LLP v. Dominic Caciopoli (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (# 106)

FACTS

The plaintiff, Winter Ridge LLP, filed a one-count complaint against the defendant, Dominic Caciopoli, alleging legal malpractice on August 10, 2011.   The complaint alleges the following facts.   In February 2006, property owned by the plaintiff was transported to Milton Caterpillar in Milford, Massachusetts for repair after it had been vandalized.   On July 26, 2006, the plaintiff discovered that, due to the negligence of Milton Caterpillar, the property suffered damage so severe that its value was totally destroyed.   Though the defendant represented the plaintiff with respect to the property from December 29, 2005 until January 2009, at no time did the defendant make any claim or institute any action against Milton Caterpillar.   As a result of the defendant's negligence, the statute of limitations expired and the plaintiff “lost the entire recovery it would have obtained from pursuing its valid claim against Milton Caterpillar.”

On October 27, 2010, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the statute of limitations for the claim against Milton Caterpillar has not expired and that the plaintiff continues to have a right to bring a cause of action against the company.   The plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment on November 8, 2010.   The defendant filed a reply to the brief in opposition on November 12, 2010.¹  The matter was heard at short calendar on November 15, 2010.

DISCUSSION

“Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989).  “[T]he use of a motion for summary judgment to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint is appropriate when the complaint fails to set forth a cause of action and the defendant can establish that the defect could not be cured by repleading.”  Larobina v. McDonald, 274 Conn. 394, 401, 876 A.2d 522 (2005).  “In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact.   The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law.   The courts hold the movant to a strict standard.   To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.”  Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 10-11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).

“On a motion by [the] defendant for summary judgment, the burden is on [the] defendant to negate each claim as framed by the complaint ․ It necessarily follows that it is only [o]nce [the] defendant's burden in establishing his entitlement to summary judgment is met [that] the burden shifts to [the] plaintiff to show that a genuine issue of fact exists justifying a trial ․ Accordingly, [w]hen documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Vitale v. Kowal, 101 Conn.App. 691, 696-97, 923 A.2d 778, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 904, 931 A.2d 268 (2007).

In his motion for summary judgment, the defendant argues that there is no issue of material fact that the plaintiff has not met the elements for legal malpractice because based on the allegations of the complaint, the plaintiff satisfies the elements for a breach of bailment contract claim.   The statute of limitations for the contract claim is governed by General Statutes § 52-576(a) and establishes a six-year statute of limitations.   Since the breach is alleged to have occurred in 2006, the plaintiff has until 2012 to file a claim against Milton Caterpillar, and the defendant is therefore not liable for legal malpractice.   The plaintiff argues that it is unclear whether the plaintiff could maintain an action for breach of bailment contract, and even if it could, the elements for the cause of action are more difficult to prove than the elements for negligence.   The plaintiff further argues that the statute of limitations for simple negligence has expired, which is sufficient to establish malpractice liability.

“Malpractice is commonly defined as the failure of one rendering professional services to exercise that degree of skill and learning commonly applied under all the circumstances in the community by the average prudent reputable member of the profession with the result of injury, loss, or damage to the recipient of those services ․ In general, the plaintiff in an attorney malpractice action must establish:  (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship;  (2) the attorney's wrongful act or omission;  (3) causation;  and (4) damages.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, P.C. v. Beckett, 269 Conn. 613, 649, 850 A.2d 145 (2004).

In the present case, the crux of the defendant's argument is that his failure to file a lawsuit within the statute of limitations for a negligence claim is not a wrongful act or omission which caused damage because the plaintiff can still file a lawsuit under a breach of bailment contract claim.   In his answer to the plaintiff's complaint, the defendant admits the existence of an attorney-client relationship from December 2005 until January 2009, but leaves the plaintiff to his proof as to the facts of the underlying claim against Milton Caterpillar and denies the allegations as to the defendant's actions.   Since the defendant has failed to submit any evidence that a bailment contract exists, the court cannot find that there is no question of material fact that the plaintiff has a cause of action under a contract claim.   Neither has the defendant submitted any evidence that a viable negligence action exists.   Thus, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff has a viable cause of action available to him against Milton Caterpillar.   Accordingly, the defendant has not met his burden and the motion for summary judgment is therefore denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied.

Wilson, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Neither of the parties provided the court with any evidence, but the court may take judicial notice of facts in a court file.  Borkowski v. Borkowski, 228 Conn. 729, 746, 638 A.2d 1060 (1994)..  FN1. Neither of the parties provided the court with any evidence, but the court may take judicial notice of facts in a court file.  Borkowski v. Borkowski, 228 Conn. 729, 746, 638 A.2d 1060 (1994).

Wilson, Robin L., J.