Eugene W. Grzeika v. Michael Carlson Agency et al. (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT PEQUABUCK GOLF CLUB OF BRISTOL, INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, # 143

This action was commenced by a small claims complaint dated March 22, 2007, by the plaintiff, Eugene W. Grzeika, against the defendants, Michael Carlson Agency (“Carlson Agency”), and Pequabuck Golf Club of Bristol, Inc. (“Pequabuck”).  The matter was transferred to the superior court, and the plaintiff's substitute complaint dated February 26, 2008 is the operative complaint (“the complaint”).   The complaint consists of two counts, one for defamation against Pequabuck, and the second count against the Carlson Agency for fraud and deceit.   The count against Pequabuck alleges that the agents, employees or officers of Pequabuck are liable for two defamatory statements.   The defendant, Pequabuck, has filed a motion for summary judgment, together with a memorandum and supporting documentation, on the grounds that there exists no genuine issue of material fact as to the liability of this defendant, and therefore is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.¹

The defendant filed an objection to the motion for summary judgment.²  The documentation which he attached is as follows:  Exhibit A-page from the Practice Book;  Exhibit B-page from the Practice Book;  Exhibit C-Internet definition of the word “genuine;” Exhibit D-Internet definition of the phrase “material fact;” Exhibit F-Internet definition of the phrase “undue influence;” Exhibit F-first page of Carlson Agency's memorandum of law in support of motion for summary judgment;  Exhibit G-Plaintiff's interrogatories and request for production as well as the judicial branch's webpage of another matter;  Exhibit H-Small claims notice of judgment or disposition;  Exhibit I-August 3, 2004 letter of Dolores Dreper-Ignala;  Exhibit J-Memo to members of board of Pequabuck from Wally Crumb;  Exhibit J-1-Pequabuck board of directors meeting minutes for October 19, 2004;  Exhibit K-Notation dated 1-24-03;  Exhibit L-By-laws of Pequabuck;  Exhibit M-Substitute complaint dated February 26, 2008;  Exhibit N-Notices of meetings;  Exhibit O-Executive board meeting of Pequabuck dated January 20, 2004;  Exhibit P-E-mail correspondence from plaintiff to Pequabuck's office:  and Exhibit O-Internet definition of words “prima-facie,” “evidence,” and “case.”   None of this documentation contains any sworn affidavits or statements by any persons.

In the first count of the complaint, titled defamation, the plaintiff alleges that Pequabuck is liable for the two following statements:

On or about August 3, 2004, Dolores Dreper-Ignala, and (sic) agent-employee of Pequabuck wrote a letter to Ted Wagenknecht, Wally Crumb and Jeff Bajck stating that Mr. Grzeika had come into her office, pointed his fingers and yelled at her.   On or about January 17, 2007, Mike Butler, the then president of the Pequabuck wrote a letter to Mr. Grzeika stating that Plaintiff's actions were a threat and ‘were deemed detrimental to the welfare and good of the Pequabuck Golf Club of Bristol, Inc.’ and as such his membership, club house privileges and public play were suspended indefinitely.   Complaint, Count 1, ¶¶ 4, 5.

The plaintiff did not specifically identify or produce the letters referenced in the above-referenced paragraphs, and in Pequabuck's requests for admissions and interrogatory and production requests, there was no identification of any other factual circumstances to support his claim of defamation.   As previously noted, the plaintiff did not provide the court with any other credible evidence to support his claims in his response.

DISCUSSION

“Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Allen v. Cox, 285 Conn. 603, 609, 942 A.2d 296 (2008).  “In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issues of fact.   The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law.   The courts hold the movant to a strict standard.   To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact ․ As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Zielinski v. Kotsoris, 279 Conn. 312, 318-19, 901 A.2d 1207 (2006).

“When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue ․ Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue ․ It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue.   Mere assertions of fact ․ are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45].”  Id.

“Although the court must view the inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion ․ a party may not rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment ․ A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Tuccio Development, Inc. v. Neumann, 111 Conn.App. 588, 594, 960 A.2d 1071 (2008).

“Defamation is comprised of the torts of libel and slander.   Defamation is that which tends to injure reputation in the popular sense;  to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory, or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him ․ slander is oral defamation ․ libel is written defamation.”  Lega Siciliana Social Club, Inc. v. St. Germaine, 77 Conn.App. 846, 851-52, 825 A.2d 827, cert. denied, 267 Conn. 901, 838 A.2d 210 (2003).

A cause of action for defamation requires that the plaintiff plead and prove four essential elements:  (1) a false statement of fact;  (2) unprivileged publication of the statement;  (3) publication caused by negligent or intentional conduct;  and (4) injury to reputation.  Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chemical Co., 267 Conn. 210, 217, 837 A.2d 759 (2004);  Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc., 193 Conn. 313, 316, 477 A.2d 1005 (1984).

The plaintiff's factual bases for the allegations of the complaint are contained in the 2004 and 2007 letters.   In examining those letters, it is unclear whether one and/or both were ever published, when and if the publication occurred, and by whom and to whom the publication(s) occurred.   The responses by the plaintiff to discovery requests substantiate Pequabuck's position that the plaintiff has no factual evidence of any kind to establish a prima facie case of defamation.³

The plaintiff's revised complaint is devoid of the necessary facts to establish a cause of action for defamation or libel.   He did not plead any of the elements necessary for an action in defamation or libel.   The plaintiff submitted no supporting documents with his objection to the defendant's motion for summary judgment.⁴  The defendant is entitled to summary judgment on any claim for defamation, slander or libel.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the defendant, Pequabuck's motion for summary judgment is granted as to count one.

Swienton, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The defendant, Carlson Agency, also filed a motion for summary judgment, but it has not been argued.   Carlson Agency is the insurance agent for Pequabuck, and the plaintiff alleges that he fell and was injured at Pequabuck, and that the principal of Carlson Agency made representations to him regarding the payment of his medical bills..  FN1. The defendant, Carlson Agency, also filed a motion for summary judgment, but it has not been argued.   Carlson Agency is the insurance agent for Pequabuck, and the plaintiff alleges that he fell and was injured at Pequabuck, and that the principal of Carlson Agency made representations to him regarding the payment of his medical bills.

FN2. The document which he filed is entitled “Pesponse (sic) to Defendant's Michael Carlson Agency/Pequabuck Golf Club Motion for Summary Judgment.”.  FN2. The document which he filed is entitled “Pesponse (sic) to Defendant's Michael Carlson Agency/Pequabuck Golf Club Motion for Summary Judgment.”

FN3. The plaintiff alleges in his complaint that “[b]oth letters were published by the employees and officers of Pequabuck ․” However, in a response to an interrogatory which asked “with respect to each document that is alleged to be defamatory, (a) who the document was addressed to;  (b) the date of the document;  (c) who wrote the document;  and (d) to whom the document was published,” the plaintiff answered “unknown.”.  FN3. The plaintiff alleges in his complaint that “[b]oth letters were published by the employees and officers of Pequabuck ․” However, in a response to an interrogatory which asked “with respect to each document that is alleged to be defamatory, (a) who the document was addressed to;  (b) the date of the document;  (c) who wrote the document;  and (d) to whom the document was published,” the plaintiff answered “unknown.”

FN4. Moreover, any statements contained in the 2004 and 2007 letters Report could be claimed as privileged as the communications were between employees concerning the plaintiff who was at that time an employee of Pequabuck.  “[C]ommunications between managers regarding the review of an employee's job performance and the preparation of documents regarding an employee's termination are protected by a qualified privilege.   Such communications and documents are necessary to effectuate the interests of the employer in efficiently managing its business.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheimn Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 234 Conn. 1, 29, 662 A.2d 89 (1995)..  FN4. Moreover, any statements contained in the 2004 and 2007 letters Report could be claimed as privileged as the communications were between employees concerning the plaintiff who was at that time an employee of Pequabuck.  “[C]ommunications between managers regarding the review of an employee's job performance and the preparation of documents regarding an employee's termination are protected by a qualified privilege.   Such communications and documents are necessary to effectuate the interests of the employer in efficiently managing its business.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheimn Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 234 Conn. 1, 29, 662 A.2d 89 (1995).

Swienton, Cynthia K., J.