaintiff against the defendants in the amount of $6,850.15.

On December 1, 2010 only the defendant Charnina Smith filed a Motion to Open Judgment.   Oral argument on that motion was heard on December 15, 2010.

On December 15, 2010 only the defendant Charnina Smith filed a Motion to Dismiss asserting a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

On December 15, 2010 the defendant Charnina Smith filed a Motion to Dismiss asserting a lack of jurisdiction over the person and, within the same motion, asserting “the Plaintiff lacks standing to bring suit against BNS Consulting, LLC, a separate entity.”

The plaintiff declined an opportunity to respond to the December 15, 2010 motions to dismiss filed by the defendant.

Motion to Open Judgment dated December 1, 2010

The defendant Attorney Charnina Smith, hereinafter “Attorney Smith,” moved the court to open the judgment because:

Clerk did not send notices to defendant regarding the next hearing date, receipt of the plaintiff's motion for default for failure to plead dated 3/1/2010, or default for failure to plead dated 3/4/10.   It is not sufficient that notices be marked in the file as having been sent.   The clerk must meet the requirement that all such notices be actually given to all parties.   Defendant did not receive actual notice of the forestated (sic) motion and default until November 30, 2010, and desires to defend against this claim.

No supporting documents or memorandum of law accompanied the motion.   No testimony was offered at the oral argument on the motion.

CGS § 52-212a ¹ is the relevant statute and P.B. § 17-4 ² the relevant practice rule.  “It is well established that a court's ability to modify a prior ruling ordinarily is limited by § 52-212a.   See Rocque v. Light Sources, Inc., 275 Conn. 420, 432, 881 A.2d 230 (2005);  see also General Statutes § 52-212a;  Practice Book § 17-4;  Commissioner of Transportation v. Rocky Mountain, LL C, 277 Conn. 696, 706, 894 A.2d 259 (2006).  “Where judicial error exists ․ § 52-212a imposes a time limit so that a judgment may not be modified in matters of substance beyond a period of four months after the judgment has become final.   State v. Wilson, [supra, 199 Conn. 437].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Rome v. Album, 73 Conn.App. 103, 107 n.3, 807 A.2d 1017 (2002).   Our Supreme Court has recognized, however, that it is within the equitable powers of the trial court to fashion whatever orders [are] required to protect the integrity of [its original] judgment.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Rocque v. Light Sources, Inc., supra, 433.  “A trial court possesses the power to modify substantively its own judgment within four months succeeding the date on which it was rendered or passed ․” Jordan v. Jordan, 125 Conn.App. 207, 211 (2010).

Examination of the court file and the court's questioning of counsel during the oral argument established:

1. the instant case was initiated on 7/6/09 with abode service on the defendant Attorney Smith on 7/13/09 at 15-17 June Street, Woodbridge, CT by a state marshal;

2. plaintiff's 7/31/09 motion for default for failure to appear was granted against both defendants on 8/7/09, notice of the court order was mailed to defendants at 15-17 June Street, Woodbridge, CT;

3. after a certificate of closed pleadings and a claim to the hearing in damages list was filed, judgment entered for the plaintiff against the defendants in the amount of $4,216.65 on 12/29/09, James Abrams, J.

4. notice of the judgment was sent to the defendants at the same June Street, Woodbridge, CT address as previously noted;

5. on 1/28/10 Attorney Smith filed a Motion to Open Judgment.   The reason stated was:  “No knowledge of conditional judgment.”   Attorney Smith listed her address on that motion as 52 South End Road, East Haven CT 06510;

6. notice of oral argument on the motion to open judgment scheduled for 2/11/10 with notice to counsel of record:  Attorney Smith at 52 South End Road, East Haven, CT 06512 and plaintiff's counsel;

7.  Attorney Smith appeared in the New Haven Superior Court, Housing Session, on 2/11/10 and her motion to open judgment was granted without objection by James Abrams, J.;

8. on 3/4/10 the court granted the plaintiff's 3/1/10 motion for default for failure to plead a copy of which motion was certified by plaintiff's counsel to Attorney Smith at both 52 South End Road, East Haven CT 06512 and to Attorney Smith at 36 Nash Street, Unit 2 New Haven, CT 06511 (this was the address Attorney Smith had listed in the lease between the parties that gave rise to both the summary process action that preceded the instant case and the instant case where money damages were sought for breach of the lease);

9. notice of the 3/4/10 court entry of the default for failure to plead was mailed to Attorney Smith at 52 South End Road, East Haven CT 06512 by the court clerk on 3/4/10;

10. another certificate of closed pleadings was filed by the plaintiff;

11. on 11/2/10 the court clerk mailed notice to the parties, including Attorney Smith at 52 South End Road East Haven CT 06512, that the case was assigned for a hearing in damages on 11/16/10 at 2:00 p.m.;

12. on 11/16/10 by fax time stamped 13:07 p.m. Attorney Smith faxed a Motion for Continuance to the court requesting the case be continued to 11/23/10 because “received notice late” and the court, Zemetis, J., granted the continuance to November 30, 2010 and requested the clerk's office fax the ruling back to Attorney Smith at the same fax number on which the motion had been sent as well as mailing the same-the court file shows that several attempted fax transmissions made on 11/16/10 to the very same fax number that appeared on the motion for continuance were unsuccessful-but that Attorney Smith confirmed she received notice of the continuance of the hearing in damages scheduled for 11/30/10 via the notice mailed by the court clerk's office to Attorney Smith at 52 South End Road East Haven CT 06512;

13. on November 30, 2010 Attorney Smith appeared in court for the scheduled hearing in damages.   She filed an Appearance for all plaintiffs -which she indicated was simply a mistake as she meant to appear for all defendants.   Attorney Smith vigorously contested the plaintiff's claims including the amount of damages though she had not filed any notice of defense pursuant to PB 17-34 et seq.;

14. judgment entered for the plaintiff against both defendants;

15. the defendant Attorney Charnina Smith has filed post-judgment motions listed above;  and

16. the defendant BNS Consulting, LLC-without a separate motion of any caption and within the defendant Smith's 12/15/10 Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over her person due to insufficiency of process-has moved to dismiss the case because the plaintiff lacked standing to sue BNS Consulting, LLC based on an evidentiary argument not raised at trial.

Attorney Smith's motion to open the judgment for the reason that she had inadequate notice of the proceedings is denied.   The recitation of the history of this case indicates that Attorney Smith was well aware of the case, had the first judgment (12/29/09) set aside-without opposition-based on a claim that she had no notice of the action.   She appeared via a written motion to open the judgment made, apparently, on behalf of both defendants on 1/28/10 and literally appeared in the court on 2/11/10 when the motion to open judgment was calendared and granted by the court, Abrams, J., in her presence.   Attorney Smith appeared in this court in this proceeding on 1/28/10 when she filed her first motion to open judgment.  “Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed.1990) generally defines an appearance as:  “A coming into court as a party to a suit ․ The formal proceeding by which a defendant submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court.   The voluntary submission to a court's jurisdiction ․” Pitchell v. City of Hartford, 247 Conn. 422 (1999).  “The rule concerning appearances “is a rule of convenience and as such should be observed;” Schoonmaker v. Albertson & Douglass Machine Co., 51 Conn. 387, 393 (1884);  however, “there may be an actual appearance for all the purposes of a defense without an entry on the docket.”  Id., 393-94.   Additionally, “[t]he entry of an appearance need not necessarily be made by filing a formal appearance form.”  Beardsley v. Beardsley, 144 Conn. 725, 730, 137 A.2d 752 (1957).   The rules of practice will be interpreted liberally in any case where it shall be manifest that a strict adherence to them will work an injustice.  Snow v. Calise, 174 Conn. 567, 574, 392 A.2d 440 (1978);  see also Practice Book § 1-8, formerly § 6.' “ Fontaine v. Thomas, 51 Conn.App. 77, 81 (1998).

After the granting of her 1/28/10 motion on 2/11/10, Attorney Smith did not file any pleadings, discovery or participate in the case until 11/16/10 when she filed a motion for continuance of the hearing in damages scheduled for that very day.   She offered no explanation or reasonable excuse for failure to examine the court file, file a responsive pleading or otherwise attend to the existing case against her.

Her 11/16/10 motion for continuance was granted.   A notice of a new, and final, date for a hearing in damages was set and proper notice sent by the court.   Attorney Smith received the same.   She appeared in court.   She defended the action through questioning the plaintiff's witnesses and testifying herself.   Judgment entered against her and her co-defendant.   BNS Consulting, LLC did not assert that it was not a party to the lease or lease extension agreement with the plaintiff.

Attorney Smith's due process rights of reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard on the merits of the case were fully protected.

The December 15, 2010 motion to open judgment based on lack of notice of the proceedings is denied.

Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction dated December 15, 2010

During the hearing on the 12/1/10 Motion to Open Judgment, the defendant, Attorney Smith, filed a December 15, 2010 motion to dismiss, an accompanying memorandum of law, an affidavit signed by Attorney Smith and six pages of color photographs, two pages of correspondence from the plaintiff to the defendant and four pages of records apparently from the Town of Woodbridge assessor's office.

The motion to dismiss cites PB 10-31(a)(1) ³ and 10-33 ⁴ and simply asserts that because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction the case should be dismissed.   The memorandum of law asserts that the plaintiff lacked standing to prosecute the case thereby depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction.

The instant matter involves a claim between private parties, one Connecticut resident against two other Connecticut residents, for money damages arising out of an alleged breach of a lease agreement between them involving a Connecticut property, and the Connecticut Superior Court has jurisdiction over the dispute, see CGS 51-164s.⁵

The defendant's memorandum of law accompanying the motion to dismiss asserts that the plaintiff lacks standing to prosecute the case because the lease contract is “illegal.”

“Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it ․ [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ferguson Mechanical Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 282 Conn. 764, 770-71, 924 A.2d 846 (2007).”   Massad v. Greaves, 116 Conn.App. 672 (2009).   It is well established that “[a] party must have standing to assert a claim in order for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Lewis v. Slack, 110 Conn.App. 641, 643, 955 A.2d 620, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 953, 961 A.2d 417 (2008).  “Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion.   One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Sadloski v. Manchester, 228 Conn. 79, 84, 634 A.2d 888 (1993), on appeal after remand, 235 Conn. 637, 668 A.2d 1314 (1995).”  Megin v. Town of New Milford, 125 Conn.App. 35, 39 (2010).

The essence of the challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction seems to be that the plaintiff lacked standing because the leased premises had “work performed in 1998 or 2008, and no certificate of occupancy has been issued to date,” 12/15/10 Memorandum of Law page 2, paragraph 2, citing to defendant's own affidavit as proof of the allegations.   The defendant concludes that without the certificate of occupancy the lease is an “illegal contract” citing Sippin v. Ellam, 24 Conn.App. 385, 392 (1991) and that the “illegal contract” deprives the plaintiff of standing thereby depriving the Superior Court of subject matter jurisdiction.

The motion to dismiss fails for several reasons.   The defendant's assertion that the plaintiff had failed to obtain a certificate of occupancy was not proved through competent evidence.   The defendant's assertion that the plaintiff had ‘work performed’ that required a building permit and/or that a building permit was not obtained was not proved through competent evidence.   Even if those facts were proved, that does not establish that the lease was an “illegal contract,” see 12 Havemeyer Place Co., LLC v. Gordon, 93 Conn.App. 140, 155 (2006) distinguishing between a violation of a restrictive covenant in the deed and a claimed violation of a zoning ordinance.

“Parties may bind themselves to a contract that calls on its face for a use of property that violates the zoning laws because, due to the possibility of obtaining a variance, such a bargain is not against public policy or public morals ․ A lease providing for a use of premises which is prohibited by the zoning law is not necessarily illegal where it appears that an appeals board has the authority to permit a variance.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 390-91.  “A lease is not necessarily void if, reasonably, the prohibition can be made legal through administrative or judicial action ․ A lease does not have an unlawful purpose if the zoning laws incorporate a procedure by which a variance from the letter of the law may be obtained.”  (Citation omitted.)  Id., 390.”  12 Havemeyer Place Company v. Gordon, supra, 155.

Even if the lease contract was “illegal” that does not establish that the plaintiff has no standing to assert the claim and hence that the court is without subject matter jurisdiction.   The movant's memorandum of law cites several cases involving suits for money damages arising out of leases claimed to be ‘illegal’-e.g. Sippin v. Ellam, supra, and 12 Havemeyer Place Co., LLC v. Gordon, 76 Conn.App. 377, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 919 (2003)-neither case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.   The unenforceability of a lease due to illegality does deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction.

Both the factual underpinnings and the legal conclusions of this motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are faulty.

Examination of the complaint in the instant case reveals that the plaintiff has alleged that it and the defendants entered into a lease and a lease extension agreement, that the defendants failed to pay the rent as agreed and that the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the defendants' breach of the lease and lease extension agreements.   The lease and lease extension, appended to the complaint, confirm that the plaintiff leased 15-17 June Street, Suite B, Woodbridge, CT to the defendant Charnina Smith for a period of time in consideration of a specified rental payment.   The plaintiff has established standing, ‘a real interest in the subject matter of the case,’ to bring the case.

The motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on an assertion of plaintiff's lack of standing is denied.

Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction dated December 15, 2010

The defendant Attorney Charnina Smith has moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction claiming the service of process was invalid while simultaneously raising, for the first time, the issue of whether the co-defendant, BNS Consulting, LLC, was a party to the lease and lease extension agreement.   The court will address the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, then the issue of BNS Consulting, LLC.

Practice Book § 10-31(a)(2) states that a motion to dismiss can raise the lack of personal jurisdiction.   However, P.B. § 10-30 provides that any defendant contesting the court's jurisdiction “must do so by filing a motion to dismiss within thirty days of the filing of an appearance.”

Attorney Smith appeared in this action on 1/28/10 when she filed her first motion to open judgment.   When the clerk's office accepted her 1/28/10 motion to open judgment without her contemporaneous filing of a separate and distinct appearance form, Attorney Smith was in fact filing her appearance in the instant case.   Her motion to open judgment met all the requirements of P.B. § 3-3.⁶  Her filing of the 1/28/10 motion to open judgment, her physical appearance in court on 2/11/10 on behalf of the defendants while the motion was under the court's consideration at the calendar call and her filing of the 11/16/10 motion for continuance on behalf of the defendants all evidence both her knowledge of and participation in the judicial proceedings in the instant matter and her submission to the court's jurisdiction, Pitchell v. City of Hartford, 247 Conn. 422, fn 13, (1999).

“Unlike the situation with subject matter jurisdiction, a party waives the right to dispute personal jurisdiction unless that party files a motion to dismiss within thirty days of the filing of an appearance ․ Personal jurisdiction is not like subject matter jurisdiction, which can be raised at any time and by the court on its own motion ․ Unless the issue of personal jurisdiction is raised by a timely motion to dismiss, any challenge to the court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant is lost.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Rock Rimmon Grange # 142, Inc. v. The Bible Speaks Ministries, Inc., 92 Conn.App. 410, 416, 885 A.2d 768 (2005);  see also Practice Book §§ 10-30 and 10-32.”  St. Paul's Flax Hill Co-operative v. Johnson, 124 Conn.App. 728, 740 (2010).   As noted above, “[t]he entry of an appearance need not necessarily be made by filing a formal appearance form.”   Beardsley v. Beardsley, 144 Conn. 725, 730, 137 A.2d 752 (1957).

The instant motion to dismiss is dated 12/15/10, well after the thirty-day limitation described by Practice Book § 10-30 for filing a motion to dismiss.

The motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person of Attorney Charnina Smith is denied as untimely.

BNS Consulting, LLC, through its attorney and sole member-Attorney Charnina Smith, asserts, for the first time in the 12/15/10 Motion to Dismiss, that BNS Consulting, LLC was not a party to the lease and lease extension agreement with the plaintiff.   The plaintiff received that motion and has declined the opportunity to respond.   The court, having examined the lease and lease extension agreement, P's trial exhibits 1 and 2 respectively, is unable to determine that BNS Consulting, LLC was not a party to the lease and/or lease extension agreement as those documents are signed by Charnina Smith and beneath her signature the document provides:

“Tenant

Charnina Smith, BNS Consulting LLC”

Though this signature seems to conflict with the preceding portions of the lease wherein the parties are identified, the court cannot determine whether the lease and extension agreement was signed by Smith individually or in her representative capacity as member of the limited liability company or in both capacities.   As this issue was not raised in the pleadings, not raised in the evidence and not raised in the post-trial argument, the court declines to make new findings of fact based on an inadequate and confusing record.

Wherefore, the December 15, 2010 Motion to Open Judgment is denied.

Wherefore, the December 15, 2010 Motions to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and lack of personal jurisdiction are denied.

Terence A. Zemetis, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Sec. 52-212a.   Civil judgment or decree opened or set aside within four months only.Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed.   The continuing jurisdiction conferred on the court in preadoptive proceedings pursuant to subsection (o) of section 17a-112 does not confer continuing jurisdiction on the court for purposes of reopening a judgment terminating parental rights.   The parties may waive the provisions of this section or otherwise submit to the jurisdiction of the court, provided the filing of an amended petition for termination of parental rights does not constitute a waiver of the provisions of this section or a submission to the jurisdiction of the court to reopen a judgment terminating parental rights..  FN1. Sec. 52-212a.   Civil judgment or decree opened or set aside within four months only.Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed.   The continuing jurisdiction conferred on the court in preadoptive proceedings pursuant to subsection (o) of section 17a-112 does not confer continuing jurisdiction on the court for purposes of reopening a judgment terminating parental rights.   The parties may waive the provisions of this section or otherwise submit to the jurisdiction of the court, provided the filing of an amended petition for termination of parental rights does not constitute a waiver of the provisions of this section or a submission to the jurisdiction of the court to reopen a judgment terminating parental rights.

FN2. Sec. 17-4.   Setting Aside or Opening Judgments(a) Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, any civil judgment or decree rendered in the superior court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months succeeding the date on which notice was sent.   The parties may waive the provisions of this subsection or otherwise submit to the jurisdiction of the court. (b) Upon the filing of a motion to open or set aside a civil judgment, except a judgment in a small claims or juvenile matter, the moving party shall pay to the clerk the filing fee prescribed by statute unless such fee has been waived by the judicial authority.(c) The expedited procedures set forth in this subsection may be followed with regard to a motion to open a judgment of foreclosure filed by a plaintiff in which the filing fee has been paid, the motion has been filed prior to the vesting of title or the sale date, the plaintiff states in the motion that the committee and appraisal fees have been paid or will be paid within thirty days of court approval, and the motion has been served on each party as provided by Sections 10-12 through 10-17 and with proof of service endorsed thereon.(1) Parties shall have five days from the filing of the motion to file an objection with the court.   Unless otherwise ordered by the judicial authority, the motion shall be heard not less than seven days after the date the motion was filed.   If the plaintiff states in the motion that all appearing parties have received actual notice of the motion and are in agreement with it, the judicial authority may grant the motion without a hearing.(2) When a motion to open judgment is filed pursuant to this subsection, the court will retain jurisdiction over the action to award committee fees and expenses and appraisal fees, if necessary.   If judgment is not entered or the case has not been withdrawn within 120 days of the granting of the motion, the judicial authority shall forthwith enter a judgment of dismissal..  FN2. Sec. 17-4.   Setting Aside or Opening Judgments(a) Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, any civil judgment or decree rendered in the superior court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months succeeding the date on which notice was sent.   The parties may waive the provisions of this subsection or otherwise submit to the jurisdiction of the court. (b) Upon the filing of a motion to open or set aside a civil judgment, except a judgment in a small claims or juvenile matter, the moving party shall pay to the clerk the filing fee prescribed by statute unless such fee has been waived by the judicial authority.(c) The expedited procedures set forth in this subsection may be followed with regard to a motion to open a judgment of foreclosure filed by a plaintiff in which the filing fee has been paid, the motion has been filed prior to the vesting of title or the sale date, the plaintiff states in the motion that the committee and appraisal fees have been paid or will be paid within thirty days of court approval, and the motion has been served on each party as provided by Sections 10-12 through 10-17 and with proof of service endorsed thereon.(1) Parties shall have five days from the filing of the motion to file an objection with the court.   Unless otherwise ordered by the judicial authority, the motion shall be heard not less than seven days after the date the motion was filed.   If the plaintiff states in the motion that all appearing parties have received actual notice of the motion and are in agreement with it, the judicial authority may grant the motion without a hearing.(2) When a motion to open judgment is filed pursuant to this subsection, the court will retain jurisdiction over the action to award committee fees and expenses and appraisal fees, if necessary.   If judgment is not entered or the case has not been withdrawn within 120 days of the granting of the motion, the judicial authority shall forthwith enter a judgment of dismissal.

FN3. Sec. 10-31.-Grounds of Motion to Dismiss(a) The motion to dismiss shall be used to assert (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, and (5) insufficiency of service of process.   This motion shall always be filed with a supporting memorandum of law, and where appropriate, with supporting affidavits as to facts not apparent on the record.(b) Any adverse party who objects to this motion shall, at least five days before the motion is to be considered on the short calendar, file and serve in accordance with Sections 10-12 through 10-17 a memorandum of law and, where appropriate, supporting affidavits as to facts not apparent on the record..  FN3. Sec. 10-31.-Grounds of Motion to Dismiss(a) The motion to dismiss shall be used to assert (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, and (5) insufficiency of service of process.   This motion shall always be filed with a supporting memorandum of law, and where appropriate, with supporting affidavits as to facts not apparent on the record.(b) Any adverse party who objects to this motion shall, at least five days before the motion is to be considered on the short calendar, file and serve in accordance with Sections 10-12 through 10-17 a memorandum of law and, where appropriate, supporting affidavits as to facts not apparent on the record.

FN4. Sec. 10-33.-Waiver and Subject Matter JurisdictionAny claim of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived;  and whenever it is found after suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the judicial authority shall dismiss the action..  FN4. Sec. 10-33.-Waiver and Subject Matter JurisdictionAny claim of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived;  and whenever it is found after suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the judicial authority shall dismiss the action.

FN5. Sec. 51-164s.   Superior Court sole trial court.   Jurisdiction transferred from Court of Common Pleas and Juvenile Court.   The Superior Court shall be the sole court of original jurisdiction for all causes of action, except such actions over which the courts of probate have original jurisdiction, as provided by statute.   All jurisdiction heretofore conferred upon and exercised by the Court of Common Pleas and the Juvenile Court prior to July 1, 1978 shall be transferred to the Superior Court on July 1, 1978..  FN5. Sec. 51-164s.   Superior Court sole trial court.   Jurisdiction transferred from Court of Common Pleas and Juvenile Court.   The Superior Court shall be the sole court of original jurisdiction for all causes of action, except such actions over which the courts of probate have original jurisdiction, as provided by statute.   All jurisdiction heretofore conferred upon and exercised by the Court of Common Pleas and the Juvenile Court prior to July 1, 1978 shall be transferred to the Superior Court on July 1, 1978.

FN6. Sec. 3-3.   Form and Signing of Appearance Each appearance shall (1) be typed or printed on size 8 1/2 by 11 inch paper, (2) be headed with the name and number of the case, the name of the court location to which it is returnable and the date, (3) be legibly signed by the individual preparing the appearance with the individual's own name and (4) state the party or parties for whom the appearance is being entered and the official (with position or department, if desired), firm, professional corporation or individual whose appearance is being entered, together with the juris number assigned thereto if any, the mailing address and the telephone number.   This section shall not apply to appearances entered pursuant to Section 3-1..  FN6. Sec. 3-3.   Form and Signing of Appearance Each appearance shall (1) be typed or printed on size 8 1/2 by 11 inch paper, (2) be headed with the name and number of the case, the name of the court location to which it is returnable and the date, (3) be legibly signed by the individual preparing the appearance with the individual's own name and (4) state the party or parties for whom the appearance is being entered and the official (with position or department, if desired), firm, professional corporation or individual whose appearance is being entered, together with the juris number assigned thereto if any, the mailing address and the telephone number.   This section shall not apply to appearances entered pursuant to Section 3-1.

Zemetis, Terence A., J.