Monika Patinha v. Miguel Patinha (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This dissolution of marriage action came to the judicial district of Hartford at New Britain by return date of March 10, 2009.   It was referred to the Regional Family Trial Docket in Middletown for trial.   All financial orders and custody were at issue at the trial.

In her claims for relief, the plaintiff seeks sole custody and attendant other orders;  child support in accordance with the Guidelines, funds for school clothing and supplies, funding for extra curricular activities, preservation of alimony, the marital home, assigning parties each responsibility of their own debt and sundry other orders.   In his claims for relief, the defendant seeks joint legal custody with a schedule of access and other attendant orders, the opportunity to buy the plaintiff out of her interest in the marital home, and if he cannot, the transfer of the entire home to her with no recourse for him, and an order of preservation of alimony for him, child support in accordance with the Guidelines, 50 percent of pre-kindergarten and extracurricular activities agreed on, and other sundry matters.   Each party assumed that the Child Support Guidelines would provide for an order of $130 per week;  the defendant later asserted it is $100 per week based on only one job.

In this litigation, the children's best interest has been represented by a guardian ad litem.   The plaintiff has been represented by counsel throughout the proceedings.   Initially, the defendant had an attorney.   He has proceeded in a self-represented capacity, both a portion of the pendente lite time and throughout this trial.   While Mr. Patinha continually asserted his ineptness as a self-represented individual, the defendant was very capable and adept in marshaling exhibits and testimony in furtherance of his own cause.

The witnesses at trial were the parties, the guardian ad litem, the defendant's mother and father, Maria Dyas, who is godmother to Jacinta, and came from Lisbon, Portugal to testify, Gabriel A. Levicky;  a Czech language interpreter, Susan Notcha, who is godmother to Natalia, Ricardo Patinha, who is godfather to Natalia, and Dr. Stephanie Leite.

The court has carefully considered the statutory criteria and case law pertaining to the granting of a dissolution of marriage, custody, child support, alimony, division of the marital estate, health insurance, and attendant other issues.¹  The court finds the following facts based upon the credible evidence.

I.

The court finds that it has jurisdiction over the marriage.   The plaintiff, Monika Patinha, whose birth name was Monika Nabboutova married the defendant Miguel Patinha in Hartford, Connecticut, on December 8, 2001.   Both parties have lived in Connecticut for more than a year continuously prior to the bringing of this action.   Both currently reside in Connecticut.   The parties have three children issue of the marriage, all having been born to the wife since the date of the marriage.   They are:  Felipe Patinha, born June 17, 2003, Jacinta Patinha, born November 25, 2005 and Natalia Patinha, born May 27, 2007.   No other children have been born to the wife since the date of the marriage and she is not currently pregnant.   While the parties have not been recipients of public assistance, the children were on HUSKY health insurance during the marriage.

As described hereinafter, the court finds that the marriage between the parties has broken down and there is no reasonable hope for its reconciliation.   This has brought the parties to this action.   The parties differ in their claims for relief regarding custody, child support, alimony, distribution of the marital estate, attorneys fees and other attendant issues.

The plaintiff was born in the Czech Republic.   She lived there until she was a young adult.   At the time she met the defendant in November 2001, she was doing administrative work in an embassy.   The parties met at a Lebanese independence party.   They dated for six months in Prague.   The defendant was working for Ford at the time.   The defendant was transferred for a time to other places in Europe.   The plaintiff visited him.   They became betrothed.   The plaintiff moved to the United States to be with the defendant when he returned to Dearborn, Michigan.   Since then they have both lived continuously in Connecticut.   Upon the parties residing together as a married couple, the plaintiff went to work as a waitress in a restaurant.   During the marriage, the plaintiff attended college for nursing and acquired her degree and her registered nurse license.   She is presently employed by Bristol Hospital.

The defendant grew up in Cromwell, Connecticut.   He graduated from Worcester Polytechnic Institute in 1992 with a degree in electrical engineering.   He excelled there;  he went on to earn an MBA from Harvard Business School in 1996.   Ford Motor Company hired him in finance where he went on their European rotation after working in Brazil first.   He worked in Portugal, England, the Czech Republic and Norway.   In the Czech Republic, where he met the plaintiff, he was finance director in the country for Ford.

The defendant was relocated by Ford to Dearborn, Michigan in 2001.   He left his employment with Ford upon marrying the plaintiff.   His reason for leaving voluntarily was confusing:  at first he testified that he left Ford because he wanted “to die with the mother of my kids” who were not to start to come in this world for two more years.   He then went on later in his testimony to state that he wanted to be close to his family in Connecticut.   The defendant had no job prospects when he left Ford. Therefore, at the inception of the marriage, he gave up his employment with no alternative employment in place.

Early in the marriage, the defendant planned to open his own restaurant.   He researched it at length, and spent approximately $4,000 in pursuit of the plan.   Ultimately, the notion never came to fruition.   Mr. Patinha occasionally worked as a welder with his father throughout this period.   During the marriage, the defendant invested a large portion of the marital estate as a stock trader including margin trading.   The plaintiff documented through exhibits the large losses sustained on those investments toward the end of the marriage.   After considering all of the profits and losses, as of 2008, the parties had a loss carry forward of $258,000.   As of the time of the trial, the parties have no liquid assets.   The only asset of any significant value is the parties' marital home.

The plaintiff seeks to have the court find that the defendant dissipated the assets that were brought to the marriage as well as the earnings of the plaintiff while waitressing.   The Connecticut Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of dissipation.   The Court stated, “We conclude that, at a minimum, dissipation in the marital dissolution context requires financial misconduct involving marital assets, such as intentional waste or a selfish financial impropriety, coupled with a purpose unrelated to the marriage.”  Gershman v. Gershman, 286 Conn. 341, 350-51 (2008).   The defendant argues that he was a successful investor until the market losses that were suffered on a widespread basis by most investors.  “Poor investment decisions, without more, generally do not give rise to a finding of dissipation.”  Id. at 348.   The evidence is not sufficient for the court to find that the defendant's investment conduct constituted a dissipation of the family estate.   Mr. Patinha sought to make money for the family.   He was not investing for selfish purposes or to intentionally waste these funds.   His losses were at worst poor investment decisions not dissipation under our law.

The defendant always ran the financial books of the family.   When she worked at the restaurant, the plaintiff turned her paycheck over to him.   In retrospect, the plaintiff views the defendant's absolute control over the family books as a means to control her.   It was not proven, however, that she always felt this way.   Indeed, she testified, as well, that it was not a problem for her early in the marriage.   As she became educated and developed a career her resistance to this became more pronounced.

Over the course of the marriage, the plaintiff developed a very close relationship with the defendant's mother.   The defendant's mother does not have a close relationship with her own son.

After the children were born both of these parents participated in their care.   The heart of the dispute at this trial has been the custody of these children.   While the plaintiff was in school or at work the defendant was at home with the children, though he spent a lot of this time trading stocks on the internet.   His mother would come over to the home several days each week to bring food and be of general assistance.   When the plaintiff was not in school or working, she was primarily responsible for the children.

The marriage between the parties became increasingly strained in the two years prior to the filing of the dissolution action.   The plaintiff and the defendant's mother noticed substantial changes in the defendant's behavior during this period.   He became more disagreeable in conversation, insisting on prevailing on any issue between himself and the plaintiff.   He started accessing the plaintiff's email account without her knowledge, since he had her password.   He left tape machines around the house to eavesdrop on the plaintiff by taping her surreptitiously.   Mr. Patinha asserted he taped the plaintiff to have evidence for future counselors, and the court alike, of the behavior of the plaintiff when no one else was listening.

The court finds the taping of the plaintiff by the defendant wholly inappropriate.   Further, since the defendant knew his conversations with the plaintiff were taped, there is no authenticity that can attach to them.   He was in a position to maintain his calm and contrive the conversation.   Lastly, his selection process of which conversations to submit into evidence is in and of itself suspect.   The court has attributed no weight to this evidence.

In 2008, when the plaintiff's parents came to visit from the Czech Republic, the defendant had an altercation with the plaintiff's father.   Mrs. Patinha's father had given the parties $15,000 for her nursing college education, although the tuition did not cost them anything.   The defendant laughed at his father-in-law when he insisted on the repayment of the $15,000.   The plaintiff's father then assaulted the defendant.   The defendant called the police and filed a criminal complaint against his father-in-law.   The father-in-law returned to the Czech Republic.   He has not subsequently returned to the United States to visit his daughter or to confront the charges.   The court finds that this event was a turning point in the marriage for the plaintiff.   Faced with the situation, the plaintiff took comfort in her natural alliance with her parents, and chose her parents in the face of her husband's increasingly aggressive approach to their marriage.

The tension between the parties escalated into the final event which precipitated the filing of this action.   On January 24, 2009, the parties were having an argument which culminated in the plaintiff reaching for the phone to call the police.   The defendant sought to prevent the call by restraining her.   The plaintiff did reach the police;  they came to the home and arrested the defendant.   He was the subject of a protective order.   He has not lived in the marital home since then.   She asserted that he put his arm around her neck.   He denied that.   The parties' oldest child, Felipe, was interviewed by the police about what he observed in this altercation.   His initial version supported his mother's statement.   He later changed his version of the events.   The inference that the plaintiff seeks the court to draw is that the defendant discussed the matter with Felipe and that is why his version changed.   This inference can logically be drawn from the evidence.   The behavior of the defendant led the child to decide that the version he had remembered which put his father in the position of wrongdoer was no longer something he wanted to repeat.   This is but one instance that this child has been subjected to inappropriate conversation either directly to him, or overhearing it that has led him to feel conflicted as to the time he spends with each of his parents.

II.

Since that event this action was filed and the pendente lite period of this case ensued.   Until May 27, 2009, the defendant's visitation with the children was ordered supervised.   His father was the supervisor.   From that date forward the parties have shared joint legal custody and the defendant has had unsupervised access to the children.   The agreed court ordered schedule since May 27, 2009 has been “every Thursday from 2:00 p.m. until 5:00 p.m. and one day every weekend (Saturday or Sunday) from 10:30 a.m. until 7:30 p.m., said day to be arranged according to the parties' schedule, if there is difficulty in scheduling this day, the parties shall consult with the Guardian Ad Litem.”   Additionally, since June 16, 2009, the defendant has had court ordered access every Tuesday as well.

During the pendente lite period, the plaintiff has been in counseling at the Prudence Crandall Center.   The Center concentrates on services for women who have been victims of domestic violence.   The plaintiff asserts her husband controlled her throughout the marriage, hit her in the later years and called her bad and derogatory names.   Mr. Patinha denies these claims.   He states that this is one of the reasons he taped her, to prove otherwise.   Ironically and tragically, the defendant does not understand that this taping conduct in itself was both manipulative and controlling.   The plaintiff also took the children to Prudence Crandall for a period of time;  that was ended by court order.   At the time of trial, the plaintiff testified that she was not in fear of the defendant.

The defendant also sought therapy when the marriage fell apart.   He counseled with Dr. Liza Thayer for most of 2009.   She found him to be experiencing a high level of distress, with symptoms of depression, poor concentration and anxiety.   She worked with him on controlling his emotions and sorting out the difference between his wishes for reality and what was actual reality.   Mr. Patinha terminated this treatment because of its cost.

Joint legal custody is defined in Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46b-56a.   Joint legal custody requires joint decision making.   This requires the parties to be able to participate in some meaningful manner of communication so that they can co-operatively make the decisions necessary for the upbringing of their three children.   In determining custody both physical and legal, the court must conclude as to what is the best interest of the minor children.  Connecticut General Statute Section 46b-56(c) details factors, inter alia, that the court may consider in determining what is in the best interest of these three children.   They have been considered by this court.

To assist the court in this matter, a psychological custody evaluation was performed by Dr. Stephanie Stein Leite.   The evaluator's work included evaluation (including psychological testing) of both of the parents and the oldest child Felipe and interactional observation of both of the parents (individually) with the children.   While both parents ‘faked good’ on personality inventory, overall the evaluator was able to consider all of the other data collected to make observations as testified to by her and stated in her report.   This data supported her ultimate evaluation findings.

Dr. Leite found that the plaintiff's passive nature likely contributes, at this time, to her seeing all of the defendant' behavior as attempting to control her.   While she had somewhat poor insight into her own role in the events between the parties and her own character traits that may have contributed to the custody dispute between her and the defendant over the children, her functioning is seen within normal limits psychologically.

The report included clinical evaluation of Felipe.   He has a close relationship with both parents and wishes he could spend more time with his father.   While he is a resilient young boy, he is showing early signs of depression and social isolation.   He does, however, do well in school which bodes well for his resilience carrying the day.   Based on his adult language, his seeking his father's approval and sense of urgency in correcting his statements regarding the alleged choking incident, the evaluator found it more likely than not that the defendant had been talking to him about these things (rather than any other scenario creating Felipe's changed version of the event).

Dr. Leite found the defendant struggled with testing and inability to engage in logical thinking, particularly over matters based on new information.   She found he fixated on details, was anxious, engaged in narcissistic thinking, compulsive rumination and was very anxious and defensive.   The evaluator noted “his anxiety presents to others as controlling and obsessive” behavior.   This court found these findings persuasive.

That said, in interaction with his children, the evaluator found Mr. Patinha to be child-focused, able to set gentle limits, able to let the children lead their play and otherwise interact positively as a parent, all the while well-bonded and making the time fun for the children.   These findings are important in assuring the court that Mr. Patinha's psychological limitations do not interfere with his direct care of the children.

In attacking Dr. Leite's findings in court, the defendant focused on minutiae in an obsessive way in his questioning.   This approach only heightened the court's awareness of the validity of the evaluator's findings as it relates to that behavior.   It is difficult for the court to discern any possibility for the easy give and take of discussion toward joint decision-making when the defendant's unrestrained perseverance on the most minute issue enforces only his point of view.   It results in his domination of the parties' communication.

Dr. Leite's examination of the defendant led her to be concerned that the defendant may have an organic neuropsychological condition that is undiagnosed.   This concern arose from numerous factors:  his verbal intellectual screening testing was very average, which the evaluator noted is wholly inconsistent with his education;  he also often spoke at length about matters in minute detail and often straying off topic.   His affect was labile and he often was on the verge of tears in his interview.

In the defendant's testimony, the court noted similar characteristic matters about the defendant:  he preoccupied in his testimony about details-on the one hand perseverating on a particular point and then on the other hand, jumping from topic to topic, at other times.   The defendant was quick to show emotion both at points in his testimony.   Finally, he often forgot things, an attribute noted by the evaluator as well.

Notwithstanding the evaluator's recommendation that the defendant be screened for an organic defect, he has not pursued it further in the context of this litigation.   He did testify that he had a neuropsychological screening as a result of an automobile accident that was negative.   The court, through all of the exhibits, lacks evidence that the defendant was the subject of neuropsychological testing.   By his testimony, the court concludes he did have a brain scan and had his endocrine system functioning reviewed.   The disappointing result of this is the court cannot determine whether the conduct engaged in by him in familial relationships that is problematic in terms of his ability to co-parent would be easily controlled by some medical regimen or is, instead, ingrained characteristics of his personality.

The guardian ad litem in this case testified.   Notably, the child Felipe, sua sponte, sought to tell his corrected story of the alleged choking incident to the guardian ad litem.   Felipe loves the time he spends with his father but is not happy that his father questions him so much about his mother.   He told the guardian that his father said, “Pi [father in Portugese] said Mommy plays tricks and he'll open my eyes to the tricks Mommy plays.”   When seeing the guardian, Felipe also insisted on saying he wanted to stay with each parent half the time.   Only after he said this did he feel free to play.   The guardian expressed concern because over the time of his involvement he has seen this child become timid, shy and less outgoing.   This year's school teacher has confirmed this.   It is the guardian's recommendation that the father have consistent therapy to help him work the issues through and learn to stop these inappropriate communications:  The littlest child is still having accidents;  her therapist believes she harbors a lot of anger.   She has expressed concern that her father will have no place to live.

Upon being examined by the defendant, the guardian noted that the children enjoy spending time with both of their parents, but Felipe wanted his father to stop saying bad things about his mother.

One question for the court to consider is whether these personality characteristics will interfere with joint custody.   The court concurs with the opinion of the evaluator that these parents cannot co-parent in decision-making.   The defendant's style of obsessing over detail because of his anxiety and his need to control matters interferes with joint decision-making.   These parents are not able to consistently support the children in their relationship with each other because of their feelings about each other.   Therefore, it is essential that the court orders regarding access be assiduously followed inasmuch as the children's time with both of their parents is essential to their well-being.

During the pendency of the trial, there was a hiatus as a result of the defendant having a medical condition that required a hospitalization, and, the plaintiff having a planned two-week trip to the Czech Republic with the children.   The defendant opposed the trip.   On the one hand he claimed to be fearful that the plaintiff would never return the children back to the United States, on the other hand he said he did not oppose the trip if he received a comparable time with the children.   He also opposed the children being with the plaintiff's father because he had used belt whipping as punishment to the plaintiff when she was an adolescent.   The trial court provided for a schedule of access of the children with their father on their return that included over nights at his father's home.   This was something that had not occurred pendente lite.   This extension of parenting time to the defendant was abused by him.   The testimony later in the trial disclosed that on one of the overnights he and the children stayed at the home of his parish priest while the priest was away.   Straight-faced, the defendant told the court in testimony that he and the children were staying at his father's home-Father George the priest ² and so he thought he was complying with the court order.   Additionally, he removed Felipe from school two of the days an hour earlier than it was to let out, and, Jacinta missed orientation, because he insisted on maximum time with the children during this week.   He claims he did not know about the orientation.   In any case, this behavior leaves the court to the conclusion that there can be absolutely no ambiguity in the court order because the defendant will otherwise bend it to the extreme of his sense of his entitlement.

The testimony in this case is replete with other examples of the defendant making choices that are unilateral and putting his perception of his needs ahead of the children.   He believes their need to be with him is paramount.   During the trial, Mr. Patinha insisted that he was the primary ‘at home’ parent while the plaintiff was seeking her education and working.   While this appears to have been so for periods of time, he is presently unable to function in a co-parenting capacity and protect the children from his frustration over the conflict.   The latter was seen as recently as mid-trial when, on the day the children were to leave for the Czech Republic with their mother, in front of the children, he told his mother that he did not want to spend time with the children with herself or plaintiff present.   This inability to curb his comments while the parties were under a microscope leads the court to be concerned about his internal regulator when this decision is issued, and from then forward.

During the trial, the plaintiff asked that the defendant's time with the children be supervised because of his continued comments about the plaintiff.   The court notes, first as a practical matter, that the paternal grandfather was the pendente lite supervisor.   He is giving thought to moving away from the area.   The defendant should not be talking to the children about their mother, causes of the dissolution of the marriage or any other adult issues.   If he remains unable to restrain himself, these children will continue to suffer emotionally.   On the other hand, if he were to engage in continuous therapy with a qualified professional, such as Dr. Liza Thayer, he would perhaps gain the care, treatment and insight necessary to learn not to do these things, in the best interests of his children.

III.

In anticipation of the dissolution of marriage, the defendant withdrew $33,000 of marital funds for his own use.   He claims to have paid marital bills with these funds while the parties were living separate.   From January to June 2009, he paid the second mortgage.   Since then, his mother has paid it for the parties.   Other than the home equity, he paid some utilities but documented nothing else spent for the family.   He was not subject to a court ordered child support obligation until October 2009.   He paid no child support voluntarily until then either.

The parties own a home at 127 Superior Avenue in Newington, Connecticut.   There was little evidence as to value but the parties' values are only $5,000 apart:  $215,000 and $220,000.   The court has no evidence upon which to narrow the value closer than these two estimates.   At purchase the house and mortgage were placed in Mr. Patinha's name alone.   The two mortgages total $160,000.   The second mortgage was entirely for home improvements as claimed by the defendant.   The plaintiff asserts he used it for investing;  regardless of the same home improvements close in value to the $45,000 second mortgage were completed.   The plaintiff seeks the entire home.   The defendant offers to buy her out at a one-half interest and if he cannot do so, to abandon any claim to an equity interest in the property, leaving it to her to hold his claimed amount for the children's college.

The plaintiff has a 2003 Honda Odyssey with a value of $10,000, a loan balance of $5,500 and net equity of $4,500.   The defendant has a 1997 Buick LeSabre valued at $1,000.   The parties each have their own personal effects and has minimal sums of about $500 each in their bank accounts.   The plaintiff has a non-vested, unvalued interest in a pension plan at Bristol Hospital, which requires another year of service before vesting.   Her contribution to date is unknown.   The defendant is unaware if he has any interest in a pension through the Teamsters at UPS, noting he has contributed nothing.   He does not believe he has any pension of value at Enterprise.   The defendant has employment life insurance which may be around $50,000, though he is not sure.   The defendant asserts an interest in a Pace trailer and a 1984 vehicle.   There was some brief testimony that other cars of de minimus value are in the defendant's control.   The defendant has debt of $106,400, on revolving credit cards.   He does not plan to pay these and expects to file bankruptcy.   The plaintiff has credit card debt of $5,486 and a debt for car repairs of $5,000.

The plaintiff continues to live in the marital home.   Her income as a registered nurse at Bristol Hospital is $1,003.00 per week gross and $812.73 net.   During the trial, the defendant had two main jobs:  an assistant manager of Enterprise Rent-A-Car and working at UPS. He also worked a couple of hours a week as a caregiver.   The hours that he worked were far in excess of forty-five hours per week and yet total they were only $845.00 gross and $500.70 per week net.   The defendant has suffered from exhaustion working two full-time jobs:  this contributed to his hospitalization mid-trial and also limited his availability as a parent.   At the conclusion of the trial, he managed to get a raise at Enterprise and therefore left his other employment.   His Enterprise wages for one full-time job there are $750.00 per week gross and as shown on his financial affidavit $437.00 net.   A computation of the Child Support Guidelines based upon the independency exemption orders in this court which provide a net weekly income of $811 for the mother and $648 for the father and a basic child support obligation of $407 per week.³  The defendant's share of the basic child support obligation is $181 per week and his share of unreimbursed health expenditures and qualifying day care is 32 percent.

The parties have three young children.   Their needs in the future for the time and attention of their parents is not yet known.   Presently, they show no special needs that will keep their mother out of the work force.   The plaintiff is new to her profession.   While it is promising, she does not have a long track record regarding the same.   The defendant's employment history is reflective of his inability to reach back up to where he once was career-wise with Ford. The reasons for the same are not clear but concerns have been raised throughout the proceeding about his overall health and how it affects his functioning.   This case requires the court then, to preserve the right of alimony for both parties.   The alimony is modifiable in both instances only upon a showing of a substantial change of circumstances, consistent with the law.

The guardian ad litem is being paid by the CCPA at state rates, therefore, no order was sought from this court.   The plaintiff seeks the restoration of her birth name but without the feminization of the surname as she had it previously.   The law only allows this court to restore a party to a prior name.   The plaintiff's attorney seeks attorneys fees and stated that she would present an affidavit if requested.   None was before the court as a part of these proceedings.

The court orders:

1. Dissolution of the marriage.

2. Sole legal custody and primary residence to the plaintiff.   The children shall be in the physical custody of the plaintiff at all other times than those in paragraph 3.

3. The defendant shall have physical parenting responsibility for the children on the following schedule:

a. Weekly

Every Saturday each weekend from 10:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. and every Tuesday from 4:00 p.m. (or after work and/or school) to 7:00 p.m. and every Thursday from 4:00 p.m. (or after work and/or school) to 7:00 p.m. During school vacation weeks and in the summer this shall extend to 8:00 p.m. All transfers will be in the driveway or at the parental grandmother's home (as designated by the plaintiff).   Neither party will enter into the other's residence.   In the event the father cannot exercise his scheduled visitation, he will notify plaintiff twenty-four (24) hours in advance by Our Family Wizard and by telephone call.   If he fails to notify the plaintiff, he will pay plaintiff $50 for each such occurrence.

b. Holidays

Christmas:  In 2010 and in subsequent even years, Mother shall have the children on Christmas Eve. Father shall have the children Christmas Day from 10:30 a.m. until 7:00 p.m., at which time the regular schedule shall resume.   In 2011 and in subsequent odd years Father shall have the children on Christmas Eve from 10:30 a.m. until 8:00 p.m. and Mother shall have the children from 8:00 p.m. Christmas Eve through Christmas Day.

Other Holidays Even years Odd years

New Year's Day Mother Father

Martin Luther King Day Father Mother

President's Day Mother Father

Good Friday Father Mother

Easter Mother Father

Memorial Day Mother Father

4th of July Father Father

Labor Day Mother Father

Columbus Day Father Mother

Veteran's Day Mother Father

Thanksgiving Day Father Mother

Father's Day Father Father

Mother's Day Mother Mother

Father's access on the above holidays will be 10:30 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. with the exception of Christmas Eve and New Year's Eve when the return time will be extended to 8:00 p.m. The regular access schedule shall resume upon the conclusion of the holiday schedule.

c. Vacation

Mother and Father will each be entitled to vacation with the children for up to three nonconsecutive weeks per year.   A week is defined as seven days.   The other party's permission will not be required for domestic travel.   The mother may travel with the children outside of the United States once per year.   If she does so, two of her vacation weeks may be consecutive.   However, the party's itinerary and contact information will be provided to the other parent prior to any such travel.   Father will immediately remove the children's names from the Children's Passport Issuance Alert Program, or any “watch list” or other measures he may have unilaterally taken to prevent their departure from the United States.   Father will not object to Mother's renewal of the children's U.S. passports.

d. Visitation Priorities

The holiday and vacation schedules shall supersede the regular access schedule.

4. The plaintiff and the defendant shall each re-sign up for Our Family Wizard website within seven days.   The court is aware of the cost as testified to by the evaluator.   The plaintiff shall post all school and extracurricular events there that parents are generally welcome at and medical and religious appointments and activities.   They shall be posted within twenty-four hours of learning of them.   The parties may each attend all of these even if they are not on their respective parenting responsibility times.

5. The plaintiff shall not permanently relocate the children outside of the state of Connecticut without written approval of the defendant or prior court order.

6. The plaintiff will retain the children's United States of America passports.

7. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff child support in the amount of $181 per week.   He shall pay 32 percent of the children's unreimbursed health expenditures (those not paid by insurance, to be liberally construed to include but not be limited to medical, hospitalization, dental, orthodontic, optical and optometric, mental health treatment).   The plaintiff shall submit in writing by mail said sums to him with receipts monthly on the last day of each month and he shall pay them not later than fifteen days later.   The amounts sought by the plaintiff shall be posted as well on the parties' Our Family Wizard account.   The plaintiff shall maintain health insurance for the benefit of the minor children as it is available at a reasonable cost through her place of employment.   If said insurance is not available at a reasonable cost then the defendant shall maintain it, if it is available at a reasonable cost.   Reasonable cost is defined by statute.   If neither party has health insurance available for the minor children through their employment at a reasonable cost then the plaintiff shall immediately procure HUSKY health coverage for the children.

8. Any child support arrearage pending as of this date (there was $4,190 at the time of the closing arguments) shall be paid within five days, in full.

9. There shall be an income withholding order for child support, however, the defendant's obligation is not contingent on the same;  that is, he shall pay the support with a bank check for any week that the funds are not taken from his paycheck in whole or in part.   Day care, health expenditures, pre-kindergarten and extracurricular activity payments and reimbursements by the defendant shall all be paid by bank check.

10. Each party is responsible for procuring his/her own health insurance.   They have whatever COBRA health insurance rights as may exist, at their own cost.

11. For each year that the defendant is current in his child support, he shall be entitled to take the parties' youngest child as a dependency exemption on his federal and state tax returns and the plaintiff shall execute such forms as are necessary to effectuate the same.

12. Pursuant to the request of the parties, the court will retain jurisdiction over support of the children's post-majority education pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. Section 46b-56c.   The court finds that if the parties had remained an intact family, they would have provided for the post-majority educational support of their children in accordance with their respective abilities to do so.

13. As they have agreed, the parties shall each pay one-half of pre-kindergarten for Jacinta as the sums come due.

14. The parties shall each pay one-half of the childrens' extracurricular activities that they agree to.   This agreement for this financial obligation is separate from the otherwise sole custody orders in this case.   The plaintiff remains the sole custodian and may solely make the extracurricular decisions.   However, if she desires the defendant to pay one- half of the cost of the same, he shall first agree to the activity.   The parties' Our Family Wizard account shall be used for this purpose.

15. The plaintiff shall pay to the defendant $1.00 per year alimony for a period of eight years.   This shall sooner terminate on death or remarriage or as otherwise provided by law.   Said alimony is non-modifiable as to term.

16. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff $1.00 per year alimony for a period of eight years.   This shall sooner terminate on death or remarriage or as otherwise provided by law.   Said alimony is non-modifiable as to term.

17. Each party shall be responsible for his/her own debts as shown on their respective financial affidavits and shall indemnify and hold the other harmless on the same.   If either party discharges a debt obligation in bankruptcy that the other party has co-signed or guaranteed, then the resulting obligation shall be a basis for modification of alimony inasmuch as the non-bankrupt party will be in need of spousal support to satisfy the debt that was court ordered the responsibility of the bankrupting party.   To not order this will result in an inappropriate disturbance of the financial mosaic crafted in this matter.

18. The defendant shall quitclaim all of his right, title and interest in and to the marital home within thirty days.   The plaintiff shall indemnify and hold the defendant harmless on the mortgages, taxes and other expenses of the home.   Within four (4) years of today's date, the plaintiff shall cause the defendant's name to be removed from the mortgages and pay him $8,000 plus simple interest at the rate of 2% per year.   If she is unable to do so then the property shall be sold and after the payment of normal closing costs, including the mortgages as if they were current, the plaintiff shall pay the defendant from the proceeds the smaller of 30% of the net proceeds or $8,000 plus interest.   The court for this event only retains jurisdiction over the issue of the listing price and sales price.   The plaintiff shall execute a note and mortgage evidencing this obligation within thirty days, which shall be exchanged to the defendant with the receipt of the deed from him.

19. The plaintiff is the sole owner of the Honda and the furnishings of the home and her bank accounts and personal bank accounts.   The defendant is the sole owner of the Buick, the trailer and the 1987 automobile and such other cars as are in his control, his personal effects and furnishings in his control and his personal bank accounts.   Each party shall sign such titles and other documents as are necessary to effectuate these orders on presentation of the same.

20. To secure their respective child support obligations, each party shall maintain $50,000 (term or whole) life insurance for the benefit of the minor children and provide proof of the same to each other by January 31 of each year, in writing.

21. The plaintiff shall have restored to her the birth name of Monica Nabboutova.

22. Each party shall be responsible for their own attorney fees.

LYNDA MUNRO, JUDGE

FOOTNOTES

FN1. No purpose is served in reciting and repeating the statutory language.   The parties may reference Connecticut General Statutes Section 46b-1 et seq., including sections 46b-56, 46b-56a, 46b-56c, 46b-62, 46b-63, 46b-67, 46b-81, 46b-82, and 46b-84..  FN1. No purpose is served in reciting and repeating the statutory language.   The parties may reference Connecticut General Statutes Section 46b-1 et seq., including sections 46b-56, 46b-56a, 46b-56c, 46b-62, 46b-63, 46b-67, 46b-81, 46b-82, and 46b-84.

FN2. As he spoke, the defendant put his hands up using his fingers making the gesture of quotation marks..  FN2. As he spoke, the defendant put his hands up using his fingers making the gesture of quotation marks.

FN3. Both parties will have head of household status because each will have a qualifying child for the year claimed.  (See IRS Publication 501.).  FN3. Both parties will have head of household status because each will have a qualifying child for the year claimed.  (See IRS Publication 501.)

Munro, Lynda B., J.